Absolute Bar, Limited Reach: The Texas Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the Religious Services Clause in Perez v. City of San Antonio

I. Introduction

In Gary Perez and Matilde Torres v. City of San Antonio, the Supreme Court of Texas issued the first major construction of the 2021 “Religious Service Protections” amendment to the Texas Constitution, Article I, § 6-a (the “Religious Services Clause”). The case arose from a conflict between indigenous religious practitioners and a city’s plan to rehabilitate a historic public park.

Gary Perez and Matilde Torres, members of the Lipan-Apache Native American Church, conduct religious ceremonies at a small “Sacred Area” on the banks of the San Antonio River within Brackenridge Park, a city-owned public park and historic landmark. They allege that San Antonio’s plan to repair eroding retaining walls, remove most of the trees, and deter migratory birds (including cormorants) will destroy elements that are religiously indispensable to their worship—particularly trees and birds that form part of a “spiritual ecology” central to their “religious services.”

After federal district court proceedings and a preliminary injunction that did not halt the tree-removal and bird-deterrence measures, Perez appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certified a pure question of Texas constitutional law to the Texas Supreme Court under Texas Constitution Article V, § 3-c:

Does the “Religious Service Protections” provision of the Constitution of the State of Texas—as expressed in Article 1, Section 6-a—impose a categorical bar on any limitation of any religious service, regardless of the sort of limitation and the government's interest in that limitation?

The Texas Supreme Court’s opinion—authored by Justice Boyd, joined by eight Justices with a dissent by Justice Sullivan—draws a sharp yet nuanced line:

• When Article I, § 6-a applies, it operates as an absolute, categorical bar to governmental prohibitions or limitations on “religious services,” regardless of governmental interests or tailoring.
• However, the scope of what counts as a prohibited “limitation” on “religious services” is not unlimited, and—critically for this case—does not extend to governmental preservation and management of public lands, such as San Antonio’s management of Brackenridge Park.

In short: the Court answers “yes and no.” Yes, the Clause is categorical in force once triggered; no, it does not reach every impact on religious services, and it specifically does not convert public lands into environments that must be preserved in perpetuity to support any religious use.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. The Question and the Court’s Framing

The Court disaggregates the certified question into two sub-questions:

1. Force: When the Religious Services Clause applies, does it impose a categorical bar regardless of governmental interests or tailoring (i.e., no strict scrutiny balancing)?
2. Scope: Does the Clause cover any kind of limitation on any religious service, regardless of the nature of the limitation?

The Court answers:

• Force: The Clause is absolute and categorical. It forbids governmental prohibitions or limitations on religious services without any embedded strict-scrutiny exception.
• Scope: The Clause’s coverage is limited. It does not extend to governmental actions that fall within the government’s ordinary preservation and management of public lands. On the facts presented, San Antonio’s decisions about trees and birds in Brackenridge Park are not within § 6-a’s reach.

The Court offers a “general” but not exhaustive answer; it explicitly refuses to comprehensively map the Clause’s outer boundaries, instead deciding only what it must to guide the Fifth Circuit in resolving this dispute.

B. The Holding in One Sentence

As a matter of Texas constitutional law, Article I, § 6-a is a categorical bar against governmental prohibitions and limitations on religious services when it applies, but its scope does not encompass general public land management decisions like those challenged by Perez.

The Court expresses no opinion on whether Perez may obtain relief under the federal Free Exercise Clause, the Texas Constitution’s Freedom of Worship Clause (Art. I, § 6), or the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act (Texas RFRA).

III. Constitutional and Statutory Framework

The decision situates Article I, § 6-a against a tripartite backdrop of existing religious liberty protections:

1. First Amendment Free Exercise Clause (U.S. Const. amend. I)
   • Historically interpreted, through Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), and later cases, to require strict scrutiny for laws that substantially burden religious exercise unless those laws are neutral and generally applicable.
2. Texas Constitution, Article I, § 6 – “Freedom of Worship Clause”
   • Original to the 1876 Constitution.
   • Provides that “All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences,” and that “No human authority ought, in any case whatever, to control or interfere with the rights of conscience in matters of religion.”
   • Texas Supreme Court has generally treated its protection for free exercise as coextensive with the federal Free Exercise Clause, applying a similar strict-scrutiny framework when properly invoked (see HEB Ministries, Inc. v. Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board, 235 S.W.3d 627 (Tex. 2007); Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. 1996)).
3. Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act (Texas RFRA), Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code ch. 110
   • Prohibits government agencies from imposing a “substantial burden” on a person’s free exercise of religion unless the government shows the burden is:
     1. In furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
     2. The least restrictive means of furthering that interest.
   • This is an explicit statutory codification of strict scrutiny.

