Abusive Employer Lawsuits as Attempted Forced Labor and Permissive Forum Clauses in Physician Immigration Contracts: Commentary on Hemant Patel M.D., P.C. v. Bandikatla (2d Cir. 2025)

Abusive Employer Lawsuits as Attempted Forced Labor and Permissive Forum Clauses in Physician Immigration Contracts

Comprehensive Commentary on Hemant Patel M.D., P.C. v. Bandikatla, 24-988(L), 24‑1071 (2d Cir. Nov. 24, 2025) (Summary Order)

Important Note: The decision commented on here is a Second Circuit summary order. As the court itself emphasizes, such orders are non‑precedential, though they may be cited under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and Local Rule 32.1.1. The analysis below therefore treats the order as an instructive application and synthesis of existing law, not as binding precedent.

I. Introduction

This case sits at the intersection of immigration law, physician employment contracts in underserved communities, the federal Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA), and federal jurisdiction doctrines.

Parties:

  • Plaintiff–Counter‑Defendant–Appellant: Hemant Patel, M.D., P.C. (“HPMDPC”), a New York professional corporation that owns and operates a medical practice in New York City. Dr. Hemant Patel is its CEO and a shareholder.
  • Defendant–Counter‑Claimant–Appellee: Dr. Thejaswi Bandikatla, an Indian‑born physician who entered the United States on a J‑1 exchange visitor visa to complete residency and later practiced in New York under an H‑1B visa sponsored by HPMDPC, before moving to Florida.

Core factual setting: HPMDPC employed Dr. Bandikatla under a contract tied to the J‑1 waiver program, which requires foreign physicians to practice for three years in underserved areas as a condition of remaining in the United States. When family medical issues compelled her to relocate to Florida, she obtained a federal “extenuating circumstances” determination allowing transfer of her H‑1B visa to a Florida employer. HPMDPC responded with a sweeping lawsuit seeking specific performance or massive damages, plus injunctive relief, and sued the new employer as well.

The resulting litigation produced:

  • Multiple pretrial rulings (motions to remand, dismiss, and for summary judgment),
  • A jury verdict in favor of the doctor on:
    • Her counterclaim for breach of contract (unpaid wages), and
    • Her TVPA claim premised on HPMDPC’s alleged abuse of legal process to coerce her labor,
  • A mid‑trial Rule 50 dismissal of HPMDPC’s own breach of contract claim, and
  • A substantial award of attorneys’ fees and costs to the doctor.

On appeal, HPMDPC attacked:

  • The removal to federal court (domicile and a supposed mandatory forum clause),
  • Dismissal of its fraud, prima facie tort, fiduciary duty, and implied covenant claims,
  • Refusal to grant summary judgment against the TVPA counterclaim,
  • Mid‑trial dismissal of its contract claim,
  • The TVPA jury instructions and denial of judgment as a matter of law, and
  • The attorneys’ fee and cost award.

The Second Circuit affirmed across the board.

Broad significance (despite nonprecedential status):

  • It illustrates how employer‑initiated civil litigation may, in context, support a TVPA claim for attempted forced labor by abuse of legal process.
  • It clarifies how J‑1 waiver service obligations and the INA’s “extenuating circumstances” exception can shape the meaning of physician employment contracts.
  • It reinforces that common language such as “submit to” or “irrevocably consent to” jurisdiction, with venue specified, creates a permissive, not mandatory, forum selection clause in the Second Circuit.
  • It reaffirms core doctrines on diversity jurisdiction and domicile, duplicative contract‑tort claims, fiduciary duty in employment, post‑trial review of summary judgment rulings, and fee‑shifting standards.

II. Summary of the Second Circuit’s Opinion

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of Dr. Bandikatla, holding:

  1. Removal and jurisdiction:
    • The case was properly removed to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction; by the time the complaint was filed, Dr. Bandikatla had established domicile in Florida.
    • The employment agreement’s choice‑of‑law/consent‑to‑jurisdiction clause was permissive and did not bar removal.
  2. Dismissal of HPMDPC’s tort and quasi‑contract claims:
    • The fraud, prima facie tort, and implied covenant claims were duplicative of the breach of contract claim and were properly dismissed.
    • No fiduciary duty arose from the employment and visa sponsorship relationship; the fiduciary duty claim was thus correctly dismissed.
  3. Summary judgment on the TVPA claim:
    • Because the case had gone to a full jury trial, the court lacked authority to review the earlier denial of summary judgment on the TVPA claim, pursuant to Ortiz v. Jordan.
  4. Dismissal of HPMDPC’s breach of contract claim at trial:
    • The district court properly granted judgment as a matter of law (Rule 50) for Dr. Bandikatla: the employment contract unambiguously incorporated INA § 214(l), including the extenuating circumstances exception.
    • Because USCIS had found extenuating circumstances and approved her waiver transfer, she did not breach the contract by leaving before three years.
    • The law‑of‑the‑case doctrine did not prevent the district court from revisiting its earlier denial of summary judgment on this issue.
  5. TVPA jury instructions and verdict:
    • The challenged language in the TVPA jury instructions, describing an “abusive lawsuit wrongly brought,” was not erroneous or prejudicial; read in context, it summarized the doctor’s theory, not a judicial conclusion.
    • The denial of judgment as a matter of law on the TVPA verdict was affirmed; HPMDPC’s arguments largely overlapped with its jury‑instruction challenge; any sufficiency arguments raised only in the reply brief were deemed waived.
  6. Attorneys’ fees and costs:
    • The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding over $259,000 in attorneys’ fees and $10,206.38 in costs to Dr. Bandikatla, based on:
      • The jury’s award of the “costs of her defense,”
      • A fee‑shifting clause in the employment contract, and
      • The fee‑shifting provision of the TVPA, 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a).
    • The fee agreements were not contingent fee agreements subject to New York’s retainer‑statement filing rule, and the size of the award relative to the monetary damages was not unreasonable, particularly where the defendant did not initiate the litigation and prevailed on all claims.

