1. Introduction

This appeal arises from the termination of William J. Shelton, a CMHA police officer who also published rap videos on public social-media platforms. CMHA terminated Shelton after discovering a set of YouTube videos depicting (among other content) simulated violence, firearm-brandishing, and graphic, misogynistic lyrics—conduct CMHA deemed incompatible with its rules governing officer conduct on and off duty.

Shelton sued CMHA (and a supervisor, though he did not pursue those claims on appeal), alleging:

• § 1983 constitutional claims (Counts I–IV), including First Amendment retaliation and challenges to CMHA speech-related policies; and
• Title VII claims (Counts VII–VIII) for race discrimination and retaliation based on his internal workplace harassment complaint.

The case presented two core issue clusters:

• Limitations/Accrual: When did Shelton’s § 1983 claims accrue—at termination (January 29, 2021) or later (March 2022), when he learned CMHA had retained outside counsel to evaluate the videos’ First Amendment status?
• Merits/Evidence: Did Shelton create a triable Title VII issue that CMHA’s stated reason (the videos violating policy) was a pretext for discrimination or retaliation—and did the district court properly consider CMHA’s declarations under 28 U.S.C. § 1746?

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed across the board:

• § 1983 Counts I–IV were time-barred. Accrual occurred no later than Shelton’s termination because he immediately knew of the injury (job loss) and the injurer (CMHA). Learning later that CMHA sought an outside “First Amendment assessment” did not delay accrual under either the occurrence rule or the discovery rule.
• No equitable tolling. The argument was forfeited and, in any event, Shelton failed to show concealment/misrepresentation preventing timely suit.
• Title VII summary judgment affirmed. Assuming a prima facie case, CMHA offered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason (policy-violating video content). Shelton failed to present evidence of pretext, especially given no proof CMHA knew of the specific videos before September 2020.
• Declarations under § 1746 were properly considered. The district court did not abuse its discretion in accepting amended declarations; the originals arguably “substantially” complied, and curing was timely and non-substantive.
• Procedural forfeiture enforced. Shelton’s appellate attack on the McDonnell Douglas framework was raised for the first time on appeal and was therefore forfeited.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited (and How They Drove the Result)

A. Pleadings-stage limitations rulings and burdens

• Berry v. Experian Info. Sols, Inc. — Provided the de novo standard of review for Rule 12(c) judgments on the pleadings, framing the appellate posture for the time-bar dismissal.
• Jackson v. Pro. Radiology Inc. — Reiterated that well-pleaded allegations are accepted as true on Rule 12(c), but judgment is appropriate if the movant is “clearly” entitled to it.
• Cataldo v. U.S. Steel Corp. — Supplied the key limitation principle: although limitations is an affirmative defense and usually not suitable for a pleadings-only dismissal, dismissal is proper when the complaint affirmatively shows the claim is time-barred.
• Lutz v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C. and Campbell v. Grand Trunk W. R.R. Co. — Confirmed the defendant bears the burden to show the statute has run, and supplied Ohio equitable tolling contours later used to reject tolling.

B. Selecting the limitations period for § 1983

• Wallace v. Kato — Controlled the borrowing rule: § 1983 uses the forum state’s personal-injury limitations period (Ohio: two years), making Shelton’s timing problem dispositive absent delayed accrual/tolling.

C. Federal accrual and the “complete and present cause of action”

• Sevier v. Turner — Anchored that federal law governs accrual for § 1983.
• Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Tr. Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., Inc. — Provided the “complete and present cause of action” formulation, which the court used to pinpoint accrual at termination.
• Reed v. Goertz — Emphasized that accrual can depend on the “specific constitutional right” asserted; the panel then applied that lens to First Amendment retaliation.
• Rudd v. City of Norton Shores — Supplied the three elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim, supporting the conclusion that once termination occurred (the adverse action), a suit-ready claim existed (assuming protected speech and causation).
• Reguli v. Russ — Played a decisive role in two ways:
  • It illustrated that accrual occurs when the unlawful act causing injury occurs (there, an officer’s unlawful search of social media because of disliked speech).
  • It narrowed the discovery-rule “causation” inquiry to who caused the injury, not why—undercutting Shelton’s attempt to delay accrual until he learned of CMHA’s legal review and its purported implications about motive.
• Snyder-Hill v. Ohio State Univ. and Ouellette v. Beaupre — These cases were central to rejecting Shelton’s analogy. In both, plaintiffs lacked information connecting a particular institutional defendant to their injuries (e.g., knowledge and failure to act). The Shelton panel distinguished them: Shelton knew both the injury (termination) and the injurer (CMHA) immediately, and his later-discovered “assessment” did not identify a new responsible party or a newly discovered injury.

