Abeyance, Not Dismissal: Sixth Circuit Clarifies That Tennessee Criminal-Malpractice Claims Must Be Stayed Until Post-Conviction Relief Is Finally Resolved

Introduction

In Dimitar Petlechkov v. Michael J. Stengel, No. 24-5483 (6th Cir. July 18, 2025) (not recommended for publication), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit addressed the interplay between Tennessee’s “exoneration” requirement for criminal-legal-malpractice claims and federal case-management tools such as stays and dismissals. The case arises from a legal-malpractice suit filed by Mr. Petlechkov, a Bulgarian citizen proceeding pro se, against his former federal criminal defense attorney, Michael Stengel. After a 2018 jury conviction for mail fraud in a scheme involving discounted FedEx shipping, and following direct appeals and resentencing, Mr. Petlechkov sued Stengel for malpractice in federal district court in the Western District of Tennessee.

Several procedural crossroads defined the appeal:

• Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying “partial reassignment” after the originally assigned judge recused.
• Whether the court properly reinstated a stay of the malpractice case while a federal coram nobis petition was pending.
• Whether the court prematurely dismissed the malpractice complaint (and denied leave to amend) for failure to obtain post-conviction relief as required by Tennessee law.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of partial reassignment and the reinstatement of the stay, but vacated the dismissal of the malpractice action and the denial of leave to amend, remanding with instructions to hold the malpractice case in abeyance pending final resolution of post-conviction proceedings. The court also denied Mr. Petlechkov’s pending motions (including requests regarding electronic filing, expedited oral argument/virtual appearance, and expedited decision) in this appeal. A separate appeal from a pre-filing restriction imposed by the district court remains pending (No. 25-5339), as does Mr. Petlechkov’s appeal from the denial of his coram nobis petition (No. 24-6080).

Summary of the Opinion

The panel (Judges Gibbons, Bush, and Davis) held:

• Partial reassignment: No abuse of discretion in denying “partial reassignment” after the original judge recused; partial recusal is permitted but not required under 28 U.S.C. § 455, and no prejudice or impartiality concerns were shown.
• Reinstatement of stay: The district court acted within its broad discretion in staying the malpractice case under Landis and Clinton pending resolution of the coram nobis petition; the stay was not immoderate, particularly with 90-day status-report requirements.
• Dismissal and leave to amend: The district court prematurely dismissed the malpractice complaint and denied leave to amend. Under Tennessee law (Gibson v. Trant) and subsequent Tennessee appellate decisions, malpractice courts should await the outcome of post-conviction proceedings before dismissing. Because Mr. Petlechkov’s coram nobis appeal remains pending, dismissal was improper. The case must be held in abeyance.
• Remand directive: On remand, the court indicates that discovery should not proceed while post-conviction proceedings are unresolved, because the plaintiff cannot prevail on a criminal-malpractice theory absent post-conviction relief.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Tennessee’s criminal-malpractice rule — Gibson v. Trant, 58 S.W.3d 103 (Tenn. 2001): The Tennessee Supreme Court held that “a plaintiff cannot prevail in a ‘criminal malpractice’ case against his defense lawyer unless he proves that he has obtained post-conviction relief.” The Sixth Circuit applied this substantive Tennessee rule to the federal malpractice action. It operated as a gating requirement: without post-conviction relief, the claim cannot succeed.
• Timing/abeyance under Tennessee law — Burnett v. South, 2006 WL 4497729 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2006); Montague v. Kellum, 2002 WL 31640568 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2002); Blackwood v. Martin, 2002 WL 1751238 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2002): Tennessee intermediate appellate courts interpret Gibson to mean the malpractice court should await the outcome of post-conviction proceedings rather than dismissing prematurely. The Sixth Circuit followed this approach: because Mr. Petlechkov’s coram nobis petition and appeal were pending, dismissal was precluded and abeyance was appropriate.
• Federal stay authority — Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248 (1936); Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997); Ohio Environmental Council v. U.S. District Court, 565 F.2d 393 (6th Cir. 1977): These cases confirm a district court’s inherent power and broad discretion to stay proceedings. Landis imposes limits: a stay cannot be “immoderate” or indefinite; it must be framed to end within reasonable limits, and the moving party bears the burden to show a pressing need and lack of undue harm to others. The Sixth Circuit held that the district court appropriately weighed judicial economy, litigant burdens, and public interest, and constrained the stay by requiring periodic status reports.
• Recusal/reassignment — 28 U.S.C. § 455; Decker v. GE Healthcare Inc., 770 F.3d 378 (6th Cir. 2014); United States v. Ashrafkhan, 821 F. App’x 428 (6th Cir. 2020); Sinito v. United States, 750 F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1984): Section 455 requires disqualification where impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Decker recognizes that partial recusal is permissible, but not compulsory. Absent a showing that the newly assigned judge lacked impartiality or that reassignment caused prejudice, denial of “partial reassignment” is not an abuse of discretion.
• Pleadings posture — Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(c): Although the defendant had already answered, the Sixth Circuit treated the Rule 12(b)(6) motion as a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings (Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436 n.1 (6th Cir. 1988)), and applied de novo review (Moore v. Hiram Township, 988 F.3d 353, 357 (6th Cir. 2021); Moderwell v. Cuyahoga County, 997 F.3d 653, 659 (6th Cir. 2021)).
• Persuasive district authority — Meyer v. Pellegrin, 2019 WL 5777759 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 10, 2019): This decision supports abeyance of a Tennessee criminal-malpractice suit pending the outcome of post-conviction proceedings.

