Accrual of Non‑Medical FTCA Claims in the Tenth Circuit: Injury‑Occurrence Rule Reaffirmed in Mullins v. United States

Commentary on the Tenth Circuit’s Order and Judgment in Mullins v. United States, No. 24‑4099 (10th Cir. Dec. 3, 2025)

I. Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Tenth Circuit’s nonprecedential order and judgment in Mullins v. United States, a case that primarily concerns the statute of limitations and accrual rules governing claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). Although designated as nonbinding precedent except under law-of-the-case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel, the decision offers a clear and instructive restatement of several important doctrines:

The FTCA’s strict timing requirements, and the distinction between the general six‑year limitation in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) and the two‑year administrative presentment requirement in § 2401(b).
The Tenth Circuit’s adherence to the “injury‑occurrence” accrual rule for non‑medical malpractice FTCA claims, rather than a broad “discovery rule.”
The principle that the United States is the only proper defendant in an FTCA action.
Appellate waiver rules where an appellant fails to challenge key district court determinations.
The limited legal effect of self‑styled “agreements” or unilateral settlement demands sent to federal officials.

The plaintiff–appellant, Robert Andrew Mullins, proceeding pro se, attempted to recover damages for alleged unlawful acquisition and use of child‑pornography images that led to his state‑court conviction in Utah in 2010. He brought claims labeled as abuse of process and false imprisonment against the United States, federal prosecutors and agents, and various county entities and officials. The district court dismissed his case under Rule 12(b)(6) as untimely and, as to non‑federal defendants, as improperly pleaded under the FTCA. The Tenth Circuit affirmed.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit (Judges Hartz, Moritz, and Rossman) decided the appeal without oral argument pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The panel’s key holdings are:

FTCA as the exclusive theory in the complaint. Although Mullins named a variety of federal and non‑federal defendants, the district court construed the complaint as asserting only FTCA claims. On appeal, Mullins did not challenge that construction in his opening brief. The Tenth Circuit therefore deemed any objection waived and accepted that the case proceeded solely under the FTCA.
Only the United States is a proper FTCA defendant. Because FTCA claims can be brought only against the United States, the court affirmed dismissal of all claims against the individual federal officials, the Cache County Attorney’s Office, the Cache County Clerk of Court, and other non‑federal defendants.
FTCA claims time‑barred under § 2401(a). The court held that Mullins’s FTCA claims accrued no later than October 2010, when he was convicted and imprisoned on the basis of the allegedly unlawfully obtained images. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a), he had six years from accrual to file suit against the United States. He did not file his complaint until July 2022, almost twelve years later, rendering his claims untimely.
Injury‑occurrence accrual rule controls; discovery rule rejected. The court reaffirmed that, in the Tenth Circuit, non‑medical malpractice FTCA claims generally accrue at the time the plaintiff is injured, not when the plaintiff later discovers more evidence or fully understands all details. It declined Mullins’s invitation to adopt a later accrual date based on his alleged discovery of “exculpatory evidence” in March 2022.
No reliance on § 1983 accrual standards. Mullins argued that his claim did not accrue until he had a “complete and present cause of action,” citing Wallace v. Kato. The Tenth Circuit rejected this, emphasizing that Wallace governs § 1983 actions and that Mullins himself had disavowed reliance on § 1983 in the district court.
“Memorandum of Understanding and Agreement” is neither timely presentment nor an enforceable contract.
- The court treated the April 2022 “Memorandum of Understanding and Agreement” (demanding $26 million and non‑monetary relief) as, at most, a written presentment of his FTCA claim. But it was sent over two years after the claim accrued, making it untimely under § 2401(b)’s two‑year presentment rule.
- The document was also not an enforceable contract or settlement agreement because there was no evidence the United States agreed to its terms. The three‑day “silence equals assent” condition could not create an implied‑in‑fact contract.
Equitable tolling argument waived. Mullins appeared to raise equitable tolling only in his reply brief. The court held that, under its waiver doctrine, new arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief will not be considered.
Ancillary motions resolved. The court granted Mullins’s request to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, but denied his motion to disqualify the district judge, his motion for expedited ruling, and his “Request to Submit for Decision” as moot.

Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal without prejudice of Mullins’s FTCA action.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Characterization of the Complaint as FTCA‑Only and Appellate Waiver

The district court concluded that, despite multiple defendants (federal and local), Mullins’s complaint asserted only FTCA claims. This characterization has important consequences:

Under the FTCA, the United States is the exclusive defendant; individual officials and agencies are not proper defendants.
Claims against state or local actors (e.g., county attorneys, clerks of court) ordinarily would be raised under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, state tort law, or constitutional theories—not under the FTCA.

On appeal, a dissatisfied litigant must directly challenge erroneous rulings in his opening brief. The Tenth Circuit invoked In re Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litigation (Hossley-Embry Grp. II), 111 F.4th 1095, 1112 (10th Cir. 2024), to reiterate the rule:

“[I]f an appellant fails to address an issue in its opening brief, we ordinarily deem that issue waived and decline to consider it.”

Because Mullins did not meaningfully contest the district court’s FTCA‑only characterization in his opening brief, he waived the issue. The court thus accepted that the suit was purely an FTCA case and analyzed it within that framework.

This is particularly instructive for pro se litigants. The Tenth Circuit did reiterate that pro se filings are construed liberally (Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1096 (10th Cir. 2009)), but emphasized that liberal construction does not extend to rewriting the complaint or appellate brief:

“We construe Mr. Mullins’s filings liberally because he proceeds pro se. But we do not supply allegations for him or construct legal theories on his behalf.”

Thus, even with pro se leniency, strategic omissions in the opening brief—such as failing to challenge the FTCA‑only characterization—are fatal.

B. FTCA Statutes of Limitations and Accrual

1. Dual Timing Requirements: § 2401(a) and § 2401(b)

The FTCA contains two key timing provisions:

28 U.S.C. § 2401(a): General six‑year limitation “Every civil action commenced against the United States shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action first accrues.”
28 U.S.C. § 2401(b): Two‑year administrative presentment and six‑month filing deadline A tort claim is barred unless:
- It is “presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues,” and
- The civil action is filed within six months after the agency denies the claim.

The district court relied on both, noting that Mullins neither presented an administrative claim within two years nor filed suit within six years of accrual. The Tenth Circuit’s analysis focused primarily on § 2401(a) for the appeal’s core holding (time‑barred action) while invoking § 2401(b) in analyzing the “Memorandum of Understanding” as a putative presentment.

2. The Injury‑Occurrence Rule in the Tenth Circuit

The central legal question was: When did Mullins’s FTCA claims accrue? The Tenth Circuit reiterated its long‑standing rule, citing Harvey v. United States, 685 F.3d 939, 947 (10th Cir. 2012):

“[A]n FTCA claim accrues at the time the plaintiff is injured.”

The district court pegged accrual “no later than October 2010,” when Mullins was sentenced and imprisoned. The Tenth Circuit agreed: at that point, the alleged injury—conviction and imprisonment based on unlawfully obtained evidence—had fully manifested.

To challenge this, Mullins argued that his claim did not accrue until March 8, 2022, when he allegedly obtained “exculpatory evidence” and gained more detailed knowledge of the facts underlying the alleged wrongdoing. The court rejected this, relying on Plaza Speedway Inc. v. United States, 311 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir. 2002), and Bayless v. United States, 767 F.3d 958 (10th Cir. 2014). While Plaza Speedway was abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Wong, 575 U.S. 402 (2015), its accrual analysis remains intact.

In Plaza Speedway, the Tenth Circuit held:

“In this circuit, the general statute of limitations accrual rule in non‑medical malpractice FTCA cases remains the injury occurrence, and not the discovery rule.” (emphasis added)

And it recognized a discovery rule only in “exceptional” cases where the plaintiff “could not have immediately known of the injury.” Similarly, in Bayless, the court described the limited function of the discovery rule:

In “exceptional cases . . . the discovery rule applies to protect plaintiffs who are blamelessly unaware of their claim because the injury has not yet manifested itself or because the facts establishing a causal link between the injury and the [tortious conduct] are in the control of the tortfeasor or otherwise not evident.”

Applying these standards, the court held:

Mullins’s injury—his conviction and imprisonment—was clear and manifest by October 2010.
The “causal link” between the alleged unlawful acquisition of images and his conviction was evident at that time.
His later discovery of additional or “exculpatory” evidence in 2022 was, at most, the acquisition of new supporting proof, not the first emergence of his injury.

Therefore, the claim accrued no later than 2010, and the 2022 filing was outside the six‑year period in § 2401(a).