D. Equitable tolling (state borrowing) and forfeiture

• Wallace v. Kato — Also supported borrowing Ohio equitable-tolling principles in the § 1983 context.
• Lutz v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C. — Provided Ohio’s tolling standard requiring compelling circumstances and typically some conduct (e.g., misrepresentation) that prevents inquiry; the panel found no such conduct.

E. Summary judgment evidence and § 1746 declarations

• Briggs v. Potter and Aerel, S.R.L. v. PCC Airfoils, L.L.C. — Established abuse-of-discretion review and what constitutes an abuse in evidentiary rulings.
• In re FirstEnergy Corp. — Supported CMHA’s position that the original declarations substantially complied with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 even though they lacked the exact “true and correct” language, making the district court’s acceptance of amended declarations particularly unsurprising.
• Collazos-Cruz v. United States — Supported the general proposition that courts may accept amended declarations/affidavits, reinforcing the district court’s procedural discretion to permit curing.

F. Appellate forfeiture and “new theory on appeal” limits

• Berkshire v. Dahl — Distinguished waiver from forfeiture and framed Shelton’s failure as forfeiture (not an intentional abandonment).
• Hayward v. Cleveland Clinic Found. — Supplied the narrow “plain miscarriage of justice”/“exceptional circumstances” gate for considering forfeited issues; the panel found neither and declined to consider Shelton’s new attack on McDonnell Douglas.

G. Title VII summary judgment framework and pretext

• Lowe v. Walbro LLC — Standard of review for summary judgment (de novo).
• Saunders v. Ford Motor Co. and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. — Defined what constitutes a genuine dispute of material fact.
• McNeal v. City of Blue Ash — Stated the tripartite McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting approach for circumstantial evidence discrimination claims.
• Tingle v. Arbors at Hillard — Provided the key pretext evidentiary point used against Shelton: a “bare assertion” that the employer’s reason lacks factual basis is insufficient to create a triable issue.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Accrual of the § 1983 claims: injury-and-causation knowledge, not motive knowledge

The central doctrinal move is the court’s separation of (i) the facts necessary to sue from (ii) additional information that might strengthen a narrative of improper motive. The panel assumed (without deciding) that Shelton’s music and/or his internal harassment complaint could be protected activity and that termination was adverse action causally connected to that activity. Even on those favorable assumptions, the claim was “complete and present” when he was terminated.

Shelton’s attempt to delay accrual to March 2022 hinged on his discovery that CMHA had sought outside counsel to evaluate which videos were “personal interest” versus “public concern.” The court rejected this for two linked reasons:

• No new injury / no new injurer: The actionable injury asserted in Counts I–IV was the termination (and connected alleged speech-policy suppression). Shelton knew of termination and CMHA’s role immediately, and he even attributed the firing to his videos and complaints in his February 2021 EEOC charge.
• Discovery rule does not await proof of subjective reasons: Relying on Reguli v. Russ, the panel emphasized discovery focuses on knowing who caused the injury, not why. Learning that CMHA sought legal advice was, at most, additional evidence about motive, not a prerequisite to filing suit.

The court also rejected Shelton’s effort to analogize to institutional-concealment cases (Snyder-Hill v. Ohio State Univ., Ouellette v. Beaupre) because those cases involved delayed discovery that a separate institutional defendant had knowledge and responsibility—facts that were not apparent earlier. Here, CMHA’s responsibility was apparent at termination.

B. Equitable tolling: forfeiture plus no concealment preventing inquiry

The panel gave two independent reasons to deny tolling:

• Procedural default: Shelton did not meaningfully raise equitable tolling below as a distinct doctrine; the issue was treated as forfeited.
• Substantive failure: Even if considered, Shelton did not identify concealment or misrepresentation that “excludes suspicion and prevents inquiry” (language drawn from Lutz v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C.). The alleged nondisclosure of the outside legal review—assuming it occurred—was not shown to be wrongful concealment or to have prevented timely filing.

C. § 1746 declarations: substantial compliance and curable defects

Shelton attacked CMHA’s summary-judgment declarations because they stated “SIGNED UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY” but did not initially include the “true and correct” phrase specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1746’s exemplar language. The Sixth Circuit held the district court acted within its discretion to accept amended declarations that cured the omission, stressing:

• the cure was timely (before the summary judgment ruling),
• there were no substantive changes, and
• In re FirstEnergy Corp. supported treating the originals as at least substantially compliant.

