Above-Guidelines Variances: Serious Uncharged Conduct Can Supply a Sufficiently Compelling Justification Without a Numerical “Variance Math” Explanation

Introduction

United States v. Jerry J. Jones (7th Cir. Jan. 5, 2026) concerns the procedural reasonableness of a substantial above-Guidelines sentence after multiple resentencings. Jerry J. Jones was convicted (1998) of two carjackings (18 U.S.C. § 2119), armed bank robbery (18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d)), and three counts of using a firearm during crimes of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)). The case’s distinctive feature is the defendants’ flight: after a high-speed crash, they broke into the Routte family home, threatened family members at gunpoint, and coerced Michael Routte to drive them to Indianapolis.

After postconviction relief and a prior remand for inadequate sentencing explanation, the district court imposed a new sentence of 660 months, still 270 months above the top of the Guidelines range (348–390 months). The appeal asked whether the district judge adequately justified that large upward variance, particularly by relying on serious conduct (the home invasion and terrorizing of the Routte family) that was not charged as a separate offense and, in part, arguably overlapped with Guideline enhancements.

Key Issues

What level of explanation is required to justify a large upward deviation from the Guidelines range?
May a judge justify an above-Guidelines sentence by emphasizing serious, uncharged conduct connected to the offense?
Must the judge quantify how much of the sentence is attributable to the aggravating conduct (a “variance math” explanation)?
How should a court respond to a prior appellate remand requiring clearer justification (from Jones I)?

Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit affirmed. It held that the district judge’s justification—explicitly finding that the Guidelines “really don’t entirely account for the break-in” at the Routtes’ home and treating that conduct as aggravating—was sufficiently compelling to support a substantial variance. The court rejected the argument that the sentencing judge had to provide a detailed numerical accounting of how the uncharged conduct translated into months, and it reiterated that even if the Guidelines account for some aspects of conduct, the sentencing court may weigh those facts differently than the Sentencing Commission.

The decision is labeled a NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION and “To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1,” but it provides a concrete application of established standards governing variances and explanations at resentencing after remand.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Baseline standards for variances and explanation

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007): The opinion anchors the governing framework: no “rigid mathematical formula” is required, and appellate courts do not demand “extraordinary” circumstances to uphold significant deviations. Yet the sentencing judge must provide reasons sufficient to permit meaningful appellate review, and reviewing courts must give “due deference” to the district court’s § 3553(a) assessment.
Influence here: The Seventh Circuit used Gall to reject any requirement that the judge quantify the variance in a formulaic way, while still insisting on a real justification tied to § 3553(a).
United States v. Ballard, 12 F.4th 734 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Miller, 601 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 2010)): The court reiterated that the judge must consider the extent of the deviation and ensure the justification is “sufficiently compelling to support the degree of variance.”
Influence here: This was the standard the panel applied to Jones’s “nearly 70 percent” above-range sentence, concluding the justification was compelling because the judge tied it to grave conduct the Guidelines did not “entirely account” for.
United States v. Padilla, 520 F.3d 766 (7th Cir. 2008): “The more significant the deviation, the more detailed the district court’s explanation must be.”
Influence here: Jones relied on this principle; the panel accepted the premise but held the judge’s explanation met the required level of detail by expressly identifying and emphasizing unaccounted-for aggravating facts.
United States v. Robertson, 648 F.3d 858 (7th Cir. 2011): A judge must “give a reason, however brief, for ignoring” the Guidelines.
Influence here: The panel treated the district court’s finding—Guidelines do not fully account for the home invasion/terrorizing episode—as the key “reason” supporting the variance.

