Introduction

In A.P. v. Dannhauser (No. 25-1030, decided November 7, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued a nonprecedential summary order affirming the Eastern District of New York’s dismissal of a civil rights suit brought by parents against the City of New York, the New York City Administration for Children’s Services (ACS), and various current and former city officials. Plaintiffs alleged that their constitutional rights were violated through ACS’s practices surrounding emergency child removals, asserting several claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as state-law theories. The district court (Chen, J.) dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), denied leave to amend under Rule 15, and entered judgment without prejudice.

On appeal, Plaintiffs challenged (1) the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, (2) the denial of leave to amend as futile, and (3) alleged judicial bias and hostility—seeking reversal and disqualification of the district judge. The Second Circuit affirmed in all respects.

Although styled as a summary order with no precedential effect under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Local Rule 32.1.1, the decision delivers clear, persuasive guidance on recurring issues in § 1983 litigation against municipalities: whom to sue, how to plead Monell liability, what suffices to justify amendment, and when (and how) to raise recusal concerns.

Summary of the Opinion

• Improper Defendants:
  • ACS is a non-suable city agency under New York City Charter § 396; the proper municipal defendant is the City of New York.
  • Official-capacity claims against individual officers were properly dismissed as duplicative of the suit against the City.
  • Individual-capacity claims failed because the complaint did not allege personal involvement with the requisite specificity.
• Monell Claim Fails:
  • Plaintiffs did not plausibly allege a municipal policy, custom, or failure to train that was the moving force behind a constitutional violation. Conclusory references to “ACS policy” and generalized failure-to-train assertions were insufficient under Twombly/Iqbal.
• Leave to Amend Properly Denied:
  • Plaintiffs’ proposed amendment—adding an ACS report, three complaints from other cases, and statistics indicating that 39–45% of emergency removals were later “unfounded”—was futile.
  • Unadjudicated allegations in other cases and raw statistics, without more, do not plausibly show a municipal policy or custom.
• Judicial Bias Claim Rejected:
  • Recusal arguments were waived because Plaintiffs failed to move under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 or 455 in the district court despite having nine months to do so.
  • Even on the merits, the court found no abuse of discretion: routine case-management decisions (e.g., extending a briefing deadline, denying an untimely reconsideration motion, and warning about Rule 11) did not evidence bias.

The judgment of the district court was affirmed in full.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

• Pleading Standard:
  • Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) — A complaint must plead facts that render liability plausible, not merely possible.
• Proper Municipal Defendant:
  • New York City Charter § 396 — City agencies generally are not suable entities; actions must be brought against the City of New York.
• Official vs. Individual Capacity:
  • O’Connor v. Pierson, 568 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2009); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985) — Official-capacity suits are effectively suits against the entity and are duplicative when the municipality is a named defendant.
  • Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2013); Darby v. Greenman, 14 F.4th 124 (2d Cir. 2021) — Individual-capacity § 1983 liability requires nonconclusory allegations of personal involvement.
• Monell Liability:
  • Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) — A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when a municipal policy or custom is the moving force of a constitutional violation; no respondeat superior.
  • Agosto v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 982 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 2020) — Elements of a Monell claim articulated.
  • Chislett v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 2025 WL 2725669 (2d Cir. Sept. 25, 2025) — Emphasizes the “moving force” requirement and no respondeat superior.
  • Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2015) — Conclusory assertions of policy or custom do not suffice; persistent or widespread practice must be plausibly alleged.
• Leave to Amend:
  • Smith v. Hogan, 794 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2015) — Denial of leave to amend based on futility is reviewed de novo.
  • Jin v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2002) — Leave should be freely given but may be denied for futility, bad faith, undue delay, or prejudice.
  • Buari v. City of New York, 530 F. Supp. 3d 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2021); Isaac v. City of New York, 2018 WL 5020173 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2018) — Unproven allegations in other cases do not plausibly establish a municipal policy at the pleading stage.
• Judicial Bias/Recusal:
  • United States v. Bayless, 201 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2000) — Untimeliness can constitute implied waiver of recusal arguments.
  • United States v. Wedd, 993 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2021); United States v. Thompson, 76 F.3d 442 (2d Cir. 1996) — Abuse-of-discretion review and the “impartiality might reasonably be questioned” standard.
  • Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994) — Adverse judicial rulings and ordinary case-management conduct are not evidence of bias; recusal is not a vehicle for judge-shopping.
  • Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges, Canon 3 — Judges must be fair, impartial, and diligent; conduct alleged here fell far short of any bias.
• Appellate and Local Rules on Summary Orders:
  • FRAP 32.1; Second Circuit Local Rule 32.1.1 — Summary orders are nonprecedential but citable for persuasive value.

Legal Reasoning and Application

1) Threshold Party and Capacity Issues

The court began by pruning improper defendants and claims. Under NYC Charter § 396, ACS is not a suable entity; the proper municipal defendant is the City. Official-capacity claims against individual officers mirrored the suit against the City and were dismissed as redundant. As to individual-capacity claims, the complaint offered no nonconclusory facts showing each named official’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violations. The Second Circuit reaffirmed that “vague and conclusory allegations” do not satisfy § 1983’s personal-involvement requirement.

2) Monell Pleading Deficiencies

Turning to the core municipal-liability theory, the panel held that Plaintiffs’ allegations did not plausibly plead that a municipal policy, custom, or deliberate failure to train was the moving force behind a constitutional deprivation. The complaint “alluded” to an ACS policy and alleged failure to train, but it did not supply facts demonstrating:

• the existence of a formal policy or a widespread practice “so persistent” as to have the force of law,
• actions or decisions by a final municipal policy-maker, or
• identifiable training deficiencies coupled with deliberate indifference and a causal nexus to the injury.