3. The Role of Herrera v. City of Española in the Accrual Analysis

The court cited Herrera v. City of Española, 32 F.4th 980, 991 (10th Cir. 2022), for the proposition that, when the relevant facts and dates are undisputed, the accrual date is a question of law for the court. Here, the dates were uncontested:

Conviction and imprisonment: October 2010.
Alleged new evidence: March 8, 2022.
Filing of civil action: July 2022.

Given these undisputed facts, the court could decide accrual as a matter of law, leading to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) because the statute of limitations defense was apparent on the face of the complaint—consistent with Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007).

C. Rejecting the Wallace v. Kato Analogy

Mullins relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007), which states that a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff has a “complete and present cause of action.” That formula is typically used in § 1983 actions to determine when federal civil rights claims accrue under state personal‑injury statutes of limitation.

The Tenth Circuit rejected Mullins’s argument on two grounds:

Doctrinal mismatch: Wallace deals with accrual for § 1983 claims, not FTCA claims. FTCA accrual is governed by federal law and, in this circuit, by the injury‑occurrence rule.
Litigant’s own position below: Mullins explicitly disavowed § 1983 claims in the district court. He could not then import § 1983 accrual standards while maintaining that his case was not a § 1983 action.

The court thus reinforced that FTCA accrual is an independent question, governed by federal tort‑claims principles and prior Tenth Circuit precedent, not by § 1983 case law.

D. Proper FTCA Defendant: The United States Alone

The court reaffirmed a settled but often misunderstood rule: in an FTCA action, the United States is the only proper defendant. Citing Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1099 (10th Cir. 2009), and Oxendine v. Kaplan, 241 F.3d 1272, 1275 n.4 (10th Cir. 2001), it noted:

“‘The United States is the only proper defendant in an FTCA action.’”

Consequences of this doctrine in Mullins:

All claims against the Assistant U.S. Attorney (Karin Fojtik), Social Security Administration officials, private attorneys, the Cache County Attorney’s Office, and the Clerk of the Cache County Court were properly dismissed.
To the extent Mullins attempted to hold local or state actors liable under the FTCA, such claims were misconceived; FTCA liability attaches to the United States for torts committed by federal employees acting within the scope of employment, not state or local officials.

While this principle is not new, the case underscores that misidentifying defendants can be fatal—and that appellate courts will not construct alternative legal theories (such as § 1983) to circumvent such errors when the plaintiff has not advanced them.

E. The “Memorandum of Understanding and Agreement”: Presentment and Contract Theories

In an effort to salvage his claims, Mullins pointed to an April 2022 document titled “Memorandum of Understanding and Agreement,” which he sent to federal officials. In it, he:

Outlined essentially the same allegations later raised in his complaint.
Demanded $26 million in damages and certain non‑monetary relief.
Insisted the government respond within three days, suggesting that silence would be treated as acceptance.

Mullins argued that:

As a presentment under § 2401(b), this document made his FTCA claims viable; and/or
Because the government did not respond within three days, the document constituted an enforceable settlement agreement or contract, potentially cognizable under the Tucker Act.

The Tenth Circuit rejected both theories.

1. Untimely Presentment Under § 2401(b)

Assuming for argument’s sake that the memorandum was a “written presentation” of his claim to the appropriate federal agency, it was still sent “over two years after his claims accrued”—long after the two‑year presentment window had closed. Section 2401(b) provides:

“A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues . . . .”

Because the claim accrued no later than 2010, any administrative presentment needed to be made by 2012. The 2022 memorandum came a decade too late.

2. No Enforceable Contract or Settlement Agreement

The court also considered whether the memorandum could constitute a contract or settlement agreement. It concluded that it could not, relying on standard contract principles and citing Scarlett v. Air Methods Corp., 922 F.3d 1053, 1064 (10th Cir. 2019), which holds that an implied‑in‑fact contract must be “founded upon a meeting of minds.”

Key defects in Mullins’s contract theory:

No acceptance: There was no evidence the United States assented—explicitly or implicitly—to the terms of his demand. Silence in response to an unsolicited demand, especially one imposing an arbitrary three‑day deadline, does not create a contract with the federal government.
No mutual assent or “meeting of the minds”: A unilateral assertion that non‑response equals acceptance is legally insufficient to establish a meeting of the minds.
No Tucker Act basis: Even if one characterizes the claim as contract‑based, there is no plausible allegation of an agreement to pay money damages within the meaning of the Tucker Act. The government’s non‑response cannot be transformed into an enforceable promise.

