Accrual and Pleading‑Stage Statute‑of‑Limitations Defenses in Hybrid Postal Labor Claims: Commentary on Maja McDonald v. United States Postal Service & NALC Branch 11

I. Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Seventh Circuit’s nonprecedential order in Maja McDonald v. United States Postal Service and National Association of Letter Carriers, Branch 11, No. 24‑3291 (7th Cir. Dec. 10, 2025). Although designated as a “Nonprecedential Disposition,” the decision offers an important clarification of:

When a hybrid labor claim against the Postal Service and a union “accrues” for limitations purposes; and
How cautiously district courts must treat statute‑of‑limitations defenses at the Rule 12(b)(6) pleading stage.

The plaintiff, Maja McDonald, was a city carrier assistant employed by the United States Postal Service (USPS) and represented by the National Association of Letter Carriers (NALC), Branch 11. Working under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that contained a multi‑step grievance process, she alleged:

USPS breached the CBA repeatedly between 2019 and 2021, including improper denial of work and pay; and
The union failed in its duty of fair representation by not filing, prosecuting, or adequately pursuing grievances on her behalf.

McDonald brought a “hybrid” claim under:

39 U.S.C. § 1208(b) (Postal Service Reorganization Act – PSRA), and
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (§ 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act – LMRA),

alleging both the employer’s breach of the CBA and the union’s breach of its duty of fair representation (DFR).

The district court dismissed her federal action as untimely under the six‑month limitations period borrowed from § 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b). The court treated the union’s last email update in December 2021 as the date when her claim accrued, finding her December 2022 complaint a year too late.

The Seventh Circuit vacated that dismissal and remanded. The panel concluded that, on the complaint’s face, it was not yet clear when McDonald knew or should have known the union had abandoned her grievances. Because the complaint left room for facts under which her claim would be timely, dismissal at the pleading stage was premature.

Along the way, the court:

Confirmed appellate jurisdiction despite an unserved union defendant;
Reaffirmed that hybrid Postal Service/union suits carry a six‑month limitations period borrowed from the NLRA;
Clarified accrual rules: a hybrid claim accrues when a final decision is made on a grievance or when the employee, exercising reasonable diligence, should know no further action will be taken;
Rejected arguments that EEOC proceedings toll that limitations period, absent identity of claims; and
Reiterated that equitable tolling requires “extraordinary circumstances,” a question usually unsuitable for resolution on the pleadings alone.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual Background

McDonald worked as a city carrier assistant under a CBA between USPS and NALC. The CBA provided a three‑step grievance process:

Step 1: The employee must raise the grievance with a supervisor within 14 days of the incident.
Step 2: The union assumes control and meets with management to pursue the grievance.
Step 3: A resolution team (without the employee directly participating) attempts to resolve the matter.

Steps 2 and 3 normally follow in one‑ to two‑week intervals but may be rescheduled by agreement between union and management.

In early 2020, McDonald filed a charge with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), alleging:

For six months, the union failed to file and prosecute grievances on her behalf; and
The union refused to accept her withdrawal from membership or tell her how to resign.

While that charge was pending, she emailed the NLRB copies of other grievances that she said management ignored and the union failed to advance. The NLRB clarified that her then‑existing charge covered only the union’s failure to file/prosecute grievances and refusal to explain withdrawal procedures. For new allegations, she needed a new charge.

Over the course of 2020:

The NLRB worked with her on a proposed settlement; after receiving a draft in August 2020, she asked an NLRB agent to explain it.
The agent clarified the proposal and sent her information on filing a new charge based on the union’s failure to represent her fairly in meetings with management.
McDonald rejected the initial proposal the day after that explanation, and later rejected an amended proposal in December 2020 because it did not cover all of her grievances.

McDonald says she heard nothing further about the proposed settlement for nearly a year, until September 2021, when an NLRB agent informed her that:

The union was making progress on the grievances addressed in the proposal; and
The NLRB had asked the union to keep her updated.

The union then emailed her in December 2021. The email:

Reported that from March 2020 to November 2021, at least six grievances had been appealed to Step 2 and remained pending; and
Listed further steps she should take regarding other grievances.