Article I, § 6-a, added in 2021 following the COVID-19 pandemic, is thus an additional, distinct layer of protection, specifically tailored to “religious services” and framed quite differently from these other provisions.

IV. The Court’s Interpretive Method

A. Original Public Meaning and Context

The Court reiterates its established methodology for interpreting the Texas Constitution:

• The “bottom-line task” is to determine what the provision “would have meant to those who ratified it” at the time of adoption (citing Hogan v. Southern Methodist University, 688 S.W.3d 852 (Tex. 2024); In re Abbott, 628 S.W.3d 288 (Tex. 2021)).
• It “relies heavily on the literal text,” presuming that the framers (and, here, the proposing Legislature) carefully chose their language (Harris Cnty. Hosp. Dist. v. Tomball Reg’l Hosp., 283 S.W.3d 838 (Tex. 2009); Degan v. Board of Trustees, 594 S.W.3d 309 (Tex. 2020)).
• But it also considers “historical and linguistic context” and reads the Constitution as a whole (In re Dallas County, 697 S.W.3d 142 (Tex. 2024); In re Nestle USA, Inc., 387 S.W.3d 610 (Tex. 2012)).

The Court warns against:

• “Hyper-technical readings of isolated words or phrases”; and
• Simply “open[ing] a dictionary and ignor[ing] the historical traditions and legal foundations” (citing Hogan and In re Office of the Attorney General, 456 S.W.3d 153 (Tex. 2015)).

B. Use of Legislative and Other Historical Materials

The Court draws an important distinction between statutory interpretation (where it is skeptical of legislative history) and constitutional interpretation:

• For statutes, the Court has stressed that legislative history is “generally useless” and can be “manipulable” (Brown v. City of Houston, 660 S.W.3d 749 (Tex. 2023); In re Facebook, Inc., 625 S.W.3d 80 (Tex. 2021)).
• For constitutional provisions, however, statements by the proposing legislature, convention records, and contemporaneous public commentary can legitimately inform how the ratifying public likely understood the text (citing Degan, Marshall, Edgewood I.S.D. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989), and In re Allcat Claims Service, L.P., 356 S.W.3d 455 (Tex. 2011)).

Still, historical materials “must ordinarily yield when the text’s plain meaning says the opposite” (Allcat).

V. The Force of the Religious Services Clause: A Categorical Bar

A. The Text: “May Not … Prohibit or Limit Religious Services”

Article I, § 6-a provides:

This state or a political subdivision of this state may not enact, adopt, or issue a statute, order, proclamation, decision, or rule that prohibits or limits religious services, including religious services conducted in churches, congregations, and places of worship, in this state by a religious organization established to support and serve the propagation of a sincerely held religious belief.

Key textual features:

• The clause uses the unqualified phrase “may not,” which by default in Texas law means “is not permitted to” or “shall not” (Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.016(5)).
• Unlike other constitutional or statutory provisions, it contains no explicit exceptions:
  • No “unless,” “except,” or “subject to” clause.
• By comparison, Texas RFRA says government “may not substantially burden” religious exercise but makes that prohibition explicitly “[s]ubject to” strict scrutiny (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 110.003(a)-(b)).

The absence of qualifying language—especially alongside nearby provisions that explicitly use strict-scrutiny structure—strongly suggests that § 6-a itself is meant to be unconditional in its operative force.

B. Avoiding Redundancy with Other Protections

The Court emphasizes interpretive canon: constitutional provisions should be construed to give each an “independent meaning and operative effect” (Doody v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 49 S.W.3d 342 (Tex. 2001)).

