Absolute Litigation Privilege Shields Governmental Participants from CHRO Discrimination Claims Based on In‑Court Conduct in Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings

Introduction

In Ammar I. v. Department of Children and Families (Supreme Court of Connecticut, officially released April 1, 2025), the Court addressed whether the common-law litigation privilege affords absolute immunity to the Department of Children and Families (DCF), a governmental agency, against a religious discrimination claim brought under General Statutes §§ 46a-58 (a) and 46a-71 (a). The claim arose from DCF’s advocacy and litigation conduct during a termination of parental rights (TPR) trial in which the plaintiff-father, a self-represented Muslim parent, ultimately lost his parental rights.

After the Superior Court dismissed most of the plaintiff’s discrimination allegations as untimely under the 180-day filing limit in General Statutes (Rev. to 2019) § 46a-82 (f), it allowed a narrow set of allegations to proceed—those tied to DCF’s words and conduct during the 2019 TPR trial and subsequent appeal. DCF then raised the litigation privilege; the trial court rejected that defense. On interlocutory appeal, however, the Appellate Court held the privilege barred the remaining timely allegations and directed dismissal of the entire complaint. The Supreme Court granted certification to decide whether the litigation privilege applies in this context.

The key issues were:

Whether a discrimination claim, premised solely on in-court litigation conduct in a properly commenced proceeding, is barred by the litigation privilege.
Whether a governmental entity may invoke the privilege.
Whether Connecticut’s antidiscrimination statutes abrogate the privilege.
Whether the Appellate Court’s remand direction—ordering dismissal of the entire complaint—improperly foreclosed appellate review of the trial court’s earlier timeliness rulings.

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part:

Privilege applies to in-court conduct: The Court held that the litigation privilege bars the plaintiff’s remaining, timely discrimination allegations because they exclusively challenge DCF’s words and litigation conduct during the TPR trial and appeal, not the purpose for commencing the underlying proceeding. The claim is “akin to defamation,” a core category protected by the privilege.
Privilege extends to governmental entities: DCF, as a governmental participant, is entitled to invoke the litigation privilege. The Court declined to create a “nonperson” exception.
No statutory abrogation: The legislature did not expressly abrogate the litigation privilege for discrimination claims under §§ 46a-58 (a) and 46a-71 (a).
Procedural correction: The Court partially reversed the Appellate Court’s remand directive because it ordered dismissal of the entire complaint, thereby impeding the plaintiff’s ability to seek appellate review of the trial court’s earlier timeliness dismissals. The Appellate Court was directed to vacate the trial court’s premature dismissal and remand for entry of a new judgment from which the plaintiff may take an appeal on the timeliness issues.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Simms v. Seaman, 308 Conn. 523 (2013): The Court relied on Simms’s framework for balancing interests underlying the litigation privilege. Simms expanded the privilege beyond defamation and provided three instructive considerations: whether the conduct subverts the proceeding’s purpose akin to misuse claims (abuse of process, vexatious litigation), whether the conduct resembles defamation (privileged), and whether other remedies adequately address the harms. These guideposts shaped the Court’s conclusion that Ammar’s allegations (false evidence, eliciting false testimony, litigation arguments) are privileged in-court conduct.
Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1 (2021): Reinforced that the privilege covers statements in pleadings and filings throughout litigation and clarified that a plaintiff cannot evade the privilege by labeling litigation conduct as “abuse” unless the cause of action itself challenges the underlying purpose for commencing the litigation. Ammar’s discrimination claim did not do so.
Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, 349 Conn. 120 (2024): Confirmed broad application of the privilege to diverse torts (e.g., fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, CUTPA) when they target communicative acts in litigation; also reaffirmed the exception for claims that inherently challenge misuse of the judicial process (vexatious litigation, abuse of process).
Dorfman v. Smith, 342 Conn. 582 (2022): Emphasized that merely alleging litigation “misconduct” does not defeat the privilege unless the cause of action itself challenges the litigation’s improper purpose. Also highlighted floodgates concerns when allowing non-misuse claims to proceed.
Hopkins v. O’Connor, 282 Conn. 821 (2007); DeLaurentis v. New Haven, 220 Conn. 225 (1991): These cases underscore the policy rationale—ensuring candor and robust participation in judicial proceedings, protected by oaths, perjury penalties, and contempt powers as alternative safeguards.
MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti, 310 Conn. 616 (2013): The Court distinguished its narrow exception to the privilege for retaliatory litigation claims under § 31-290a because that statute targets the improper initiation of litigation to retaliate against protected workers’ compensation activity. By contrast, §§ 46a-58 and 46a-71 do not focus on retaliatory use of the courts, and Ammar did not allege DCF initiated the TPR action (children’s counsel did), so MacDermid’s exception did not apply.
Carrubba v. Moskowitz, 274 Conn. 533 (2005); Walden v. Wishengrad, 745 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1984): These authorities supported recognizing absolute immunities for mandated participants in child-protection proceedings to prevent intimidation and encourage vigorous advocacy in the best interests of children—policy considerations that also support applying the litigation privilege to DCF’s in-court conduct.
In re Omar I., 197 Conn. App. 499 (2020): The underlying TPR appeal. The Court noted that Ammar had raised discrimination arguments in the TPR litigation and appeal, and those arguments were rejected—illustrating that other remedial forums existed to air these grievances.
Cross-jurisdictional alignment: The Court’s approach aligns with decisions applying the privilege to litigation-related conduct in child protection and family matters (e.g., Spencer v. Omega Labs (E.D.N.Y. 2024); Wilson v. NJ DCPP (D.N.J. 2019); Borden v. Malone (Ala. 2020); Falcon v. Long Beach Genetics (Cal. Ct. App. 2014); M.D. v. NJ DYFS (N.J. App. Div. 2011)). The outlier Mason v. Mason (Wash. Ct. App. 2021) did not control.