This aspect of the decision is particularly instructive for individuals who send unilateral “settlement” documents to government agencies or officials. Absent clear government assent, such documents have no binding legal effect.

F. Equitable Tolling: Raised Too Late and Deemed Waived

The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Wong, 575 U.S. 402 (2015), held that the FTCA’s time bars in § 2401(b) are not jurisdictional and are subject to equitable tolling. The Tenth Circuit in Mullins acknowledged Wong (via the citation to Plaza Speedway as abrogated on jurisdictional grounds) but did not apply equitable tolling here because Mullins raised the argument only in his reply brief.

Under Tenth Circuit practice, arguments first raised in a reply brief are deemed waived. Again relying on In re Syngenta, the court declined to consider equitable tolling. Thus, even if Mullins had a colorable tolling argument, it was forfeited by his litigation strategy.

The decision thereby reinforces that, post‑Wong, while equitable tolling is theoretically available in FTCA cases, it is not automatically considered; it must be timely raised and properly supported.

G. Liberal Construction of Pro Se Filings—But No New Claims or Theories

The court’s repeated references to Smith v. United States underscore the balance it seeks to strike with pro se litigants:

Liberal reading of the words that are actually written, to avoid technical forfeiture based on poor drafting.
No role as advocate: The court will not invent new claims (e.g., § 1983, Bivens) or new factual allegations that the litigant did not allege.

In Mullins, this meant:

The court did not recharacterize the case as a constitutional or § 1983 challenge to a state conviction.
It accepted the FTCA framing and applied FTCA doctrines, including the strict time bars.

This is a crucial reminder that pro se status does not relax substantive legal standards such as statutes of limitations, accrual rules, or proper party requirements.

IV. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

A. Chilcoat v. San Juan County, 41 F.4th 1196 (10th Cir. 2022)

Cited for the standard of review on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Chilcoat instructs courts to accept well‑pleaded allegations as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. In Mullins, the Tenth Circuit followed this standard but emphasized that, even accepting the facts as pleaded, the statute of limitations was clearly violated.

B. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007)

Jones stands for the proposition that a complaint may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) when the allegations on its face demonstrate that the claims are time‑barred. The Tenth Circuit invoked this principle to justify dismissal of Mullins’s complaint at the pleading stage once the accrual date (2010) and filing date (2022) were established.

C. Plaza Speedway Inc. v. United States, 311 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir. 2002)

Although abrogated by Wong on the jurisdictional nature of § 2401(b), Plaza Speedway remains the Tenth Circuit’s key case on FTCA accrual in non‑medical malpractice contexts. It establishes:

The general “injury‑occurrence” rule for accrual.
Only “exceptional cases” justify a discovery rule.

Mullins reaffirms that this framework continues to govern, with the caveat that the time bars are now non‑jurisdictional post‑Wong.

D. Bayless v. United States, 767 F.3d 958 (10th Cir. 2014)

Bayless further refines the circumstances in which a discovery rule may apply. It focuses on situations where:

The injury has not yet manifested; or
The facts connecting the injury to the alleged tort are hidden or exclusively controlled by the defendant.

By invoking Bayless, the court clarified that Mullins’s case did not fit this narrow category: his injuries—conviction and imprisonment—and the role of the images in his prosecution were immediately apparent in 2010.

E. Harvey v. United States, 685 F.3d 939 (10th Cir. 2012)

Cited for the general principle that FTCA claims accrue at the time of injury, Harvey provides the broad, simple rule upon which the court’s analysis rests. Mullins underscores the durability of this rule in the Tenth Circuit.

F. Herrera v. City of Española, 32 F.4th 980 (10th Cir. 2022)

Herrera is used to frame accrual as a question of law when the key facts are undisputed. This allows the Tenth Circuit to resolve the limitations issue at the motion‑to‑dismiss stage rather than deferring it to factual development or trial.

G. Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 2009)

Smith is cited both:

For the principle of liberal construction of pro se filings; and
For the proposition that the United States is the only proper defendant in an FTCA action.

It provides much of the doctrinal backbone for how the Tenth Circuit deals with both procedural and substantive aspects of pro se FTCA cases.

H. Oxendine v. Kaplan, 241 F.3d 1272 (10th Cir. 2001)

Oxendine is cited (via Smith) for the footnoted statement confirming that only the United States can be sued under the FTCA. This authority underpins the dismissal of all non‑United States defendants in Mullins.