If Article I, § 6-a simply imported a strict-scrutiny test:

• It would protect against laws that “prohibit or limit religious services” unless they are narrowly tailored to a compelling interest.
• But that protection is already substantially provided by:
  • The First Amendment Free Exercise Clause (as understood through Sherbert and subsequent authority);
  • The Texas Freedom of Worship Clause, treated as coextensive with Free Exercise in practice; and
  • Texas RFRA’s strict-scrutiny scheme.

Construing § 6-a as yet another strict-scrutiny provision would render it largely superfluous. The Court rejects that result, reinforcing the conclusion that § 6-a’s force must be stronger—categorical rather than balancing.

C. Historical Context: COVID-19 and the Drive for “More” Protection

The Court firmly anchors the Clause in the COVID-19 pandemic and the governmental responses in 2020:

• Governments across the country—and in Texas—issued “lock-down” and “social-distancing” orders, sometimes described as “the greatest intrusions on civil liberties in the peacetime history of this country” (quoting Justice Gorsuch in Arizona v. Mayorkas, 143 S. Ct. 1312 (2023) (statement)).
• These orders:
  • Closed churches and other places of worship;
  • Prohibited or severely limited in-person religious gatherings;
  • Imposed strict capacity limits (sometimes as low as ten people);
  • Forbade activities like singing or chanting; and
  • Restricted sacramental or pastoral practices (e.g., communion, group worship).
• At the same time, many secular activities were permitted to continue as “essential” or with fewer restrictions (e.g., stores, casinos, factories, marijuana dispensaries, etc.).

Lawsuits were filed nationwide challenging these orders under Free Exercise and various RFRA statutes, with mixed outcomes. The U.S. Supreme Court:

• Initially denied injunctive relief in some high-profile cases (Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603 (2020); South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom (South Bay I), 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020)), accepting arguments that religious entities were treated similarly to some secular comparators.
• Later granted relief when religious gatherings were treated worse than comparable secular activities (Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U.S. 14 (2020); South Bay II, 141 S. Ct. 716 (2021); Tandon v. Newsom, 593 U.S. 61 (2021), and others).

Texas-specific developments:

• Local governments, such as Travis County, issued orders explicitly prohibiting “religious services” as part of bans on “community gatherings.”
• The Governor later issued orders defining “essential services” to include religious services alongside federal “critical infrastructure” activities (Exec. Order GA-14, Mar. 31, 2020).
• The Legislature responded with:
  • S.J.R. 27, proposing Article I, § 6-a; and
  • H.B. 525, enacting Tex. Gov’t Code ch. 2401, expressly designating religious organizations as “essential businesses” and their activities as “essential activities” during declared disasters.

Legislative and public materials—House analyses, debate transcripts, media commentary—consistently framed § 6-a as a response to perceived inadequacy of existing free-exercise protections during the pandemic. The stated goal was to “do more” and “ensure that religious liberty is not abridged in the future.”

D. Evidence that the Clause Was Meant to Be Categorical

• During House debate, a member proposed inserting the “normal” strict-scrutiny language (“narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest”). The sponsor responded that “there is a reason we have left that language out,” and the proposal failed.
• Opponents of the amendment likewise understood it to mean that “no state interests can ever justify limiting religious services” (Houston Chronicle editorial, paraphrased by the Court) and that government “could never restrict capacity in a church service for any reason.”

Against this backdrop, the Court finds it clear that:

When Article I, § 6-a applies, it forbids governmental prohibitions or limitations on religious services regardless of governmental interest or narrow tailoring—no strict-scrutiny balancing is built into the provision.

E. The City’s “Every Right Has Limits” Argument

The City argued that every constitutional right must in some sense be limited—citing Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908)—and that, as with the Free Exercise Clause, limits should be implemented through a strict-scrutiny framework.

The Court’s response:

• Yes, all rights encounter limits “in the neighborhood of principles of policy,” but how those limits are recognized depends on the provision’s text and context.
• The Free Exercise Clause’s use of strict scrutiny stems from its own textual and historical context, and case law such as Sherbert and City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
• The Religious Services Clause’s context is different. Its language, legislative background, and purpose demonstrate that the people chose a different balance: a specific, categorical protection for “religious services,” with limits expressed instead through scope, not through interest balancing.

The City also raised concerns about federal Establishment Clause violations if religious services receive special treatment. The Court defers that concern to the separate question of scope (whether the Clause applies to particular scenarios at all) rather than using it to dilute the categorical nature of the right once triggered.

