A single address can satisfy Fourth Amendment particularity for unmarked, attached efficiency apartments when officers reasonably could not know the property is subdivided

Introduction

In United States v. Steven Berne Schmitz (11th Cir. Sept. 25, 2025), the Eleventh Circuit addressed a recurring Fourth Amendment problem: what happens when a search warrant identifies a single-family street address, but the structure at that address actually contains multiple dwelling units that are not outwardly marked or separately addressed? The defendant, Steven Schmitz, lived in one of several “efficiency” apartments attached to the rear of a single-family house. Officers, relying on property records and on-the-ground observations showing only one mailbox, one trash can, and no unit markings, reasonably believed the property was a single residence when they swore out and executed a warrant for “4279 Violet Circle.”

During execution, officers learned the house was subdivided. They located Schmitz’s unmarked unit with guidance from occupants and used a key (previously recovered during a traffic stop) to enter after knocking. Inside, they found firearms and drugs. Schmitz moved to suppress, arguing the warrant lacked particularity because it did not specify his apartment, and the officers knew or should have known the premises was multi-unit. The district court denied suppression on good-faith grounds. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed—on the ground that the warrant itself satisfied the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement given what the officers knew and reasonably could have known when they applied for it. The panel also remanded solely to correct a clerical error in the judgment (which incorrectly recited a guilty plea rather than a bench-trial conviction).

Summary of the Opinion

The court held that the first warrant authorizing a search of “4279 Violet Circle” particularly described the place to be searched under the Fourth Amendment, notwithstanding that the property in fact contained multiple efficiency apartments. Applying Maryland v. Garrison, the panel reasoned that warrant validity turns on what officers knew—or should have known—at the time of issuance, not on facts learned later during execution. Here, officers reasonably believed the property was a single-family residence based on:

Repeated surveillance that revealed no separate unit markings and no rear-access vantage;
One mailbox labeled “4279,” a single trash can (with drug-residue baggies and mail addressed to the owner), and no unit identifiers; and
County property records listing the structure as a single-family home.

Because the warrant validly covered the premises at 4279 Violet Circle, the officers lawfully entered Schmitz’s unmarked apartment. Once inside, the firearms were in plain view, so a second, later warrant was unnecessary to seize them. The court therefore affirmed the denial of suppression without reaching the district court’s good-faith rationale.

A concurring opinion stressed the distinct inquiry into the reasonableness of warrant execution. As in Garrison and United States v. Ofshe, once officers learn mid-execution that a property is subdivided, they must limit their search to the correct unit. The concurrence concluded the officers did so here: they ceased searching the wrong unit, asked the owner to identify Schmitz’s apartment, and then entered only that apartment.

Factual and Procedural Background

Officers investigated Schmitz for narcotics trafficking beginning in 2022. They surveilled 4279 Violet Circle at least weekly from the street, avoiding positions that might reveal their presence. From those vantage points, they saw a single mailbox marked “4279,” one trash can, four vehicles, and no labels or signage indicating multiple units. A trash pull produced two baggies with marijuana residue and mail addressed to the owner, further tying the suspected contraband activity to that address.

Property records identified the structure as a single-family residence. There were no separate unit addresses, mailboxes, door placards, or other outward indicia of independent apartments. The landlord testified that, unless one walked into the backyard, the existence of the rear efficiency apartments was not apparent.

On the day of the search, Agent Valencia stopped Schmitz and recovered keys. He then swore out a warrant for “4279 Violet Circle,” describing a single-family residence with a tan mailbox labeled “4279,” and seeking drugs, currency, and identification documents. During execution, officers initially secured the main house, learned Schmitz did not live there, and were directed by residents toward an attached efficiency unit. After knocking and receiving no response, they used Schmitz’s key to enter his apartment and found firearms and drugs. A second warrant was later obtained (largely copying the first) specifically listing firearms, but the panel deemed that second warrant immaterial because the first warrant lawfully placed officers inside Schmitz’s unit and plain view would have sufficed to seize the guns.

The district court denied suppression based on the good-faith exception. Schmitz proceeded to a stipulated-facts bench trial and was convicted on all counts. He appealed, challenging the warrant’s particularity.

The Holding

The Eleventh Circuit held:

The first warrant was sufficiently particular under the Fourth Amendment to authorize a search of the premises at 4279 Violet Circle, including Schmitz’s unmarked efficiency apartment.
Officers reasonably believed the property was a single residence at the time they applied for the warrant, and they conducted a reasonable investigation to confirm that belief.
Facts learned during execution (that the property was subdivided) did not retroactively invalidate the warrant, though those facts did limit the permissible scope of the ongoing search to Schmitz’s unit.
Because the first warrant was valid, the firearms were lawfully seized under the plain-view doctrine; the second warrant’s particulars were therefore not dispositive.
The case is remanded solely to correct a clerical error in the judgment (to reflect a bench-trial conviction, not a guilty plea).

