Accident Location Is Not Dispositive: Evidence, Not Assertions, Controls Transfers Under Alabama’s Forum Non Conveniens Statute (§ 6-3-21.1)

Accident Location Is Not Dispositive: Evidence, Not Assertions, Controls Transfers Under Alabama’s Forum Non Conveniens Statute (§ 6-3-21.1)

Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Supreme Court of Alabama’s decision in Ex parte Penn National Security Insurance Company, decided September 19, 2025, denying a petition for writ of mandamus that sought to compel transfer of an action from the Dallas Circuit Court to the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court under Alabama’s forum non conveniens statute, § 6-3-21.1, Ala. Code 1975.

The underlying case stems from a rear-end automobile collision in rural Tuscaloosa County on January 3, 2024. Plaintiff James Godwin, a Dallas County resident employed by Talton Communications, Inc. (headquartered in Dallas County), was driving a company vehicle when he was struck from behind by Desi Bernard Peoples, a Fayette County resident. Godwin sued in Dallas County for negligence and wantonness against Peoples, uninsured/underinsured-motorist (UM/UIM) benefits under a policy issued by Penn National Security Insurance Company (a foreign insurer doing business in Alabama), and workers’ compensation benefits from Talton.

Penn National moved to sever the workers’ compensation claim and to transfer the tort and UM/UIM claims to Tuscaloosa County, invoking both prongs of § 6-3-21.1: (1) convenience of parties and witnesses and (2) the interest of justice. The trial court denied severance (but ordered separate trials) and denied transfer. Penn National petitioned for mandamus relief on the transfer ruling; Peoples did not join the mandamus petition, and Penn National did not challenge the severance ruling.

The central questions were whether Penn National carried its burden to show that Tuscaloosa County is “significantly more convenient” than Dallas County and that the “interest of justice” compels moving the case to where the accident occurred. The Court’s answer was no on both counts.

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Alabama denied Penn National’s mandamus petition. Applying the high bar for mandamus review, and deference to the plaintiff’s choice of an admittedly proper venue, the Court held:

  • On the convenience prong: Penn National failed to present evidence—beyond the complaint and an accident report—that Tuscaloosa County would be “significantly more convenient” than Dallas County. Conclusory attorney arguments are not evidence; the movant offered no affidavits from its own witnesses, from Peoples, or from the investigating officer, while Godwin offered affidavits from Dallas County medical providers and his Dallas County resident spouse demonstrating inconvenience if the case were transferred.
  • On the interest-of-justice prong: Although the accident location is entitled to “considerable weight,” it is not dispositive. The movant must show both that the proposed transferee county has a strong nexus and that the chosen forum has only a weak nexus. Penn National relied essentially on the accident report to show Tuscaloosa’s connection, but did not negate Dallas County’s multiple material ties: plaintiff’s residence, location of all treatment and associated witnesses, employer’s principal place of business (and related workers’ compensation claim), and the UM/UIM policy issued there. On these facts, both counties have meaningful connections; the defendant failed to show Dallas County’s connection is weak.

Result: No abuse of discretion by the trial court; no “clear legal right” to transfer; petition denied. Chief Justice Stewart and Justices Shaw, Wise, Mendheim, Cook, McCool, and Lewis concurred; Justice Sellers concurred in the result.

Analysis

I. Procedural Posture and Standard of Review

A venue transfer denial is reviewable by mandamus, not appeal. But mandamus is extraordinary: the petitioner must show a clear legal right to the relief, a duty in the respondent to act, no adequate alternative remedy, and proper jurisdiction. The Court reviews for abuse of discretion and, critically, is “limited to those facts that were before the trial court.”

Key authorities:

  • Ex parte Southeast Alabama Timber Harvesting, LLC, 94 So. 3d 371 (Ala. 2012) and Ex parte National Security Insurance Co., 727 So. 2d 788 (Ala. 1998): Mandamus as the proper vehicle to review venue denials.
  • Ex parte Brookwood Health Services, Inc., 781 So. 2d 954 (Ala. 2000) and Ex parte Jim Burke Auto., Inc., 776 So. 2d 118 (Ala. 2000): Abuse-of-discretion standard; record-limited review.

II. Statutory Framework and Deference to Plaintiff’s Choice

Section 6-3-21.1 authorizes transfer of a civil action “filed in an appropriate venue” for either (a) “the convenience of parties and witnesses” or (b) “the interest of justice.” The parties agreed that venue was proper in both Dallas and Tuscaloosa Counties (see § 6-3-7 and Rule 82(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.). When multiple venues are proper, the plaintiff’s selection receives “great deference,” and the “burden of proof” to justify a transfer falls squarely on the defendant. Ex parte Perfection Siding, Inc., 882 So. 2d 307, 312 (Ala. 2003).

