Accessible Eviction Notice Required: Third Circuit Revives ADA/§504 Claims and Limits Quasi‑Judicial Immunity for Constables

Introduction

In William Murphy v. State of Delaware Justices of the Peace, the Third Circuit addressed the intersection of disability law and eviction enforcement. The panel held that a blind tenant plausibly alleged disability discrimination under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act when constables executed a writ of possession after posting written notice that was not readable by a blind person and that identified a different tenant. The court also reversed the dismissal of individual-capacity § 1983 claims against the constables, concluding that quasi-judicial immunity could not be resolved at the pleading stage because the claims targeted the manner and timing of execution of the writ, not its validity. At the same time, the court affirmed dismissal of the plaintiffs’ official-capacity § 1983 claims for prospective relief, finding no ongoing violation established by a single incident.

The case arises from a wrongful eviction in Wilmington, Delaware. The landlord (who later settled) filed an eviction action against a former tenant and obtained a writ of possession. Constables executed the writ against William Murphy—an observably blind tenant with a valid lease—after posting a written notice that he could not read, and despite his on-the-spot showing of the lease. The eviction occurred during a snowstorm and left Murphy and his two minor daughters on the street.

Plaintiffs sued the Delaware Justices of the Peace Court (JP Court), its Chief Magistrate Alan Davis, and three constables (Craig, Brison, and Hernandez), alleging disability discrimination under Title II and § 504, and constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (due process and unreasonable seizure). The district court dismissed all claims. The Third Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and reversed in part.

Summary of the Opinion

Title II and Section 504: The court vacated dismissal of disability claims, holding plaintiffs plausibly alleged that Murphy’s blindness was the but-for cause (Title II) and sole cause (§ 504) of the denial of a legally required 24-hour eviction notice in a format readable by a blind person. The constables’ failure to make reasonable modifications and provide auxiliary aids (e.g., notice in an accessible format) states a claim at the pleading stage.
§ 1983 (individual capacity against constables): The court reversed dismissal, holding that quasi-judicial immunity cannot be decided without a record because the claims challenge the timing/manner of execution (where constables may have had discretion to delay), not the validity of the court’s writ.
§ 1983 (official capacity): The court affirmed dismissal of official-capacity claims for prospective relief due to the absence of a plausibly alleged ongoing violation or policy (“evict first, ask questions later”) based solely on a single incident.
§ 1983 (JP Court as defendant): Dismissal was not challenged on appeal because the JP Court, as an arm of the state, is not a “person” under § 1983.
Nonprecedential disposition: The panel’s decision is not binding precedent, but it is a significant and instructive application of ADA/§ 504 principles to eviction enforcement and the scope of quasi-judicial immunity at the pleading stage.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools (U.S. 2017) and Alexander v. Choate (U.S. 1985): Establish that Title II and § 504 prohibit disability-based discrimination by public entities and require reasonable modifications to policies, practices, or procedures to avoid such discrimination.
Williams v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (3d Cir. 2024): Emphasizes entities’ affirmative duty to take proactive steps to avoid discrimination and recognizes that failure to make reasonable modifications can itself violate Title II.
Durham v. Kelley (3d Cir. 2023): Clarifies causation standards—Title II requires but-for causation, while § 504 requires disability to be the sole cause. Also confirms that refusal to make reasonable accommodations can amount to denial of access.
Haberle v. Troxell (3d Cir. 2018): Supports the plausibility standard for alleging causation under ADA Title II in the Rule 12(b)(6) context.
Berardelli v. Allied Services Institute of Rehabilitation Medicine (3d Cir. 2018): Aligns reasonableness standards under ADA and § 504; the same reasonableness inquiry governs both statutes.
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)(i): Requires reasonable modifications unless the entity shows a fundamental alteration to the nature of its service; this burden is on the public entity.
28 C.F.R. § 35.160(b)(1) and § 35.104: Require auxiliary aids and services, including qualified readers, audio recordings, Braille, and “other effective methods” to make visually delivered materials available to people who are blind.
28 C.F.R. § 35.160(c)(2): Generally forbids public entities from relying on accompanying adults to interpret/facilitate communication for a person with a disability; undercuts constables’ reliance on third-party reading of notices.
Uronis v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp. (3d Cir. 2022): Reiterates that, at the motion to dismiss stage, all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the plaintiff; defendants are not entitled to their preferred inferences.
Russell v. Richardson (3d Cir. 2018): Defines and limits quasi-judicial immunity; immunity extends to acts authorized by court order (execution of the order), but not to the manner of execution where officers misuse or inappropriately exercise their functions or have discretion.
Cleavinger v. Saxner (U.S. 1985) and Hafer v. Melo (U.S. 1991): Explain the contours of quasi-judicial immunity and individual-capacity suits.
Merritts v. Richards (3d Cir. 2023): A single incident generally does not establish an ongoing violation for Ex parte Young-style prospective relief in official-capacity suits.
Will v. Michigan Department of State Police (U.S. 1989): A state and its arms are not “persons” for § 1983 damages; explains the district court’s unchallenged dismissal of § 1983 claims against the JP Court.
Delaware statutes: 25 Del. C. § 5715 (24-hour notice requirement and direction to constables to execute writs), and related landlord-tenant notice provisions (§§ 5502, 5704–07).

