A New Standard for County-Splitting and Standing in Tennessee Redistricting Litigation: Commentary on Wygant v. Lee

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Tennessee’s decision in Gary Wygant v. Bill Lee, Governor (No. M2023-01686-SC-R3-CV, Dec. 10, 2025) is a major redistricting and state-constitutional law opinion. It does three important things:

• It sharply narrows who has standing to bring redistricting challenges in Tennessee state courts.
• It replaces the older Lockert-line burden-shifting framework for county-splitting claims with a new, highly deferential, two‑step standard that keeps the burden entirely on the challenger.
• It gives a detailed, originalist reading of Article II, Section 4 of the Tennessee Constitution, rejecting the argument that redistricting disputes are nonjusticiable political questions.

The case arises from Tennessee’s post‑2020 Census redistricting. Two voters challenged separate aspects of the legislative maps:

• Gary Wygant, a Gibson County voter, attacked the House map under Article II, Section 5, arguing that the General Assembly split more counties than necessary to comply with federal law, including an allegedly unjustified split of Gibson County.
• Francie Hunt, a Davidson County voter, challenged the Senate map under Article II, Section 3, asserting that the Senate districts within Davidson County were not numbered consecutively as the Constitution requires.

A three‑judge panel upheld the House plan on the merits but invalidated the Senate plan. On direct appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court:

• Held that Wygant has standing only to bring a district‑specific challenge to the Gibson County split, not a statewide attack on all county splits;
• Clarified and tightened the substantive standard for county‑splitting claims and affirmed that the Gibson County split is constitutional; and
• Held that Hunt lacks standing to challenge the Senate map’s misnumbering, and vacated the declaration that the Senate plan is unconstitutional.

In doing so, the Court substantially recalibrates Tennessee’s redistricting jurisprudence: it protects the General Assembly’s discretion, insists on rigorous standing for public‑rights claims, and reconfigures the relationship between state and federal constraints on redistricting.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Holdings

The Court (Justice Sarah K. Campbell writing for the majority, joined by Chief Justice Bivins and Justice Wagner) holds:

1. Political question: Challenges to county‑splitting under Article II, Section 5 are justiciable. Article II, Section 4 does not textually commit apportionment disputes to the legislature, nor does it authorize the General Assembly to disregard the county‑splitting rule.
2. Nature of the rights and standing framework:
   • Redistricting claims seeking to enforce state constitutional apportionment rules are public‑rights claims.
   • As such, under City of Memphis v. Hargett and Wilmington Trust, plaintiffs must satisfy a three‑part standing test: injury in fact, traceability, and redressability.
3. Wygant – standing:
   • Wygant has standing to challenge the split of Gibson County in his own House District (District 79) because that split causes him a sufficiently concrete “representational” injury.
   • He does not have standing to mount a statewide challenge to all county splits; he is not injured by splits in counties where he does not live.
4. Hunt – standing:
   • Hunt lacks standing to challenge the misnumbering of Davidson County Senate districts because she has not suffered a distinct, actual or imminent injury from the non‑consecutive numbering.
   • Her “vote dilution” theory fails, and she suffered no delay or concrete harm in her opportunity to vote.
5. New standard for county‑splitting challenges:
   • The Court rejects the burden‑shifting “good faith” framework from Lockert I and the “bad faith” language in Lincoln County to the extent they focus on subjective motivation or shift burdens.
   • The challenger always bears the burden to:
     1. Prove that the challenged county split(s) were not necessary to comply with federal law (Equal Protection’s one‑person‑one‑vote principle and the VRA); and
     2. Prove that the legislature’s decision to split the county lacked a rational or legitimate basis related to achieving compliance with federal law.
   • Alternative maps are the usual way to meet step (1), but even a “better” map does not automatically invalidate the legislature’s choice.
6. Application to Gibson County:
   • Wygant’s expert map (Map 13d_e) showed the Legislature could have complied with federal law with fewer county splits and without splitting Gibson County (satisfying step one).
   • But the Court finds that splitting Gibson County was still rationally and legitimately related to federal compliance (equal population, VRA concerns in Madison County, and core preservation), so Wygant fails overall.
7. Senate map:
   • Because Hunt lacks standing, the Court vacates the trial court’s judgment that the Senate map is unconstitutional and leaves the misnumbered Senate districts in place.