Legal Reasoning

1. Partial reassignment denied within discretion: The original district judge recused due to a recently discovered conflict after FedEx made a limited appearance to quash a subpoena. The plaintiff sought “partial reassignment,” effectively asking the new judge to decide the FedEx subpoena and then return the case. The Sixth Circuit noted that while partial recusal is allowed, it is not required. The plaintiff alleged no bias or prejudice from the newly assigned judge and showed no cognizable harm. Given that the case had been stayed most of the prior period, continuity concerns carried little weight. No abuse of discretion occurred.
2. Stay reinstatement affirmed under Landis/Clinton: The district court reinstated a stay pending resolution of the plaintiff’s federal coram nobis petition. Applying federal stay law, the court weighed:
   • Judicial economy (the outcome of post-conviction proceedings could dispose of the malpractice suit as a matter of law under Gibson);
   • Hardship and inequity (avoiding unnecessary litigation costs for the defendant and non-parties);
   • Plaintiff’s interests (the court questioned urgency given his history of filings and asked why FedEx discovery could not be pursued in other proceedings);
   • Public interest (neutral).
   The stay was cabined by 90-day status reports, avoiding an “immoderate” or indefinite duration. This fell squarely within the court’s discretion.
3. Dismissal vacated as premature under Tennessee law: Although Tennessee’s Gibson rule requires post-conviction relief for a plaintiff to prevail, Tennessee appellate decisions instruct malpractice courts to wait for the post-conviction outcome rather than dismiss while post-conviction litigation is pending. Here, when the district court dismissed, the coram nobis petition had been denied, but the appeal period had not run; the appeal is now pending and has been accepted as timely. Because post-conviction proceedings remain live, Tennessee law—as applied by federal courts—requires abeyance, not dismissal. The denial of leave to amend as “futile” fell with the premature dismissal.
4. Remand instructions: The Sixth Circuit directs that the malpractice case be held in abeyance pending final resolution of the post-conviction proceedings, including the coram nobis appeal. It further indicates discovery should not proceed because the plaintiff cannot succeed absent post-conviction relief. This balances Gibson’s substantive requirement with Landis’s case-management principles.

Impact

The order, though nonprecedential, provides clear guidance to federal courts sitting in Tennessee (and to litigants) on managing criminal-legal-malpractice suits that hinge on post-conviction relief:

• Abeyance is the default while post-conviction remains pending: Whether the post-conviction vehicle is § 2255, coram nobis under the All Writs Act, or another mechanism, and whether at the trial or appellate stage, federal courts should generally stay the malpractice action rather than dismiss it until post-conviction proceedings are finally resolved.
• Final resolution includes appeal time: Dismissal is premature if the time to appeal the post-conviction ruling has not run, or if an appeal is pending.
• Discovery should be deferred: The Sixth Circuit endorses avoiding discovery burdens on defendants and non-parties in criminal-malpractice suits that cannot succeed unless and until post-conviction relief is obtained.
• Stays must be bounded: Status-report requirements (e.g., every 90 days) are a best practice to avoid “immoderate” or indefinite stays under Landis.
• Partial reassignment is exceptional: Parties seeking partial reassignment after a recusal must show more than case tenure; they must demonstrate impartiality concerns or concrete prejudice.
• Rule 12 posture is flexible: A Rule 12(b)(6) motion filed after an answer may be treated as a Rule 12(c) motion; that technicality does not shield a premature dismissal from appellate correction.