VI. The Scope of the Religious Services Clause

A. Express Textual Limits

The Court identifies five textual limitations on what § 6-a covers:

1. Who is constrained? Only “this state or a political subdivision of this state.” Private actors are not directly bound.
2. What kinds of actions? Only governmental actions taken by “enact[ing], adopt[ing], or issu[ing] a statute, order, proclamation, decision, or rule.” Informal conduct or non-rule actions might be outside the Clause’s reach.
3. What is protected? “Religious services,” not the entire breadth of “free exercise of religion.” (The Court does, however, read the phrase “including religious services conducted in churches, congregations, and places of worship” as providing examples, not an exhaustive list.)
4. Whose services? Religious services “conducted in this state by a religious organization established to support and serve the propagation of a sincerely held religious belief.” Thus, informal or ad hoc gatherings not conducted by such an organization may arguably fall outside the Clause.
5. What type of governmental effect? The government action must “prohibit or limit” religious services. Incidental effects that do not amount to a “prohibit[ion] or limit[ation]” may not be covered.

The opinion accepts these as baseline constraints that all parties essentially acknowledge.

B. Competing Theories of Scope and Why the Court Rejects Them

1. The City’s “Unequal Treatment / Essential Services” Theory

The City contended that § 6-a only prevents governmental actions that subject religious services to unequal treatment compared to secular activities, essentially requiring that religious services be treated as “essential” and at least as favorably regulated as secular analogues (a view modeled on COVID-era disputes).

The Court’s response:

• While the Clause certainly does forbid such unequal treatment (e.g., closing churches while leaving casinos open), its text does not condition protection on comparative analysis with secular activities.
• The Clause’s wording lacks any explicit reference to “essential” status or equal treatment.
• The historical record shows that some restrictions targeted religious gatherings across the board—such as Travis County’s ban on all community gatherings including religious ones—even where no more lenient secular comparators existed. The Clause was intended to respond to those orders as well.

The Court therefore rejects the idea that § 6-a is merely an “equal treatment” provision; it is broader in its own domain.

2. The State’s “Gatherings-Only” Theory

The State of Texas (as amicus) argued that § 6-a protects only the right to gather for religious services—preventing closures, capacity caps, or location bans—but does not reach restrictions on what worshippers may do during a service (e.g., prohibitions on singing, sharing communion).

The Court rejects this for several reasons:

• The text protects “religious services,” which inherently include elements like singing, preaching, sacraments, rituals, and other acts of worship.
• Legislative statements explicitly described § 6-a as preventing not only “closing the doors” but also bans on religious practices like singing and communion. Sponsors spoke of government “tr[ying] to prohibit singing in places of worship” as the kind of abuse the amendment was meant to foreclose.
• Historical context includes COVID orders that, for example, banned singing and chanting in indoor services (South Bay II), and the amendment was intended to block such intrusions.

Thus, the Clause protects both the gathering and the conduct of worship that constitutes a religious service.

3. Perez’s “Background Principles” Theory

Perez conceded that § 6-a is not unlimited and proposed that its scope be cabined by “longstanding interpretive principles of Texas constitutional law,” such that the Clause:

• Would not cover religious services that violate:
  • Ordinary property law (e.g., trespass, nuisance);
  • Criminal law (e.g., human sacrifice);
  • Basic public necessity or emergency response requirements (e.g., evacuating for imminent flood or falling tree); or
  • Others’ settled rights to use public spaces.

The Court acknowledges that these examples are persuasive in many circumstances but rejects Perez’s framing for three reasons:

1. No clear textual or contextual basis: The Clause itself does not expressly refer to “background principles” in the manner Perez proposes.
2. Indeterminacy: “Longstanding interpretive principles” is extremely amorphous and would give future governmental actors too much discretion to decide which religious services fall outside the Clause.
3. Predictability: Government and religious organizations alike need clearer, more objective boundaries to plan their conduct and vindicate their rights.