The Second Circuit’s reliance on Littlejohn and Agosto underscores that generalizations and labels are insufficient. The reference to failure-to-train was particularly thin; without concrete allegations showing deliberate indifference and causal connection—often demonstrated by patterns of similar constitutional violations or policymaker notice—courts typically dismiss such claims at the pleading stage.

3) Futility of Proposed Amendment

Plaintiffs sought to amend to add an ACS report, three complaints from other ACS-related cases, and data indicating that 39–45% of emergency removals were later unfounded. The panel agreed with the district court that this proffer would not cure the Monell defects:

• Other lawsuits that did not result in adjudications of liability—i.e., unproven allegations—do not plausibly establish a municipal policy or custom.
• Statistics alone, especially untethered to specific constitutional standards or to decision-making by policymakers, do not support an inference of bad-faith removals or a policy of unconstitutional conduct. A high rate of “unfounded” outcomes may reflect many factors (screening conservatism, evidentiary evolution, or remedial verification) and does not, by itself, demonstrate unconstitutional policy or causation.

Because the proposed amendment would not salvage the claims, denial of leave to amend as futile was proper under the de novo standard articulated in Smith v. Hogan.

4) Judicial Bias and Hostility

Plaintiffs raised bias for the first time on appeal. The panel deemed the argument waived because Plaintiffs did not timely seek recusal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 or 455 despite having nine months to do so. Even on the merits, the record showed only routine case management: granting Defendants a one-month filing extension, denying a reconsideration motion filed seven months late (and unnecessary given that Plaintiffs were already proceeding by initials), and cautioning Plaintiffs to follow local rules on pain of possible Rule 11 sanctions. Such rulings, without more, neither evidence bias nor support disqualification under Canon 3 or Liteky. Adverse rulings are not grounds for recusal.

Impact and Implications

While nonprecedential, this order is a crisp reminder of core § 1983 pleading principles in municipal-liability litigation:

• Naming Proper Defendants:
  • In suits against New York City agencies, name the City, not the agency; official-capacity claims add nothing when the City is already a defendant.
• Personal Involvement Matters:
  • To hold individual officials liable, plead concrete facts showing each official’s direct participation or supervisory culpability—not job titles or generalized oversight.
• Monell’s High Bar:
  • Monell claims require particularized facts: formal policies; decisions traceable to policymakers; patterns of similar violations; or failure-to-train theories meeting deliberate-indifference and causation standards. Other complaints and raw statistics rarely suffice without adjudicated findings, corroborating patterns, or factual detail linking the data to constitutional standards and municipal decision-making.
• Amendment Strategy:
  • To avoid futility, proposed amendments should add nonconclusory, case-specific facts tying the alleged constitutional injuries to identified municipal policies, policymaker actions, or well-pleaded failure-to-train deficiencies. Simply appending unproven allegations from other lawsuits is inadequate.
• Recusal Practice:
  • Recusal challenges must be timely raised in the district court under §§ 144/455. Routine scheduling decisions, adherence to local rules, and warnings about Rule 11 do not demonstrate bias.

Practically, plaintiffs challenging child-welfare interventions must translate concerns about systemic practices into well-pleaded facts that show a policy, custom, or deliberate systemic failure, and connect those facts to specific constitutional injuries. Absent that, Twombly/Iqbal will screen out generalized § 1983 attacks on municipal systems.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Monell Liability:
  • Municipalities are not vicariously liable for employees’ actions. A city pays only when its own policy, custom, or deliberate failure to train causes a constitutional violation.
• Policy, Custom, or Practice:
  • Can be a written rule, a decision by a final policymaker, or a widespread practice so persistent it has the force of law.
• Failure to Train (Deliberate Indifference):
  • Plaintiff must show the city knew of a need for training (e.g., repeated similar violations), deliberately chose not to act, and that the lack of training caused the violation.
• Official vs. Individual Capacity:
  • Official-capacity suits are really suits against the government entity; individual-capacity suits target a person’s own actions. You need personal involvement to sue an official individually.
• Non‑Suable Agency:
  • Under NYC law, many city agencies (including ACS) cannot be sued in their own names; the City must be named instead.
• Plausibility Pleading (Twombly/Iqbal):
  • Complaints must allege enough factual content to make wrongdoing plausible—not just possible or speculative.
• Futility of Amendment:
  • Court may deny leave to amend if the new allegations would still not state a claim.
• Recusal and Waiver:
  • Claims of judicial bias must be promptly raised in the trial court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144/455; delay can waive the issue. Normal case management is not bias.

Conclusion

The Second Circuit’s summary order in A.P. v. Dannhauser is a clear, practical reaffirmation of settled § 1983 principles: sue the City (not ACS), avoid duplicative official-capacity claims, plead individualized personal involvement for individual defendants, and satisfy Monell’s demanding plausibility standard with concrete facts showing policy, custom, or deliberate systemic failure. Attempts to bootstrap a Monell case through unadjudicated complaints and topline statistics will not substitute for well-pleaded allegations linking municipal decision-making to specific constitutional injuries.

On procedure, the ruling also underscores that leave to amend is not automatic—proposed amendments must cure defects—and that recusal challenges must be timely and grounded in evidence of actual or reasonably perceived bias, not routine judicial management. Although nonprecedential, the order offers persuasive guidance apt to influence district courts within the Circuit and serves as a cautionary roadmap for litigants contemplating systemic § 1983 challenges to municipal child-welfare practices.