Legal Reasoning

The Court framed the decisive question under Connecticut’s litigation privilege doctrine: Does the plaintiff’s cause of action challenge the purpose for commencing a proceeding (a misuse claim like vexatious litigation or abuse of process), or does it attack statements and acts made within the course of a properly commenced proceeding (a defamation-like claim)?

Classification of the claim: Ammar’s surviving allegations were limited to DCF’s courtroom conduct: introducing and eliciting allegedly false evidence and testimony, questioning children about sensitive topics, changing litigation positions vis-à-vis the non-Muslim mother, and making arguments on appeal. Those are communicative acts within litigation, paradigmatically privileged “even if the communications [were] false, extreme, outrageous, or malicious.”
No challenge to initiation/purpose: The TPR petitions were filed by the children’s counsel, not DCF, and were filed before the temporal window for timely allegations. The surviving claim did not assert that the proceeding was commenced for an illegitimate purpose; thus, it was not a misuse claim.
Simms factors:
- Subversion of purpose: Relabeling litigation conduct as subverting the proceeding does not transform the claim into a misuse action. The cause of action must itself challenge the proceeding’s purpose. It did not.
- Similarity to defamation: The claim targets in-court statements and litigation acts, aligning it with defamation and other communicative torts long barred by the privilege.
- Alternative remedies: The judicial process offers safeguards and corrective mechanisms. Ammar pursued and lost discrimination arguments in the TPR trial and appeal. If he had prevailed there, he could have sought permission through the claims commissioner to bring non-privileged misuse claims (e.g., vexatious litigation, abuse of process) against the state. Sanctions, oaths, perjury, and contempt also protect the integrity of proceedings.
Governmental entities and the privilege: The privilege protects all participants—judges, attorneys, parties, witnesses. The Court declined to create a “nonperson” exception and cited applications of the privilege to impersonal entities (e.g., insurers, law firms) and governmental agencies. DCF’s status as a mandated participant in TPR proceedings and the high-stakes, turbulent nature of child-protection litigation underscore the need for robust immunity to avert chilling effects and retaliatory suits.
No legislative abrogation: Connecticut’s antidiscrimination statutes are remedial and important, but they do not expressly abrogate the litigation privilege. Without clear, plain language from the legislature, the common-law privilege remains intact, including as to discrimination claims premised on litigation conduct. Other jurisdictions similarly apply the privilege in discrimination contexts when the conduct is litigation-related.
Jurisdictional posture: In Connecticut, the litigation privilege implicates subject matter jurisdiction, warranting dismissal when the claim falls within its scope. The Court therefore directed dismissal of the timely, in-court allegations on privilege grounds, while ensuring the plaintiff could still seek appellate review of the earlier timeliness determinations via a new final judgment.