C. The Court’s Positive Account: What the Clause Clearly Covers

While refusing a comprehensive map, the Court confidently states that § 6-a:

• Does generally forbid:
  • Governmental enactments or orders that prohibit people from gathering for religious services (e.g., blanket in-person worship bans like many COVID lockdowns).
  • Government rules that restrict the number or relationships of people who may gather for religious services (e.g., capacity caps, household-only restrictions).
  • Governmental limits on the activities that occur during services (e.g., bans on singing, chanting, or communion adopted for public-health reasons).
• Does not attempt to comprehensively regulate other areas already governed by different doctrinal structures (e.g., fire codes, criminal law, police activity)—though the Court leaves their precise interaction for future cases.

Notably, the Court cites legislative statements that existing fire codes, zoning, and criminal laws were expected to remain enforceable; the sponsor expressly said the amendment “does nothing to affect those.” Another legislator observed that no court would read § 6-a to bar enforcement of “true health and safety” laws.

D. The Critical Limitation: Public Land Preservation and Management

For purposes of this case, the Court announces a key new doctrinal boundary:

The Religious Services Clause does not extend to governmental actions for the preservation and management of public lands.

Applied to Brackenridge Park:

• The City’s plan to:
  • Repair failing retaining walls;
  • Remove and replace most trees (for safety and maintenance reasons); and
  • Deter migratory birds, including cormorants, due to public health and safety concerns about bird excrement
• Is not an “order, proclamation, decision, or rule” that prohibits or limits a religious service directly. It instead reconfigures the natural and built environment of public land for general public use.
• At most, these actions remove or alter natural features (specific trees and bird presence) that the Church considers “necessary components” of its religious services.

The Court finds these actions categorically different from:

• COVID-era orders that closed churches or banned religious gatherings; or
• Orders that restricted specific worship practices like singing or communion.

The Court emphasizes:

• Perez does not claim the City must create trees or cormorants.
• He concedes the City could sell the land to a private developer (subject to deed restrictions), which would end his access altogether.
• He concedes the City may manage the area to ensure all members of the public can access and enjoy the park.

His position is instead that, while the City owns the land, § 6-a forbids it from taking actions that would remove trees and birds that are essential to his religious services. The Court declines to read § 6-a so broadly.

VII. Role of Federal Precedent on Public Lands and Religious Exercise

A. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n

The Court discusses Lyng, 485 U.S. 439 (1988), where the U.S. Supreme Court held that the federal Free Exercise Clause did not prevent the government from harvesting timber and building a road on federal land, even though it would cause “irreparable damage” to lands long held sacred by indigenous peoples and severely affect their religious practices.

Key points from Lyng:

• The government’s actions did not “coerce” believers into violating their beliefs or deny them benefits enjoyed by others.
• Government couldn’t function if it had to satisfy “every citizen’s religious needs and desires” regarding public property.
• Recognizing such a right could amount to granting religious groups “de facto beneficial ownership of some rather spacious tracts of public property.”

The Texas Supreme Court echoes these themes in saying that, “whatever rights the Indians may have to the use of the area, those rights do not divest the Government of its right to use what is, after all, its land.”

B. Apache Stronghold v. United States

The Court also references the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision in Apache Stronghold v. United States, 101 F.4th 1036 (9th Cir. 2024), which held that neither the Free Exercise Clause nor the federal RFRA prevented the government from conveying a sacred site (Oak Flat) to a mining company, even though the site had served as a focal point of indigenous religious practice for centuries.

The Ninth Circuit reasoned that:

• Lyng remains controlling; neither Free Exercise nor RFRA grants indigenous practitioners a right to dictate how the government uses or disposes of its land, absent coercion or denial of equal rights.
• Even RFRA’s “substantial burden” standard was interpreted in light of Lyng, such that altering or destroying the sacred site did not, by itself, constitute a legally cognizable “substantial burden” under that federal statute.

The Texas Supreme Court does not adopt Lyng or Apache Stronghold as binding interpretations of Texas law, but uses them as illustrative of the conceptual tension between religious freedom and public land management, and as background for clarifying what Article I, § 6-a does not do.

VIII. Certified Question Practice and the Court’s Restraint

The Court underscores that a certified question:

• Is not a full-blown appeal from a Texas court and does not come with the usual development of state jurisprudence in lower courts.
• Raises the risk of the Court issuing broad advisory opinions unmoored from fully developed factual records and Texas procedural contexts.

