Accrual of §1983 Land-Use Due Process Claims: Potter v. Incorporated Village of Ocean Beach
Introduction
Potter v. Incorporated Village of Ocean Beach, decided April 10, 2025 by the Second Circuit, addresses when a § 1983 procedural and substantive due process claim accrues in the land-use context. Plaintiff‐appellant Philip G. Potter, owner of a seasonal residence in the Village of Ocean Beach, New York, alleged that Village officials improperly revoked his Certificate of Occupancy (CO), issued criminal citations for building‐code violations, denied multiple rental‐permit applications, and refused to hold a hearing ordered by a state court. The District Court dismissed all claims as time-barred under the three-year statute of limitations; Potter appealed. The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that even the CO-revocation claims accrued outside the limitations period once Potter knew that the Village had adopted a final, adverse position.
Summary of the Judgment
The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of Potter’s § 1983 claims.
- Claims based on criminal citations issued in early 2012 and denial of rental permits in 2016–2018 plainly accrued more than three years before Potter filed suit on August 29, 2023.
- Though Potter received notice in July 2011 that his CO was “revoked,” the Village did not vote to adopt that revocation until after an administrative hearing officer recommended it—and then indefinitely tabled the question in 2015. Nevertheless, by the time Potter’s rental‐permit applications were repeatedly denied in 2016–2018, he “knew or had reason to know” that the Village treated the revocation as final. That knowledge triggered accrual for his due process challenges.
- The continuing-violation doctrine and equitable estoppel did not rescue Potter’s claim, because each denial of a permit was a discrete act and Potter had taken independent legal steps (an Article 78 proceeding) by 2019.
Analysis
Precedents Cited
The Court relied on a series of Supreme Court and Second Circuit precedents to govern accrual and timeliness in § 1983 actions:
- Owens v. Okure (488 U.S. 235 (1989)) and Pearl v. City of Long Beach (296 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2002)) establish that state law fixes the limitations period (three years in New York), while federal law governs accrual.
- Wallace v. Kato (549 U.S. 384 (2007)) and McDonough v. Smith (588 U.S. 109 (2019)) confirm that a § 1983 claim “accrues” when the plaintiff has a “complete and present cause of action”—i.e., when he knows enough about the injury and its cause to seek legal advice.
- Kronisch v. United States (150 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 1998)) and DeSuze v. Ammon (990 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 2021)) articulate the “reason to know” standard for accrual: a plaintiff must be aware of “critical facts of injury and causation.”
- Pettaway v. National Recovery Solutions (955 F.3d 299 (2d Cir. 2020)), Ashcroft v. Iqbal (556 U.S. 662 (2009)), and Bell Atlantic v. Twombly (550 U.S. 554 (2007)) set forth Rule 12(b)(6) pleading and review standards, including consideration of facially‐apparent statute-of-limitations defenses.
Legal Reasoning
The Court’s reasoning proceeds in two main steps:
- Statute of Limitations: Under New York C.P.L.R. § 214(5), Potter had three years from accrual to file his § 1983 claims. Because the suit was filed August 29, 2023, any claim accruing before August 29, 2020 is time-barred.
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Accrual Analysis:
- The 2012 criminal citations and the 2016–2018 permit denials indisputably accrued when issued, each well before August 2020.
- For the CO revocation, although initial notice came in 2011 and a formal hearing occurred thereafter, accrual did not wait for the Village Board’s final vote. Instead, Potter’s own allegations—repeated denials of rental permits based on the Village’s stance that no valid CO existed—demonstrated that by at least 2018 he “knew or had reason to know” the revocation was final and injurious. That knowledge triggered accrual by the end of 2018 at the latest.
Impact
This decision clarifies several recurring issues in § 1983 land-use litigation:
- Accrual Clarity: Plaintiffs must monitor adverse administrative acts (even if a formal vote is pending) and understand that repeated denials of permits based on an asserted revocation suffice to trigger accrual.
- Ripeness vs. Accrual: While ripeness may depend on de facto finality of land-use decisions, accrual arms defendants with a bright-line accrual date when the plaintiff “knows enough” of the injury.
- Affirmative Defense on the Face of the Complaint: Defendants may succeed on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion by showing—through dates pled in the complaint—that § 1983 claims are time-barred.
Complex Concepts Simplified
- § 1983 Claim Accrual: The moment a plaintiff knows the government has taken an adverse position that causes harm, the clock starts ticking.
- Statute of Limitations: In New York, plaintiffs have three years from accrual to sue under § 1983.
- Ripeness vs. Finality: Courts require that a land-use decision be “de facto final” before judicial review, but accrual may occur even before a formal board vote if the plaintiff reasonably perceives the decision as final.
- Continuing-Violation Doctrine: Applies only when misconduct is inherently ongoing; discrete acts (like separate permit denials) each start their own limitations clock.
- Equitable Estoppel: May toll limitations if defendant’s misconduct prevented timely suit—but cannot apply when plaintiff was aware of his claim and filed alternative proceedings.
Conclusion
Potter v. Incorporated Village of Ocean Beach underscores the importance for land-use litigants to track adverse administrative acts and to file suit promptly once they “know or have reason to know” of the injury and its cause. By affirming dismissal of all § 1983 claims as time-barred, the Second Circuit provides clear guidance on accrual in the land-use context, reinforcing that eventual board inaction or indefinite tabling does not indefinitely toll the statute of limitations once the plaintiff has received definitive—and repeated—indications of finality.
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