Absolute Judicial Immunity in Custody Proceedings and the Ex parte Young Path to Prospective Relief: A Commentary on Kowalski v. Kelley (10th Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

In Kowalski v. Kelley, No. 25‑1380 (10th Cir. Dec. 3, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit addressed a familiar but difficult intersection of doctrines: (1) the near-absolute protection that judicial officers enjoy from damages under the doctrine of judicial immunity, and (2) the possibility of suing state officials in their official capacities for prospective relief under the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity.

The case arises from a Colorado state domestic-relations matter. Robert G. Kowalski, proceeding pro se, was dissatisfied with rulings and comments by State Magistrate Judge Elizabeth H. Kelley in a post‑dissolution child‑custody proceeding. He filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in federal court against Magistrate Judge Kelley in both her individual and official capacities, alleging violations of:

his Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection,
and, more loosely, his Fourth Amendment rights (framed as part of his “due process” claim),
as well as the Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct.

The district court dismissed all claims: individual‑capacity claims on the ground of absolute judicial immunity, and official‑capacity claims under the Eleventh Amendment. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit:

affirmed the dismissal of all individual‑capacity claims as barred by judicial immunity, but
vacated the dismissal of the official‑capacity claims and remanded for a proper Ex parte Young analysis, focusing on an order requiring Mr. Kowalski to undergo psychological evaluation.

Although the court labelled its decision as an unpublished “Order and Judgment” without binding precedential effect (except for law‑of‑the‑case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel), it has clear persuasive value. It reinforces core principles of judicial and sovereign immunity while underscoring that district courts must meaningfully engage with claims of ongoing constitutional violations when plaintiffs seek prospective relief against state judicial officers.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Claims and Allegations

According to the amended complaint (whose allegations the appellate court assumed true for purposes of review), Magistrate Judge Kelley, presiding over a child‑custody matter, allegedly:

referred to Mr. Kowalski as “toxic” during an in‑camera interview with his teenage son;
allowed counsel for Mr. Kowalski’s spouse to attend the interview while excluding Mr. Kowalski;
reacted to a report that Mr. Kowalski had left the courthouse by “fabricating” a perceived danger and suggesting or ordering a sheriff’s escort for the son;
found that Mr. Kowalski had caused emotional harm to his children and removed his son and daughter from his care;
ordered Mr. Kowalski to undergo psychological testing;
and engaged in procedural rulings that he characterized as showing a pattern of bias.

He sued under § 1983, alleging constitutional violations and misconduct under the Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief (but did not clearly seek damages).

B. District Court Disposition

A federal magistrate judge recommended:

Individual capacity: dismissal under absolute judicial immunity, because the challenged acts were taken in a judicial capacity and not in clear absence of jurisdiction.
Official capacity: dismissal under the Eleventh Amendment, concluding that the Ex parte Young exception (for ongoing violations and prospective relief) did not apply since there was no ongoing federal violation.

Mr. Kowalski objected, particularly emphasizing that the order requiring a psychological evaluation was an ongoing violation and that the magistrate judge had not addressed that aspect. The district judge adopted the recommendation and dismissed the case, doing so “without explanation” as to the psychological evaluation order and the Ex parte Young issue.

C. Tenth Circuit’s Disposition

The Tenth Circuit:

Affirmed dismissal of the individual‑capacity claims, holding that all complained‑of acts fell within Magistrate Judge Kelley’s judicial capacity and jurisdiction, rendering her absolutely immune from damages, regardless of alleged bias or error.
Vacated the dismissal of the official‑capacity claims and remanded for the district court to perform a proper Ex parte Young analysis as to whether:
- the psychological evaluation order constitutes an ongoing violation of federal law, and
- the relief sought is prospective declaratory or injunctive relief authorized under Ex parte Young.

The court emphasized, relying on Ellis v. Salt Lake City Corp., 147 F.4th 1206 (10th Cir. 2025), that when the record and lower court’s analysis are undeveloped on a key issue (here, the ongoing nature of a constitutional violation for Ex parte Young purposes), the “prudent course” is to remand for a fuller analysis.

III. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. Judicial Immunity: Stump v. Sparkman and Tenth Circuit Authority

Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978)
The Supreme Court’s canonical decision on judicial immunity. It establishes that judges are absolutely immune from damages for acts performed in their judicial capacity, even if:
- the acts are in error,
- done maliciously, or
- in excess of authority,
unless the judge acts in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.”
Beedle v. Wilson, 422 F.3d 1059 (10th Cir. 2005)
The Tenth Circuit reiterates that judges defending against § 1983 actions enjoy absolute immunity from damages for judicial acts. The Kowalski panel quotes this authority for the longstanding rule that policy considerations favor unencumbered judicial decision‑making, unhampered by fear of personal liability.

B. Colorado Domestic-Relations Authority on Psychological Evaluations

To address Mr. Kowalski’s argument that the psychological evaluation order was ultra vires (outside jurisdiction), the Tenth Circuit relied on Colorado appellate decisions:

In re Marriage of Isaac and Ball, No. 19CA1981, 2021 WL 12343917 (Colo. App. Feb. 4, 2021)
The Colorado Court of Appeals recognized that a district court may order a parent to complete psychological counseling when doing so is in the child’s best interests.
In re Marriage of Neri, No. 20CA1574, 2021 WL 12341817 (Colo. App. Nov. 18, 2021)
Acknowledges the regular use of psychological evaluations in Colorado dissolution and child‑custody cases.
In re Marriage of Yates, 148 P.3d 304 (Colo. App. 2006), and In re Marriage of Henne, 620 P.2d 62 (Colo. App. 1980)
These cases further underscore courts’ authority to order evaluations or counseling in domestic‑relations matters where the child’s best interests are implicated.

These cases collectively support the Tenth Circuit’s conclusion that ordering a psychological evaluation in a child‑custody context is squarely within a Colorado court’s subject‑matter jurisdiction and traditional judicial role, defeating any suggestion that Magistrate Judge Kelley acted in “clear absence of all jurisdiction.”

C. Judicial Conduct vs. Judicial Immunity

In re Assad, 185 P.3d 1044 (Nev. 2008)
The Nevada Supreme Court held that dismissal of a § 1983 action against a judge on judicial immunity grounds does not preclude separate judicial discipline proceedings for violation of a Code of Judicial Conduct. Immunity from damages in civil suits and the disciplinary regime are distinct systems.
Hall v. Necessary, No. 2:21‑cv‑131, 2021 WL 12262516 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 10, 2021) (unpublished)
Cited for persuasive value, this case clarifies that Codes of Judicial Conduct regulate judges through disciplinary bodies and do not abrogate judicial immunity. Violating a Code may be sanctionable professionally but does not create § 1983 liability.

D. Capacity and Remedies in § 1983: Brown v. Montoya

Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir. 2011)
In a footnote, the Tenth Circuit in Brown observed that § 1983 plaintiffs commonly:
- sue individual‑capacity defendants for money damages, and
- sue official‑capacity defendants for injunctive relief.
The Kowalski panel notes that Mr. Kowalski did not expressly request damages in his amended complaint, raising a structural concern with his individual‑capacity claims. This observation underscores the importance of properly aligning capacities sued with the type of relief sought.

E. Sovereign Immunity and the Ex parte Young Exception

Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)
The foundational case which allows suits against state officials in their official capacities for prospective injunctive or declaratory relief to end ongoing violations of federal law, notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment. The state itself may be immune, but a state officer can be compelled to comply with federal law moving forward.

F. Remand for Fuller Analysis: Ellis v. Salt Lake City Corp.

Ellis v. Salt Lake City Corp., 147 F.4th 1206 (10th Cir. 2025)
The Tenth Circuit in Ellis held that where significant legal questions have not been adequately analyzed below and the record is underdeveloped, the “prudent course” is to remand for a more complete analysis. The Kowalski panel applies this approach to the unresolved question whether the psychological evaluation order constitutes an ongoing federal violation under Ex parte Young.

G. Colorado Jurisdictional Statutes and Pro Se Standard

Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 14‑13‑101 et seq.
These provisions, part of the Uniform Child‑custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) and related statutes, confirm that Colorado district courts have jurisdiction over child‑custody matters. The Tenth Circuit notes that Mr. Kowalski did not dispute that the state court had subject‑matter jurisdiction.
James v. Wadas, 724 F.3d 1312 (10th Cir. 2013)
Cited for the familiar pro se standard: courts liberally construe pro se filings, but do not act as a litigant’s advocate.