I. United States v. Wong, 575 U.S. 402 (2015)

Wong is noted as having abrogated Plaza Speedway on the question of whether FTCA time bars are jurisdictional. While Wong enables equitable tolling, Mullins shows that equitable tolling is not automatic; it must be argued properly and timely.

J. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007)

Wallace is the foundation for the “complete and present cause of action” standard in § 1983 cases. Mullins distinguishes it as inapplicable to FTCA accrual and reinforces the doctrinal separation between § 1983 and FTCA cases.

K. Scarlett v. Air Methods Corp., 922 F.3d 1053 (10th Cir. 2019)

Cited for the requirement that an implied‑in‑fact contract must rest on a “meeting of minds,” Scarlett supplies the contract‑law framework that defeats Mullins’s attempt to treat his unilateral memorandum as a binding settlement.

L. In re Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litigation (Hossley-Embry Grp. II), 111 F.4th 1095 (10th Cir. 2024)

Syngenta is repeatedly cited for the waiver rule: issues not raised in the opening brief—and arguments first raised in a reply brief—are ordinarily waived. This doctrine is crucial to the resolution of both the accrual/FTCA framing issue and the equitable tolling question in Mullins.

V. Impact and Significance

A. Reaffirmation of the Injury‑Occurrence Rule for FTCA Accrual

Mullins powerfully confirms that, in the Tenth Circuit, non‑medical malpractice FTCA claims generally accrue when the injury occurs, not when the plaintiff discovers new evidence, understands all legal implications, or subjectively realizes the full extent of wrongdoing. This has concrete implications:

Individuals harmed by the actions of federal employees must be vigilant about timing; the clock usually starts when harm is suffered, not when additional proof is uncovered.
Attempts to reframe late‑discovered evidence as a new injury or as a trigger for delayed accrual are unlikely to succeed absent truly exceptional circumstances.

B. Constraints on Post‑Conviction Civil Litigation Under the FTCA

Mullins’s underlying grievance is closely related to his 2010 criminal conviction: he alleges unlawful acquisition and use of evidence that led to his imprisonment. This decision signals that:

Using the FTCA to challenge long‑past convictions is procedurally very difficult because accrual will be tied to the time of conviction and incarceration.
Post‑conviction discovery of potentially exculpatory material does not re‑start the FTCA clock.
Individuals seeking redress for wrongful convictions must pay close attention to other avenues (e.g., habeas, post‑conviction relief, civil rights actions) and their distinct time limits, rather than relying on FTCA decades later.

C. Practical Lesson on “Self‑Created” Agreements with the Government

The court’s treatment of Mullins’s “Memorandum of Understanding and Agreement” has broader practical significance:

Unilateral documents that purport to bind the government, especially through silence or inaction, do not ordinarily create enforceable obligations.
For an agreement with the United States to be binding, there must be clear evidence of government assent, compliance with contracting authority rules, and a genuine meeting of the minds.

This clarifies for litigants that “silent acceptance” theories and arbitrary response deadlines imposed on the government are not a path to enforceable settlements or to circumvent statutory time bars.

D. Appellate Practice: The Critical Role of the Opening Brief

The decision is also a cautionary tale about appellate procedure:

Failure to challenge key district court rulings (such as the FTCA‑only characterization) in the opening brief can lock in those rulings on appeal.
Raising new legal theories (e.g., equitable tolling) only in a reply brief almost guarantees waiver.

For both lawyers and pro se litigants, Mullins illustrates that the opening brief is the principal vehicle for preserving and articulating claims of error.

E. Continued Influence Despite Nonprecedential Status

The order explicitly states it is “not binding precedent” except under law‑of‑the‑case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel, but may be cited for its persuasive value under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Given its careful restatement of FTCA timing and accrual standards, it is likely to be cited by:

District courts within the Tenth Circuit facing similar FTCA limitations arguments.
Government counsel defending against untimely FTCA suits.
Civil rights and post‑conviction practitioners as a caution regarding FTCA’s limited utility in long‑delayed claims related to criminal convictions.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) in Plain Terms

The FTCA is a statute that allows private individuals to sue the United States for certain torts (wrongs) committed by federal employees acting within the scope of their employment, in circumstances where a private person would be liable under state law. It is a limited waiver of the United States’ sovereign immunity.

