Accomplice Jury Instruction as Judicial Opinion: Mandatory New Trial Under OCGA § 17-8-57(c)

Introduction

State v. Cleveland and State v. Williams were consolidated appeals decided by the Supreme Court of Georgia on April 8, 2025. The defendants, Jalontaye Clay Cleveland and Courtney Trumaine Williams, had been convicted of malice murder and related offenses for a string of gas‐station robberies culminating in the shooting death of Vatsal Patel. After conviction, the trial court granted a new trial on the ground that it had, in its jury charge, labeled three testifying co-defendants as “accomplices” in violation of OCGA § 17-8-57(a)(1), which forbids any judicial expression or intimation of opinion on the accused’s guilt. The State appealed the grant of a new trial, arguing the instructional error was harmless in the context of the charge as a whole. The Supreme Court affirmed, establishing that naming co-indictees as accomplices in a jury instruction is an impermissible expression of judicial opinion on guilt and warrants an automatic new trial under OCGA § 17-8-57(c).

Summary of the Judgment

The Court held that by explicitly instructing the jury that Dominique Collins, Joshua Tucker, and Kimberly Huffman “are accomplices” to specific counts naming Cleveland and Williams as defendants, the trial court impermissibly signaled its own view that Cleveland and Williams were guilty. Under OCGA § 17-8-57(c), any judicial comment or expression of opinion on the guilt of the accused mandates the granting of a new trial—regardless of whether the error was objected to or whether the remainder of the charge was neutral. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court’s order granting new trials for both Cleveland and Williams (with the caveat that charges on which each had been acquitted remain foreclosed by double jeopardy).

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Millwood v. State, 102 Ga. App. 180 (1960) – Held that instructing the jury that certain witnesses “were accomplices of the defendant” was “an expression of opinion that the defendant is guilty,” requiring reversal under the predecessor to OCGA § 17-8-57.
Ladson v. State, 248 Ga. 470, 477–78 (1981) – Emphasized that calling a witness an accomplice “as a matter of law” assumes the defendant’s participation and is therefore a prohibited judicial opinion on guilt.
Johnson v. State, 288 Ga. 803, 807 (2011) – Reaffirmed that naming a witness “an accomplice as a matter of law” in a charge inevitably intimates the defendant’s guilt, violating OCGA § 17-8-57.
Hamm v. State, 294 Ga. 791 (2014) – Clarified that whether a witness is an accomplice “is a question for the jury,” not the judge.
State v. Sims, 266 Ga. 417 (1996) – Noted that an in-trial curative instruction may sometimes cure a judicial opinion error, but only if the judge recognizes and corrects it before submission.

Legal Reasoning

OCGA § 17-8-57(a)(1) prohibits any judicial expression or intimation of opinion on the guilt of the accused. Subsection (c) requires a new trial if the judge “expresses an opinion as to the guilt of the accused.” By identifying Collins, Tucker, and Huffman—who had pleaded or testified as codefendants—as “accomplices” to the offenses charged against Cleveland and Williams, the trial court conclusively treated Cleveland and Williams as co-participants. Georgia law is clear that an accomplice cannot exist without the guilt of the party whom they accompany; thus, the charge was a direct comment on the defendants’ guilt and cannot stand.

The State’s attempt to invoke harmless-error principles fails because OCGA § 17-8-57(c) mandates reversal without regard to prejudice once a judicial opinion on guilt is made. The trial court’s additional statements disavowing any opinion could not cure the core error of naming accomplices by judicial fiat.

Impact

Insistence on Jury Determination: Trial courts must submit the question of whether any witness is an accomplice to the jury, not resolve it as a matter of law.
Zero-Tolerance for Opinion-Error: Any charge that co-defendants or testifying participants are “accomplices” is now clearly per se reversible under the plain language of OCGA § 17-8-57(c).
Charge-Conference Protocol: Defense and prosecution must agree on accomplice-corroboration language that assigns the jury—not the judge—the role of determining accomplice status.
Double Jeopardy Safeguard: Although new trials are required where error occurs, acquittals on certain counts remain final and cannot be retried.

Complex Concepts Simplified

OCGA § 17-8-57: A statute forbidding judges from giving juries any hint—direct or indirect—about a judge’s belief in a defendant’s guilt. Violation of this is automatic grounds for a new trial.
Accomplice Corroboration Rule: When a witness is an accomplice, their testimony must be corroborated by other evidence. But whether they are an accomplice is a jury question, not a legal determination by the court.
Per Se vs. Harmless Error: Some errors require automatic reversal (“per se”), especially those dealing with constitutional or statutory rights. Under OCGA § 17-8-57(c), naming accomplices is per se reversible, meaning no harmless-error analysis applies.
Double Jeopardy Principle: Once acquitted of a charge, a defendant may never be retried on that same charge—even if a new trial is ordered as to other counts.

Conclusion

State v. Cleveland and State v. Williams reaffirm Georgia’s strict prohibition on any judicial expression of opinion on a defendant’s guilt. By expressly labeling testifying codefendants as “accomplices” in its jury instructions, the trial court invaded the jury’s exclusive domain to assess guilt and breached OCGA § 17-8-57(c). The Supreme Court’s decision underscores that trial judges must confine accomplice-corroboration instructions to pattern language that entrusts the jury with determining accomplice status. Any departure that implicitly or explicitly treats a witness as an accomplice to the defendant is reversible error and mandates a new trial. This ruling will guide future jury charge conferences, ensuring that the fact-finder alone resolves all critical issues of criminal culpability.