Accrual and Notice in Wage Disputes: Moore v. Pooches Establishes Limits on FLSA and FMWA Claims and Common Law Remedies

Introduction

In Melanie Nicole Moore v. Pooches of Largo, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit addressed a sprawling employment dispute that encompassed federal‐statutory wage claims, state whistleblower protections, pre-suit notice requirements, and a host of common-law tort theories. Plaintiff-Appellant Melanie Moore worked as a veterinary kennel technician for approximately three weeks in August 2018, earned $184, then was terminated after protesting her pay. She filed suit pro se under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Florida labor laws, and later amended to add fraud, conversion, malicious prosecution, and related claims. The district court dismissed several counts, granted summary judgment on the Florida Minimum Wage Act (FMWA) cause of action, entered judgment as a matter of law against individual defendant Marquez on fraud, and held that a jury verdict against Pooches on minimum wage liability was time-barred because not willful. On May 20, 2025, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in full.

Summary of the Judgment

After careful de novo review, the appeals court upheld each ruling:

It affirmed dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the FLSA retaliation, Florida Whistleblower Act retaliation, fraudulent‐inducement (as to Marquez), tortious interference, civil theft, conversion, and malicious prosecution claims.
It affirmed summary judgment on the FMWA claim because Moore’s demand letter lacked the required itemized notice of hours, rates, and total wages due.
It upheld the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law on the fraudulent misrepresentation claim against Marquez, there being no evidence he made any false statement directly to Moore.
It held Moore forfeited any new accrual theory for her FLSA claim by failing to raise it below, and it accepted the jury’s finding that Pooches did not willfully violate the FLSA such that only the two-year limitations period applies. Moore’s FLSA suit—filed more than two years after her termination—was time-barred.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128 (1988) – Defined “willfulness” under the FLSA as knowing or reckless disregard of statutory requirements.
Reich v. Department of Conservation & Natural Resources, 28 F.3d 1076 (11th Cir. 1994) – Adopted McLaughlin’s standard and explained the statute of limitations structure in FLSA actions (2 vs. 3 years).
Knight v. Columbus, Ga., 19 F.3d 579 (11th Cir. 1994) – Clarified when an FLSA claim “accrues.”
Blue Martini Kendall, LLC v. Miami-Dade County, 816 F.3d 1343 (11th Cir. 2016) – Held new theories not argued below are forfeited on appeal.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) – Recited the “plausibility” standard for pleading under Rule 12(b)(6).
Cohen v. Corwin, 980 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) – Held a dismissal without prejudice for failure to prosecute is not a favorable termination for a malicious prosecution claim.
Gasparini v. Pordomingo, 972 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) and Masvidal v. Ochoa, 505 So. 2d 555 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) – Confirmed that unpaid wages, as an ordinary debt, cannot form the basis of conversion or theft claims absent a specific fund.
Butler v. Yusem, 44 So. 3d 102 (Fla. 2010) – Enumerated elements of fraudulent misrepresentation under Florida law.

Legal Reasoning

• Statute of Limitations (FLSA): The court applied 29 U.S.C. § 255(a), distinguishing the two-year ordinary period from the three-year “willful” period. Moore contended her claim accrued later, but she never advanced that theory below and thus forfeited it (Blue Martini). Because the jury found no willfulness, the two-year bar applied, rendering her suit untimely.

• Pleading Standards: Under Iqbal, Moore’s shotgun pleading and conclusory allegations failed to state viable claims for FLSA and FWA retaliation (no statutory reference to “law, rule, or regulation”), tortious interference (no factual basis for improper coercion of her attorney), or malicious prosecution (no termination in her favor).

• Common-Law Torts: Florida law requires a specific fund for conversion or civil theft claims (Gasparini; Masvidal), and a favorable termination for malicious prosecution (Cohen). Moore’s attempt to recast unpaid wages as “property” failed, as did her attempt to rely on a procedural dismissal.

• Pre-Suit Notice (FMWA): The FMWA’s statutory text—Fla. Stat. § 448.110(6)(a)—demands detailed notice identifying the wage claimed, dates and hours worked, and the total amount. Moore’s demand letter merely asserted a salary figure and cited other statutes; it omitted the granular data the statute requires. Summary judgment was therefore appropriate.

• Judgment as a Matter of Law: On the fraudulent misrepresentation claim against Marquez, Moore presented no evidence he personally communicated any falsehood. Having stipulated to no direct contact, she could not carry her burden under Butler v. Yusem, justifying JML.

Impact

This decision sharpens the boundaries for litigants and practitioners in wage disputes:

FLSA Accrual: Defendants will rely on the final paycheck and last day worked to trigger the limitations period. Plaintiffs must carefully preserve alternative accrual theories below or forfeit them.
Willfulness Findings: Plaintiffs must present concrete evidence of knowledge or reckless disregard to invoke the three-year window.
FMWA Pre-Suit Obligations: Counsel must strictly comply with the statutory notice template or face summary disposition. Innovative attempts to combine notice under multiple statutory regimes will not suffice.
Common-Law Pitfalls: Wage underpayment remains fundamentally a contract or statutory claim, not a conversion/theft tort. Malicious‐prosecution plaintiffs must secure a merits-based dismissal.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Accrual vs. Discovery: Under FLSA law, a claim “accrues” when the unpaid wages become due, not when a plaintiff learns of the violation. The date of the last paycheck typically marks accrual.
Willfulness: A legal term meaning the employer knew (or recklessly ignored) that its pay practices violated the statute. Without proof, only a two-year claim survives.
Judgment as a Matter of Law (JML): Post-trial relief authorizing a court to take a claim away from the jury when no reasonable jury could rule for the non-movant.
Shotgun Pleading: A complaint that lumps multiple claims together without factual particularity or separates each count by reference to “all prior paragraphs,” making it impossible to discern which allegations support which claim.

Conclusion

Moore v. Pooches of Largo cements key principles in wage litigation: the paramount importance of timely accrual, the narrow scope for tolling absent willfulness, strict compliance with pre-suit notice under Florida law, and the limitations of tort doctrines to redress unpaid wages. By affirming dismissal, summary judgment, and JML on each front, the Eleventh Circuit has provided a roadmap for both plaintiffs and employers navigating the intersection of statutory and common-law relief in employment disputes.