Abuse of Judicial Prestige and Ex Parte Emergency Relief: The Louisiana Supreme Court’s Six‑Month Suspension in In re Judge Royale Colbert

I. Introduction

The Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in In re: Judge Royale Colbert, No. 2025‑O‑00994 (La. Dec. 11, 2025), is a significant development in the state’s judicial discipline jurisprudence. The court imposed a six‑month suspension without pay, mandated anger management treatment, and taxed costs, arising from two distinct episodes:

• Count I (The District / TRO incident): ex parte communications and issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) on a Saturday to permit a concert at a Lafayette venue (“The District”) to proceed, despite no petition having been filed and no assignment of the matter to Judge Colbert’s division.
• Count II (Traffic stop incident): a roadside encounter in which Judge Colbert, stopped for running a red light, behaved in a combative and threatening manner towards a Lafayette police officer, repeatedly invoking his judicial status and threatening to destroy the officer’s credibility in court.

The Judiciary Commission of Louisiana (“Commission”) found multiple violations of the Louisiana Code of Judicial Conduct and Article V, § 25(C) of the Louisiana Constitution and recommended a 30‑day suspension and anger management. The Supreme Court agreed with the findings of misconduct, but found the recommended sanction “too lenient,” instead imposing a six‑month suspension. The court anchored that enhanced sanction largely in out‑of‑state precedent addressing judges who invoke the prestige of judicial office in dealings with law enforcement.

This opinion is important for at least three reasons:

1. It clarifies the procedural and ethical limits on judges’ involvement in emergency injunctive relief, especially ex parte weekend TROs.
2. It firmly establishes that a judge’s abuse of the “prestige of office” in a traffic stop or similar encounter with police is serious willful misconduct warranting a lengthy suspension.
3. It signals a willingness by the Louisiana Supreme Court to move sanctions upward beyond the Commission’s recommendations when the integrity and appearance of impartial justice are at stake.

II. Factual Background and Procedural History

A. Count I – The District Concert and the Improper TRO

On Friday, August 13, 2021, the Lafayette Police Department, citing safety concerns after a recent shooting, closed a concert venue known as The District, effectively cancelling a concert scheduled for the following day. The venue’s attorney called Judge Royale Colbert to explore seeking a TRO to prevent the closure.

In that unsolicited, ex parte communication, the judge remarked that the timing of the closure on a Friday was “BS” and indicated that if asked, he would sign a TRO. Shortly thereafter, the Lafayette City Attorney contacted the judge after learning of the possible TRO. In that second ex parte call, the judge:

• indicated he planned to grant a TRO,
• used profanity, referring to the closure as “bullsh*t” and “chickensh*t,” and
• agreed to meet at the courthouse on Saturday to discuss the matter.

On Saturday, August 14, 2021, the judge convened a meeting in his courtroom with counsel for The District and the City:

• No petition for injunctive relief had been filed.
• No case had been assigned to his division.
• No witnesses were sworn.
• No court staff or court reporter were present.
• No procedural rules were followed.

Believing he was mediating, the judge brokered additional security measures and then signed a TRO allowing the concert to proceed. He testified he considered the loss of a $60,000 deposit to the performer to be “irreparable damage” under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3601, justifying injunctive relief.

B. Count II – The Traffic Stop and Threats to a Police Officer

In May 2023, Officer Dominique Robinson, a Lafayette police officer, observed Judge Colbert run a clearly red traffic light. Dashcam footage, as described by the Commission and the court, showed the judge driving an entire block toward an obviously red light and then proceeding through it. The officer initiated a traffic stop.

The encounter lasted about 17 minutes and was captured on both dashcam and body camera video. Key elements included:

• The judge immediately exited his truck and approached the officer before the patrol car fully stopped.
• When the officer tried to de‑escalate by saying “a mistake is a mistake,” the judge retorted sharply that he had made “no mistake” and told the officer to “write your ticket.”
• The judge refused to obey the officer’s instruction to stand at the front of his vehicle.
• The officer, not recognizing the judge, called for a supervisor and asked over the radio: “Who is Royale Colbert?” noting that Colbert had “flashed a badge” and refused to comply. The judge conceded he carried his old Assistant District Attorney badge in his wallet.
• Throughout the interaction, the judge:
  • used repeated profanity,
  • called the officer a “liar,”
  • twice said in substance “let him lie” and “let him come to court,”
  • stated “you have no idea who you’re talking to,”
  • identified himself as “Fifteenth Judicial District Court,”
  • refused to sign the ticket, and
  • threatened to ensure the officer’s “credibility is shot” and that he “might as well leave the district.”