III. Case Background and Procedural History

A. Immigration and Employment Context

Dr. Thejaswi Bandikatla, born and educated in India, entered the United States in 2012 under a J‑1 exchange visitor visa to complete her medical residency. Ordinarily, J‑1 physician visa holders must return to their home country for two years after the program ends. However, under INA § 214(l), a “J‑1 waiver” allows a doctor to remain in the U.S. if she:

  • Signs an employment contract to practice full‑time medicine in an underserved area for at least three years, and
  • Obtains sponsorship from a state health department.

Once the waiver is recommended and granted, the employer must secure an H‑1B visa for the physician by:

  1. Obtaining a U.S. Department of Labor labor condition certification, and
  2. Filing the doctor’s H‑1B petition and DOL certification with the Department of Homeland Security (through USCIS).

In October 2015, HPMDPC offered employment to Dr. Bandikatla under this program. The October 15, 2015 contract included two key provisions:

  • Paragraph 1: HPMDPC “hereby employs Physician as a full‑time doctor in Employer's medical practice for an initial three‑year term commencing within 90 days of J1 waiver and H1B approval,” unless extended or earlier terminated as provided.
  • Paragraph 2: The physician “agrees to the contractual obligations set forth in section 214(l)” of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1184(l)), which:
    • Requires the doctor to begin employment within 90 days of the waiver, and
    • Requires three years of work, “unless the Attorney General determines that extenuating circumstances exist”, in which case the doctor may terminate earlier if she secures a bona fide new employment offer for the remaining period.

USCIS approved the J‑1 waiver and H‑1B on October 12, 2016, and Dr. Bandikatla began working November 3, 2016. Her salary was $150,000 per year; HPMDPC did not pay her for the first few days, characterizing them as unpaid “training days.” Her H‑1B was later extended through December 4, 2020.

B. Move to Florida and Visa Transfer

In early 2018, family health issues required her and her husband to relocate to Florida to care for ill relatives. She secured an offer from Central Florida Medical Associates (CFMA), which agreed to sponsor her H‑1B transfer. In August 2018, CFMA submitted the necessary petition and documentation.

On September 13, 2018, USCIS determined that she had established “extenuating circumstances” under INA § 214(l), and approved the transfer of her H‑1B visa to CFMA. Four days later, on September 17, 2018, she submitted a written resignation to HPMDPC, setting her last day as October 5, 2018. No one responded.

C. HPMDPC’s Lawsuit and Federal Removal

Instead, HPMDPC filed suit in New York state court on October 9, 2018, asserting:

  • Fraud and fraudulent concealment,
  • Breach of contract,
  • Breach of fiduciary duty,
  • Prima facie tort, and
  • Tortious interference against unknown “John Doe” defendants (the future employer),

and seeking specific performance, millions in damages, and an injunction barring her from accepting competing employment “within a reasonable geographic area.”

By then, however, she had moved to Florida. She removed the case to the Southern District of New York on the basis of diversity jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1332), asserting that she was domiciled in Florida. HPMDPC moved to remand, arguing that she remained a New York domiciliary and that the employment contract contained a forum selection clause preventing removal.

Judge Lorna G. Schofield denied the motion to remand on December 20, 2018, and later allowed amendment substituting CFMA and its principal in place of the John Does. Judge Schofield soon dismissed the claim against CFMA and its principal; nonetheless, CFMA fired Dr. Bandikatla in July 2019 because of the lawsuit. By late August 2019, she had secured a new employer‑sponsor.

D. Counterclaims and Pretrial Rulings

HPMDPC’s amended complaint added claims but was largely pruned by motion to dismiss. On December 20, 2019, Dr. Bandikatla filed counterclaims for:

  • Breach of contract (unpaid wages),
  • Violations of the New York City Human Rights Law and the New York State Human Rights Law,
  • Tortious interference with contract, and
  • Violation of the TVPA, 18 U.S.C. § 1589, predicated on alleged abuse of legal process and threats of serious harm.

The TVPA claim was pled on several theories, including forcing her to pay her own H‑1B filing fees, filing “fraudulent” immigration documents, and using abusive litigation tactics (demanding specific performance or $10 million and adding CFMA as a defendant) to coerce her continued labor.

On summary judgment (September 17, 2021), Judge Schofield:

  • Granted HPMDPC summary judgment on:
    • The state and city human rights law claims,
    • The tortious interference claim, and
    • TVPA theories concerning H‑1B fees and allegedly “fraudulent” immigration documents.
  • Denied summary judgment on:
    • The TVPA theory premised on HPMDPC’s aggressive litigation strategy (massive damages demand and claims against CFMA) as an abuse of legal process to coerce labor, and
    • Both sides’ breach of contract claims.