IV. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Individual-Capacity Claims and Absolute Judicial Immunity

1. Scope of Judicial Immunity

The Tenth Circuit reiterated the established doctrine: a judge is absolutely immune from § 1983 damages for acts:

performed in a judicial capacity, and
not taken in the clear absence of all subject‑matter jurisdiction.

Under Stump v. Sparkman, immunity holds even if acts are:

“in error,”
“done maliciously,” or
“in excess of [the judge’s] authority.”

The single disqualifying condition is if the judge acts in “the clear absence of all jurisdiction” — a very high bar. The plaintiff’s characterization of actions as “fabricated,” biased, or abusive does not remove them from the judicial sphere if they arise from the judge’s adjudicative role in a case properly before the court.

2. Application to Magistrate Judge Kelley’s Conduct

The Tenth Circuit concluded that all challenged acts occurred while Magistrate Judge Kelley was exercising her judicial function in a matter over which her court indisputably had subject‑matter jurisdiction:

In‑camera interview and “toxic” comment. Conducting an in‑camera interview with a child in a custody case is a paradigmatic judicial act. Comments made during that interview — even if alleged to be biased, unfair, or inappropriate — occur in the course of adjudication. Hence, they fall within judicial capacity.
Excluding the father and including mother’s counsel. Deciding who may be present in an in‑camera interview is a procedural ruling squarely within the judge’s authority to manage proceedings.
Using the report that Mr. Kowalski left the courthouse and suggesting/ordering a sheriff’s escort. The court treated the protective escort as an exercise of judicial authority to ensure safety in the context of a custody dispute. Regardless of whether the perceived danger was real or “fabricated,” as plaintiff alleged, the protective measure was a judicial act.
Finding emotional harm and removing the children from Mr. Kowalski’s care. These are central discretionary rulings in a custody proceeding and plainly fall within the judge’s adjudicative function.
Ordering a psychological evaluation. Here, the court relied heavily on Colorado case law (e.g., Isaac and Ball, Neri, Yates, Henne) to confirm that ordering a parent to undergo psychological evaluation or counseling is a recognized tool for protecting a child’s best interests in domestic‑relations cases. This makes such an order not only a judicial act, but one well within the court’s jurisdiction.

Importantly, the court highlighted that Mr. Kowalski did not dispute the state court’s subject‑matter jurisdiction over custody matters. His argument was that these particular acts were beyond Judge Kelley’s jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit rejected that framing: where the court has jurisdiction over the type of case (here, child custody), individual rulings—even if allegedly unauthorized or unconstitutional—are still made under color of that jurisdiction and thus shielded by absolute immunity.

3. Mislabeling the Constitutional Provision Does Not Affect Immunity

Mr. Kowalski variously invoked the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, claiming that the psychological evaluation order violated his Fourth Amendment rights and that his due process rights were “based on” the Fourth Amendment. The panel noted:

“Due process protection against state action comes from the Fourteenth Amendment. Our affirmance of dismissal based on judicial immunity does not turn on whether Mr. Kowalski is asserting a Fourth Amendment claim, a Fourteenth Amendment claim, or both.”

Thus, whatever the precise constitutional theory, judicial immunity barred the claim so long as the challenged act was a judicial act within jurisdiction.

4. Code of Judicial Conduct vs. § 1983 Claims

Mr. Kowalski tried to bolster his allegations by listing examples of judicial discipline imposed by the Colorado Supreme Court for inappropriate comments and ethical violations. The Tenth Circuit acknowledged this but drew a sharp distinction:

Ethical violations can lead to disciplinary sanctions via state judicial disciplinary bodies.
They do not by themselves create a private right of action or negate judicial immunity from damages under § 1983.

By citing In re Assad and Hall v. Necessary, the court reinforced that judicial discipline and civil liability operate on separate tracks. Even a judge whose conduct warrants reprimand or removal may still be immune from damages for those very acts, provided they are judicial in nature and within jurisdiction.