Officer Robinson testified that:

• Pre‑COVID, someone who refused to sign a ticket might be brought to jail; but “because of Covid and also because of who he is, obviously, I wasn't going to put him in cuffs and bring him to jail.”
• He felt the judge was employing his power and status to intimidate him.
• He was very concerned that an adverse credibility judgment from a district judge would undermine his ability to function as a police officer.
• Since the incident, he had not and likely would not send warrant requests to the judge, out of fear of bias or reprisal.

Before the Commission, the judge ultimately acknowledged, “I was attempting to intimidate the officer. I make no excuses.”

C. Commission Proceedings and Supreme Court Review

The events involving the TRO were reported by the media, prompting Commission investigation. Separately, the Lafayette Police Department filed a judicial complaint about the traffic stop.

After investigation, the Commission issued a Notice of Hearing alleging violations of:

• Canons 1, 2, 2A, 2B, 3A(1), 3A(3), 3A(4), and 3A(6) of the Code of Judicial Conduct; and
• Article V, § 25(C) of the Louisiana Constitution.

Judge Colbert:

• stipulated to the material facts and to the conclusions of law,
• agreed his conduct violated the judicial canons, and
• appeared before the Commission to testify.

The Commission accepted the stipulations (while reserving the right to add findings), found all the alleged canon and constitutional violations, and concluded the misconduct caused substantial harm to public confidence in and respect for the judiciary. It recommended:

• a 30‑day suspension without pay, and
• anger management treatment.

A joint motion to waive briefing and oral argument was granted. The Supreme Court thus decided the case on the Commission’s record and recommendations.

III. Summary of the Court’s Decision

The Louisiana Supreme Court:

• Found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Judge Colbert committed judicial misconduct on both counts.
• Held that, in Count I, the judge:
  • engaged in improper ex parte communications,
  • prejudged a matter before any case was filed,
  • issued a TRO in direct contravention of the Code of Civil Procedure (no petition, no verified pleadings, no record), and
  • misapplied the concept of “irreparable injury.”
• Held that, in Count II, the judge:
  • abused the prestige and authority of his office,
  • attempted to intimidate a police officer with threats to his credibility and career,
  • failed to comply with basic lawful instructions during a traffic stop, and
  • thereby engaged in willful and public conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.
• Found violations of:
  • Canons 1, 2, 2A, 2B, 3A(1), 3A(3), 3A(4), 3A(6) of the Code of Judicial Conduct; and
  • Article V, § 25(C) of the Louisiana Constitution (willful misconduct relating to official duty, and persistent/public conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, bringing the judicial office into disrepute).
• Determined that the Commission’s recommended 30‑day suspension was inadequate, particularly in light of the traffic‑stop misconduct, and instead:
  • Suspended Judge Colbert from office for six months without pay.
  • Ordered him to attend anger management classes.
  • Assessed costs of $2,635.96 in favor of the Judiciary Commission.

Chief Justice Weimer concurred in the result but wrote separately to say the sanction was still too lenient and to offer a broader reflection on “black robe fever” (judicial arrogance). Justice Guidry dissented, joined in result preferences also by Justices Hughes and Griffin in separate notations, arguing the Commission’s 30‑day recommendation was sufficient or that, at most, a 90‑day suspension should be imposed.

IV. Legal Analysis

A. Framework: Judicial Discipline in Louisiana

Under Article V, § 25(C) of the Louisiana Constitution, the Supreme Court has exclusive original jurisdiction in judicial discipline cases and may:

• censure,
• suspend,
• remove from office, and/or
• disqualify a judge from future judicial office,

when the judge engages in, among other things, willful misconduct relating to official duty or persistent and public conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the office into disrepute.

The Code of Judicial Conduct, adopted by the court, supplies specific ethical norms. The Commission investigates and recommends findings and sanctions, but the Supreme Court independently evaluates both the misconduct and the appropriate penalty. The burden of proof is clear and convincing evidence (citing In re Hunter, 823 So.2d 325 (La. 2002)).

In setting sanctions, the court applies the multifactor analysis articulated in In re Chaisson, 549 So.2d 259 (La. 1989), which considers, among other things, patterns of conduct, context, acknowledgment and remorse, prior discipline, impact on the judiciary, and the extent of exploitation of judicial office.