Accordingly, although the Fifth Circuit gave the Court leeway not to confine itself strictly to the question’s “precise form,” the Court:

• Refuses to draw the entire map of § 6-a’s scope.
• Instead confines its binding conclusions to:
  • The Clause’s categorical force when it applies; and
  • The fact that its scope does not extend to general preservation and management of public lands, as exemplified by San Antonio’s park-improvement decisions.

The Court notes that applying its answer to the facts of the federal case remains “solely the province of” the certifying court.

IX. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

A. “Categorical Bar” vs. “Strict Scrutiny”

• Categorical Bar: A rule that admits no exception based on government interests. If the government action falls within the rule’s scope, it is unconstitutional, full stop.
• Strict Scrutiny: A balancing test. The government may infringe a right if:
  • It pursues a compelling interest (an extremely important objective); and
  • The law or action is narrowly tailored and is the least restrictive means to achieve that interest.

Article I, § 6-a operates as a categorical bar when it applies; it does not weigh governmental interests once triggered.

B. “Scope” vs. “Force” of a Right

• Scope: The situations to which a right applies at all—who is protected, against what types of actions, and in what contexts.
• Force: What happens when the right does apply. Is it absolute, or subject to balancing against governmental interests?

Here:

• Scope of § 6-a is limited (e.g., does not cover park tree-removal decisions);
• Force is absolute within that scope (no strict-scrutiny exceptions once an action is deemed to “prohibit or limit religious services”).

C. “Religious Services” vs. “Free Exercise of Religion”

• Free Exercise of Religion: Very broad; includes beliefs, individual observances, personal conduct, moral choices, and non-ritual religious expression.
• Religious Services: Narrower; structured (or semi-structured) corporate or communal acts of worship—services in churches, congregations, sacred sites, etc.

Article I, § 6-a is focused on religious services, not the entire breadth of religious life. Other constitutional or statutory provisions may still protect broader religious exercise.

D. Preservation and Management of Public Lands

“Preservation and management of public lands” refers to the government’s role as landowner and steward of public spaces—parks, forests, beaches, and similar:

• Maintaining safety (e.g., removing dangerous trees, repairing structures);
• Ensuring public health (e.g., dealing with disease-bearing wildlife or sanitation problems);
• Balancing diverse public uses (e.g., recreation, environmental protection, historic preservation).

The Court holds that Article I, § 6-a does not give religious groups veto power over these land-management decisions simply because their religious practices are located there.

X. Precedents Shaping the Court’s Reasoning

Beyond the religious-freedom and COVID cases already discussed, several interpretive and structural precedents influence the Court’s approach:

• Hogan v. Southern Methodist University, 688 S.W.3d 852 (Tex. 2024) and In re Abbott, 628 S.W.3d 288 (Tex. 2021)
  • Reinforce original-public-meaning methodology in constitutional interpretation.
• Travelers’ Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 76 S.W.2d 1007 (Tex. 1934)
  • Confirms that constitutional meaning is fixed at the time of adoption, though it may apply to new circumstances.
• In re Dallas County, 697 S.W.3d 142 (Tex. 2024); In re Office of Attorney General, 456 S.W.3d 153 (Tex. 2015)
  • Counsel that words must be read in full linguistic and structural context, not in isolation.
• Degan v. Board of Trustees, 594 S.W.3d 309 (Tex. 2020)
  • Demonstrates reliance on constitutional history (including prior court decisions) to construe later amendments.
• In re Allcat Claims Service, L.P., 356 S.W.3d 455 (Tex. 2011)
  • Emphasizes that extratextual materials must yield where the text’s plain meaning dictates otherwise.
• Amberboy v. Société de Banque Privée, 831 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. 1992); Janvey v. GMAG, L.L.C., 592 S.W.3d 125 (Tex. 2019)
  • Explain the function and risks of certified questions and the Court’s cooperative federalism role.

XI. Impact and Future Implications

A. Strengthening Protection for Religious Services in Texas

The decision cements Article I, § 6-a as a uniquely strong protection for religious services in Texas:

• Texas governments may not:
  • Close houses of worship;
  • Impose capacity caps or relationship-based attendance rules on religious services;
  • Ban core worship practices like singing or communion—even in emergent circumstances—if those rules specifically “prohibit or limit religious services” within § 6-a’s scope.
• Government actors will have to address public health, safety, and emergency conditions through other mechanisms:
  • Truly neutral, generally applicable rules that may not qualify as “limits” on religious services (though this remains a fertile ground for litigation); or
  • Reliance on other legal authority (e.g., criminal law, emergency powers) that might fall outside § 6-a’s definitional scope.