The surviving claims proceeded to a jury trial before Judge Jed S. Rakoff in March 2023, after the case was reassigned.

E. Trial and Judgment

At trial, a crucial turning point came when Dr. Patel conceded that his argument for a three‑year employment obligation rested on paragraph 2 of the contract—i.e., on the physician’s agreement to be bound by INA § 214(l).

Judge Rakoff concluded that the contract, “carefully read,” was unambiguous and incorporated § 214(l) in full, including its extenuating circumstances provision. Since USCIS had already determined that extenuating circumstances existed and approved the H‑1B transfer, the court held as a matter of law that no breach occurred when she left HPMDPC early. The court dismissed HPMDPC’s breach of contract claim under Rule 50.

The jury then considered:

  • Dr. Bandikatla’s breach of contract counterclaim (unpaid wages), and
  • Her TVPA claim premised on abusive litigation to coerce labor.

The jury returned a verdict in her favor, awarding:

  • $4,657.40 in contract damages (unpaid wages), and
  • $45,000 in non‑economic damages on the TVPA claim.

The district court denied HPMDPC’s post‑trial motion for judgment as a matter of law on the TVPA claim (Rule 50). The court also awarded Dr. Bandikatla $259,701.00 in attorneys’ fees and $10,206.38 in costs, after a partial reduction from the lodestar figure.

HPMDPC appealed; the Second Circuit affirmed in this summary order.

IV. Detailed Analysis of the Second Circuit’s Reasoning

A. Diversity Jurisdiction, Domicile, and the Forum Clause

1. Domicile for Diversity: Evidence and Standard of Review

HPMDPC’s first line of attack was jurisdictional: it argued that removal was improper because at the time the complaint was filed, both it and Dr. Bandikatla were domiciled in New York, defeating diversity.

The Second Circuit applied settled principles, citing Briarpatch Ltd., L.P. v. Phoenix Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d 296 (2d Cir. 2004), and Palazzo ex rel. Delmage v. Corio, 232 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 2000):

  • Questions of law in remand decisions are reviewed de novo.
  • Factual findings about domicile (change of residence, intent to remain) are reviewed for clear error.

Palazzo sets the core rule on domicile:

  • To change domicile, two indispensable elements are required:
    1. Residence in the new location, and
    2. Intent to remain there indefinitely.
  • The party asserting a change of domicile bears the burden, and must show the requisite facts by clear and convincing evidence.

The district court found that, before HPMDPC filed suit, Dr. Bandikatla had become domiciled in Florida based on multiple, corroborated factors:

  • She was living with her in‑laws in Hernando, Florida, returning to New York only to work and move belongings.
  • She had signed an employment agreement with CFMA in September 2018.
  • She changed the address on her bank account from New York to Florida.
  • She and her husband applied and were approved for an apartment rental in Maitland, Florida, with an October 26, 2018 move‑in date.
  • Her husband had registered his car and paid taxes in Florida.
  • She applied to transfer the address on her medical license to the Florida employer’s address.

These facts were largely documented (rental application, bank screenshot, vehicle registration, license paperwork) and supported by a declaration from her in‑laws.

HPMDPC tried to undermine this showing by pointing to countervailing signs: a New York address on a pay stub, her physical presence in New York when she received the summons, alleged inconsistencies between her declaration and later trial testimony about the timing of her Florida medical license, and her answer’s admission that the state court had jurisdiction.

The Second Circuit dismissed these arguments:

  • Conflicting evidence about address records and timing did not render the district court’s findings clearly erroneous, particularly in light of strong evidence of her intent to relocate permanently.
  • Her admission that the state court had jurisdiction and that venue was proper said nothing about her domicile; personal jurisdiction can exist over non‑domiciliaries based on business contacts, as illustrated by Porina v. Marward Shipping Co., 521 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2008).
  • The apparent inconsistency in her declaration about “application” dates for Florida licensure was, at most, a matter of imprecise wording (change‑of‑address versus initial license application), and in any event showed only that she may have taken steps toward Florida licensure even earlier—if anything, strengthening the Florida domicile conclusion.

Takeaway: The court reaffirmed that domicile analysis is fact‑intensive and deferential once the district court has weighed the evidence. Mixed indicia (some still pointing to the prior state) do not suffice to overturn a domicile finding backed by clear, contemporaneous steps toward relocation and a credible narrative of intent.

2. The Forum Selection / Choice‑of‑Law Clause: Permissive, Not Mandatory

HPMDPC also argued that the employment agreement’s boilerplate choice‑of‑law and jurisdiction provision formed a mandatory forum selection clause requiring litigation in state courts sitting in New York County, thus barring removal to federal court.

The provision stated:

“This Agreement shall be governed by and be construed in accordance with the laws of the State of New York, without giving effect to conflict of laws, applicable to agreements made and to be performed entirely within such state. The parties hereby irrevocably consent to (i) the jurisdiction of the courts of the State of New York, with venue to lie in the City and County of New York . . . .”

HPMDPC argued that “irrevocably consent” and the venue language implied exclusivity. The Second Circuit, relying on its recent decision in Rabinowitz v. Kelman, 75 F.4th 73 (2d Cir. 2023), rejected this reading.