The Court rejected the notion that the statute’s use of “shall” makes transfer automatic whenever the movant invokes convenience or interest-of-justice language. Instead, consistent with Ex parte First Family Financial Services, Inc., 718 So. 2d 658 (Ala. 1998) and Ex parte Indiana Mills & Manufacturing, Inc., 10 So. 3d 536 (Ala. 2008), the trial court retains discretion to determine, on the evidentiary record, whether the statutory factors actually favor transfer; appellate review is for abuse of that discretion.

III. Convenience of the Parties and Witnesses: “Significantly More Convenient” and the Evidentiary Burden

The moving party must prove that the transferee forum is “significantly more convenient” than the plaintiff’s chosen forum. See Ex parte Townsend, 589 So. 2d 711, 715 (Ala. 1991); Ex parte Integon Corp., 672 So. 2d 497, 500 (Ala. 1995); Ex parte First Tennessee Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 994 So. 2d 906, 909 (Ala. 2008); Ex parte Tyson Chicken, Inc., 291 So. 3d 477, 480–81 (Ala. 2019).

Penn National relied on two documents: the verified complaint and the accident report. Neither showed specific inconvenience to any identified witness or party from litigating in Dallas County. By contrast, the plaintiff offered concrete affidavits:

  • Eric Jackson, director of the Dallas County physical-therapy facility where Godwin received treatment, attested that testifying in Tuscaloosa would be highly inconvenient and burdensome, causing greater time away from work; Dallas County would minimize disruption for his staff witnesses.
  • Godwin’s wife, Stephanie, a Dallas County resident and anticipated witness on damages, attested to the added inconvenience and work disruption if forced to travel to Tuscaloosa.

The Court emphasized that “arguments of counsel are not evidence” (Deng v. Scroggins, 169 So. 3d 1015, 1028 (Ala. 2014); Ex parte Autauga Heating & Cooling, LLC, 58 So. 3d 745, 749 (Ala. 2010)) and faulted Penn National for offering no affidavits from its own representatives, from Peoples, or from the investigating officer regarding inconvenience or cost if the case remains in Dallas County.

The Court distinguished Ex parte Kane, 989 So. 2d 509 (Ala. 2008), which Penn National invoked to argue for transfer when the only connections to the plaintiff’s chosen forum were residence and insurer doing business there. In Kane, the movants supplied multiple affidavits demonstrating that witnesses resided in the transferee county (Lee County) and would be burdened by the plaintiff’s chosen forum (Clay County); all acts/omissions occurred in Lee County. Here, by contrast, the plaintiff showed multiple Dallas County convenience ties, and Penn National showed none.

Bottom line: Without evidentiary support establishing that Tuscaloosa County is substantially more convenient, Penn National did not overcome the deference owed to Godwin’s Dallas County choice. See also Ex parte Alabama Power Co., 640 So. 2d 921, 925 (Ala. 1994) (“Without more,” no abuse of discretion in declining transfer).

IV. Interest of Justice: Strong vs. Weak Nexus, and Why Accident Location Is Not Dispositive

Under the interest-of-justice prong, the movant must show “the transfer of the action from a county with little, if any, connection to the action, to the county with a strong connection to the action.” Ex parte National Security Ins. Co., 727 So. 2d 788, 790 (Ala. 1998). The inquiry includes:

  • Party-centered factors (ease of access to proof; cost of obtaining witnesses; availability of compulsory process; possibility of view) and
  • Public-interest factors (local interest in localized controversies; avoiding burdening jurors in communities with little relation; administrative efficiency), echoing Gulf Oil v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508–09 (1947), adopted in Alabama through Ex parte First Family and Ex parte Smiths Water & Sewer Authority, 982 So. 2d 484, 489–90 (Ala. 2007).

Crucially, this is not a simple balancing test, and no single factor is dispositive. See Ex parte J & W Enterprises, LLC, 150 So. 3d 190, 196 (Ala. 2014). While the location of injury is given “considerable weight,” it “is not, and should not be, the sole consideration.” Id. at 196–97; Ex parte Elliott, 254 So. 3d 882, 886–87 (Ala. 2017).

Penn National argued that Alabama cases make injury location dispositive. The Court flatly rejected that characterization. Its canvass of precedents—including Quality Carriers, Morton, Manning, State Farm, Indiana Mills, Southeast Alabama Timber Harvesting, Wachovia Bank, and Reed—demonstrates that:

  • The movant must do more than invoke the place of injury; it must establish the transferee county’s strong nexus and, importantly, the transferor county’s weak nexus—often framed as whether “nothing material” occurred there. See, e.g., Ex parte Reed, 295 So. 3d 38, 43 (Ala. 2019); Ex parte Southeast Alabama Timber Harvesting, 94 So. 3d at 376; Ex parte Wachovia Bank, N.A., 77 So. 3d 570, 573–74 (Ala. 2011).
  • Where both counties have meaningful connections, transfer is improper because the movant has not shown the plaintiff’s chosen forum is weak. See Ex parte Sanders, 314 So. 3d 1226, 1230–31 (Ala. 2020); Ex parte Tyson Chicken, 291 So. 3d at 482–83; Ex parte Elliott, 254 So. 3d at 887.