Impact

Scope of litigation privilege reaffirmed and clarified: The decision solidifies that discrimination claims under §§ 46a-58 (a) and 46a-71 (a), when predicated on in-court statements and conduct within properly commenced proceedings, are barred. Labeling litigation conduct as discriminatory does not defeat the privilege.
Government agencies protected: Governmental entities—particularly mandated participants like DCF—can invoke the privilege to shield in-court advocacy from collateral civil liability, reducing exposure to retaliatory litigation by disappointed litigants in child welfare cases.
Pleading and strategy guidance: Litigants seeking to avoid the privilege must plead causes of action that inherently challenge the improper use of the judicial process (e.g., vexatious litigation, abuse of process), and they must satisfy those claims’ rigorous safeguards (e.g., favorable termination, lack of probable cause). Attacks on in-court conduct alone will likely be dismissed.
Channeling disputes into the underlying proceedings: Claims of bias, discrimination, evidentiary falsity, and investigative misconduct should be raised and developed in the underlying case (through motions, evidentiary objections, sanctions, appeals) rather than through satellite civil litigation.
Legislative signal: If the legislature wishes to carve out a discrimination-based exception to the litigation privilege for in-court conduct, it must do so expressly. Absent such abrogation, the privilege remains robust.
Procedural clarity on interlocutory appeals and stays: The Court corrected the Appellate Court’s sweeping remand instruction and the trial court’s premature compliance during the automatic appellate stay, preserving the plaintiff’s right to appellate review of earlier timeliness rulings. This guidance will help prevent inadvertent foreclosure of appellate rights following interlocutory dispositions.
Open questions remain: The Court did not reach sovereign immunity or standing (raised by DCF), and it did not decide the merits of the timeliness rulings or the continuing violation doctrine. Those may surface on remand if appealed from a new final judgment.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Litigation privilege: A common-law doctrine granting absolute immunity from civil liability for statements and communicative acts made in the course of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, so long as they are pertinent. It promotes full candor without fear of retaliatory lawsuits. It is treated in Connecticut as implicating subject matter jurisdiction.
Defamation-like vs. misuse claims:
- Defamation-like claims (e.g., fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, CUTPA) attack what was said or done in court. These are typically barred.
- Misuse claims (e.g., vexatious litigation, abuse of process, malicious prosecution, certain § 31-290a retaliation claims) attack the purpose of bringing or using the litigation process. These are not barred but have demanding elements (favorable termination, lack of probable cause).
Subject matter jurisdiction: A court’s authority to hear a type of case. When the litigation privilege applies, the court lacks jurisdiction over the privileged claims and must dismiss them.
CHRO process and § 46a-82 (f): Discrimination complaints generally must be filed with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act. After a “release of jurisdiction,” a complainant may sue in Superior Court.
Claims commissioner (General Statutes § 4-160): To sue the state for many torts (e.g., vexatious litigation, abuse of process), a claimant typically needs authorization from the claims commissioner. This is a potential avenue when privilege does not bar the theory and statutory prerequisites are met.
Automatic appellate stay: Certain trial court orders are automatically stayed pending appellate review. A trial court should not take further action inconsistent with the stay (e.g., entry of final judgment) while an appeal or certification process is pending.
TPR proceedings and § 46b-129: DCF is a mandated participant in child protection cases. The Court’s reasoning acknowledges the unique public interest in protecting children and the need for DCF to advocate vigorously without fear of collateral suits.

Conclusion

Ammar I. squarely reaffirms and extends Connecticut’s robust litigation privilege in three important ways. First, it holds that discrimination claims under §§ 46a-58 (a) and 46a-71 (a), when based solely on in-court litigation conduct in a properly commenced proceeding, are barred as “defamation-like” claims. Second, it confirms that governmental entities—here, DCF—stand on the same footing as other litigation participants and may invoke the privilege. Third, it emphasizes that the legislature has not abrogated the privilege in the discrimination context and would need to do so explicitly if such an exception is intended.

On the procedural front, the Court corrected an overbroad remand directive to safeguard the plaintiff’s opportunity to appeal the trial court’s earlier timeliness dismissals. Substantively, the message is clear: allegations of false evidence, improper questioning, litigation position changes, or misstatements in briefs—however serious—must be addressed within the underlying proceeding and its appellate avenues, not through collateral damages actions, unless the cause of action itself targets the improper use of the judicial system and satisfies the stringent elements of such claims.

As a result, the decision will likely curtail satellite discrimination litigation against state actors arising from high-conflict child protection proceedings, while preserving appropriate avenues for redressing true misuse of the courts. It also invites legislative reflection on whether any targeted carve-outs to the privilege are warranted in this sensitive area of law.