B. Count I – Ex Parte TRO and Misuse of Judicial Authority

1. Violations of Procedural Law (La. C.C.P. arts. 3601 and 3603)

The majority grounded its conclusion that the TRO was improperly issued in the text of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure:

• Article 3601 requires that an injunction issue only where:
  • irreparable injury, loss, or damage may result; and
  • “except as otherwise provided by law, an application for injunctive relief shall be by petition.”
  It further contemplates that TROs and preliminary injunctions are available “during the pendency of an action for an injunction,” i.e., after a lawsuit has been initiated.
• Article 3603 allows a TRO without notice only when:
  • It “clearly appears from specific facts shown by a verified petition, supporting affidavit, or equivalent affirmation” that immediate and irreparable injury will result before the other side can be heard; and
  • The applicant’s attorney certifies in writing the efforts made to give notice or reasons why notice should not be required.

The court identified two fundamental defects:

1. No petition, no verified pleadings, and no record. The TRO was issued without an application or petition being filed. This is not a mere technicality; it deprived the process of any sworn factual basis and produced no appealable record.
2. Mistaken concept of “irreparable injury.” The judge treated a $60,000 deposit as “irreparable damage,” but, relying on Terrebonne Parish Police Jury v. Matherne, 405 So.2d 314, 319 (La. 1981), the court reiterated that irreparable injury is that which cannot be adequately compensated in money or measured by pecuniary standards. A lost deposit is quintessentially compensable in damages.

Although the judge testified he also considered damage to reputation and goodwill, the court underscored that no evidence of such intangible harm was presented.

2. Ex Parte Communications and Prejudgment

The court emphasized several interconnected judicial ethics violations:

• The judge participated in ex parte communications with the venue’s attorney and the City Attorney about a developing legal dispute—before any case was filed.
• During those conversations, he:
  • expressed a clear opinion about the merits (“BS,” “bullsh*t,” “chickensh*t”), and
  • indicated in advance how he would rule (“if requested, he would sign a TRO”; “planned to grant a TRO”).
• He then followed through, convening a Saturday session, negotiating security terms, and signing the TRO—with no case filed and no adversarial procedure.

This conduct implicated and violated multiple canons:

• Canon 1: failure to personally observe high standards of conduct to preserve the independence and integrity of the judiciary.
• Canon 2 & 2A: appearance of impropriety and failure to respect and comply with the law and to act in a manner that promotes public confidence in judicial integrity and impartiality.
• Canon 3A(1): failure to be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in it.
• Canon 3A(3): failure to be patient, dignified, and courteous to those dealt with in official capacity (profanity and intemperate language).
• Canon 3A(4): failure to perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice (prejudging the request and advocating for one side).
• Canon 3A(6): engaging in ex parte communications designed to influence judicial action.

By “commenting on a potential legal matter, then taking judicial action without any pleadings being filed,” the court held, the judge failed to act as a “neutral, detached judge” and instead became an advocate.

3. Prior Cases on Ex Parte Communications and Emergency Relief

The court situated Count I within Louisiana precedent involving ex parte conduct and misuse of judicial process:

• In re Best, 195 So.3d 460 (La. 2016): Fifteen‑day suspension without pay where a judge engaged in ex parte communications and adjudicated a matter without prosecutorial participation.
• In re Canaday, 372 So.3d 328 (La. 2023): Public censure for ex parte communications, giving the appearance of committing to rule on a motion to unseal records that had not yet been filed, and summarily granting the motion without the required hearing.
• In re Cresap, 940 So.2d 624 (La. 2006): Thirty‑day suspension without pay for inappropriate conduct during a motion‑to‑recuse hearing and engaging in ex parte communications.
• In re Elloie, 921 So.2d 882 (La. 2006) (cited in the concurrence): Emphasized that procedural rules help avoid the appearance of impropriety and forum shopping, and promote efficient court operation.

These cases help fix the approximate weight of the Count I misconduct in the sanction calculus. The court regarded them as “helpful with respect to Count I,” but inadequate to account for the separate, more aggravated misconduct in Count II.

Additionally, the court noted that this was not the first ex parte issue in the judge’s record. In July 2022, the Commission had sent him a letter of caution for engaging in ex parte communications in an unrelated case in which a litigant raised concerns about a shared Masonic affiliation. That caution specifically reminded him:

• that ex parte conversations are improper, and
• that he should not have addressed a party directly on recusal absent a proper motion.