The Court’s pairing of J & W Enterprises and Elliott is instructive:

  • In J & W Enterprises, the accident occurred in Mobile County, but neither party resided there; no treatment occurred there; there were no eyewitnesses; and the investigating officer said traveling to Clarke County would not be inconvenient. On those facts, Mobile’s nexus was “purely fortuitous,” and the movant failed to show Clarke County’s connection was weak. 150 So. 3d at 196–97.
  • In Elliott, the insurer moved away from the accident county (Lowndes) to the insured’s residence/treatment/policy county (Montgomery). The Court held both counties had strong ties—accident and investigation in Lowndes; residence, treatment, and contract in Montgomery—and thus transfer was improper because the movant had not shown a weak nexus for the transferor forum. 254 So. 3d at 887.

Here, as in Elliott, both forums have substantial ties. Tuscaloosa County is where the accident and law enforcement investigation occurred. Dallas County is where the plaintiff resides, obtained all medical treatment (yielding key damages witnesses), maintains the employment relationship underpinning the workers’ compensation claim, and where the UM/UIM policy was issued. Penn National offered only the accident report to support transfer—precisely the type of skeletal showing the Court has deemed insufficient. See Ex parte Burgess, 298 So. 3d 1080, 1083–84 (Ala. 2020) (accident report alone does not establish the chosen forum’s weak nexus).

Because Penn National did not establish that Dallas County’s connection is weak, the “interest of justice” does not compel transfer despite the weight accorded to the accident location. The trial court’s refusal to transfer therefore fell well within its discretion.

V. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

  • Ex parte Perfection Siding, Inc., 882 So. 2d 307 (Ala. 2003): Underscores deference to plaintiff’s proper forum choice and allocates the burden to the movant.
  • Ex parte First Family Financial Services, Inc., 718 So. 2d 658 (Ala. 1998) and Ex parte Indiana Mills & Manufacturing, Inc., 10 So. 3d 536 (Ala. 2008): Clarify that although § 6-3-21.1 uses “shall,” transfer remains a discretionary determination keyed to the evidentiary record.
  • Ex parte New England Mutual Life, 663 So. 2d 952 (Ala. 1995); Ex parte Townsend, 589 So. 2d 711 (Ala. 1991); Ex parte Integon Corp., 672 So. 2d 497 (Ala. 1995); Ex parte First Tennessee Bank, 994 So. 2d 906 (Ala. 2008); Ex parte Tyson Chicken, 291 So. 3d 477 (Ala. 2019): Define the “significantly more convenient” test and the type of affidavits and specifics needed to carry that burden.
  • Deng v. Scroggins, 169 So. 3d 1015 (Ala. 2014); Ex parte Autauga Heating & Cooling, 58 So. 3d 745 (Ala. 2010): Reaffirm that attorney argument is not evidence; affidavits or comparable proofs are required.
  • Ex parte Gentile Co., 221 So. 3d 1066 (Ala. 2016): Failure to present evidence in support of forum non conveniens warrants denial.
  • Ex parte Smiths Water & Sewer Authority, 982 So. 2d 484 (Ala. 2007): Articulates public-interest factors (Gilbert) relevant to the interest-of-justice prong.
  • Ex parte National Security Ins. Co., 727 So. 2d 788 (Ala. 1998): Transfers are appropriate when moving from a weak-nexus to a strong-nexus county; sets the strong/weak paradigm.
  • Ex parte J & W Enterprises, LLC, 150 So. 3d 190 (Ala. 2014) and Ex parte Elliott, 254 So. 3d 882 (Ala. 2017): Together, clarify that the accident location carries “considerable weight” but is not dispositive; the movant must prove the chosen forum’s nexus is weak; both forums can have strong ties.
  • Ex parte Southeast Alabama Timber Harvesting, LLC, 94 So. 3d 371 (Ala. 2012); Ex parte Wachovia Bank, N.A., 77 So. 3d 570 (Ala. 2011); Ex parte Reed, 295 So. 3d 38 (Ala. 2019); Ex parte Burgess, 298 So. 3d 1080 (Ala. 2020): Emphasize the “nothing material”/weak nexus inquiry and the insufficiency of a bare accident report to justify transfer.
  • Ex parte Kane, 989 So. 2d 509 (Ala. 2008): Illustrates a proper evidentiary showing for transfer where the vast majority of witnesses and operative facts are centered in the transferee county; distinguished here for lack of comparable proof.
  • Ex parte Sanders, 314 So. 3d 1226 (Ala. 2020); Ex parte Manning, 170 So. 3d 638 (Ala. 2014); Ex parte Morton, 167 So. 3d 295 (Ala. 2014); Ex parte State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 149 So. 3d 1082 (Ala. 2014): Reinforce that location-of-injury is important but coexists with other material connections—residence, medical treatment, place of employment, insurance contracting—in determining the nexus of each forum.