5. Capacity and Remedy: A Structural Problem with the Individual-Capacity Claims

In a pointed footnote, the panel observed that Mr. Kowalski’s amended complaint “prays for” declaratory and injunctive relief and attorney’s fees but “does not expressly ask for damages.” This is significant because, as the Tenth Circuit has noted (quoting Brown v. Montoya):

“Section 1983 plaintiffs may sue individual‑capacity defendants only for money damages and official‑capacity defendants only for injunctive relief.”

While the panel did not base its holding on this misalignment, it underscores a common pleading pitfall: suing a judge in an individual capacity but asking only for equitable relief is structurally incoherent under prevailing § 1983 practice in the Tenth Circuit. Future plaintiffs should be attentive to matching:

individual capacity → damages, and
official capacity → prospective declaratory or injunctive relief.

That said, in this case, even if damages had been properly requested, judicial immunity would still have compelled dismissal of the individual‑capacity claims.

B. Official-Capacity Claims, Eleventh Amendment, and Ex parte Young

1. Eleventh Amendment Baseline

Suits against state officials in their official capacities are generally treated as suits against the State itself. Under the Eleventh Amendment and related sovereign immunity doctrine, a state is immune from suits for retrospective relief (including monetary damages) in federal court unless:

the state has waived immunity, or
Congress has validly abrogated immunity for the type of claim at issue.

Section 1983 does not abrogate state sovereign immunity, and Colorado had not waived it here. The federal magistrate judge therefore correctly identified a bar to official‑capacity claims, unless the Ex parte Young exception applied.

2. The Ex parte Young Exception: Ongoing Violations and Prospective Relief

Under Ex parte Young, a plaintiff may seek:

prospective injunctive or declaratory relief
against a state official in his or her official capacity
to end an ongoing violation of federal law.

This doctrine rests on a legal fiction: the state official is “stripped of his official or representative character” when acting unconstitutionally and thus can be ordered to conform his future conduct to federal law, even though the state itself remains immune from damages.

The key limits are:

the violation must be ongoing, not wholly in the past, and
the relief must be prospective, not a disguised form of retroactive damages or relief undoing past state‑court judgments.

3. The Error Below: Failure to Consider the Psychological Evaluation Order

The federal magistrate judge identified the in‑camera “toxic” comment as a past harm and concluded there was no ongoing constitutional violation, rendering Ex parte Young inapplicable. However, he did not address the separate and critical allegation that the order requiring Mr. Kowalski to undergo a psychological evaluation was still in effect and constituted a continuing violation of his constitutional rights.

Mr. Kowalski raised this explicitly in:

his objections to the magistrate judge’s recommendation in the district court, and
his opening brief on appeal.

He argued that:

the alleged “unconstitutional actions … are continuing and ongoing, and will necessarily occur in the future absent action providing prospective declaratory and/or injunctive relief.”

The district court adopted the recommendation without addressing this argument. The Tenth Circuit noted that neither the federal magistrate judge nor the district judge analyzed whether:

the psychological evaluation order remains operative and coerces Mr. Kowalski into future conduct (an ongoing effect), and
the relief he seeks—declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent enforcement of that order—fits within the Ex parte Young framework.

Given this omission, the Tenth Circuit declined to decide the Ex parte Young issue in the first instance. Invoking Ellis v. Salt Lake City Corp., the panel concluded that “the prudent course” is to remand to the district court so it can:

develop the record as needed, and
perform a “more complete analysis” of whether the psychological evaluation order constitutes an ongoing violation of federal law for which prospective official‑capacity relief may be available.

4. What the Panel Did Not Decide

Notably, the Tenth Circuit did not hold that:

the psychological evaluation order is in fact unconstitutional; or
that Ex parte Young necessarily applies.

Instead, it held only that:

“The federal magistrate judge and district judge did not address whether the psychological evaluation order is an ongoing violation for which Mr. Kowalski requested prospective relief under Ex parte Young. Without the benefit of analysis from the district court or any briefing on this issue from the official capacity defendant, we believe the prudent course is to remand the matter to the district court to perform a more complete analysis.”

This is a procedural ruling directing the district court to take seriously the possibility that:

a custody‑related psychological evaluation order,
if unconstitutional, and
still in force,

could be challenged via official‑capacity claims under Ex parte Young.

