A Roof Is Not the Home: Public Exposure Defines “Outside the Home” under Penal Law § 265.03(3) and Limits on Miranda in On‑Scene Questioning

Commentary on People v. Casiano, 2025 NY Slip Op 04316 (App Div 4th Dept, July 25, 2025)

Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Fourth Department’s decision in People v. Casiano, a weapons possession case that clarifies two important points of New York criminal law: (1) how courts determine whether possession of a loaded firearm occurs “outside the home” within the meaning of Penal Law § 265.03(3), and (2) when on‑scene questioning in an unfolding crime scene does, or does not, amount to “custodial interrogation” requiring Miranda warnings.

The case arises from a late‑night “shots fired” response to the defendant’s residence. Officers arriving around 10:30 p.m. heard shots, observed the defendant on his detached garage roof, and at least one officer saw a muzzle flash. The defendant was apprehended in his fenced backyard after jumping or falling from the garage, suffering a leg injury. A handgun and loaded magazine were recovered from the yard; shell casings were found on the garage roof and back porch; bullet strikes were located on a vehicle and at two locations across the street. Body‑worn camera footage and audio captured the defendant’s statements, both at the scene and later at a hospital, indicating he fired in response to an altercation in which his son had been stabbed.

A jury convicted the defendant of two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree: (i) possession with intent to use unlawfully against another (§ 265.03[1][b]) and (ii) possession of a loaded firearm outside the home (§ 265.03[3]). On appeal, the defendant challenged legal sufficiency as to intent (count one) and as to the “outside the home” element (count two), sought suppression of his statements for lack of Miranda warnings, and argued the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and the sentence excessive.

Summary of the Judgment

• Convictions affirmed on the merits: The Fourth Department held the evidence was legally sufficient on both counts and the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence.
• Miranda ruling: The majority held the defendant’s statements at the scene and at the hospital were obtained during noncustodial, investigatory inquiries; no Miranda warnings were required, so suppression was properly denied.
• Sentencing: Exercising interest‑of‑justice discretion under CPL 470.15(6)(b), the court reduced each determinate sentence to four years (with five years’ postrelease supervision), to run concurrently.
• Dissent: One justice would have reversed, concluding the backyard questioning was custodial and accusatory, requiring Miranda warnings; the later hospital statements were tainted under the “cat‑out‑of‑the‑bag” theory. The dissent would suppress the statements and grant a new trial.

Detailed Analysis

Issues Presented

• Whether the People proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed a firearm with intent to use it unlawfully against another (Penal Law § 265.03[1][b]).
• Whether the possession occurred “outside of [his] home” under Penal Law § 265.03(3) when the defendant was on the roof of a detached garage within a fenced yard but visible to the public.
• Whether the defendant’s statements to police—at the scene and at the hospital—were obtained in violation of Miranda due to custodial interrogation without warnings.
• Whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and whether the sentence was unduly harsh.

Precedents Cited and Their Role

• People v. Powell, 54 NY2d 524 (1981): Central to defining “home” under Article 265. Powell holds that “home” is not coextensive with all areas of a person’s property or common areas; the touchstone is whether the area affords “privacy, as one would have in [their] home.” The Casiano majority relies on Powell to emphasize that public observability undermines “home” status for § 265.03(3).
• People v. Horton, 216 AD2d 913 (4th Dept 1995), lv denied 87 NY2d 902 (1995): Supports inferring intent to use a firearm unlawfully from circumstantial evidence such as actual firing, muzzle flashes, and surrounding circumstances. The majority uses Horton, along with the defendant’s statements, to uphold the intent element.
• People v. Estrella, 41 NY3d 514 (2024): Cited for the legal sufficiency standard—verdict may stand if a rational jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on a “valid line of reasoning” and reasonable inferences. The Fourth Department invokes Estrella repeatedly to frame its sufficiency analysis.
• People v. Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 (2007) and People v. Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490 (1987): Provide the framework for weight‑of‑evidence review, focusing on the elements as charged and whether the jury failed to give the evidence its proper weight.
• Miranda cluster:
  • People v. Paulman, 5 NY3d 122 (2005) and People v. Berg, 92 NY2d 701 (1999): Establish that Miranda applies upon custodial interrogation; custody is evaluated objectively.
  • People v. Bennett, 70 NY2d 891 (1987) and People v. Baker, 188 AD2d 1012 (4th Dept 1992), lv denied 81 NY2d 967 (1993): Recognize that brief, on‑scene, investigatory questioning amid unfolding events can be noncustodial.
  • People v. Lunderman, 19 AD3d 1067 (4th Dept 2005), lv denied 5 NY3d 830 (2005): Lists six non‑exclusive factors for the custody determination (time with police, restrictions on movement, location/atmosphere, cooperation, advisement of rights, investigatory vs accusatory tone). The majority cites Lunderman; the dissent applies the factors in detail and reaches the opposite conclusion.
• The dissent’s authorities:
  • Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 US 291 (1980); People v. Ferro, 63 NY2d 316 (1984): Define “interrogation” as express questioning or its functional equivalent reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.
  • People v. Cabrera, 41 NY3d 35 (2023); People v. Allen, 183 AD3d 1284 (4th Dept 2020), affd 36 NY3d 1033 (2021); People v. Hughes, 199 AD3d 1332 (4th Dept 2021): Provide recent custodial analysis in New York; the dissent uses them to emphasize an objective “not free to leave” perspective.
  • “Cat‑out‑of‑the‑bag” line: United States v. Bayer, 331 US 532 (1947); People v. Parker, 82 AD2d 661 (2d Dept 1981), affd 57 NY2d 815 (1982); People v. Johnson, 121 AD2d 84 (4th Dept 1986); People v. Tanner, 30 NY2d 102 (1972): Successive confessions rule where an initial unwarned statement can taint later statements, even if warnings are later given (here, none were given at the hospital, deepening the dissent’s concern).
  • Additional atmosphere/circumstances cases illustrate the coerciveness of multiple officers, commands not to move, and accusatory questioning during prolonged detention.