Legal Reasoning

1) ADA Title II and Section 504

The panel took a straightforward but consequential approach: the statutory 24-hour eviction notice is a “benefit of a service, program, or activity” of a public entity (here, enforcement by constables of writs of possession), and the notice must be accessible to the person who is entitled to receive it. By posting a written notice naming a different tenant and offering no accessible alternative for a blind occupant whom they observed was blind, the constables denied the Murphys equal access to the benefit of pre-eviction notice.

The court held that plaintiffs plausibly alleged causation:

Title II: But-for Murphy’s blindness, he would have received meaningful 24-hour notice (i.e., in an accessible format), satisfying the “by reason of” standard (citing Durham and Haberle).
Section 504: The allegations permit the inference that blindness was the sole cause of the deprivation, satisfying § 504’s stricter causation standard (Durham).

Crucially, the court emphasized the proactive obligations under the ADA’s implementing regulations. When a public entity knows a recipient of its service is blind, it must make reasonable modifications and furnish appropriate auxiliary aids to ensure effective communication and equal participation (28 C.F.R. §§ 35.130(b)(7)(i), 35.160(b)(1)). The constables’ failure to do so plausibly states a claim. At the pleading stage, the constables cannot meet their burden to show a “fundamental alteration” defense; no such facts appear on the face of the complaint.

The panel also rejected the constables’ attempt to rely on the notion that a family member had read the notice to Murphy. First, Rule 12(b)(6) requires drawing inferences in favor of the plaintiffs (Uronis). Second, ADA regulations generally prohibit reliance on accompanying adults to facilitate communication (28 C.F.R. § 35.160(c)(2)). Third, there were no well-pleaded facts showing the complete notice was read in a manner equivalent to accessible notice.

Two additional doctrinal notes the panel flagged:

Vicarious liability: The court assumed, without deciding, that a public entity may be vicariously liable under Title II for the acts of its employees. That question remains open in the Third Circuit.
Program funding: For § 504, plaintiffs must ultimately show the relevant “program or activity” receives federal financial assistance. That merits issue was not resolved at the pleading stage.

2) § 1983 Claims and Quasi-Judicial Immunity

The panel drew a critical distinction under Russell v. Richardson: quasi-judicial immunity extends to acts authorized by the order itself (executing a facially valid writ), but not to the manner or timing of execution where officers may exercise discretion. Plaintiffs alleged the constables had reason to pause—Murphy was observably blind; he presented a facially valid lease; the notice named a different person; and the constables’ own reports reflected uncertainty and consultation with a supervisor. The court could not determine on the pleadings alone that the constables lacked discretion to delay execution to comply with the ADA and due process. As such, dismissal on quasi-judicial immunity grounds was reversed, with the defense preserved for later reassertion on a fuller record.

By contrast, the panel affirmed dismissal of official-capacity § 1983 claims for prospective relief. A single, past incident (even one involving an instruction from a supervisor) did not plausibly allege an ongoing violation to justify Ex parte Young relief, consistent with Merritts. Finally, the panel noted that § 1983 claims against the JP Court were properly dismissed because the state is not a “person” for § 1983 purposes (Will), and plaintiffs did not appeal that ruling.

Impact and Implications

On Eviction Enforcement and Court Officers

Accessibility is part of the service: The opinion recognizes that the procedural protections surrounding eviction—here, the 24-hour notice—are “services” of a public entity subject to Title II and § 504. Posting written notice alone will not suffice if the intended recipient cannot access it due to a known disability.
Reasonable modifications and auxiliary aids: Sheriffs, marshals, constables, and court personnel across Delaware, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey will need policies to ensure notice is provided in accessible formats (e.g., readable electronic notice, audio calls, Braille/large print, or in-person read-aloud with confirmation), along with procedures for modest delays to effectuate those obligations when warranted.
Training and documentation: Agencies should train officers on the ADA’s communication and modification rules and how to document compliance (including when and why execution is briefly postponed to secure accessibility).
Immunity not an early exit when discretion exists: Quasi-judicial immunity will not necessarily dispose of suits at the pleadings stage if the claim targets the manner or timing of execution, not the validity of the writ. Discovery may be required to determine the scope of officers’ discretion and the reasonableness of their actions under the circumstances.
Damages exposure: While the panel did not reach the damages standard, entities should anticipate that compensatory damages under Title II/§ 504 typically require deliberate indifference. Proactive policies and documented efforts to accommodate will be critical to mitigate risk.