The repetition of ex parte behavior after a formal caution was a serious aggravating factor under the Chaisson framework.

C. Count II – Traffic Stop, Intimidation, and Abuse of Prestige

1. Canon and Constitutional Violations

The Supreme Court found that the traffic‑stop conduct violated:

• Canon 1: undermining the integrity and independence of the judiciary through belligerent and abusive conduct.
• Canon 2 & 2A: failing to avoid the appearance of impropriety and to act in a way that promotes public confidence in integrity and impartiality—particularly by appearing to be “above the law” in a basic traffic encounter.
• Canon 2B: lending the prestige of judicial office to advance private interests (invoking his judgeship to intimidate the officer and to influence how his own citation and future cases involving that officer would be treated).
• Article V, § 25(C): engaging in both
  • “willful misconduct relating to his official duty,” and
  • “persistent and public conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute.”

The court highlighted that the officers remained calm and professional, while the judge:

• used profanity and called the officer a liar,
• refused to obey lawful instructions,
• refused to sign the citation,
• openly invoked his judicial status (“Fifteenth Judicial District Court”),
• threatened to destroy the officer’s credibility before other judges (“we'll see how that works”), and
• announced he would obtain the officer’s “whole record” and indicated the officer “might as well leave the district.”

The testimony of Officer Robinson—that he felt constrained in how to treat the judge and later unsure whether he could safely present warrants in the judge’s court—demonstrated a direct, practical impact on the administration of justice.

2. Louisiana Precedents on Using Judicial Office in Personal Matters

Louisiana has relatively few decisions on judges invoking their office to influence non‑judicial processes, but the court discussed two:

• In re Burgess, 85 So.3d 604 (La. 2012): Judge Burgess sought to aid his niece in obtaining a protective order, contacted a district attorney for advice, accompanied the niece, and sought another judge to expedite the case. He was publicly censured.
• In re Parro, 847 So.2d 1178 (La. 2003): Judge Parro attempted to intervene in his niece’s felony theft case by contacting the district attorney, discussing possible pretrial intervention, and even contacting the presiding judge about a continuance. He too was publicly censured.

The court distinguished these from Count II in Colbert:

• In Burgess and Parro, the judges intervened in others’ cases, but not in the posture of a suspect or defendant interacting with law enforcement.
• Neither case involved a real‑time invocation of judicial status during a roadside stop coupled with threats to the officer’s credibility and career.

Thus, while instructive on the impropriety of using judicial office to influence other legal processes, these precedents were not fully analogous for sanction setting in the traffic‑stop context.

3. Out‑of‑State Benchmarking: Ferguson and Williams

Because Louisiana lacked close analogue cases, the court turned to West Virginia precedent:

• Matter of Ferguson, 841 S.E.2d 887 (W. Va. 2020): Judge Ferguson exceeded the legal fishing limit, was approached by undercover officers, and responded by:
  • arrogantly displaying his court identification card,
  • suggesting he was above the law,
  • pacing, raising his voice, making threatening gestures, and
  • name‑dropping supervisors he would contact.
  He later pled no contest; the West Virginia court imposed a 90‑day suspension without pay.
• Matter of Williams, 887 S.E.2d 231 (W. Va. 2023): Judge Williams, during a traffic stop, announced he was a judge, questioned the basis for the stop, became visibly agitated, initially refused to produce license and registration, and then:
  • complained to the chief of police and the mayor,
  • questioned whether the officer should keep his job, and
  • suggested he would scrutinize that department’s cases more harshly.
  It emerged he had been involved in other stops in which he identified himself as a judge and was not ticketed. The court imposed a six‑month suspension without pay.

The Louisiana Supreme Court deemed Williams the most analogous:

• invocation of judicial status to contest a traffic stop,
• aggressive demeanor,
• suggestions that the officer’s job or credibility were in jeopardy, and
• a pattern (in Williams) of using judicial office in routine traffic encounters.

The court expressly stated: “We find Judge Colbert’s conduct analogous to Williams… Finding [the Commission’s] recommendation too lenient, we impose a six month suspension without pay. See Williams, 887 S.E.2d 231.”