In future emergencies (pandemics, natural disasters), Texas officials will have sharply reduced flexibility to directly regulate religious gatherings as such.

B. Clarifying, but Not Exhaustively Defining, the Clause’s Boundaries

While the Court explicitly declines to fully delineate § 6-a’s scope, Perez leaves some guiding markers:

• The Clause’s core is:
  • Governmental actions aimed at religious gatherings or worship activities as such.
  • COVID-style orders that close churches, cap attendance, or forbid singing are paradigmatic examples of what is now prohibited.
• It does not extend to:
  • Government decisions that merely change the physical or natural conditions of public land, even if those changes adversely affect religious practice conducted there.

Open questions likely to arise:

• Do neutral zoning laws that prevent operation of religious services in particular neighborhoods “limit” religious services for § 6-a purposes?
• How will courts treat noise ordinances, curfews, and fire-code limits on occupancy if applied to religious services?
• What counts as a “religious organization established to support and serve the propagation of a sincerely held religious belief”?

Future Texas litigation will likely refine these contours.

C. Implications for Indigenous and Other Sacred-Site Claims on Public Land

For practitioners of religions strongly tied to natural features on public lands (such as indigenous groups):

• Perez signals that Article I, § 6-a is not a vehicle for compelling the state to maintain or preserve specific physical attributes of public property (trees, animals, water flows) that are spiritually or ritually significant.
• Relief for such claims may instead have to be sought (if at all) under:
  • Other constitutional provisions (Free Exercise, Art. I § 6);
  • Texas RFRA (which retains a strict-scrutiny balancing test); or
  • Any applicable statutory or heritage-preservation laws.

The Court does not decide whether Perez might prevail on his Free Exercise or RFRA theories; it leaves those to the federal courts. But it clearly removes § 6-a from the set of tools available to attack general land-management decisions.

D. Federal–State Interplay

The decision also demonstrates:

• Texas’s willingness to create state constitutional rights that go beyond federal baselines.
• The importance of certified questions in allowing federal courts (here, the Fifth Circuit) to obtain authoritative answers on novel state constitutional provisions.
• The Court’s cautious approach to issuing sweeping doctrines without a broad base of state precedent, especially in areas (like Article I, § 6-a) that are both new and potentially wide-ranging in effect.

XII. Conclusion: Key Takeaways

Perez v. City of San Antonio is the foundational case for interpreting Texas’s Religious Services Clause, Article I, § 6-a. Its key contributions are:

1. Categorical Force: When the Clause applies, it is absolute. It forbids government from enacting or issuing laws or orders that “prohibit or limit religious services,” regardless of governmental interests, no matter how compelling and no matter how narrowly tailored the law might be.
2. Limited Scope: The Clause does not cover every effect on religious services. Its scope is textually and contextually constrained; among other things, it:
   • Clearly reaches bans on religious gatherings, capacity caps, and prohibitions on worship activities (like singing) adopted in response to crises.
   • Does not extend to general governmental activities in the preservation and management of public lands, even when such activities alter the physical environment of a site used for religious services.
3. Methodological Clarity: The Court reaffirms an original-public-meaning approach to constitutional interpretation that is text-driven but historically and contextually informed, and it distinguishes sharply between the roles of strict scrutiny under other provisions and the categorical nature of § 6-a.
4. Future Litigation: While marking out a concrete limit (public land management), the Court leaves open a wide field of questions about what else counts as a “limitation” on religious services and how § 6-a interacts with other legal regimes—issues that will shape Texas religious liberty jurisprudence for years to come.

In the narrow sense, the opinion tells the Fifth Circuit that San Antonio’s management of Brackenridge Park’s trees and bird populations does not violate Article I, § 6-a. In the broader sense, it establishes a major new principle: Texas has chosen to protect religious services with a uniquely powerful, categorical constitutional shield—but that shield does not transform public land into religiously controlled space.