According to McDonald, that December 2021 email was the last update she ever received from the union.

B. District Court Proceedings

In December 2022, McDonald sued the Postmaster General (Louis DeJoy) in the Northern District of Illinois. Her initial complaint focused on various torts and workplace mistreatment, mainly describing harassment and denial of hours and pay by managers who were not named defendants.

The district court dismissed that complaint but allowed amendment. In her amended complaint, McDonald:

Dropped her claims against the Postmaster General individually;
Named USPS and NALC Branch 11 as defendants; and
Brought a hybrid claim under 39 U.S.C. § 1208(b) and 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), alleging:
- Repeated CBA violations by USPS from 2019 to 2021; and
- Union failure to fulfill its duty of fair representation—specifically, failure to file and prosecute grievances.

She also alleged she contacted the NLRB about her grievances in July 2022 and spoke with an NLRB agent as late as March 2024 about pending charges.

USPS moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing the hybrid claim was time‑barred under the six‑month limitations period borrowed from the NLRA. The district court agreed: while acknowledging that McDonald had properly stated a hybrid claim, it ruled that because her initial complaint was filed in December 2022—more than a year after the December 2021 union update—her claim was untimely.

C. Appeal and Issues Presented

On appeal, McDonald argued:

Her claim did not accrue until less than six months before she filed suit because she did not know, and could not reasonably have known, that the union had stopped processing her grievances earlier;
The limitations period should be tolled while she pursued administrative remedies, including an EEOC right‑to‑sue letter; and
Equitable tolling should apply due to her efforts to seek redress through agencies.

USPS defended the dismissal, emphasizing:

The December 2021 email as the last documented union activity; and
The fact that McDonald sued more than six months after that date.

A jurisdictional complication arose because:

The district court’s judgment formally disposed only of the claim against USPS; and
McDonald had never served the union with the amended complaint.

Ordinarily, an appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 is premature if claims remain unresolved as to any party. The panel therefore had to address finality and appealability before reaching the merits.

D. The Seventh Circuit’s Decision

The panel (Judges Hamilton, Jackson‑Akiwumi, and Lee) held:

Appellate jurisdiction existed.
- Under Manley v. City of Chicago, an unserved defendant does not destroy finality when service would now be untimely and any new complaint would be time‑barred.
- By the time of appeal, it was far too late to serve the union under Rule 4(m), and the short limitations period for a hybrid claim against the union had also run.
- As a result, the district court’s order was final as to all viable claims and parties.
- The panel noted that McDonald had no obligation to sue the union at all on her hybrid claim, citing Wince v. CBRE, Inc.
Dismissal on statute‑of‑limitations grounds was premature.
- An affirmative defense like limitations is rarely resolvable on a motion to dismiss. A complaint need not anticipate such defenses, and dismissal is proper only when the plaintiff has “pleaded [herself] out of court” by alleging facts that conclusively establish the defense.
- Hybrid claims accrue when there is a final decision on a grievance, or when the plaintiff discovers—or should, with reasonable diligence, discover—that no further action will be taken.
- The December 2021 union email described grievances as “pending,” and McDonald alleges that during 2022 she believed her grievances were still being processed; she even contacted the NLRB in July 2022 to check on them.
- On this record, it is conceivable that she did not know, and had no reason to know, prior to June 2022 that the union had effectively abandoned her grievances.
- Because this possibility is consistent with her complaint, the panel held that the limitations defense could not be resolved at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage.
Tolling arguments did not supply an independent basis to affirm at this stage.
- EEOC proceedings do not toll hybrid CBA/fair‑representation claims absent “complete identity” between the causes of action. An EEOC charge alleges discrimination; a hybrid claim alleges breach of the CBA and inadequate union representation.
- Equitable tolling requires “extraordinary circumstances” preventing timely filing. McDonald had not yet identified such circumstances conclusively, but, like accrual, equitable tolling is typically best addressed on a fuller record.

Accordingly, the panel vacated the judgment and remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

III. Key Precedents and Framework

A. Statutory Framework: PSRA, LMRA, and NLRA

1. 39 U.S.C. § 1208(b) (Postal Service Reorganization Act)

Section 1208(b) of the PSRA is the functional equivalent, for Postal Service labor disputes, of § 301 of the LMRA. It authorizes suits in federal district court for violations of CBAs between USPS and unions.