This is one of the clearest instances in which the Louisiana Supreme Court has used an out‑of‑state disciplinary case not merely as an illustration, but as a benchmark for calibrating the length of a suspension.

D. Application of the Chaisson Factors and the Escalation of Sanction

The court methodically applied the Chaisson factors:

1. Pattern of misconduct; nature and frequency:
   • The two counts were factually unrelated, but both showed an underlying pattern: misuse of judicial authority, failure to appreciate the judge’s role as neutral arbitrator, and a lack of judicial temperament (impulsivity, profanity, hostility).
   • Count I involved impulsive ex parte engagement and procedural violations; Count II involved an angry, threatening confrontation with law enforcement.
2. In‑court vs. out‑of‑court; official vs. private capacity:
   • Count I occurred in his courtroom, in his official capacity, but outside regular procedures and without a case filed.
   • Count II occurred on a public street, ostensibly in his private life; however, the court emphasized that “the prestige of his office was brought to bear” on the officer and reaffirmed that a judge cannot “step out” of the judicial function “so easily,” especially when invoking the power he has over law enforcement officers.
   • The court cited Parro and Burgess for the principle that judges remain subject to judicial ethics even in personal contexts when they leverage their office.
3. Acknowledgment, remorse, and efforts to change:
   • The judge stipulated to the facts and acknowledged he violated the canons. He expressed a desire to “learn from his mistakes.”
   • However, the Commission—echoed and expanded upon by Chief Justice Weimer—found troubling indications:
     • In Count I, he initially attributed the problem to a lack of weekend emergency procedures rather than fully internalizing the legal limits on his authority.
     • In Count II, he had not recently re‑watched the traffic‑stop video when appearing before the Commission; he was equivocal at first about whether he ran the red light, only later conceding it, and he did not remember key details on the video (refusal to sign the ticket, “you have no idea who you’re talking to,” etc.).
4. Length of service:
   • He had been on the bench about seven months at the time of Count I, and a bit over two years by Count II.
   • The court noted that with more than twenty years of legal experience, he “either knew or should have known” not to engage in ex parte communications, to prejudge matters, or to treat police in this manner.
5. Prior complaints:
   • The July 2022 letter of caution for ex parte conduct was a powerful aggravator, demonstrating either a lack of understanding or resistance to change.
6. Effect on integrity and respect for the judiciary:
   • In Count I, the ex parte handling of a politically sensitive event (a public concert) without filings or a record, followed by media reporting, “negatively affected the perception of and respect for the judiciary.”
   • In Count II, a district judge’s explicit threats to a line officer’s credibility, fully captured on video, undermined respect and confidence in judicial impartiality, especially from law enforcement.
7. Exploitation of office:
   • In Count I, the court did not find he acted to satisfy personal desires (no financial benefit or personal stake in the concert).
   • In Count II, by contrast, he clearly invoked and exploited his judicial power for personal gain—namely, to contest a traffic citation and to intimidate the officer. This yielded differential treatment (no jail for refusing to sign the ticket) and chilled the officer’s willingness to appear before him.

Balancing these factors, the majority concluded that:

• Existing Louisiana sanctions (15–30 days in cases like Best, Canaday, Cresap) were a reasonable baseline for Count I.
• The Commission’s total 30‑day recommendation did not adequately account for Count II’s more serious abuse of judicial prestige.
• A six‑month suspension, aligned with Williams, was necessary to vindicate judicial integrity and deter similar misconduct.

V. Separate Opinions: Competing Views on Sanction and Judicial Temperament

A. Chief Justice Weimer’s Concurrence: “Black Robe Fever” and Due Process Values

Chief Justice Weimer concurred in the result “to ensure sufficient votes to impose a sanction,” but stated that, in his view, the sanction was “too lenient” and that the judge “should not serve as a judge until he can demonstrate he possesses the proper temperament and discernment.”

The concurrence is notable for its broader, almost essay‑like reflection on judicial role and temperament:

• He references “Black Robe Fever” or “Robe‑itis”—a syndrome in which judges become self‑righteous, pompous, and behave as though the law does not apply to them.
• He stresses that judges are public servants and “disciples of the law,” not above it, and that abuse of power—whether for personal gain, partisanship, or retaliation—undermines trust and alienates those who seek justice.
• He emphasizes the need for attributes like impartiality, independence from politics, fairness, respect, compassion, diligence, and an “understanding heart” (invoking the Biblical story of Solomon).
• He criticizes “belligerence, self‑centeredness, and a complete disdain for due process” as intolerable attributes in a judge.