Rabinowitz clarifies that:

  • A forum selection clause is mandatory only if it contains “specific language of exclusion”—words that clearly indicate that the chosen forum is exclusive (e.g., “only,” “must,” “shall be brought exclusively in”).
  • Clauses that say a party “submits to” or “consents to” the jurisdiction of a forum are permissive, merely allowing suit there, not forbidding suit elsewhere.

Applying that framework, the court held that the language here did no more than establish:

  • New York law would govern the contract, and
  • The parties consented to jurisdiction in New York state courts, with venue in New York County.

It did not contain exclusionary wording that would preclude litigation in federal court. Thus, the clause did not prevent removal.

Practical implication: Contract drafters who intend to require litigation in New York state court must use explicitly exclusive language. Standard consent‑to‑jurisdiction language with a venue specification will be treated as permissive under Second Circuit law.

B. Employer’s Tort and Contract‑Like Claims: Duplicative Theories and No Fiduciary Duty

1. Fraud, Implied Covenant, and Prima Facie Tort as Duplicative Claims

The district court had dismissed HPMDPC’s non‑breach claims—fraud, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and prima facie tort—as merely recasting the breach of contract theory. The Second Circuit agreed.

Fraud: HPMDPC alleged that Dr. Bandikatla fraudulently represented she “would be employed by” HPMDPC for three years. The court, citing Cronos Group Ltd. v. XComIP, LLC, 64 N.Y.S.3d 180 (1st Dep’t 2017), correctly characterized this as an allegation that she entered the contract without the intention to perform it.

Under New York law:

  • A fraud claim cannot be based solely on an alleged false promise of future performance where that promise is identical to a contractual obligation.
  • Such claims are “redundant of a claim for breach of the parties’ contract” and must be dismissed absent a showing of some collateral misrepresentation.

Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing: HPMDPC’s implied covenant claim was based on the same allegation—that she resigned before the end of a supposed three‑year commitment. Citing Tillage Commodities Fund, L.P. v. SS&C Techs., Inc., 58 N.Y.S.3d 28 (1st Dep’t 2017), the court reaffirmed that an implied covenant claim that rests on the same conduct and seeks the same damages as a contract claim is duplicative and must be dismissed.

Prima Facie Tort: HPMDPC’s prima facie tort theory similarly alleged that it was harmed by her leaving before the contractual term. Citing Susman v. Commerzbank Capital Mkts. Corp., 945 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1st Dep’t 2012), the court held that such a claim is likewise impermissibly duplicative of the breach claim. Prima facie tort cannot be used as a “back‑up tort” for every alleged contractual wrong.

HPMDPC’s appellate defense of these claims was described as “threadbare” and conclusory; the Second Circuit declined to engage with them in detail, invoking the principle (ultimately from Ashcroft v. Iqbal) that mere conclusory assertions need not be credited.

2. No Fiduciary Duty Arising from Employment and Visa Sponsorship

HPMDPC’s fiduciary duty claim alleged that, because it sponsored Dr. Bandikatla’s immigration benefits, she owed a special duty of honesty and loyalty beyond ordinary contract duties.

The court relied on its recent decision in Pauwels v. Deloitte LLP, 83 F.4th 171 (2d Cir. 2023), which held that “employment relationships, without more, do not create fiduciary relationships.” While fiduciary relationships can sometimes arise against a commercial backdrop (e.g., investment advisors entrusted with funds and special expertise, as in Kern v. Robert Currie Assocs.), they require:

  • A relationship of particular trust and confidence beyond the norm; and
  • Typically, entrustment of property or control coupled with dependence on the other’s expertise for discretionary decisions.

Here, HPMDPC argued that the immigration sponsorship setting created a heighted trust: beneficiaries must be “truthful and honest” with sponsors in immigration filings, etc. However:

  • HPMDPC cited no authority for the proposition that visa sponsorship per se creates a fiduciary relationship under New York law.
  • The court emphasized that “the mere communication of confidential information is not sufficient in and of itself to create a fiduciary relationship.”
  • Even if the doctor had access to some “confidential” information (which HPMDPC did not clearly specify), that alone does not transform the employment relationship into a fiduciary one.

Accordingly, the fiduciary duty claim failed as a matter of law.

Implication: Employers cannot bootstrap ordinary employment and immigration sponsorship relationships into fiduciary ones without more. Claims of fiduciary breach must rest on a genuinely “special” relationship, not simply on alleged reliance or access to confidential information.

C. The Contract, INA § 214(l), and the Three‑Year Obligation

One of the most practically significant aspects of the decision is the treatment of the physician’s purported three‑year service obligation under the employment contract and INA § 214(l).

1. The Contractual Structure

Two contractual provisions mattered:

  • Paragraph 1 states that the employer “hereby employs Physician . . . for an initial three‑year term” commencing within 90 days of J‑1 waiver and H‑1B approval.
  • Paragraph 2 states that the physician agrees to the “contractual obligations” in INA § 214(l), which require three years of service but include an explicit extenuating circumstances exception.

At trial, Dr. Patel conceded that the three‑year obligation he sought to enforce against the doctor arose from paragraph 2—her agreement to comply with § 214(l)—not only from paragraph 1.