McDonald’s claim proceeds under § 1208(b) and mirrors traditional “§ 301 hybrid” claims in non‑postal settings. In that sense, DelCostello and other § 301 precedents guide the analysis.

2. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (§ 301 of the LMRA)

Section 301 authorizes suits for violations of CBAs in the private sector. A “hybrid” § 301/DFR claim is one in which:

The employee alleges the employer violated the CBA; and
The employee alleges the union breached its duty of fair representation in processing the grievance.

In such cases, the plaintiff must prove:

A CBA breach by the employer; and
A DFR breach by the union.

Either failure defeats the hybrid claim, even if the other component is proved.

3. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (NLRA – Six‑Month Limitations Period)

Section 10(b) of the NLRA provides a six‑month statute of limitations for filing unfair labor practice charges with the NLRB. In DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983), the Supreme Court held that this six‑month period applies, by borrowing, to hybrid § 301/DFR suits in federal court.

The Seventh Circuit has long applied this six‑month period to hybrid claims under § 1208(b) brought by Postal Service employees. The panel here cites DelCostello (462 U.S. at 169) and Truhlar v. U.S. Postal Serv., 600 F.3d 888, 891 n.1 (7th Cir. 2010), to affirm that principle.

B. Accrual of Hybrid Claims: Moultrie and Chapple

A central question in this case is not the length of the limitations period (six months is clear) but when the clock starts.

The panel relies on:

Moultrie v. Penn Aluminum Int’l, LLC, 766 F.3d 747, 751–52 (7th Cir. 2014); and
Chapple v. National Starch & Chemical Co. & Oil, 178 F.3d 501, 505 (7th Cir. 1999).

Under these cases, a hybrid CBA/DFR claim accrues:

Either when the grievance process reaches a final decision (the last step in the contractual procedure);
Or when the plaintiff:
- “discovers,” or
- in the exercise of “reasonable diligence” should discover
that “no further action would be taken” on the grievance.

This “discovery” rule is fact‑intensive: it depends on what a reasonable worker in the plaintiff’s position would have understood about the status of her grievances.

The panel reinforces that accrual depends on discovery of injury, not knowledge of law, citing Tobey v. Chibucos, 890 F.3d 634, 646 (7th Cir. 2018):

Accrual depends on when she can discover the injury, not on her knowledge of her legal rights.

Thus, a plaintiff’s ignorance of the six‑month deadline does not delay accrual if the underlying injury (e.g., union abandonment) was reasonably discoverable earlier. But by the same token, if the plaintiff reasonably believed the union was still working on her grievances, accrual may be delayed.

C. Rule 12(b)(6) and Statute‑of‑Limitations Defenses

The opinion strongly reaffirms the Seventh Circuit’s approach to resolving limitations defenses on the pleadings.

The court cites:

Luna Vanegas v. Signet Builders, Inc., 46 F.4th 636, 640 (7th Cir. 2022);
Reilly v. Will County Sheriff’s Office, 142 F.4th 924, 930 (7th Cir. 2025);
Sidney Hillman Health Center of Rochester v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 782 F.3d 922, 928 (7th Cir. 2015); and
Clark v. City of Braidwood, 318 F.3d 764, 768 (7th Cir. 2003).

These cases establish several key propositions:

A plaintiff is not required to plead around affirmative defenses. The complaint need not anticipate and negate a statute‑of‑limitations argument.
Dismissal is proper only if the complaint itself conclusively establishes the defense. This is sometimes referred to as “pleading oneself out of court.”
Timeliness is often fact‑dependent. Questions of when a plaintiff knew or should have known of an injury typically require a developed factual record and are better resolved at summary judgment or trial.
If any conceivable facts consistent with the complaint would defeat the defense, dismissal must be denied. This is the Sidney Hillman standard the panel quotes.

Clark is particularly important in this opinion. There, the plaintiff’s allegations were “not exactly artful,” but sufficiently clear that he claimed to have learned of his injury outside the limitations period. The court held that such ambiguity precluded dismissal at the pleading stage. The panel applies the same principle to McDonald: her complaint may conflate different grievances and charges, but she alleges facts that could support a later accrual date.

