Accrual of Discrimination Claims and Accommodation Obligations in Residency Programs: Ikedilo v. Statter

Introduction

In Ikedilo v. Statter, 23-7947 (2nd Cir. Apr. 2, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed a multifaceted dispute brought by Dr. Ojinika Ikedilo, a Black female surgeon, against Montefiore Medical Center and several of its physicians. Dr. Ikedilo challenged the institution’s general surgery residency program decisions—ranging from performance evaluations and remediation requirements to her ultimate termination—as discriminatory under federal, state, and local law, and also alleged failure to accommodate her pregnancy and related medical conditions. The court’s summary order, though non-precedential, provides important guidance on:

The accrual date for discrimination claims arising from termination decisions;
The elements of reasonable accommodation claims in an educational/professional training context;
The interplay of federal anti-discrimination statutes (42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VI, Title IX, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act) and New York’s human rights laws; and
The requirements for breach of contract and implied covenant claims in residency agreements.

The parties at bar were:

Plaintiff-Appellant: Dr. Ojinika Ikedilo, M.D., represented by Ofodile & Associates, P.C., Brooklyn, NY;
Defendants-Appellees: Drs. Mindy Statter, Jody Kaban, Scott Melvin, and Montefiore Medical Center, represented by Littler Mendelson, P.C., New York, NY.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of many claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and its grant of summary judgment on the remaining claims. Key holdings include:

The statute of limitations for Dr. Ikedilo’s federal and state discrimination claims arising from her termination accrued when she was first told of her termination in April 2016—not when her internal appeal concluded in November 2016.
Her Title IX, Title VI, § 504, New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL), and New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL) claims based on termination were time-barred because they accrued more than three years before filing.
The § 1981 claim for wrongful termination was timely but dismissed on summary judgment for lack of evidence of discriminatory intent or a suitable comparator.
The § 1981 claim alleging failure to send a summary evaluation to another institution was dismissed for failure to show a cognizable injury “but for” race.
Claims for failure to accommodate Dr. Ikedilo’s pregnancy and related medical issues were dismissed as the requested accommodation (a second remedial year without satisfying program benchmarks) was objectively unreasonable.
Breach of contract and implied covenant claims based on reappointment and promotion criteria were dismissed because the residency agreement expressly reserved promotion discretion to Montefiore.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980): Held that a discrimination claim accrues when the adverse decision is made and communicated, regardless of internal grievance procedures thereafter.
Pauk v. Board of Trustees of City University of New York, 654 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1981): Applied the “decision and communicated” rule in an academic tenure-denial context, emphasizing that internal review procedures do not toll accrual.
City of Pontiac Gen. Employees’ Retirement System v. MBIA, Inc., 637 F.3d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 2011): Standard of review for Rule 12(b)(6) motions, confirming plausibility pleading under Iqbal and Twombly.
Byrne v. Rutledge, 623 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 2010): Standard for summary judgment in the Second Circuit.
Comcast Corp. v. National Association of African American-Owned Media, 589 U.S. 327 (2020): “But for” causation requirement in § 1981 discrimination claims.
Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2015): Pleading requirements for plausible claims under civil rights statutes.
Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979): Limits on reasonable accommodations under federal disability law (undue hardship standard).
Dean v. University at Buffalo School of Medicine & Biomedical Sciences, 804 F.3d 178 (2d Cir. 2015): Undue hardship standard applied to academic accommodations.

2. Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning follows a two-stage approach:

Accrual and Dismissal Under Rule 12(b)(6): Applying Ricks and Pauk, the court held that Dr. Ikedilo’s termination-based claims accrued when she first received notice of termination in April 2016, regardless of her appeal. Because federal and state claims (Title VI, Title IX, § 504, NYSHRL, NYCHRL) carry a three-year limitations period, and § 1981 a four-year period, all state/local claims and the § 1981 discrimination claim based on termination (other than Count 1) were untimely.
Summary Judgment on the Merits:
- Count 1 (§ 1981 wrongful termination): No direct evidence of discriminatory intent and no similarly situated comparator; disparate treatment claim fails.
- Count 2 (§ 1981 evaluation delay): Plaintiff failed to allege any actual adverse consequences “but for” her race.
- Count 16 (Failure to accommodate): Reasonable accommodations do not require “substantial modifications” or unduly burdensome measures, and here the requested accommodation—repeating a year without meeting benchmarks—was objectively unreasonable under Davis and Dean.
- Contract claims (Counts 12–15): The House Officer Agreement expressly reserved promotion discretion to the Program Chairman, and Montefiore’s application of ABSITE score requirements fell within its contractual rights; no breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

3. Impact

Although designated a summary order, this decision provides practical guidance for discrimination and accommodation disputes in medical and academic settings:

Accrual Clarity: Reinforces that accrual of claims is tied to the moment of communicated decision, not subsequent appeals. Practitioners must monitor filing deadlines from the date of notice of adverse action.
Scope of Grievance Procedures: Internal or collective-bargaining grievance avenues do not toll federal or state statutes of limitations—highlighting the finality of communicated adverse decisions.
Accommodation Limits: Institutions need not provide accommodations that effectively rewrite academic or training standards or impose undue burdens.
Contractual Discretion: Residency programs that reserve promotion and reappointment discretion in written contracts will likely prevail on breach claims if they adhere to their own stated criteria.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Statute of Limitations & Accrual: A time limit to sue begins when you know (or reasonably should know) of an injury. In discrimination cases, that is when the decision is made and communicated, not when appeals finish.
Rule 12(b)(6) Motion: A procedural device to dismiss claims that, even if all alleged facts are true, fail to state a plausible legal claim.
Summary Judgment: A ruling in favor of one side when no genuine factual disputes remain and the law clearly supports that side.
“But For” Causation: In § 1981 discrimination claims, a plaintiff must show that, if not for race (or another protected characteristic), the adverse action would not have occurred.
Reasonable Accommodation vs. Undue Hardship: Under federal disability (and pregnancy-based) laws, organizations must make adjustments unless doing so would impose significant difficulty or expense or undermine core requirements.
Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing: Every contract implicitly requires parties not to act in ways that destroy the contract’s benefits, but it does not override express contractual terms granting discretion.

Conclusion

Ikedilo v. Statter crystallizes key procedural and substantive principles for discrimination, retaliation, and accommodation claims within professional training programs. It underscores that:

Claims accrue upon communicated adverse decisions, regardless of appeal mechanisms;
Plaintiffs must meet “but for” causation and comparator requirements in § 1981 cases;
Reasonable accommodations cannot overhaul core educational standards;
Express contractual reservation of promotion discretion insulates institutions from breach claims so long as they apply stated criteria.

Future litigants and institutions in the Second Circuit should heed these clarifications to ensure timely filings, properly framed discrimination claims, and reasoned accommodation requests.