V. Complex Legal Concepts Simplified

A. Individual vs. Official Capacity

Individual capacity: The official is sued personally. A judgment can be collected from the official as an individual, and the suit is often for money damages. Judicial immunity applies here to protect judges from damages for judicial acts.
Official capacity: The official is sued as a representative of the State. The suit is, in substance, against the State itself. Damages are typically barred by the Eleventh Amendment, but Ex parte Young may permit prospective injunctive or declaratory relief to stop an ongoing violation of federal law.

B. Judicial Immunity

Judicial immunity is a powerful doctrine that shields judges from being sued for money damages for actions they take as judges. It:

applies even if the judge’s rulings are wrong, unfair, or allegedly malicious;
protects judicial independence by preventing fear of personal liability from influencing decisions; and
has only one narrow exception: when the judge acts in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction” (for example, a probate judge trying to preside over a criminal trial with no statutory authority).

In Kowalski, because the state court clearly had jurisdiction over child custody and the orders were typical judicial actions in such a proceeding, the judge was immune from damages.

C. Eleventh Amendment Sovereign Immunity

The Eleventh Amendment (as interpreted) generally bars suits in federal court:

against a state by its own citizens,
when the relief sought is money damages or other retrospective remedies paid from the state treasury.

Suing a state official in their official capacity is typically treated as a suit against the state, triggering this immunity. Ex parte Young is a narrow exception allowing certain prospective relief.

D. The Ex parte Young Exception

Ex parte Young permits federal courts to:

enjoin a state official in his or her official capacity from continuing to violate federal law,
thereby compelling future compliance with the Constitution or federal statutes.

Key conditions:

The violation must be ongoing, not purely in the past.
The plaintiff must seek prospective relief (e.g., “Do not enforce this unconstitutional order going forward”), not retroactive compensation.

In Kowalski, the relevant question is whether the psychological evaluation order is still operative and coercive, making it an ongoing violation, and whether the requested declaratory or injunctive relief truly targets the future rather than relitigating past state‑court decisions.

E. “In-Camera” Interviews

An “in‑camera” interview is conducted privately in the judge’s chambers rather than in open court, often without one or both parents present, particularly in sensitive child‑custody cases. The goal is to:

allow the child to speak freely,
reduce pressure or intimidation, and
help the judge assess the child’s best interests.

Such interviews are widely recognized as judicial acts, and the manner in which they are conducted—who is present, what is said—falls squarely within the judge’s adjudicative function.

F. “Clear Absence of All Jurisdiction”

This phrase, from Stump v. Sparkman, sets the threshold for overcoming judicial immunity. It does not mean:

the judge exceeded authority in some respect, or
the judge misapplied the law.

Instead, it means the court had no legal power at all to act in that type of case. For example, if a small‑claims judge purported to issue a divorce decree, that might be in clear absence of jurisdiction. By contrast, in Kowalski, a magistrate judge handling a custody case and making custody‑related rulings is plainly acting within her jurisdiction—even if the plaintiff believes those rulings to be unconstitutional or abusive.

VI. Impact and Broader Significance

A. Reinforcing the Breadth of Judicial Immunity in Domestic-Relations Cases

The decision strongly reaffirms that:

Child‑custody and domestic‑relations rulings are quintessential judicial acts.
Measures such as in‑camera child interviews, protective escorts, findings of emotional harm, changes in custody, and orders for psychological evaluations are all within the judicial role.
As long as the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter (here, custody under Colorado statutes), judges are immune from personal § 1983 liability for such actions, regardless of allegations of bias or bad faith.

This is especially important in domestic‑relations contexts, which frequently produce highly emotional litigants and repeated allegations of judicial bias. Kowalski underscores that federal civil rights suits are not the vehicle for relitigating custody disputes by seeking damages from the judge.

B. Clarifying the Distinction Between Judicial Discipline and Civil Liability

By explicitly addressing Mr. Kowalski’s reliance on judicial disciplinary precedents, the Tenth Circuit highlights that:

Ethical or disciplinary standards are enforced through specialized judicial conduct commissions or state supreme courts.
Those bodies can sanction judges for inappropriate comments or behavior even when judicial immunity protects the judge from damages in a § 1983 action.

Litigants dissatisfied with a judge’s demeanor or comments must understand that:

the Code of Judicial Conduct does not itself create § 1983 causes of action; and
violating the Code does not strip the judge of immunity from § 1983 damages.