D. Title VII: legitimate reason plus insufficient pretext evidence

Proceeding under McDonnell Douglas, the court assumed the prima facie case and decided the case at steps two and three:

• Legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason: CMHA cited the videos’ violent depictions, weapon display, and derogatory lyrics as violating off-duty conduct rules. The court treated that as a facially legitimate rationale.
• No triable pretext: Shelton’s main pretext theme was that CMHA “knew” he rapped for a long time. The court found that too general: knowledge he rapped is not evidence CMHA knew of these specific videos. Absent evidence of such knowledge (or other concrete comparator/animus evidence), Shelton’s position amounted to the kind of “bare assertion” rejected in Tingle v. Arbors at Hillard.

The arbitration outcome (reinstatement based on lack of warning and lack of public complaints) did not carry Shelton’s Title VII burden in federal court; the panel focused on whether evidence in the summary judgment record could let a jury find CMHA’s stated reason was a cover for discrimination or retaliation.

3.3 Impact

A. Practical accrual rule for employment-related § 1983 speech claims

Even as an unpublished decision, the opinion is a clear application of Sixth Circuit accrual principles to a recurring fact pattern: a terminated employee later learns additional details about internal decision-making (here, a legal review of speech). The court’s approach signals that:

• Termination generally triggers accrual for speech-retaliation claims when the plaintiff immediately knows the adverse action and the employer’s role.
• Later-discovered internal deliberations (including legal reviews) typically will not delay accrual absent discovery of a new injury or a previously unknown responsible actor.

B. Litigation conduct: preserving equitable tolling and standards challenges

The opinion underscores two procedural lessons:

• Equitable tolling must be distinctly raised and supported in the district court with evidence of concealment/misrepresentation that prevented timely filing.
• Attacks on governing frameworks (e.g., McDonnell Douglas) must be preserved; raising them first on appeal will almost always be forfeiture without exceptional-circumstances relief.

C. Summary judgment evidence: § 1746 defects are often curable

The declaration holding, read with In re FirstEnergy Corp., suggests district courts in the circuit have broad discretion to treat minor § 1746 phrasing defects as curable (and sometimes as “substantial compliance” even before cure), reducing the leverage of purely formal challenges when no prejudice is shown.

D. Employment and social media: policy enforcement as a “legitimate reason”

The Title VII analysis reinforces that, where an employer documents a policy-based reason tied to public content (violent/explicit videos), plaintiffs must meet pretext with concrete evidence—such as proof the employer knew of comparable content by others and treated it differently, evidence undermining the factual basis for the policy violation, or evidence that the stated reason was not actually relied upon.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Accrual: The moment a legal claim “starts the clock” for the statute of limitations. For many § 1983 employment claims, that is when the adverse action happens (e.g., termination) and the plaintiff knows it happened and who did it.
• Discovery rule: A rule delaying accrual until the plaintiff knows (or should know) they were injured and who caused it. In this opinion, “who caused it” means the responsible actor—not the actor’s internal reasoning.
• Equitable tolling: A doctrine that can pause the limitations clock in extraordinary situations (often involving concealment or misrepresentation) that prevented timely filing. It is not triggered merely by learning extra details later.
• Rule 12(c) judgment on the pleadings: A pre-discovery mechanism to dispose of claims when the pleadings themselves show the claimant cannot win—here, because the complaint and dates made the time bar apparent.
• 28 U.S.C. § 1746 declarations: Written statements that can substitute for notarized affidavits at summary judgment if they are made under penalty of perjury in substantially the required form.
• McDonnell Douglas framework: A burden-shifting method used when discrimination is proved indirectly:
  1. plaintiff shows a prima facie case;
  2. employer gives a legitimate reason;
  3. plaintiff shows that reason is pretext.
• Pretext: Evidence that the employer’s stated reason is not the true reason (e.g., it has no factual basis, didn’t actually motivate the decision, or was insufficient to motivate it), suggesting discrimination or retaliation instead.
• Forfeiture vs. waiver: Forfeiture is failing to raise an argument in time; waiver is intentionally giving it up. Forfeited arguments are rarely heard on appeal.

5. Conclusion

The Shelton opinion reinforces a stringent, event-focused approach to limitations in § 1983 employment retaliation litigation: when an employee is terminated and immediately knows both the injury and the employer responsible, the claim accrues then—even if later proceedings reveal internal legal reviews bearing on “public concern” or motive. It also highlights the Sixth Circuit’s insistence on issue preservation (equitable tolling and standards challenges) and confirms district courts’ discretion to accept cured § 1746 declarations.

On the merits, the decision illustrates a common summary-judgment endpoint in Title VII cases: once an employer identifies a policy-based, documented rationale for termination, the plaintiff must answer with evidence—not inference—that the reason was a cover for discrimination or retaliation.