2. Judge Rakoff’s Ruling (Affirmed by the Second Circuit)

Judge Rakoff interpreted the contract as follows:

  • Paragraph 1 imposes a three‑year employment term on the employer—i.e., that HPMDPC will employ her for three years unless the agreement is extended or terminated per its terms.
  • It does not, by its own words, say that the physician irrevocably agrees to work three years.
  • Paragraph 2 is the source of the physician’s three‑year service obligation, and that obligation is defined by reference to § 214(l)—including its built‑in exception for extenuating circumstances.

The court concluded that the contract, “carefully read,” was unambiguous: by incorporating § 214(l), it necessarily incorporated both:

  • The three‑year service requirement, and
  • The possibility that the Attorney General (acting through USCIS) might determine that “extenuating circumstances” justify a shorter stint, so long as the doctor completes the remaining time at another qualifying facility.

Because it was undisputed that USCIS had, in fact, made such a determination and approved the H‑1B transfer to CFMA, Judge Rakoff ruled as a matter of law that Dr. Bandikatla did not breach the contract by leaving HPMDPC early. He granted Rule 50 judgment in her favor on HPMDPC’s contract claim.

3. Law‑of‑the‑Case and Mid‑Trial Rule 50

HPMDPC argued on appeal that the district court should not have dismissed its contract claim mid‑trial because the same claim had survived summary judgment earlier. The Second Circuit rejected this argument, invoking the law‑of‑the‑case doctrine as described in Sagendorf‑Teal v. County of Rensselaer, 100 F.3d 270 (2d Cir. 1996), and Cangemi v. United States, 13 F.4th 115 (2d Cir. 2021):

  • Law‑of‑the‑case is a prudential, not jurisdictional, doctrine.
  • A court can revisit its prior interlocutory rulings before final judgment when warranted by:
    • New evidence,
    • Intervening law, or
    • Clear error or manifest injustice.

Here, the district court had heard new testimony, including Dr. Patel’s trial concession pinpointing paragraph 2 as the basis of the three‑year obligation. It was therefore free to reassess the contract’s meaning in light of the developed evidentiary record. The Second Circuit emphasized that HPMDPC did not even challenge the merits of this interpretive ruling on appeal; it relied solely on procedural law‑of‑the‑case arguments, which failed.

Practical impact: For employers participating in J‑1 waiver programs, contract language that simply incorporates “the obligations of INA § 214(l)” will be read to incorporate not only the three‑year requirement but also the extenuating circumstances escape valve. Employers seeking stricter commitments would need to draft around that explicitly (and even then might collide with immigration policy concerns).

D. The TVPA Claim: Abusive Litigation as Attempted Forced Labor

1. TVPA Framework

The Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) makes it unlawful, in civil and criminal contexts, to obtain (or attempt to obtain) a person’s labor or services by certain coercive means. Relevant here, 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a) prohibits obtaining labor or services:

  • § 1589(a)(2): “by means of serious harm or threats of serious harm,”
  • § 1589(a)(3): “by means of the abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal process,” or
  • § 1589(a)(4): by means of schemes intended to make a person believe that nonperformance will lead to serious harm or physical restraint.

Key definitions in § 1589(c):

  • “Abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal process” means using a law or legal process (civil, criminal, or administrative) “in any manner or for any purpose for which the law was not designed” in order to exert pressure to compel action or inaction.
  • “Serious harm” includes any sufficiently serious harm—physical or nonphysical (psychological, financial, reputational)—that would compel a reasonable person of similar background, in the same circumstances, to perform or continue performing labor to avoid that harm.

Section 1595(a) creates a civil cause of action and authorizes recovery of damages and attorneys’ fees. Section 1594(a) extends liability to attempts to violate § 1589, subject to the usual “substantial step” standard for attempts (as described in United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2011)).

2. The Surviving TVPA Theory in this Case

Judge Schofield granted HPMDPC summary judgment on some of the pleaded TVPA theories—for example, those based on forcing the doctor to pay her H‑1B fees and allegedly “fraudulent” immigration filings. However, she allowed to proceed the theory that HPMDPC attempted to obtain or continue to obtain the doctor’s labor through:

  • Abuse of the legal process by:
    • Demanding specific performance or $10 million in damages without factual basis,
    • Suing her new employer CFMA—and its principal—for millions, also allegedly without basis, thereby placing her Florida employment in jeopardy,
  • With the alleged purpose of coercing her to return to work at HPMDPC rather than relocate as permitted by USCIS’s extenuating circumstances determination.

At trial, the TVPA claim was framed as an attempt under § 1589(a)(3)—i.e., using the “abuse of legal process” prong, not physical force.

3. Nonreviewability of Denied Summary Judgment After Trial

On appeal, HPMDPC tried to challenge the district court’s partial denial of its summary judgment motion on the TVPA claim. The Second Circuit refused to consider this, citing its own precedent in Pahuta v. Massey‑Ferguson, Inc., 170 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 1999), and the Supreme Court’s later, controlling decision in Ortiz v. Jordan, 562 U.S. 180 (2011).

Ortiz holds that, once a case has gone through a full trial on the merits, a party cannot appeal the pretrial denial of summary judgment. Instead, the proper route is to:

  • Move for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50 at trial, and
  • Appeal the denial of that Rule 50 motion, based on the trial evidence, not the pretrial summary judgment record.

Because HPMDPC attempted to challenge only the earlier summary judgment ruling, and the opposing party had not cross‑appealed the grants of summary judgment on other counterclaims, the appellate court declined review.