D. Finality and Unserved Defendants: Chessie Logistics, Manley, Wince

Before reaching the merits, the panel confronts finality under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Typically, as Chessie Logistics Co. v. Krinos Holdings, Inc., 867 F.3d 852, 856 (7th Cir. 2017), explains, a decision is final and appealable only if it disposes of all claims against all parties.

However, under Manley v. City of Chicago, 236 F.3d 392, 395 (7th Cir. 2001), a defendant who is never served does not prevent final judgment when:

Service is now untimely under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m); and
Any new suit would be time‑barred by the statute of limitations.

Applying this doctrine, the panel holds:

By the time of appeal, Rule 4(m)’s 90‑day service window for the union had long passed; and
The six‑month statute of limitations for a hybrid claim against the union had also expired, making any new suit time‑barred.

Thus, the unresolved claim against the unserved union defendant no longer precluded finality.

The court then adds a doctrinal reminder, citing Wince v. CBRE, Inc., 66 F.4th 1033, 1039 n.1 (7th Cir. 2023):

A plaintiff bringing a hybrid CBA/DFR claim is not obligated to name the union as a defendant, even though the union’s breach is an element she must prove.

In other words, McDonald may proceed solely against USPS on remand, but she will still need to establish a DFR breach by the union as part of her claim’s merits.

E. Tolling and Identity of Claims: Xanthopoulos, Johnson, Christiansen, Watkins

1. EEOC Proceedings and the “Complete Identity” Rule

McDonald argued that the limitations period should be tolled while she waited for an EEOC right‑to‑sue letter. The panel rejects this, relying on:

Xanthopoulos v. U.S. Department of Labor, 991 F.3d 823, 832–33 (7th Cir. 2021); and
Johnson v. Artim Transport Systems, Inc., 826 F.2d 538, 550–51 (7th Cir. 1987).

Those cases hold that pursuing administrative remedies does not toll a separate judicial claim unless there is a “complete identity of the causes of action.” Here, the panel emphasizes:

An EEOC charge concerns discrimination by an employer or union on protected grounds; by contrast,
A hybrid PSRA/LMRA claim alleges:
- Employer breach of the CBA; and
- Union breach of its duty of fair representation in pursuing contractual grievances.

Because these are distinct legal injuries with different elements and remedies, pursuing an EEOC charge does not toll the six‑month limitations period for the hybrid claim once it accrues.

2. No Tolling by Mere Inquiry: Christiansen

McDonald repeatedly contacted the NLRB about the status of her grievances. The panel notes that this conduct:

Does not toll the statute of limitations by itself, citing Christiansen v. APV Crepaco, Inc., 178 F.3d 910, 916–17 (7th Cir. 1999); but
May nonetheless be relevant evidence that she reasonably believed her grievances were still being processed and thus had no reason to suspect abandonment.

This is a central nuance: inquiries do not stop the clock, but they may delay the point at which the plaintiff reasonably discovers her injury—i.e., delay accrual.

3. Equitable Tolling and Extraordinary Circumstances: Watkins

McDonald also invoked equitable tolling. The panel cites Watkins v. Mohan, 144 F.4th 926, 943, 946 (7th Cir. 2025), for two propositions:

Equitable tolling is available only where “extraordinary circumstances” prevented timely filing after the claim accrued; and
Questions of equitable tolling are often ill‑suited to resolution on a motion to dismiss, because they turn on factual details about what the plaintiff reasonably could do and when.

The panel notes that McDonald has not yet identified such extraordinary circumstances, but leaves room for further development of that issue on remand.

IV. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Appellate Jurisdiction and Finality

The court first resolves a threshold jurisdictional question: whether the district court’s order was final under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, given that:

Judgment was entered only for USPS; and
NALC Branch 11 was never served.

Applying Chessie Logistics and Manley, the panel reasons:

A decision is not generally final if any claim remains against any party.
However, where a defendant was never served and now cannot realistically be sued because both:
- Rule 4(m) time has expired; and
- The statute of limitations has run,
the unresolved claim against that defendant is effectively dead and does not prevent finality.