Factually, the Chief Justice highlighted details the majority did not fully develop:

• The judge had tried to justify his anger at the traffic stop by claiming worry about a sick daughter at home, yet on camera he declared he had “all the time in the world,” was coming from the gym, and was going to wash his truck—contradicting his professed concern.
• The judge did not watch the dash/body‑cam videos until after his sworn statement, and not again before the Commission appearance, yet still portrayed the red‑light violation as a “close call,” something the Commission deemed obviously incorrect from the video.
• The judge initially responded evasively (“If you want to say I ran the red light, I ran the red light.”), suggesting reluctance to fully accept responsibility.
• A separate witness described the judge as having a “hot temper” and recounted a courthouse meeting in which he cursed other judges over renovation plans.
• The judge’s apology to Officer Robinson came more than ten months after the incident and only after the officer had already testified; the judge had previously dismissed the matter as “water under the bridge.”

With respect to Count I, the Chief Justice stressed that the judge’s conduct:

• “essentially coerced” city attorneys into a Saturday meeting,
• put him in an advocate’s posture, using judicial authority to broker a deal he deemed fair, and
• reinforced “forum shopping” and the perception of unequal access to justice—i.e., that reaching out to a sympathetic judge before filing can fix outcomes.

For the Chief Justice, these features, together with the failed attempts to justify behavior and perceived lack of genuine remorse, justified an even harsher sanction than six months.

B. Justice Guidry’s Dissent (and the Views of Justices Hughes and Griffin)

Justice Guidry dissented from the sanction, while agreeing there were violations. He would have adopted the Commission’s 30‑day suspension and anger management recommendation, emphasizing:

• At the time of the TRO incident, the judge was newly elected (seven months on the bench).
• The judge stipulated to all facts and ethical violations and repeatedly took “full responsibility.”
• When the Chaisson factors and the court’s prior discipline jurisprudence are weighed, a 30‑day suspension was sufficient.

Separately, Justice Hughes dissented and would have imposed a 90‑day suspension; Justice Griffin also dissented, stating he would impose “no more than 90 days.” Although they did not issue full separate written reasons in the text excerpted, their votes reflect a disagreement with the majority’s six‑month benchmark and a preference for a lesser (but still significant) sanction.

Taken together, the separate opinions reveal a court divided not on the existence of misconduct but on how aggressively to punish such behavior. The spectrum of proposed sanctions ranged from 30 days (Guidry) to at least more than six months (Weimer, conceptually), with the majority settling on six months as a middle ground.

VI. Complex Concepts and Terminology Explained

1. Ex Parte Communication

An “ex parte” communication is a contact with the judge by one side of a dispute without the other side being present or notified. Because it undermines fairness and the appearance of impartiality, judicial ethics generally prohibit a judge from:

• receiving substantive information about a case from only one party, or
• discussing how he or she will rule, outside of formal proceedings with both parties present (or properly notified).

Limited ex parte communications are allowed for purely scheduling or administrative matters, or where expressly authorized by law (for example, some emergency orders with strict procedural safeguards). But what occurred here—substantive calls about the merits of a potential TRO and the judge expressing his intended ruling—was clearly prohibited.

2. TRO, Preliminary Injunction, and Irreparable Injury

• A Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) is a short‑term emergency order issued to preserve the status quo until a more formal hearing can be held. It is usually granted without the other side present, which is why strict procedural conditions (like verified petitions and certifications of efforts to give notice) are required.
• A Preliminary Injunction is a longer‑term order issued after a hearing where both sides have an opportunity to be heard. It typically requires notice and an adversarial proceeding.
• Irreparable injury means harm that cannot be adequately remedied by a money judgment later. Financial losses that can be calculated—like a lost deposit—are usually considered not irreparable.

3. Clear and Convincing Evidence

“Clear and convincing” is a middle standard of proof, higher than “preponderance of the evidence” (more likely than not) but lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt.” In judicial discipline, it means the evidence must make the conclusion highly probable, leaving no serious or substantial doubt about the material facts.

4. Prestige of Judicial Office

Canon 2B prohibits a judge from “lending the prestige of judicial office to advance private interests.” This means a judge must not:

• use the title “Judge” to get favored treatment in personal matters (like traffic stops, ticket disputes, personal business), or
• pressure others—lawyers, police, officials—by hinting that future cases or careers might be affected if they do not comply with the judge’s personal wishes.