4. Jury Instructions on “Injury” and “Abusive Lawsuit”

HPMDPC’s main attack on the TVPA verdict focused on the jury instructions, particularly the instruction on the fourth element of the TVPA claim—injury.

The district court defined the first element (acts constituting abuse of legal process) by explaining that the doctor alleged HPMDPC:

  • “abused the legal process by pursuing her for millions of dollars in damages . . . without any factual basis,” and
  • abused process by “naming her now‑former employer . . . as a defendant . . . and demanding millions of dollars in damages from them, also without any factual basis but for purposes of putting additional pressure on” her.

The instruction also noted that HPMDPC denied these allegations and asserted it had legitimate reasons for its litigation choices.

As to the fourth element (injury), the court instructed the jury that injury could be:

  • Economic, “such as the cost of defending an abusive lawsuit wrongly brought by [HPMDPC] against Dr. Bandikatla to try to force her to return to work,” or
  • Psychological, “such as subjecting [her] to unwanted stress.”

HPMDPC objected specifically to the italicized phrase “an abusive lawsuit wrongly brought,” arguing it was the court’s own assessment of the lawsuit’s legitimacy and improperly invaded the jury’s role.

The Second Circuit, reviewing de novo under Saint‑Jean v. Emigrant Mortgage Co., 129 F.4th 124 (2d Cir. 2025), held that:

  • Jury instructions must be assessed as a whole, not parsed “strand‑by‑strand.”
  • Read contextually, the instruction was clearly referencing the doctor’s theory of the case, not stating as fact that the lawsuit was abusive or wrongful.
  • Earlier instructions explicitly told the jury:
    • That HPMDPC denied abusing the legal process, and
    • That the jury had to find each element proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
  • Even the modification HPMDPC sought (“this lawsuit” instead of “an abusive lawsuit wrongly brought”) would still have conveyed that the lawsuit could be a source of injury; what HPMDPC really challenged was the permissible example itself, not the wording.

The court thus found no instructional error and, correspondingly, no prejudice warranting a new trial.

5. Denial of Judgment as a Matter of Law (Rule 50) on the TVPA Claim

HPMDPC also appealed the denial of its Rule 50 motion on the TVPA claim. The standard, as articulated in Ortiz v. Stambach, 137 F.4th 48 (2d Cir. 2025), is whether a reasonable jury could have a “legally sufficient evidentiary basis” for its verdict when viewing the evidence in the non‑movant’s favor.

To prove attempted TVPA violation under § 1589(a)(3), Dr. Bandikatla had to show:

  1. An act (or acts) constituting abuse of law or legal process,
  2. Taken knowingly,
  3. That was a substantial step toward obtaining her labor or services.

In its principal brief, HPMDPC’s argument basically reiterated its jury‑instruction objections rather than undertaking a true sufficiency analysis. In its reply brief, it attempted to raise new sufficiency arguments, but the Second Circuit refused to consider them under the rule of McCarthy v. SEC, 406 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2005), which bars arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.

Accordingly, the denial of judgment as a matter of law stood.

Doctrinally important point: This case underscores that civil litigation itself, when deployed for a purpose for which the legal process was not designed (e.g., primarily to coerce labor rather than to vindicate legitimate contractual rights), can support a TVPA claim under the “abuse of law or legal process” theory—at least at the level of an attempt, and provided the factfinder credits the coercion narrative.

E. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

1. Bases for Fee‑Shifting

The district court awarded $259,701.00 in fees and $10,206.38 in costs—a substantial sum relative to the $49,657.40 in total damages (wage and TVPA damages). The Second Circuit, applying a “highly deferential” abuse‑of‑discretion standard under Rossbach v. Montefiore Medical Center, 81 F.4th 124 (2d Cir. 2023), upheld the award.

The district court identified three independent bases for fee‑shifting:

  1. Jury Verdict on TVPA Claim: The jury awarded the doctor “the costs of her defense,” which the court instructed included reasonable attorneys’ fees.
  2. Contractual Fee‑Shifting Provision: The employment contract apparently contained a clause requiring HPMDPC to pay the doctor’s costs and expenses, including attorneys’ fees, if HPMDPC were found to have breached the agreement. The jury found a breach (unpaid wages).
  3. Statutory Fee‑Shifting under TVPA: 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) expressly authorizes an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees to a prevailing plaintiff.

2. Contingent Fee Argument and New York Retainer Rules

HPMDPC argued that the fee award was invalid because the doctor’s lawyers had a contingent fee arrangement, yet allegedly failed to file the required contingent‑fee “retainer statements” with the New York Office of Court Administration (22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 603.25).

The Second Circuit agreed with the district court that this regulation was “facially inapplicable” to the fee agreements at issue because they were not contingent within the meaning of the rule. Specifically:

  • One law firm billed purely on an hourly basis.
  • The other had a hybrid arrangement: an hourly fee structure with a fee cap, combined with an agreement that, if the firm succeeded on a fee‑shifting claim, a lodestar‑based fee might be sought.

The court viewed this as an hourly arrangement with a possible future adjustment via fee‑shifting, not a fee that was “dependent or contingent in whole or in part upon the successful prosecution or settlement” of the case. Thus, § 603.25 did not apply.