Given the “short statute of limitations” and the passage of time, the panel declares it “far too late” to serve the amended complaint on the union, and any new claim against the union would be time‑barred. Thus, the judgment is final and appealable.

The court underscored that McDonald is now limited to her claim against USPS alone, but noted she was never required to sue the union at all to bring a hybrid claim—an important doctrinal clarification from Wince. In practice, the union’s conduct remains central: McDonald still must prove a DFR breach by the union to prevail against USPS.

B. Why the District Court’s Limitations Ruling Was Premature

The panel’s central holding is that the district court erred by treating the December 2021 union email as the definitive accrual date based purely on the pleadings.

1. The December 2021 Email Did Not Clearly Signal Finality

The district court reasoned that:

The December 2021 email was the last communication from the union; and
Therefore, McDonald knew or should have known at that time that no further action would be taken.

The panel rejects that line of inference:

The email itself said that at least six grievances had been appealed to Step 2 and were still “pending.”
It listed next steps for McDonald to take on other grievances, implying that the grievance process remained active.
Nothing in the email, as alleged, signaled that the union considered the matters closed or that it would not pursue them further.

Thus, the mere fact that no later communication occurred does not mean that at the time of the December 2021 email, a reasonable worker would have known the union was abandoning her grievances.

2. Subsequent NLRB Contacts Support a Later Accrual Date

McDonald alleged that:

She contacted the NLRB in July 2022—less than six months before filing her December 2022 complaint—to ask about the status of grievances that the NLRB had told her were being resolved; and
An NLRB agent indicated as recently as March 2024 that she had “matters pending.”

The panel draws a careful distinction:

These inquiries do not toll the statute of limitations by themselves; however,
They are “consistent with the possibility” that McDonald had no reason to know the union had stopped processing her grievances until some point within six months of filing suit.

In other words, if she reasonably believed, based on NLRB communications, that the union was still working on her case, a factfinder could conclude that she did not “discover” union abandonment until later. That would push accrual closer to, or even within, six months of her December 2022 filing.

3. Ambiguity About Multiple Grievances and Charges

The panel recognizes that McDonald’s allegations are not entirely tidy:

She had “many distinct grievances and charges” over multiple years;
Different grievances may have been at different procedural steps at different times; and
Some grievances may have been abandoned earlier even while others remained pending.

Because of this complexity, the court acknowledges that:

It is possible that she should have known the union had resolved or abandoned particular grievances long before the time when other, unrelated issues were still pending.

Nevertheless, the key point is that these are factual questions that require a developed record and cannot be conclusively resolved on the face of the complaint. Her allegations—although “not exactly artful”—nonetheless “made reasonably clear” that she claimed not to have learned of her injury until later, making dismissal premature under Clark.

C. Accrual vs. Tolling: Distinct Doctrinal Roles

The opinion carefully separates accrual and tolling:

Accrual concerns when the cause of action “comes into existence”—i.e., when the plaintiff has suffered the injury and reasonably should know about it.
Tolling concerns whether, after accrual, the running clock is suspended due to certain circumstances (e.g., pursuit of administrative remedies that are identical in substance, or extraordinary barriers).

For McDonald:

Accrual may be delayed if she reasonably believed, based on the CBA process, union communications, and NLRB feedback, that her grievances were still progressing.
Tolling is inapplicable based solely on EEOC proceedings, because those discrimination claims are not “identical” to her hybrid contract/DFR claim.
Equitable tolling may remain theoretically available but requires evidence of extraordinary circumstances—and is unlikely to be resolved at the pleading stage.

D. The “Pleading Yourself Out of Court” Standard Reaffirmed

The panel reinforces a standing Seventh Circuit principle: a claim may be dismissed as time‑barred on Rule 12(b)(6) only when the plaintiff’s own allegations conclusively establish the limitations defense.

Here:

McDonald did not allege any explicit union statement that it would not pursue her grievances;
She alleged an email saying grievances were pending; and
She alleged ongoing interactions with the NLRB suggesting continued action on her matters.