Impact and Practical Implications

A. For Defendants and Insurers Seeking Transfer

  • Produce affidavits, not assertions. Supply declarations from:
    • Parties and key witnesses (including the investigating officer) attesting to residence, workplace, and specific burdens (time away from work, travel distances, scheduling constraints).
    • Medical providers in the transferee county, if treatment occurred there; if not, be prepared to counter the plaintiff’s treatment nexus with other material connections.
  • Demonstrate both prongs of the strong/weak nexus test: show why the transferee county’s ties are robust AND why the chosen forum’s ties are tenuous (e.g., no witnesses, no treatment, no contracting or employment links there).
  • Document practical burdens: travel mileage/time charts, docket congestion data (when relevant), subpoena power concerns, and any need for site visits.
  • In UM/UIM cases, anticipate the plaintiff’s ability to root venue in the county of residence/treatment/policy issuance. You will need more than accident location to win transfer.

B. For Plaintiffs

  • Affidavits from treating providers and lay witnesses in the chosen forum are potent. They can neutralize convenience claims and reinforce the chosen forum’s material connection.
  • Leverage multiple anchors: residence, treatment location, employer’s principal place of business, and where the policy was issued or administered can collectively establish a strong nexus.

C. For Trial Courts

  • This decision reaffirms that transfer under § 6-3-21.1 is evidence-driven and discretionary. Trial courts should resist “automatic” transfers based solely on accident location.
  • Orders denying transfer that reflect a careful weighing of the record—and recognize that both forums may have substantial ties—are insulated by the abuse-of-discretion standard on mandamus review.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Writ of Mandamus: An extraordinary appellate remedy used to correct a clear abuse of discretion or compel a clear legal duty. Not a substitute for appeal; granted sparingly.
  • Forum Non Conveniens (§ 6-3-21.1): Allows transfer of cases filed in a proper venue to another proper venue when (a) the other venue is significantly more convenient for parties and witnesses, or (b) the interest of justice demands it. The defendant bears the burden.
  • “Significantly More Convenient”: A high bar. The movant must present concrete evidence (affidavits, specifics) showing the plaintiff’s chosen forum imposes substantial, unnecessary burdens compared to the proposed forum.
  • Interest of Justice (Strong vs. Weak Nexus): Transfer is appropriate when the transferee county has a strong connection to the dispute and the chosen forum has only a weak connection (sometimes framed as “nothing material” occurred there). Location of injury is important but not dispositive.
  • “Arguments of counsel are not evidence”: Courts decide transfer motions on evidence in the record (affidavits, documents), not on statements in briefs or at the podium.
  • Verified Complaint vs. Affidavit: A verified complaint can establish basic facts (e.g., residence), but it often lacks the specificity needed to prove inconvenience or public-interest factors. Affidavits tailor the evidentiary record to the legal tests.
  • Severance vs. Bifurcation: Severance creates a new action with a new case number (and costs); bifurcation orders separate trials within the same action. Here, the court declined severance but ordered separate trials for the workers’ compensation claim—a choice not challenged on mandamus.

Conclusion

Ex parte Penn National Security Insurance Company restates and sharpens key principles governing venue transfers in Alabama:

  • Transfer under § 6-3-21.1 is not automatic; it is a discretionary, fact-bound determination requiring evidence.
  • The accident location carries “considerable weight” but is not dispositive under the interest-of-justice prong. The movant must demonstrate both a strong nexus in the transferee county and a weak nexus in the plaintiff’s chosen forum.
  • On the convenience prong, the transferee county must be shown to be “significantly more convenient” through concrete affidavits and specifics—not generalities or attorney argument.
  • Where, as here, the chosen forum houses the plaintiff’s residence, medical treatment and witnesses, the employer’s principal place of business relevant to a workers’ compensation claim, and the UM/UIM policy issuance, its connection is not weak—even if the accident occurred elsewhere.

The decision synergizes Ex parte J & W Enterprises and Ex parte Elliott: it confirms the centrality, but not the supremacy, of the accident location and cements the dual requirement that transfer proponents prove the transferee forum’s strong nexus and the transferor forum’s weak nexus with evidence. Defendants seeking transfer should treat this opinion as a roadmap: assemble affidavits, quantify burdens, and address all material connections. Without that, the plaintiff’s choice will stand.

Case Details

Comments