3. Reasonableness of the Fee Award

HPMDPC argued that paying roughly $270,000 in fees to obtain roughly $50,000 in damages was “per se unreasonable.” The Second Circuit rejected this argument for several reasons:

  • The doctor’s damages were not nominal; $45,000 in TVPA damages plus unpaid wages is a meaningful award.
  • Crucially, she did not initiate the litigation; HPMDPC did, seeking millions in damages and injunctive relief that could have had severe professional and personal consequences for her.
  • Her attorneys successfully:
    • Obtained dismissal of all of HPMDPC’s claims,
    • Won on both of her remaining counterclaims, and
    • Secured fee‑shifting via contract and statute.

Under these circumstances, the district court’s partial reduction of the lodestar to account for overall success was well within its discretion. HPMDPC offered no specific critique of the lodestar calculation, hourly rates, or time entries; its challenge was essentially proportionality‑based, which is not controlling, especially in fee‑shifting regimes designed to incentivize vindication of rights that might not otherwise be financially attractive to litigate.

V. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

This section briefly explains several technical concepts used in the opinion.

1. Domicile vs. Residence (for Diversity Jurisdiction)

  • Residence is where a person lives at a given time; a person can have multiple residences.
  • Domicile is a person’s “true, fixed, and permanent home,” the place they intend to return to and remain. A person has one domicile at a time.
  • For federal diversity jurisdiction, what matters is domicile, not citizenship or residency in the ordinary sense.

2. J‑1 Visa Waiver & INA § 214(l)

  • International medical graduates often train in the U.S. on J‑1 visas requiring a two‑year home‑country return.
  • Section 214(l) allows that requirement to be waived if the doctor:
    • Commits to three years of full‑time service in an underserved U.S. area, and
    • Obtains sponsorship from a state health agency, among other conditions.
  • The statute builds in an extenuating circumstances exception: if the facility closes or hardship or similar circumstances exist, the doctor may leave early, but must complete the three years at another qualifying facility.

3. H‑1B Visa

  • A nonimmigrant visa for specialty occupations (including physicians), tied to a specific employer and location.
  • When the employment relationship changes, the employer must file a new or amended petition; for J‑1 waiver cases, the change must be consistent with § 214(l).

4. TVPA – Forced Labor

  • Forced labor under the TVPA does not require physical force or confinement.
  • Coercion can be:
    • Physical (threats of violence),
    • Psychological (threats to family, reputational ruin),
    • Financial (threats to impose ruinous debt), or
    • Legal (abuse of lawsuits, immigration processes, etc.).
  • “Abuse of legal process” means using a legal system tool—lawsuits, administrative proceedings, criminal complaints—for purposes outside its proper scope, to pressure someone into exploitation.

5. Attempt Liability Under the TVPA

  • You can be liable for an attempt to obtain forced labor (18 U.S.C. § 1594(a)), even if the victim ultimately avoids performing the demanded labor.
  • The law requires proof that:
    • The defendant intended to obtain forced labor by prohibited means, and
    • Took a substantial step in furtherance of that goal (e.g., filing and prosecuting an abusive lawsuit intended to coerce the victim’s service).

6. Forum Selection Clause – Mandatory vs. Permissive

  • A mandatory clause specifies that disputes “must” or “shall be brought exclusively” in a certain forum; other forums are excluded.
  • A permissive clause merely says that parties “submit to” or “consent to” jurisdiction of a forum; it does not bar actions elsewhere.
  • The Second Circuit looks for “specific language of exclusion” to find a clause mandatory.

7. Duplicative Claims in Contract Disputes

  • Under New York law, fraud, implied covenant, and prima facie tort claims cannot simply restate a contract breach in tort clothing.
  • To survive, they must:
    • Be based on obligations or misrepresentations that are distinct from the contract promises, and
    • Seek different damages.

8. Law‑of‑the‑Case Doctrine

  • A flexible doctrine that discourages but does not forbid courts from revisiting their own earlier rulings in the same case.
  • It typically yields to:
    • New evidence,
    • Intervening legal authority, or
    • Correction of clear error or manifest injustice.
  • Interlocutory decisions like denial of summary judgment can be revisited at or after trial if the record has evolved.

9. Summary Judgment vs. Rule 50 (Judgment as a Matter of Law)

  • Summary judgment (Rule 56) is decided on pleadings and pretrial evidence; it is not appealable after a full trial as to denials (per Ortiz v. Jordan).
  • Rule 50 judgment as a matter of law is decided at or after trial, based on the trial evidence; denials can be appealed.

10. Attorneys’ Fees – Lodestar and Fee‑Shifting

  • The lodestar is calculated by multiplying reasonable hours by reasonable hourly rates.
  • Courts may adjust the lodestar up or down based on factors like results obtained.
  • Fee‑shifting provisions—contractual or statutory—allow the prevailing party to recover fees from the loser, shifting litigation costs.

VI. Likely Impact and Practical Lessons

Although this is a nonprecedential summary order, it offers several practical lessons for lawyers, employers, and workers, especially in the context of foreign medical graduates and employment‑based immigration.