Because there exist “conceivable facts” consistent with her complaint under which her claim would be timely, the court holds the statute of limitations defense must be litigated on a fuller record, not on the pleadings alone.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. What is a “Hybrid” CBA/DFR Claim?

A “hybrid” claim in this context involves two interlocking allegations:

Employer breach of the CBA. For example, failing to pay according to the contract, improper discipline, or denial of contractual rights.
Union breach of its duty of fair representation. The union must represent employees fairly, in good faith, and without discrimination when handling grievances. A breach can occur if the union refuses to take grievances, processes them arbitrarily, or acts in bad faith.

The claim is “hybrid” because both components must be proved:

If the employer did not actually breach the CBA, the case fails, even if the union performed poorly.
If the union acted reasonably and in good faith, the case fails, even if the employer violated the CBA, because the employee is generally bound by the union’s handling of the grievance process.

Under DelCostello, such hybrid claims are subject to a six‑month statute of limitations.

B. Accrual: When the Clock Starts

In legal terms, “accrual” means the moment when your claim formally comes into existence for limitations purposes.

In a hybrid claim, this usually occurs at:

Final denial of the grievance under the CBA process; or
Earlier, if it becomes clear the union or employer has taken its last action—if, for example, the union expressly refuses to pursue the grievance further.

If the union continues to assure the employee that grievances are pending or that the process is ongoing, the employee may reasonably not realize that her rights have been effectively cut off. In such cases, accrual may be delayed until a reasonable worker would understand that no more action will be taken.

C. Statute of Limitations vs. Tolling

Statute of limitations: The total time you have, from accrual, to file suit (here, six months).
Tolling: Circumstances that pause or extend that time, such as:
- Legally mandated administrative exhaustion where the administrative claim is essentially identical to the court claim; or
- Equitable reasons (extraordinary barriers) preventing timely filing.

In McDonald, the court stresses:

EEOC discrimination proceedings are not the same as a hybrid CBA/DFR claim, so they do not toll the six‑month period.
Mere inquiries to agencies do not, by themselves, stop the clock, though they may inform what the plaintiff reasonably knew about her situation.

D. Duty of Fair Representation (DFR)

Unions that are exclusive bargaining representatives owe a legal duty to represent all members of the bargaining unit fairly in matters such as grievances. The DFR has three elements:

Non‑arbitrariness: The union must not handle grievances in a perfunctory, irrational, or unexplained way.
Non‑discrimination: The union may not discriminate on prohibited or irrational bases when deciding which grievances to pursue.
Good faith: The union must act honestly and without hostility toward the member.

A mere mistake or tactical choice by the union is not enough; the conduct must be arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.

E. “Pleading Yourself Out of Court”

This is shorthand for a situation where the plaintiff’s own allegations prove the defense’s case so completely that the court can dismiss at the pleading stage. For example, if a complaint explicitly alleges an injury occurred more than six months before filing and also admits the plaintiff knew all necessary facts at that time.

In McDonald, the panel found that her complaint did not go that far: her allegations left room for a later date of discovery of the union’s abandonment. Thus, she did not plead herself out of court.

F. Right‑to‑Sue Letters and Identity of Claims

A right‑to‑sue letter is issued by the EEOC after it completes its investigation of a discrimination charge, giving the employee permission to file a discrimination lawsuit in court.

However:

A discrimination claim (e.g., under Title VII) alleges that the employer or union treated the employee differently because of protected characteristics (race, sex, age, etc.).
A hybrid CBA/DFR claim alleges that the employer breached the CBA and the union mishandled the grievance procedure, regardless of discriminatory motive.

Because these are different legal theories with different elements, waiting for an EEOC right‑to‑sue letter does not toll the limitations period for a hybrid CBA/DFR claim.

VI. Potential Impact of the Opinion

A. For Postal Workers and Union Members

Even as a nonprecedential decision, McDonald sends several messages to Postal Service employees and other union‑represented workers:

Act promptly, but document communications. Workers should keep all union and agency communications, especially those suggesting grievances are “pending” or being processed. Those documents may be critical to proving when they reasonably discovered any abandonment.
Do not assume administrative processes protect CBA‑based claims. Filing an EEOC discrimination charge or NLRB charge does not automatically preserve hybrid CBA/DFR claims. The six‑month period can run independently.
Legal advice early is important. Because the accrual rule is fact‑intensive and the period short, employees with suspected CBA or union violations benefit from prompt legal consultation rather than relying on administrative agencies alone.