Practically, this framework reduces duplicative litigation and protects courts and parties from expending resources on malpractice claims that are categorically barred absent post-conviction relief. Plaintiffs, especially pro se litigants, should plan their litigation strategy around the post-conviction calendar and anticipate an abeyance of civil malpractice claims until their criminal judgments are vacated or otherwise set aside.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Criminal legal malpractice under Tennessee law (the “exoneration rule”): In Tennessee, a person who sues a former criminal defense lawyer for malpractice cannot win unless they have already obtained post-conviction relief (e.g., the criminal conviction is vacated or set aside). This is meant to prevent inconsistent judgments and ensure causation is established.
• Post-conviction relief: Legal mechanisms to challenge a criminal conviction or sentence after judgment. Common examples include federal habeas/§ 2255 and the extraordinary writ of coram nobis. Relief can occur at the trial or appellate level, and finality matters for the malpractice suit.
• Writ of coram nobis (federal, under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)): An extraordinary remedy under the All Writs Act for those no longer in custody to challenge a conviction based on fundamental errors. It is rare and strictly limited. While pending (including appeal), it counts as ongoing post-conviction litigation for Gibson purposes.
• Stay of proceedings (Landis/Clinton): A court’s power to pause a case to promote efficiency and avoid prejudice. Stays must be reasonable in scope and duration. Courts weigh the movant’s need, potential harm to others, and the public interest. Periodic status reports prevent open-ended stays.
• Immoderate stay: A stay that is indefinite or lacks meaningful limits is unlawful. Courts avoid this by tying the stay to a defined event (e.g., the conclusion of a post-conviction case) and requiring updates.
• Recusal and partial reassignment: A judge must step aside if impartiality could reasonably be questioned. Partial recusal—where a judge steps aside from some matters but not others—is allowed but not required. Without a showing of bias or prejudice, courts do not have to engineer partial reassignments.
• Rule 12(b)(6) vs. Rule 12(c): If a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim (12(b)(6)) is filed after an answer, courts treat it as a motion for judgment on the pleadings (12(c)). The standards are materially similar: well-pleaded allegations are taken as true and the movant must be clearly entitled to judgment.

Case Background: A Brief Timeline

• 2018: Jury convicts Mr. Petlechkov of mail fraud; sentenced to 37 months, restitution to FedEx, and referred for deportation.
• 2019: Sixth Circuit affirms in part, reverses in part, remands for resentencing (United States v. Petlechkov, 922 F.3d 762).
• 2022: Resentencing affirmed (United States v. Petlechkov, 2022 WL 168651).
• 2020–2023: District court stays the malpractice case while criminal matters proceed.
• 2023: Scheduling order entered; defendant seeks dismissal; plaintiff files or relies on a pending coram nobis petition; defendant seeks reinstated stay; original judge recuses; case reassigned.
• 2024: District court reinstates stay; after coram nobis is denied, the court dismisses the malpractice case and denies leave to amend; it also imposes a pre-filing restriction (separate appeal pending).
• 2025: Sixth Circuit accepts coram nobis appeal as timely (No. 24-6080); in this appeal (No. 24-5483), the Sixth Circuit affirms denial of partial reassignment and stay reinstatement, vacates dismissal and denial of leave to amend, and remands with instructions to hold the malpractice case in abeyance; pending motions in this appeal are denied.

Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s order in Petlechkov v. Stengel crystallizes a practical and doctrinally coherent approach for federal courts applying Tennessee’s criminal-malpractice law: when a plaintiff’s post-conviction efforts are still unfolding—including appeals from coram nobis or other post-conviction rulings—the proper course is abeyance, not dismissal. This respects Tennessee’s Gibson rule, conserves judicial and party resources, and aligns with Landis’s stay principles by avoiding immoderate delay through regular status updates.

The decision also underscores two additional points: first, partial reassignment following a recusal remains a discretionary, exceptional measure requiring a concrete showing of prejudice or impartiality concerns; second, procedural labels (Rule 12(b)(6) versus Rule 12(c)) will not salvage a premature merits disposition that conflicts with governing state law on when criminal-malpractice claims may proceed.

Key takeaways:

• In Tennessee criminal-malpractice suits, courts should stay, not dismiss, while post-conviction proceedings are pending through finality.
• Discovery generally should not go forward until post-conviction relief is obtained.
• Stays must be time-bounded and monitored (e.g., status reports).
• Requests for partial reassignment require more than a change in case management; they require a showing tied to impartiality or prejudice.

Although not precedential, the ruling offers strong, persuasive guidance for litigants and courts managing the intersection of criminal post-conviction litigation and civil malpractice claims in Tennessee and within the Sixth Circuit.