ACCA Enhancement Inapplicable to Puerto Rico Article 173B Motor‐Vehicle Robbery

Introduction

The case of Rodríguez-Méndez v. United States (1st Cir. 2025) arises from Julio A. Rodríguez-Méndez’s collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on two fronts: (1) his 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) “felon-in-possession” conviction on double-jeopardy grounds, and (2) his sentence enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), based on three prior Puerto Rico motor‐vehicle robbery convictions (Art. 173B). The key legal questions were (a) whether a successive prosecution by Puerto Rico and by the federal government for the same weapon possession violated double jeopardy after Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle, 579 U.S. 59 (2016); and (b) whether Puerto Rico’s Article 173B robbery qualifies as a “violent felony” predicate under the ACCA after Johnson v. United States (Johnson II), 576 U.S. 591 (2015).

Summary of the Judgment

The First Circuit held:

Double Jeopardy: Rodríguez’s conviction under § 922(g)(1) and his earlier Puerto Rico conviction under Article 5.04 are distinct offenses for Blockburger purposes. Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof of “lack of license,” and Article 5.04 does not require proof of felon status or interstate commerce. Accordingly, successive prosecution did not violate double jeopardy.
ACCA Enhancement: Article 173B (“robbery of a motor vehicle by violence or intimidation with an object capable of causing grave bodily injury”) does not categorically qualify as a “violent felony.” Its indivisible element “violence or intimidation” can be satisfied by threats to property alone, which falls outside the ACCA’s force clause (“use or threatened use of physical force against the person of another”) and does not fit the generic extortion concept under the enumerated offenses clause. The ACCA enhancement was therefore invalid, and Rodríguez’s sentence is vacated in part.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932): Established the “same-elements” test for double jeopardy; two offenses are separate if each requires proof of an element the other does not.
Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle, 579 U.S. 59 (2016): Held that Puerto Rico and the United States are the same sovereign for double-jeopardy purposes.
Johnson II, 576 U.S. 591 (2015): Struck the ACCA’s residual clause; confined “violent felony” to (i) the force clause and (ii) the enumerated offenses clause.
Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) & Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500 (2016): Articulated the categorical approach for determining ACCA predicates.
United States v. Almonte-Núñez, 963 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2020): Applied Blockburger to Puerto Rico Article 5.04 and federal § 922(g), finding separate offenses.

2. Legal Reasoning

a. Double Jeopardy and Blockburger Test

Blockburger requires comparison of statutory elements, not overlapping facts. Two successive prosecutions violate double jeopardy only if each crime “contains an element not contained in the other.”
Section 922(g)(1): “Possession of a firearm by a person with a felony conviction,” requiring proof of felon status and interstate commerce.
Article 5.04 (Puerto Rico Weapons Law): “Carrying a weapon without a license,” requiring proof of lack of license, but not felon status or commerce nexus.
Conclusion: Different elements ⇒ separate offenses ⇒ no double-jeopardy bar.

b. ACCA Categorical Approach

Post-Johnson II, a “violent felony” must satisfy either:
1. Force clause: “Use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another” (18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)).
2. Enumerated clause: One of the listed offenses such as burglary, arson, extortion (18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
Categorical approach: Compare the elements of the prior‐conviction statute to the generic definition; ignore underlying conduct.
Article 173B (“robbery of a motor vehicle by violence or intimidation with an object capable of grave bodily injury”) is indivisible with respect to “violence or intimidation.”
• Under the force clause, “intimidation” may include threats against property, not necessarily threats to persons. That overbroad meaning fails to guarantee a “threatened use of physical force against the person of another.”
• Under the enumerated clause, generic extortion requires “obtaining property from another with his consent induced by wrongful threats.” Article 173B does not require induced consent—robbery “against his will” can occur without any acquiescence.
Conclusion: Article 173B sweeps more broadly than either ACCA definition and thus cannot serve as a predicate violent felony.

3. Impact

Clarifies that Puerto Rico’s motor-vehicle robbery statute (Art. 173B) cannot support ACCA enhancements.
Reinforces strict application of the categorical approach post-Johnson II: statutes with elements broader than the ACCA’s clauses yield no predicate offense.
Confirms continuing vitality of Blockburger in successive Commonwealth–federal prosecutions after Sánchez Valle.
Guides defense counsel to challenge existing ACCA enhancements based on Art. 173B convictions and compels sentencing courts to reevaluate similar priors.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Blockburger Test: Two crimes are distinct if each one requires proof of an element the other does not, regardless of overlapping facts.
Categorical Approach: Judges compare the statutory elements of a past conviction against the generic federal definition of the predicate offense without delving into case-specific conduct.
ACCA Force Clause: Only statutes requiring “physical force against the person of another” qualify.
Enumerated Offense Clause: Only generic offenses listed in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (e.g., extortion, burglary) count, and the state statute must match the generic definition exactly.

Conclusion

The First Circuit’s decision in Rodríguez-Méndez underscores two complementary themes: the primacy of statutory elements in both double-jeopardy and ACCA‐predicate analyses, and the high bar imposed on governments seeking enhanced sentences under the ACCA after its residual clause was invalidated. While § 922(g)(1) and Puerto Rico’s unlicensed‐carry statute remain separable for successive prosecutions, Puerto Rico’s Article 173B motor-vehicle robbery does not meet the ACCA’s narrowed definitions of a violent felony. Rodríguez’s ACCA‐based enhancement is vacated, reaffirming rigorous adherence to the categorical approach and protecting defendants from overbroad sentencing enhancements.