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (1987): The Supreme Court upheld a warrant describing “the third floor apartment” when officers reasonably believed there was only one third-floor apartment, but later discovered two. The Court emphasized two principles pivotal here:
- Warrant validity is judged by information known or reasonably knowable at issuance—not by facts learned later.
- Once officers learn mid-execution that a warrant’s description sweeps more broadly than the target premises, they must limit the search accordingly.
United States v. Ofshe, 817 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1987): Agents reasonably relied on a warrant describing a business’s office space; only upon execution did they learn the building housed multiple businesses. They confined the search to the target business’s area, which was deemed reasonable under Garrison.
United States v. Ellis, 971 F.2d 701 (11th Cir. 1992): Contrasts with this case. The warrant incorrectly described “the third mobile home” on a road—an entirely different structure. The description was erroneous and not cured by any identifying details tied to the suspect, rendering the warrant insufficiently particular.
United States v. Burke, 784 F.2d 1090 (11th Cir. 1986), and Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498 (1925): A warrant is sufficiently particular if it allows officers to ascertain and identify the intended place with reasonable effort; elaborate specificity is unnecessary.
United States v. Moon, 33 F.4th 1284 (11th Cir. 2022): Particularity serves to prevent general exploratory searches.
United States v. Smith, 459 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2006): Plain-view doctrine permits seizure of contraband seen during a lawful search.
United States v. McCall, 84 F.4th 1317 (11th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 1042 (2024): The exclusionary rule applies when officers violate the Fourth Amendment—an anchor for why the court first assessed particularity rather than defaulting to good faith.
Standards of review and credibility: United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc); United States v. Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d 744 (11th Cir. 2002); United States v. Lewis, 674 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012).

Legal Reasoning

The Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant “particularly describe” the place to be searched. That requirement is satisfied when the description enables officers to locate and identify the premises with reasonable effort and confines their search to that place. The Eleventh Circuit applied this familiar test through Garrison’s lens:

Validity at issuance: The court examined what officers disclosed or had a duty to discover and disclose when seeking the warrant. Their investigation was “reasonable”: weekly surveillance from unobtrusive vantage points, observation of a single mailbox and trash can, and a check of county property records showing a single-family residence. There were no external unit indicators (addresses, mailboxes, door labels, visible separate entries from the front). From the front street view, the rear efficiencies were not visible. On these facts, officers reasonably believed 4279 Violet Circle was a single dwelling; they had no duty to discover non-obvious rear apartments, and a cited building permit did not clearly flag the existence of separate dwelling units (it described a “Guest House” conversion of a family room and porch to a bedroom/bath, not a subdivision into rentable efficiencies).
No retroactive invalidation: Garrison squarely holds that facts learned during execution cannot retroactively invalidate a validly issued warrant. Here, only after entry did officers learn the house contained multiple efficiencies, including Schmitz’s unit.
Limiting the execution once subdivision emerged: Consistent with Garrison and Ofshe, officers were obliged to limit their search to the correct unit upon learning of the subdivision. The record reflected that they did: after securing the main house, they sought direction to Schmitz’s unit, abandoned the wrong unit upon learning it was not his, and proceeded to the only other door indicated by occupants. The concurrence underscored this step as part of the separate “reasonableness of execution” inquiry.
Distinguishing Ellis: Ellis involved a wrong address—“the third mobile home”—with no suspect-specific identifiers and no physical description, rendering the warrant useless and misleading. By contrast, “4279 Violet Circle” was the correct property that included Schmitz’s unit; there were no markings demarcating separate units, and officers reasonably believed the property was a single residence.
Plain view obviated the need for the second warrant: Because officers were lawfully in Schmitz’s apartment under the first warrant, seizure of firearms was permissible under the plain-view doctrine. The court thus did not reach the particularity of the second warrant (which largely copied the first).

The Concurring Opinion’s Emphasis on the Two-Stage Inquiry

Judge Kidd agreed that officers reasonably investigated and described the place to be searched, but elaborated that Fourth Amendment analysis often involves two related, but distinct questions:

1) Warrant validity at the time of issuance: Did the officers reasonably describe the location based on what they knew or should have known?
2) Reasonableness of execution: Once officers acquire new information during execution (e.g., that a property is subdivided), did they confine their search to the proper unit and avoid general searches beyond the warrant’s true scope?

Citing Garrison, Steele, Burke, and Ofshe, the concurrence stressed that knowledge acquired after issuance can limit how a warrant may be executed. On the facts here, the officers’ mid-execution adjustments were appropriate: they stopped searching a neighboring unit once it was clear it was not Schmitz’s, and then entered only his unit (after knocking and with a key tied to him). The concurrence noted that, unlike Ellis, this warrant also linked the premises to the suspect (describing premises “occupied by, or under the control of: Steven Schmitz”), further guiding officers to the intended place.