C. Emphasizing Careful Ex parte Young Analysis in Official-Capacity Suits

The most forward‑looking aspect of the opinion is its insistence that lower courts:

cannot dismiss official‑capacity claims merely by labelling alleged violations as “past harms” without probing whether some aspect of the challenged conduct is ongoing; and
must grapple with plaintiffs’ arguments that orders (such as mandated psychological evaluations) continue to compel unconstitutional behavior into the future.

The panel’s reliance on Ellis v. Salt Lake City Corp. signals that the Tenth Circuit expects district courts to:

provide reasoned analysis of Ex parte Young issues, and
develop the factual and legal record, rather than summarily dismissing on Eleventh Amendment grounds.

This has practical significance for:

plaintiffs, who must clearly plead ongoing violations and prospective relief; and
state officials, who should be prepared to brief whether challenged orders remain in effect and whether halting them would constitute improper interference with state‑court judgments.

D. Implications for Litigants in State Family Courts

For parents embroiled in custody disputes who consider federal § 1983 actions against state judges, Kowalski sends a mixed but consistent message:

No path to damages from the judge. Attempts to obtain money damages from state judicial officers for custody‑related rulings will almost invariably fail under judicial immunity.
Narrow path to prospective relief. In unusual cases where a state court order is alleged to be ongoing and unconstitutional (e.g., an ongoing compelled psychological evaluation), a carefully framed official‑capacity suit seeking prospective relief against enforcement of that order may survive the initial Eleventh Amendment screening—subject of course to other doctrines such as:
- Rooker–Feldman (federal courts cannot function as appellate courts reviewing state‑court judgments), and
- domestic‑relations abstention doctrines, which often counsel federal courts to avoid entanglement in ongoing family‑law disputes.

Kowalski does not resolve those additional barriers, but it underscores the need for a careful, issue‑specific analysis rather than categorical dismissal.

E. Guidance for Pleading and Litigation Strategy

The opinion provides several implicit lessons for litigants:

Be precise about capacities and remedies. If suing a state judge:
- individual‑capacity claims should seek damages (which will almost always be barred by immunity), and
- official‑capacity claims must seek prospective relief for ongoing violations of federal law and must confront Eleventh Amendment and abstention issues.
Clearly allege ongoing violations. To invoke Ex parte Young, plaintiffs must articulate:
- how an order or practice continues to violate federal law, and
- what forward‑looking relief is sought to stop that violation.
Recognize the limits of § 1983 against judges. Where the core grievance is a disagreement with judicial rulings in a domestic‑relations case, state‑court appellate and remedial mechanisms—not federal civil rights suits—are the primary avenues for relief.

VII. Conclusion

Kowalski v. Kelley does not break new doctrinal ground so much as it reinforces and refines established principles in a sensitive context—state child‑custody proceedings. Its key contributions can be summarized as follows:

Absolute judicial immunity remains robust. State judges are fully protected from § 1983 damages for custody‑related decisions, including psychological evaluation orders and safety measures, as long as they act in a judicial capacity within their jurisdiction.
Ethical violations and judicial discipline are distinct from § 1983 liability. Even serious ethical misconduct is addressed through disciplinary channels, not through damages actions against the judge.
Eleventh Amendment immunity is not absolute in the face of ongoing violations. Official‑capacity claims that plausibly allege ongoing constitutional violations and seek prospective relief require a thoughtful Ex parte Young analysis, not perfunctory dismissal.
District courts must fully evaluate claims of ongoing violations. By vacating the dismissal of the official‑capacity claims and remanding for further proceedings, the Tenth Circuit underscored that failure to address a core aspect of a plaintiff’s theory—here, the ongoing nature of a psychological evaluation order—constitutes reversible error in the Eleventh Amendment context.

In the broader legal landscape, Kowalski serves as a reminder that while federal courts will vigorously protect state judges from personal liability for their judicial acts, they also retain a narrow but important role in ensuring that ongoing state‑court orders do not perpetuate violations of federal rights. That role is carefully confined by doctrines of immunity, abstention, and jurisdiction, but it is not illusory—and district courts must engage it with the rigor that Ex parte Young demands.