Accrual of Section 1983 Malicious-Prosecution Claims: Separable Indictments and Limitations Periods

Introduction

Percy Dwayne Brown sued Louisville-Jefferson County Metro Government and University of Louisville Police Officer Jeffrey Jewell under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging malicious prosecution and fabrication of evidence. Brown’s complaint arose from a series of overlapping state-court indictments for murder, sexual assaults, kidnapping and other offenses—charges that were repeatedly brought and dismissed over more than a decade. After the final criminal charges were dismissed, Brown filed suit alleging that Defendants fabricated evidence and maliciously prosecuted him to punish his refusal to cooperate in a check-forgery investigation. The district court dismissed Brown’s § 1983 malicious-prosecution claim as time-barred and granted judgment on the pleadings on his fabrication-of-evidence claim. Brown appealed only the statute-of-limitations ruling regarding the murder charge. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Summary of the Judgment

The Sixth Circuit held that under Kentucky’s one-year personal-injury statute of limitations, a § 1983 malicious-prosecution claim accrues when the underlying criminal charge terminates in the plaintiff’s favor. Although Brown’s final indictments on various charges were dismissed in October 2015 and April 2016, his malicious-prosecution claim based on the murder charge accrued on February 24, 2015—the date that the murder and related intimidation counts in the February 2009 indictment were dismissed. The court rejected Brown’s arguments that (1) the continuing-violation doctrine delayed accrual until the last charges were dismissed, and (2) a broad conspiracy to prosecute him tolled the limitations period. Instead, it held that each discrete prosecution (each indictment) is separable for accrual purposes, and the statute begins to run when the specific count—for Brown, the murder charge—terminates in his favor.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

Wallace v. Kato (2007) – Section 1983 borrows the forum state’s personal-injury limitations period, and claims accrue under federal law on the date the wrongful act becomes complete.
King v. Harwood (6th Cir. 2017) – Malicious-prosecution claims accrue when the underlying criminal prosecution terminates favorably, even if dismissal was without explicit indication of innocence.
Thompson v. Clark (2022) – A dismissal without prejudice is sufficient “favorable termination” to support accrual of a malicious-prosecution claim.
Janetka v. Dabe (2d Cir. 1989) – In a mixed-verdict context, acquittal on one charge may support a malicious-prosecution claim if charges are factually and legally distinct.
Kossler v. Crisanti (3d Cir. 2009, en banc) – Charges arising from the same course of conduct that share overlapping elements may be inseparable for accrual purposes.
McCune v. City of Grand Rapids (6th Cir. 1988) – A conspiracy does not postpone accrual of individually actionable claims based on distinct wrongful acts.
Mills v. Barnard (6th Cir. 2017) – When all charges are dismissed simultaneously by nolle prosequi, accrual occurs at that unified dismissal date.

2. Legal Reasoning

Statute of Limitations and Accrual Rule. Section 1983 does not supply its own limitations period; courts borrow the state’s limitations statute—in Kentucky, one year for personal-injury claims. Accrual is governed by federal law: a § 1983 malicious-prosecution claim accrues when the criminal prosecution terminates in the plaintiff’s favor.
Separability of Indictments. Brown faced successive indictments: January 2005, December 2008, February 2009, January 2010, May 2014, February 2015, and so on. The court analogized to “mixed-verdict” cases: counts based on different victims, elements, times and places (e.g., murder vs. separate sexual assault) are separable. Under Janetka, murder and disorderly-conduct analogies, and Kossler’s “course of conduct” test, the murder count was distinct from later charges.
Conspiracy Does Not Toll Accrual. Brown argued that all wrongful acts were part of a single conspiracy to punish him. The Sixth Circuit adhered to McCune: “the existence of a conspiracy does not postpone accrual of appellant’s separate claims.” Each wrongful act—each discrete prosecution—gives rise to its own claim and causes its own limitations clock to start.
Continuing-Violation Doctrine Inapplicable. Brown also invoked a continuing-violation theory, arguing that false-evidence fabrication and indictment-after-indictment extended accrual. The court explained that only ongoing wrongful acts restart the accrual clock—not passive inaction or lingering effects. Brown’s last alleged wrongful act relating to the murder indictment occurred on February 24, 2015; nothing thereafter re-triggered the limitations period for that claim.
Policy and Finality. Starting the clock at the discrete date of dismissal of the charge ensures defendants can obtain repose and plaintiffs can pursue claims while evidence and memories remain fresh. It also prevents endless uncertainty and stale claims.

3. Potential Impact

- Separable Indictments: Defendants facing multiple successive indictments will now know that § 1983 malicious-prosecution claims accrue separately for each count and indictment. - Conspiracy Arguments: Plaintiffs cannot evade statutes of limitations by styling unrelated prosecutions as one ongoing conspiracy. - Continuing Violation Limits: Claims based on fabricated or suppressed evidence must be asserted within one year of the dismissal or acquittal on the specific charge to which the evidence pertains. - Procedural Strategy: Both plaintiffs and defense counsel must closely track the dates of favorable terminations for each charge when analyzing limitations issues.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Malicious Prosecution under § 1983: A claim that police or prosecutors used false or fabricated evidence to bring criminal charges against someone and kept the case going without probable cause or legitimate grounds.
Accrual: The moment when a legally enforceable claim “ripens” and starts the limitations clock. For malicious-prosecution claims, accrual occurs on the date the underlying criminal charge ends in favor of the accused.
“Favorable Termination”: A case dismissal, acquittal, or nolle prosequi is enough. Plaintiffs don’t need a declaration of innocence—only that the case ended without a conviction.
Continuing-Violation Doctrine: A narrow rule that sometimes delays accrual if defendants engage in repeated, ongoing unlawful acts. It does not apply if each wrongful act (e.g., each indictment) is separately actionable.
Conspiracy Tolling: Common law conspiracies do not toll or delay accrual for federal civil-rights claims when each wrongful act is distinct and independently actionable.

Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Brown v. Louisville-Jefferson County Metro Government establishes that in § 1983 malicious-prosecution cases, each discrete criminal charge—each indictment and count—triggers its own limitations period upon favorable termination. Claims cannot be tolled indefinitely by labeling successive prosecutions a continuous conspiracy or invoking a broad continuing-violation theory. This holding brings clarity and finality to accrual analysis, ensuring civil-rights plaintiffs act promptly once their criminal cases conclude and giving defendants repose from stale claims.