Practical Impact and Future Litigation

This decision reinforces several operational and doctrinal points for future cases involving hidden or unmarked multi-unit dwellings:

Reasonable pre-warrant investigation matters: Checking property records; noting mailboxes, addresses, and trash receptacles; and observing external unit markings can substantiate a reasonable belief that a structure is a single residence. The presence of multiple cars or unrelated residents is not, without more, notice of multiple dwelling units.
No duty to discover non-apparent subdivisions: When efficiencies or secondary units are accessible only through a backyard and carry no outward indicia of separate dwelling units, a single-address warrant can satisfy particularity. Officers are not required to undertake intrusive or risky tactics (e.g., revealing surveillance positions from the rear) to ferret out unmarked units absent additional indicia.
But knowledge triggers a duty to narrow execution: If, at issuance, officers know or should know the property is subdivided, they must either seek a warrant limited to the specific unit or, if that is unknown, develop probable cause for the particular unit before entry. During execution, once officers learn of subdivision, they must confine their search to the correct unit. Searches that broadly sweep other units risk suppression.
Ellis remains a cautionary tale: A warrant that misidentifies a different structure (the wrong mobile home, wrong address, or wrong building) will typically fail the particularity requirement unless cured by clear identifying features tied to the suspect. The more granular and suspect-linked the description, the more defensible the warrant.
Good faith vs. particularity: The panel chose to affirm on the merits rather than on good-faith grounds, strengthening the substantive rule for similar future cases. Prosecutors and agents should nonetheless document their pre-warrant investigation in the affidavit to demonstrate the reasonableness of their conclusion regarding the property’s configuration.
Plain-view efficiency: When officers are lawfully present under a valid warrant, contraband in plain view may be seized without a second warrant—reducing the risk that a hastily drafted “second” warrant might itself become the focal point of suppression litigation.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Particularity (Fourth Amendment): A warrant must describe the place to be searched specifically enough that officers can find it and limit their search to that place. It does not require hyper-technical detail; it requires enough specificity to avoid general, exploratory searches.
Validity vs. Execution: Validity is judged at issuance (what officers knew or reasonably should have known). Execution concerns how officers carry out the warrant, including whether they narrow the search if they learn the warrant is broader than the intended target.
“Should have known” standard: Officers must undertake a reasonable investigation and cannot ignore obvious indications of multiple units (e.g., multiple mailboxes, separate addresses or unit numbers, distinct entryways). But they are not required to uncover non-apparent or hidden subdivisions without indications suggesting their existence.
Plain-view doctrine: If officers are lawfully present in a location, they may seize contraband that is immediately apparent as evidence of a crime without obtaining an additional warrant.
Exclusionary rule: Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is typically suppressed. By finding the warrant valid, the court avoided exclusion on the merits rather than by invoking the good-faith exception.
Clerical-error remand: Appellate courts may remand to correct ministerial mistakes in the judgment (e.g., mislabeling a bench-trial conviction as a guilty plea).

Why Garrison Controls—and Its Limits

The core of this opinion is a faithful application of Garrison: police may reasonably rely on a single-address warrant when there is no reason to know that the premises includes multiple units. Crucially, the Eleventh Circuit echoed Garrison’s caveat: if officers knew or reasonably should have known about multiple units at issuance, they must seek or limit the warrant to the correct unit. And once they learn of subdivision mid-execution, they must immediately confine the search to the relevant unit. The panel also cited Garrison’s footnote distinguishing an altogether different scenario: when police already know there are multiple apartments on a floor but don’t know which one is the target, a warrant to search the entire floor presents “quite different issues”—a warning that the Fourth Amendment does not bless general rummaging among multiple units simply because the building address matches.

Key Takeaways

A single-address warrant can validly encompass an unmarked, attached efficiency apartment when officers reasonably believed the property to be a single-family residence at the time of issuance.
Reasonableness at issuance hinges on outward indicia (mailboxes, unit numbers, separate addresses, separate utility records visible to officers, etc.) and reasonable investigation; hidden or unmarked units need not be discovered absent indications of their existence.
Upon learning during execution that a property is subdivided, officers must limit the search to the correct unit—the warrant does not authorize indiscriminate searching of other units.
Ellis remains controlling when the warrant misidentifies a different structure altogether; there, particularity fails.
Plain-view seizures inside a lawfully entered unit do not require a second warrant.
Affirmance on particularity (rather than good faith) provides stronger doctrinal guidance for future investigations of properties that may conceal unmarked multi-unit configurations.

Conclusion

United States v. Schmitz clarifies and reaffirms Garrison’s practical framework for addressing hidden multi-unit dwellings. The Eleventh Circuit held that a warrant describing a single-family address is sufficiently particular where officers reasonably could not have known the structure contained unmarked, attached efficiency apartments, especially where property records and observable facts confirmed a single residence. The decision also underscores officers’ duty to limit their search once they learn, during execution, that the premises is subdivided. Together, the majority and concurrence provide a cohesive roadmap: investigate reasonably; describe the place with sufficient particularity based on what is knowable at issuance; and if new information emerges during execution, promptly restrict the search to the correct unit. For investigators, prosecutors, and courts in the Eleventh Circuit, Schmitz offers both a doctrinal anchor and practical guardrails for searches at single addresses that mask multiple unmarked living spaces.