Legal Reasoning and Doctrinal Moves

1) Intent to Use Unlawfully Against Another (§ 265.03[1][b])

The majority found the evidence sufficient for a rational juror to infer intent to use the weapon unlawfully. Critical facts included: audible shots as officers arrived, observation of the defendant on the garage roof, at least one observed muzzle flash indicating active firing, physical evidence (shell casings on roof and porch; bullet strikes on a vehicle and across the street), and the defendant’s own statements that he fired in response to an attack on his son. Under Horton and Estrella, actual firing and the surrounding circumstances permit the permissible inference of unlawful intent; the court emphasized the “valid line of reasoning” standard rather than requiring direct proof of a targeted victim or detailed mens rea.

2) “Outside the Home” under § 265.03(3): Public Exposure over Property Lines

Casiano’s most significant doctrinal contribution is its application of Powell’s privacy‑based approach to “home.” Although the defendant was within a fenced backyard—an area that, for Fourth Amendment purposes, is often treated as curtilage—the court did not equate curtilage with “home” under Article 265. Instead, it highlighted that the defendant “left the privacy of his fenced‑in yard and climbed to the roof of his garage, where he was readily observable by anyone passing by, including the police who observed him firing his weapon.”

Two key points emerge:

• “Home” for § 265.03(3) is not defined by title, fence lines, or curtilage labels, but by functional privacy “as one would have in [their] home” (Powell). Areas open to public view undermine the “home” status for this statute.
• By elevating public observability as the decisive factor, the decision suggests a practical, fact‑intensive boundary: once a person carrying a loaded firearm positions themselves in a way that is visible to the public (here, atop a detached garage roof), the possession occurs “outside” the home for § 265.03(3), even if physically within the property perimeter.

On that basis, and again invoking Estrella’s sufficiency lens, the court held that a jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed the loaded firearm “outside the home.”

3) Miranda and On‑Scene Questioning: Investigatory, Not Custodial

The majority resolved the Miranda issue by characterizing the questioning—both in the backyard and at the hospital—as noncustodial and investigatory. Applying the Lunderman factors, and relying on Bennett and Baker, the court concluded that the encounter’s nature and the officers’ inquiries did not rise to the degree of “custodial interrogation.” No warnings were therefore required.

Notably, the majority did not rely on the distinct “public safety” exception (New York v. Quarles) and instead stayed within the custodial analysis framework. The decision therefore signals that, in dynamic and unfolding gun‑crime scenes, pointed questioning may remain investigatory and noncustodial where the suspect is not yet formally arrested, the questioning is prompt and focused on immediate circumstances, and the environment, though controlled by police, has not yet crossed the threshold of a formal arrest’s restraint.

4) Weight of the Evidence

Under Danielson and Bleakley, the court reviewed the elements as charged and determined the jury did not fail to give the evidence appropriate weight. Even if a different verdict would not have been unreasonable, the panel found the record supported the jury’s rational choice.

5) Sentencing: Discretionary Reduction

Exercising CPL 470.15(6)(b), the Fourth Department reduced each determinate sentence to four years, to run concurrently, with five years of postrelease supervision. The reduction reflects the court’s equitable assessment of the circumstances—particularly the context of the shooting tied to an assault on the defendant’s son—while maintaining the seriousness of the underlying conduct.

The Dissent: A Robust Miranda Warning for Backyard and Hospital Statements

Justice Ogden’s dissent offers a comprehensive, factor‑by‑factor analysis culminating in a very different conclusion:

• Custody at the scene: The dissent highlights commands (“Don’t move!”), accusatory questions (“What did you throw back here?”), statements indicating imminent handcuffing, the heavy police presence searching for a gun, and the prolonged encounter (nearly an hour). In the dissent’s view, a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave; the restraint rose to the level associated with formal arrest (Cabrera; Allen; Hughes), so Miranda warnings were required.
• Interrogation: The questions were not neutral fact‑finding; they were accusatory and “reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response” (Paulman; Ferro; Innis). The defendant’s incriminating statement (“I was just protecting my family… he stabbed my son”) came on the heels of these exchanges.
• Hospital statements tainted: Without intervening warnings, and with continued accusatory questioning, the dissent applies the “cat‑out‑of‑the‑bag” doctrine (Bayer; Parker; Tanner; Johnson) to conclude the hospital statements were equally inadmissible.
• Not harmless: The People relied on the statements to resist dismissal and in summation; therefore, under Crimmins, there was a reasonable possibility the error contributed to the verdict.