Key points:

You must sue the United States, not the individual employee, agency, or officer.
You must first file an administrative claim with the appropriate federal agency within two years of your claim’s accrual (except in rare exceptions).
If the agency denies your claim, you have six months to file a lawsuit in federal court.
Separately, under § 2401(a), you generally have six years from accrual to commence a civil action against the United States.

B. Statute of Limitations and Accrual

A “statute of limitations” is a deadline for bringing a lawsuit. “Accrual” is the moment when the law considers your claim to have arisen—when the clock starts ticking.

Injury‑occurrence rule: The claim accrues when you are injured (e.g., when you are imprisoned, your property is taken, or you are physically harmed).
Discovery rule: In rare cases, accrual occurs when you discover (or reasonably should discover) the injury and its cause—usually applied only when the injury is hidden or not immediately knowable.

In the Tenth Circuit, non‑medical FTCA claims generally follow the injury‑occurrence rule, with a discovery rule only in exceptional circumstances.

C. Jurisdictional vs. Claims‑Processing Rules; Equitable Tolling

Before United States v. Wong, many courts treated FTCA time limits as jurisdictional—meaning courts had no power to hear late claims under any circumstances. Wong changed that:

Non‑jurisdictional time limits: The FTCA’s deadlines are now treated as “claims‑processing rules.” They can be waived by the government or tolled in extraordinary circumstances.
Equitable tolling: A doctrine allowing courts to extend filing deadlines when the plaintiff diligently pursued his rights but was prevented from timely filing by extraordinary circumstances beyond his control.

However, equitable tolling is not automatic—litigants must plead and argue for it, and courts will not infer it sua sponte.

D. Waiver on Appeal

On appeal, you must clearly raise and argue each alleged error in your opening brief. If you:

Do not address an issue at all, it is typically considered waived.
Raise an issue for the first time in a reply brief, it is usually too late.

This rule applies to represented and pro se litigants alike, though pro se filings are read more generously with respect to how they are phrased.

E. Basic Contract Principles Applied to the Government

To form a contract, you generally need:

An offer (a clear proposal of terms).
Acceptance of that offer (agreement to be bound by those terms).
Consideration (something of value exchanged).
A meeting of the minds (mutual understanding of the essential terms).

When the federal government is involved:

Only officials with proper authority can bind the United States.
Silence or inaction ordinarily does not constitute acceptance of unsolicited offers.

In Mullins, the government’s silence in response to his “Memorandum of Understanding and Agreement” did not create a contract; there was no acceptance or meeting of the minds.

F. Nonprecedential Decisions and Doctrines of Finality

The court noted that its order and judgment is not binding precedent, except:

Law of the case: The decision binds the same case in subsequent stages.
Res judicata (claim preclusion): Final judgments bar re‑litigation of the same claim between the same parties.
Collateral estoppel (issue preclusion): Issues actually litigated and decided cannot be re‑litigated between the same parties in future proceedings.

Yet, such decisions may still be cited as persuasive authority in other cases.

VII. Conclusion

The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Mullins v. United States is a succinct but rich reaffirmation of core FTCA principles and appellate practice rules. It underscores that:

FTCA claims in the Tenth Circuit generally accrue when the injury occurs—not when the plaintiff later discovers more evidence or fully understands the wrongdoing.
The FTCA’s strict timing rules (§ 2401(a) and § 2401(b)) will be enforced, and late‑filed claims will be dismissed at the pleading stage where the limitations defense is apparent on the face of the complaint.
The United States is the only proper defendant in FTCA actions; naming individual officials or state and local entities under FTCA is improper.
Unilateral “agreements” or settlement demands sent to government officials, especially those purporting to bind the government through silence, do not create enforceable contracts absent clear government assent.
Pro se litigants receive liberal construction of their filings, but courts will not invent new claims, supply missing allegations, or disregard accrual and limitations doctrines on their behalf.
Appellate waiver rules are strict: issues not raised in the opening brief, or raised only in a reply, are ordinarily lost.

Though nonprecedential, Mullins offers a clear, practical roadmap for understanding how the Tenth Circuit approaches FTCA accrual, limitations, and procedural defaults. For practitioners and litigants contemplating FTCA suits—especially those arising from long‑past criminal convictions—it serves as a cautionary illustration of the unforgiving nature of statutory deadlines and the importance of timely, properly framed claims.