2) The case-specific remand constraint and compliance

United States v. Jones (Jones I), 962 F.3d 956 (7th Cir. 2020): The prior remand required the district judge to specify why Jones was different from the “vast majority of defendants” and explain why the sentence served the cited considerations. The panel in Jones I found procedural error because the judge emphasized the Routte-home conduct but did not clearly find it aggravated the offenses; the judge also relied on inaccurate facts and did not explain disparity with co-defendants.
Influence here: The 2026 panel evaluated whether the district judge did what Jones I demanded—namely, make an express aggravation finding and articulate why the Guidelines were insufficient. It concluded the judge did so by expressly finding the break-in was not fully accounted for and by repeatedly describing the event’s extreme seriousness and trauma.
United States v. Lockwood, 789 F.3d 773 (7th Cir. 2015): Quoted in Jones I for the requirement to specify why the defendant is different from the “vast majority of defendants.”
Influence here: Although the 2026 order does not re-litigate every remand instruction, it uses the judge’s focus on extraordinary violence/trauma at the Routte home to satisfy the “what makes this case different” concern.
Bradley, 675 F.3d at 1024, 1028: Cited (via Jones I) for giving “respectful consideration” to the judgment embodied in the Guidelines and understanding “the relation between the guidelines and the ultimate sentence.”
Influence here: The panel acknowledged the judge did not expressly state the precise degree of deviation from the high end at the second resentencing, but still found the explanation adequate under deferential review.

3) “Already counted” facts and the court’s discretion to weigh them

United States v. Hayden, 775 F.3d 847 (7th Cir. 2014): Even if a fact is accounted for in the Guideline calculation, it “did not bar the sentencing court from weighing the information differently than the Sentencing Commission.”
Influence here: This was central to rebutting Jones’s argument that the PSR enhancements (abduction, carjacking, reckless flight) meant the variance lacked a valid foundation. The panel held overlap does not preclude a variance where the judge explains why the Guidelines still understate seriousness.

4) What a sentencing explanation must look like

United States v. Vasquez-Abarca, 946 F.3d 990 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Kuczora, 910 F.3d 904 (7th Cir. 2018)): A court “need not frame its explanation of a sentence in terms of a departure from the guidelines range.”
Influence here: This supported the panel’s refusal to require an explicit month-by-month allocation of how the variance was calculated.
United States v. Johnson, 612 F.3d 889 (7th Cir. 2010): The judge need not evaluate every § 3553(a) factor; it is sufficient to calculate the Guidelines correctly and explain why the defendant’s circumstances warrant a deviation.
Influence here: The panel accepted that the judge touched on some § 3553(a) factors “without elaboration,” but held the core explanation—under-accounted-for aggravating conduct—was enough.

5) Postconviction and sentencing-law context cited

Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500 (2016) and Jones v. Kreuger, No. 2:17-cv-00497-WTL-MJD, 2018 WL 2416409 (S.D. Ind. May 29, 2018): These explain why Jones received resentencing at all—his career-offender classification under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 was invalid after Mathis, making the prior sentence a “miscarriage of justice.”
Influence here: They contextualize the Guidelines range (348–390 months) that became the benchmark for variance review.
United States v. Black, 131 F.4th 542 (7th Cir. 2025): Cited for the First Step Act’s restriction on “stacking” § 924(c) sentences in the same prosecution.
Influence here: It explains why the § 924(c) component could be treated as 60 months per count at resentencing—reducing the baseline and making the extent of any variance more salient.

Legal Reasoning

Correct starting point: Guidelines range and procedural focus. The district court adopted the PSR’s calculations and offense-conduct findings, producing a range of 348–390 months. The appeal concerned not substantive reasonableness (whether the sentence is “too long” in an abstract sense), but procedural reasonableness—whether the judge adequately explained the variance.
Explicit aggravation finding cured the defect identified in Jones I. In Jones I, the Seventh Circuit could not tell whether the judge actually found the Routte-home episode aggravated the offenses and justified adding hundreds of months. On remand, the judge expressly found “the guidelines really don’t entirely account for the break-in” and concluded that conduct aggravated the offenses. That express finding is what the appellate court needed for meaningful review.
The justification was “sufficiently compelling” because it identified under-accounted-for violence and trauma. The panel emphasized the district judge’s reliance on multiple specific facts: breaking into and hiding in the Routtes’ home, brandishing and pointing a firearm at family members, tying up the family, and the severe victim impact described as a “lifelong horror story.” The court treated these facts—especially in combination—as a valid basis for concluding the Guidelines did not capture the full seriousness.
Overlap with Guideline enhancements did not negate the variance rationale. Jones argued enhancements already covered abduction, carjacking, and reckless flight. The panel responded in two ways: (a) some enhancements addressed different aspects (e.g., reckless flight related to the interstate chase/crash), and (b) even where there is overlap, United States v. Hayden permits the judge to weigh those facts differently than the Commission.
No requirement to provide a numerical “variance calculus.” Relying on Gall v. United States and United States v. Vasquez-Abarca, the panel rejected the notion that the judge must explain precisely how many months are attributable to uncharged conduct or to each § 3553(a) factor. It was enough that the judge identified the aggravating conduct and tied it to § 3553(a), chiefly the “nature and circumstances of the offense” and the seriousness of the offense (§ 3553(a)(2)(A)).
Deference and the limited role of appellate review. The panel reiterated that appellate courts must give “due deference” to district courts’ balancing of § 3553(a) factors. Here, that deference mattered because, although the judge did not explicitly state the percentage or month-difference above the high end, the record still showed a reasoned basis for concluding the Guidelines understated the case’s severity.