On Litigation Strategy

Pleading causation: Plaintiffs can plausibly satisfy Title II but-for causation and § 504 sole-causation at the pleading stage by alleging that a disability-specific barrier (inaccessible notice) denied equal access and that reasonable modifications were refused.
Focus § 1983 claims on “manner of execution”: To navigate quasi-judicial immunity, plead facts showing discretionary choices in execution timing/method that violated due process or the Fourth Amendment, rather than challenging the facial validity of the order.
Prospective relief hurdles: A single episode rarely shows an ongoing violation or policy; building a record of repeated practices or formal policies will be necessary for official-capacity injunctive claims.
Entity liability under Title II: In the Third Circuit, vicarious liability remains assumed but unresolved; litigants should brief it and consider alternative theories (e.g., policy/practice or custom of failing to provide auxiliary aids).
§ 504 proof of funding: Plaintiffs should be prepared to establish that the relevant court or enforcement function receives federal financial assistance (the “program or activity” definition is broad but fact-dependent).

Complex Concepts Simplified

Title II vs. Section 504:
- Title II applies to all “public entities” (state and local governments and their components). Causation: disability must be a but-for cause of the challenged exclusion/denial or discrimination.
- Section 504 applies to “programs or activities” receiving federal financial assistance. Causation: disability must be the sole cause of the exclusion/denial or discrimination (as clarified in Durham).
Reasonable modifications and auxiliary aids: Public entities must adapt policies and provide aids (like Braille, large print, audio, or electronic formats) to ensure people with disabilities have an equal chance to participate unless the change would fundamentally alter the service.
“Service, program, or activity”: Broadly construed. Here, the process of effecting evictions—including the legally guaranteed 24-hour notice—qualifies as a public service subject to the ADA/§ 504.
Quasi-judicial immunity: Protects officers when they execute court orders as directed, but not when they misuse discretion or engage in wrongful conduct in the manner of execution (e.g., refusing modest delays to ensure lawful, nondiscriminatory execution).
Official vs. individual capacity:
- Official-capacity suits seek relief against the entity and are limited by sovereign immunity; prospective relief requires an ongoing violation (Ex parte Young doctrine).
- Individual-capacity suits seek damages from the official personally and can be barred by absolute or qualified immunity, depending on the function performed.
Writ of possession and notice: A writ authorizes officers to restore possession to a landlord. Delaware law requires officers to give at least 24 hours’ notice to occupants before removal. Under the ADA/§ 504, that notice must be accessible to a person with a known disability.

The Dissent’s Position

Judge Matey concurred in part and dissented in part. He would have affirmed dismissal across the board, attributing responsibility solely to the landlord. On ADA/§ 504 causation, he viewed plaintiffs’ allegations as speculative that blindness caused the lack of effective notice. On § 1983, he considered the constables’ actions protected by quasi-judicial immunity because their “fidelity” to a facially valid order falls within protected conduct.

The majority, however, treated the inaccessible notice as the denial of a statutory benefit and focused on the constables’ refusal to make reasonable modifications—conduct squarely addressed by ADA regulations—while keeping open the possibility that the constables had discretion to pause execution to comply with federal law. The core divide is whether accessibility duties fall on enforcement officers in real time (majority) or whether officers are immunized when simply carrying out a court order despite disability-related barriers (dissent). Even though nonprecedential, the majority’s approach provides a detailed road map for pleading and proving ADA/§ 504 claims in the eviction context.

Conclusion

This decision underscores that the procedural protections surrounding eviction enforcement are “services” subject to the ADA and § 504. When officers know an occupant has a disability, they must ensure effective, accessible notice and consider reasonable modifications in timing or method before forcibly removing people from their homes. The Third Circuit’s opinion also reaffirms a critical limit on quasi-judicial immunity: officers may be shielded for executing a court’s command, but not for how they exercise discretion in doing so, especially where disability rights are at stake.

Key takeaways:

Accessible eviction notice is not optional—public entities must provide it or reasonably modify procedures to avoid disability discrimination.
Refusal to accommodate can itself satisfy ADA/§ 504 causation at the pleading stage (but-for under Title II; sole cause under § 504).
Quasi-judicial immunity does not automatically bar individual-capacity claims targeting the manner/timing of execution; factual development may be necessary.
Official-capacity prospective claims require plausible allegations of ongoing violations or policies; a single incident typically will not suffice.

While nonprecedential, this opinion is a significant signal to courts, constables, sheriffs, and landlords across the Third Circuit: disability accessibility obligations travel with the state’s enforcement power. Evict first, ask questions later is not consistent with federal disability law.