B. For District Courts Evaluating Rule 12(b)(6) Motions

The decision reiterates and sharpens the Seventh Circuit’s guidance on handling limitations defenses at the pleading stage:

Be cautious about dismissals where accrual depends on communications and subjective understanding. When an employee’s discovery of union abandonment depends on the content and timing of emails, phone calls, or agency responses, a more complete factual record is often necessary.
Do not equate “last contact” with “last action” without more. The mere absence of further communication is not, standing alone, conclusive that the employee knew or should have known that no more would be done.
Separate accrual from tolling. It is important to ask first when the claim accrued and only then whether any tolling (statutory or equitable) might apply.

C. For Employers and Unions Defending Hybrid Claims

USPS and unions should note the limits of statute‑of‑limitations defenses at the pleading stage:

Limitations defenses may require factual development. Employers and unions should be prepared to present evidence about:
- When grievances were actually closed or abandoned;
- What was communicated to the employee; and
- What the employee reasonably could have inferred from those communications.
Clear documentation and express closure help. Written notices that a grievance is closed or will not be pursued further create clearer accrual points than ambiguous “pending” language.
Be wary of conflation among multiple grievances. Where an employee has numerous grievances, each may have separate accrual dates. Defense strategy should distinguish them and identify which claims (if any) are clearly untimely even under the most generous reading of the facts.

D. Relationship Between Agencies (NLRB/EEOC) and Federal Litigation

McDonald illustrates the complex interplay between administrative processes and judicial remedies:

NLRB proceedings can influence the facts relevant to accrual—by shaping what the plaintiff reasonably believes about the status of her grievances—but do not necessarily toll the six‑month limitations period for hybrid suits.
EEOC proceedings are conceptually distinct and do not pause the clock for hybrid contract/DFR claims absent identity of subject matter and legal theory.

Practitioners must therefore manage multiple timelines simultaneously when advising clients with overlapping labor and discrimination issues.

E. Strategic Considerations on Joining the Union

The reminder that plaintiffs are not required to sue the union in a hybrid claim (per Wince) is important. Strategically:

Employees may sometimes sue only the employer, simplifying service and jurisdiction but still bearing the burden of proving a union DFR breach.
However, omitting the union can affect discovery, indemnification, and settlement dynamics. Employers may argue they should not be solely liable for breaches that hinge on union conduct.

In McDonald, the unserved union became a jurisdictional wrinkle resolved only because limitations and Rule 4(m) had both run. Litigants should avoid that limbo by making deliberate, timely choices about whom to name and serve.

VII. Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s nonprecedential decision in McDonald v. USPS does not reshape hybrid labor law so much as it clarifies and reinforces core principles:

A hybrid PSRA/LMRA claim by a postal worker carries a six‑month limitations period borrowed from the NLRA.
That claim accrues when a grievance reaches a final resolution or when the employee, exercising reasonable diligence, should understand that no further action will be taken.
Accrual turns on what a reasonable worker would infer from union and agency communications; an email describing grievances as “pending” may delay, not trigger, accrual.
Statute‑of‑limitations defenses are rarely suitable for resolution on Rule 12(b)(6) unless the complaint itself unmistakably establishes untimeliness.
EEOC discrimination proceedings do not toll the limitations period for hybrid CBA/DFR claims, because the causes of action are not identical.
Equitable tolling requires extraordinary circumstances and is typically assessed after factual development.
An unserved union defendant does not destroy finality where service is now untimely and any new suit would be time‑barred; and a plaintiff need not name the union at all to bring a hybrid claim.

In sum, McDonald underscores that the interplay of grievance processes, union communications, and administrative proceedings makes accrual and timeliness in hybrid labor suits highly fact‑dependent. District courts in the Seventh Circuit are reminded to tread carefully before dismissing such claims at the pleading stage, particularly where the complaint plausibly suggests that the plaintiff did not and could not reasonably know her grievances had been abandoned more than six months before filing suit.