Impact

Although nonprecedential, the order reinforces several practical points likely to influence sentencing litigation (especially resentencings after remand) in the Seventh Circuit:

Express findings matter after remand. When an appellate court previously faulted a sentencing explanation for ambiguity, the most reliable “fix” is an explicit factual finding that certain conduct aggravates the offense and that the Guidelines do not fully account for it.
Uncharged conduct can support a large variance when clearly connected to § 3553(a). The decision confirms that severe conduct intertwined with the offense (here, home invasion and terrorizing victims during flight) can justify a substantial above-range sentence if the judge articulates why it makes the case atypical.
Overlap with enhancements is not a veto. Defendants frequently argue “double counting” in variance disputes; this order underscores that overlap is not dispositive if the judge explains why the Guidelines still undervalue the seriousness.
Courts are not required to “do the math” on variances. Litigants should expect the Seventh Circuit to focus less on numerical allocation and more on whether the judge connected concrete facts to § 3553(a) and acknowledged the Guidelines as a benchmark.
Victim-impact narratives can be central to explaining variances. The judge’s repeated references to trauma and “horrific” facts show how victim impact can be used to justify an upward variance—provided it is grounded in the record and not in inaccurate facts (a defect noted in Jones I).

Complex Concepts Simplified

Guidelines range: The recommended sentencing range calculated under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines based on offense characteristics and criminal history. It is advisory, not mandatory, but must be correctly calculated and considered.
Variance vs. departure: A departure is a sentence adjustment contemplated by specific Guideline rules; a variance is a sentence outside the range based on the broader statutory factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). This opinion emphasizes that judges do not have to describe their reasoning in “departure” terms to justify a sentence outside the range.
Procedural reasonableness: Whether the sentencing process was done correctly—proper Guideline calculation, consideration of the parties’ arguments, and an adequate explanation tied to § 3553(a). Jones’s appeal challenged the explanation, not the factfinding that the conduct occurred.
§ 3553(a) factors: Statutory considerations guiding sentencing, including the nature of the offense, the defendant’s history, deterrence, protection of the public, and just punishment. A judge need not discuss every factor as long as the explanation shows reasoned consideration.
Uncharged conduct: Wrongful behavior proven or reliably described in the record but not charged as a separate count of conviction. Courts may consider such conduct at sentencing if it is supported by the record and relevant to § 3553(a).
“Stacking” under § 924(c) and the First Step Act: Historically, multiple § 924(c) counts in the same case could trigger escalating mandatory consecutive penalties. The First Step Act restricted that practice; the opinion notes this affected Jones’s resentencing exposure and the structure of his federal sentence.

Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit affirmed Jerry Jones’s 660-month sentence because the district judge supplied an adequate procedural explanation for a large above-Guidelines variance: the Guidelines did not “entirely account” for the extreme, violent, and traumatizing conduct committed at the Routte family home during flight, and that conduct aggravated the offenses under § 3553(a). The order highlights that sentencing judges need not provide a mathematical breakdown of variance months, and that even where some conduct overlaps with Guideline enhancements, courts may weigh the facts differently than the Sentencing Commission—so long as the record-based justification is clear enough to permit meaningful appellate review.