On that basis, the dissent would reverse, suppress the statements, and grant a new trial.

Doctrinal Placement and Observations

• “Home” in Article 265 vs. Fourth Amendment “curtilage”: Casiano underscores that the statutory term “home” for weapon possession is not automatically coextensive with constitutional curtilage. Powell introduced a privacy‑centric test; Casiano operationalizes it by using public observability as evidence of non‑home status even within a fenced property.
• Miranda in dynamic crime scenes: The majority’s approach fits within a line of cases allowing targeted, on‑scene questions as “investigatory” when exigency is high and formal arrest has not crystallized. The dissent warns that prolonged, command‑laden, accusatory questioning, especially with a large police presence and explicit references to imminent handcuffing, crosses into custody.
• Role of body‑worn camera (BWC): The custody analysis increasingly turns on objective video records. Casiano shows how the same footage can yield divergent judicial inferences about restraint and tone, a trend likely to persist as BWC use expands.

Impact and Implications

• Scope of § 265.03(3): Prosecutors and courts now have appellate support for treating publicly visible possession on residential structures (e.g., rooftops, porches visible from the street, possibly driveways) as “outside the home,” even within the property’s boundaries. Defense counsel should be prepared to develop evidentiary records showing privacy akin to the interior of a dwelling if they intend to claim “home” status.
• Policing and Miranda practice:
  • Casiano may encourage carefully framed, on‑scene, investigatory questioning in high‑risk settings without immediate warnings, but only where restraints on liberty remain short of formal arrest and the inquiries are tethered to immediate safety/investigation needs.
  • Where encounters become prolonged, command‑heavy, and accusatory with a strong show of force, the dissent highlights significant appellate risk. Officers and prosecutors may prudently consider early Miranda warnings or, when applicable, explicitly invoke and document the public safety exception.
• Sentencing equity amid violent contexts: The interest‑of‑justice reduction acknowledges mitigating context (defense of family motives) without negating criminal liability. Expect defense arguments to lean on Casiano when similar equities are present.
• Potential for further review: The sharp Miranda split and the novel “public exposure” articulation of “home” under § 265.03(3) could invite further clarification from the Court of Appeals.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (§ 265.03[1][b]): Possessing a firearm with the intent to use it unlawfully against another person. Intent may be inferred from conduct, such as firing the gun, and surrounding circumstances.
• Criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (§ 265.03[3]): Possessing a loaded firearm outside one’s home or place of business (without a license). “Home” is evaluated functionally under Powell—does the area provide privacy comparable to inside the dwelling?
• Legal sufficiency vs. weight of the evidence: Legal sufficiency asks if any rational juror could convict on a valid line of reasoning. Weight of the evidence asks whether the jury failed to give the evidence the weight it should have, considering the elements as the trial court charged them.
• Miranda warnings: Required when the police conduct custodial interrogation—i.e., the suspect is in custody (not free to leave to a degree associated with formal arrest) and is subjected to questioning or its functional equivalent likely to elicit incriminating responses.
• Investigatory vs. accusatory questioning: Investigatory questions gather basic facts during unfolding events and are often noncustodial; accusatory questions seek to confirm guilt and, in a custodial setting, require Miranda warnings.
• “Cat‑out‑of‑the‑bag” doctrine: If an initial unwarned confession is obtained, later confessions may be tainted by the first, especially when close in time and similar in content. The dissent would have applied this to suppress hospital statements.
• CPL 470.15(6)(b) interest‑of‑justice sentence reduction: The Appellate Division can reduce an otherwise lawful sentence when fairness and the case’s circumstances warrant leniency.

Conclusion

People v. Casiano advances New York’s firearms jurisprudence by clarifying that “outside the home” in Penal Law § 265.03(3) turns on functional privacy and public exposure—not merely on property boundaries or curtilage labels. By holding that possession on a publicly visible garage roof is “outside” the home, the Fourth Department adopts a practical, visibility‑centered application of Powell’s privacy test. The court also reaffirms that dynamic, on‑scene questioning in response to immediate gunfire can remain investigatory and noncustodial, though the forceful dissent underscores the fine line between investigatory engagement and custodial interrogation.

The decision’s dual messages are clear: defendants who take loaded firearms into public view at their residence risk triggering § 265.03(3), and police may conduct targeted, on‑scene inquiries without warnings where custody has not crystallized. Yet Casiano’s Miranda split cautions both law enforcement and prosecutors to calibrate their practices carefully—extended, command‑filled encounters with accusatory questioning can, in a different record, compel suppression. Finally, the court’s interest‑of‑justice sentence reduction reflects a nuanced appreciation of context, reaffirming the Appellate Division’s equitable role in tailoring punishment to the circumstances.