In Colbert, the judge’s statements such as “you have no idea who you’re talking to” and threats about the officer’s credibility at court squarely violated this principle.

5. Willful Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice

• Willful misconduct relating to official duty occurs when a judge intentionally engages in behavior that violates legal or ethical duties connected to his or her office—such as deliberately ignoring procedural rules to grant a TRO.
• Persistent and public conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice means behavior that, in the eyes of the public, damages the image of the courts and undermines confidence that justice will be fairly administered. A judge publicly berating and threatening a police officer during a routine traffic stop is a clear example.

6. Letter of Caution

Before formal charges, the Commission can issue a cautionary letter to a judge expressing concern about conduct that does not yet warrant formal discipline, but signals a need to correct behavior. When a judge repeats similar misconduct after such a letter, that prior caution becomes a powerful aggravating factor in determining sanctions.

VII. Broader Impact and Future Significance

A. For Louisiana’s Bench: Clear Warnings on Two Fronts

1. Emergency and Weekend Relief
   The case underscores that:
   • Even in “emergency” settings, judges must respect procedural safeguards, including filed petitions, verification, appropriate notice, and record creation.
   • “Helping out” as a mediator is dangerous when a judge has or will have adjudicative authority; it risks partiality and appearance of impropriety.
   • Good intentions do not excuse bypassing mandatory procedures, especially where media attention and public interest are involved.
2. Interactions with Law Enforcement and Personal Use of Status
   The decision sends a strong signal that:
   • There is zero tolerance for “do you know who I am?” behavior from judges during traffic stops or similar encounters.
   • Abusing judicial status to intimidate officers or threaten their careers will be treated as serious, sanctionable misconduct.
   • A six‑month suspension is now a clear benchmark for such behavior, especially where threats to credibility and career are made on camera.

B. For the Bar and Litigants

The opinion also has implications for lawyers and litigants:

• Attorneys contemplating contacting a judge informally about an impending filing should recognize that such ex parte outreach can imperil not only the judge but also the attorney’s own ethical obligations.
• The case may lead courts to refine or formalize weekend and after‑hours procedures for emergency relief, reducing ad hoc practices and the risk of ex parte abuse.
• Litigants gain reassurance that a judge’s personal conflicts with law enforcement (or others) must not impact how their cases are handled; indeed, this case exposes how such conduct can be challenged through formal discipline.

C. For Judicial Discipline Jurisprudence

Doctrinally, In re Colbert advances Louisiana law in several ways:

• It cements a six‑month suspension as an appropriate sanction where a judge misuses judicial status in a personal encounter with police and openly threatens an officer’s credibility and livelihood.
• It shows the court’s willingness to look to national consensus (e.g., Williams and Ferguson) when Louisiana precedent is sparse, potentially heralding more cross‑jurisdictional benchmarking in future discipline cases.
• It illustrates the court’s readiness to increase sanctions beyond Commission recommendations when the misconduct goes to the heart of public trust, especially where:
  • there is repeated violation after prior caution,
  • misconduct occurs both in and out of court, and
  • threats to the credibility of essential justice system actors (like police officers) are made.
• The concurrence, in particular, may influence:
  • how future courts assess “temperament” and “remorse,” and
  • how seriously they take a judge’s failure to prepare thoroughly for Commission proceedings (e.g., not reviewing key videos).

VIII. Conclusion

In re: Judge Royale Colbert is a robust affirmation of core principles of judicial ethics:

• Judges must not use their office to short‑circuit procedural safeguards, even when prompted by perceived injustices or under the banner of “emergency.”
• Judges must never exploit their status to intimidate police or any other participant in the justice system for personal advantage.
• The appearance of impartiality is as vital as impartiality itself; ex parte promises and off‑the‑record negotiations by a sitting judge erode public trust.

By imposing a six‑month suspension—elevated from the Commission’s 30‑day recommendation and aligned with out‑of‑state precedent—the Louisiana Supreme Court has drawn a bright line: judges who succumb to “black robe fever” in dealings with litigants or law enforcement risk not only censure but substantial loss of office and pay. The opinion, together with the Chief Justice’s concurring warning, will likely serve as a reference point in judicial education and future discipline cases, reinforcing the idea that judges are, first and last, servants of the law and of the public, not beneficiaries of special privilege.