1. For Employers of Foreign Physicians (Especially J‑1 Waiver Participants)

  • Incorporation of INA § 214(l): If an employment contract imports “the obligations” of § 214(l), it likely brings in both the three‑year term and the extenuating circumstances exception. Employers cannot easily argue for a rigid three‑year obligation when the contract explicitly subordinates that term to the statutory framework.
  • Lawsuits as Coercion Risk: Aggressive litigation tactics designed primarily to discourage foreign physicians from leaving—especially those involving:
    • Extremely large, arguably baseless damages claims, and
    • Attacks on subsequent employers (leading to job loss),
    may support TVPA liability theories for abusive legal process as attempted forced labor, particularly where immigration vulnerabilities are in play.
  • Forum Clauses: If an employer truly wants to require state‑court litigation in New York, the contract must use explicitly exclusive language; mere consent to jurisdiction is insufficient.

2. For Workers and Their Counsel (Especially Immigrant Professionals)

  • TVPA as a Shield: The TVPA may be invoked not only in classic trafficking scenarios but also where employers exploit immigration‑linked dependency and the legal system to coerce continued employment.
  • Attempt Liability Matters: Workers who successfully resist coercion (for instance, who obtain a favorable USCIS determination and exit a job) may still recover for attempted forced labor if they prove abuse of legal process and serious harm.
  • Fee‑Shifting Can Level the Field: When contracts and statutes both provide for fee‑shifting, defendants can realistically defend against aggressive employer suits, knowing their attorneys’ fees may be recoverable if they prevail.

3. For Contract Drafters

  • Clarity in Term Obligations: Contracts should clearly distinguish:
    • The employer’s obligation to employ the worker for a certain term, and
    • The worker’s obligation to remain employed, and under what conditions early departure is allowed.
  • Careful Use of Statutory Incorporation: Incorporating statutes “as contractual obligations” imports the entire statutory scheme, including exceptions and safety valves.
  • Forum Clauses and Choice of Law: To create an exclusive New York forum, include express exclusivity language (“only,” “must,” “shall be brought exclusively”). Otherwise, removal to federal court likely remains available.

4. For Litigators Managing Removal and Domicile Issues

  • Document the Domicile Change: To support diversity, gather robust evidence of:
    • Physical relocation,
    • Banking and licensing address changes,
    • Lease or property arrangements, and
    • Tax and vehicle registrations.
  • Expect Mixed Signals: Single items like a pay stub or a temporary presence in the old state are rarely decisive against a well‑documented relocation.
  • Beware of Over‑reading Admissions: Admissions of jurisdiction or venue in pleadings do not necessarily concede domicile; personal jurisdiction can be based on business conduct unrelated to residence.

5. For Appellate Practitioners

  • Preserving Issues Post‑Trial: Denials of summary judgment are generally unreviewable after trial; counsel must:
    • Make (and renew) Rule 50 motions, and
    • Frame appellate arguments around the trial record.
  • Don’t Save Arguments for Reply: New arguments in a reply brief—even if raised below—are considered waived in the Second Circuit.

VII. Conclusion: Key Takeaways in the Broader Legal Context

Hemant Patel M.D., P.C. v. Bandikatla is a nonprecedential decision, but it offers a rich case study in how federal courts address disputes at the intersection of immigration‑conditioned employment, contract law, and anti‑trafficking statutes.

The Second Circuit’s summary order underscores several core points:

  • Jurisdiction & Domicile: Domicile is a function of both physical presence and intent; well‑documented relocation efforts, even amid some contrary indicators, will be respected under a clear‑error standard. Admissions about jurisdiction do not equate to domicile.
  • Forum Selection Clauses: Common “consent to jurisdiction” language with a venue designation is permissive, not mandatory. Drafters wanting exclusivity must speak clearly.
  • Contract vs. Tort: New York courts remain intolerant of attempts to dress pure contract disputes in tort clothing. Fraud, implied covenant, and prima facie tort claims must be meaningfully distinct from breach of contract to survive.
  • No Fiduciary Duty from Sponsorship Alone: Employment and visa sponsorship, even where the employer undertakes immigration filings, do not, without more, create a fiduciary relationship under New York law.
  • Statutory Incorporation in Contracts: When a contract incorporates a statutory scheme as a source of obligations, it also incorporates statutory exceptions like INA § 214(l)’s extenuating circumstances provision; employers cannot selectively enforce only the favorable parts.
  • TVPA and Abuse of Legal Process: Civil lawsuits can, in appropriate circumstances, constitute an “abuse of law or legal process” under the TVPA. When such litigation is used as a tool to coerce continued labor, especially against vulnerable parties with immigration dependencies, it may give rise to forced labor or attempted forced labor claims.
  • Procedural Discipline: Appellate review is shaped by strict rules:
    • Denials of summary judgment are off‑limits post‑trial;
    • Rule 50 is the proper vehicle to preserve sufficiency arguments;
    • Arguments first aired in a reply brief are waived.
  • Fee‑Shifting and Access to Justice: Robust fee‑shifting—by contract and by statute—can protect workers who are sued in a manner that may be coercive. Courts are willing to award substantial fees even when damages are modest, particularly when the prevailing party did not initiate the suit and successfully defeats sweeping claims.

In broader perspective, the case serves as a cautionary tale for employers tempted to use litigation and immigration leverage to deter foreign professionals from exercising lawful options such as extenuating‑circumstance transfers. It also illustrates the potential power of the TVPA, in combination with traditional contract principles and fee‑shifting, to safeguard worker autonomy in sophisticated professional settings well beyond the paradigmatic trafficking context.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Comments