III. Legal and Factual Background

A. Federal Redistricting Law: Equal Population, VRA, and Race

The Court situates the case within a dense web of federal requirements:

• Equal Protection Clause and one‑person‑one‑vote:
  • Under Reynolds v. Sims, state legislative districts must be drawn so that each has “as nearly of equal population as is practicable.”
  • Maps with a maximum population deviation over 10% are prima facie unconstitutional (Voinovich v. Quilter), but there is no absolute “safe harbor” below 10% (Cox v. Larios).
  • Deviation from equal population is permissible only to advance “legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy” (e.g., preserving political subdivisions, compactness, contiguity).
• Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA):
  • Section 2 prohibits voting practices that dilute the voting strength of racial or language minorities. See, e.g., Allen v. Milligan, Rural West Tennessee African‑American Affairs Council v. Sundquist.
  • Failure to create or the dismantling of “majority‑minority” districts can violate the VRA.
  • States must be “conscious of race” to avoid VRA liability but cannot make race the “predominant factor” absent a compelling reason (Cooper v. Harris, Alexander v. SC NAACP (Thomas, J., concurring)).

These federal constraints often conflict with state constitutional and statutory redistricting rules, making redistricting, as the Court quotes from Bethune‑Hill v. Virginia State Board of Elections, a “delicate balancing of competing considerations.”

B. Tennessee’s Constitutional and Statutory Redistricting Framework

• Article II, Section 4:
  • Requires apportionment “substantially according to population” after each decennial census.
  • Contains an important third sentence (added 1966) preserving the General Assembly’s “right at any time to apportion one House . . . using geography, political subdivisions, substantially equal population and other criteria as factors,” conditioned on compliance with the U.S. Constitution.
• Article II, Section 5 (House) and Section 6 (Senate) – county‑splitting rules:
  • Section 5: “In a district composed of two or more counties, each county shall adjoin at least one other county of such district; and no county shall be divided in forming such a district.”
  • Section 6 contains a similar no‑split rule for Senate districts. The no‑splitting rule has deep roots, dating to Tennessee’s founding in 1796.
• Article II, Section 3 – consecutive numbering of Senate districts:
  • “In a county having more than one senatorial district, the districts shall be numbered consecutively.”
  • This interacts with the staggered election cycle: even‑numbered Senate districts are elected in presidential years; odd‑numbered ones in gubernatorial years.
• Legislative size:
  • Constitution fixes 99 House districts and “no more than” 33 Senate districts; by statute there have long been 33 Senate seats.
• House Redistricting Guidelines (Tenn. Code Ann. § 3‑1‑103(b)):
  • Codify criteria the General Assembly intends to follow in House redistricting: single‑member districts, substantial population equality, contiguity, county splits capped at 30, VRA compliance, etc.
  • The “30‑county split” cap traces back to Lockert II, where the Court, based on the then‑existing record, approved a House plan splitting no more than 30 counties with additional caveats.
• Three‑judge panel and remedial statute:
  • Tenn. Code Ann. § 20‑18‑101 requires three‑judge panels for statewide redistricting challenges.
  • § 20‑18‑105 gives the General Assembly at least 15 days to enact a new map once one is held unconstitutional; only then may a court impose an interim plan.

C. The 2020 Redistricting Cycle and the Challenged Maps

The 2020 cycle was compressed: COVID‑19 delays meant census data did not arrive until August 2021, leaving about five months for the General Assembly to enact maps by January 2022.

The House Speaker formed a bipartisan House Select Committee on Redistricting; counsel Doug Himes was the primary map‑drawer. The enacted House plan:

• Created 99 districts,
• Split 30 counties (tracking the statutory guideline),
• Maintained 13 majority‑minority districts, and
• Had a total population deviation of 9.90%.

Gibson County (population 50,429) was previously kept whole and combined with part of Carroll County in House District 79. Under the 2022 plan:

• Gibson County is split east‑west:
  • District 79: eastern Gibson + southern Carroll + northern Henderson;
  • District 82: western Gibson + part of Obion + all of Crockett and Lauderdale.

In the Senate plan, Davidson County has four districts, but they are numbered 17, 19, 20, and 21, not consecutively as required by Article II, Section 3. As a result, three of its four Senators (including Hunt’s) stood for election in the same gubernatorial cycle, rather than a two‑and‑two stagger.

IV. Detailed Analysis of the Court’s Reasoning

A. Political Question Doctrine and Article II, Section 4

The State argued that Article II, Section 4’s third sentence “commits to the General Assembly” discretion to determine how much to prioritize county‑line preservation relative to other redistricting criteria, rendering county‑splitting challenges nonjusticiable political questions.

The Court firmly rejects that view.

1. Political Question Framework

Relying on Baker v. Carr and Tennessee precedents like Bredesen v. Tennessee Judicial Selection Commission, the Court reiterates that a question is “political” and nonjusticiable only in “rare cases,” typically where:

• The Constitution textually commits the issue to another branch; or
• There are no judicially discoverable and manageable standards.

In Bredesen, for example, Article VII, Section 4’s explicit grant of power over filling vacancies to “the Legislature” and its statutory implementation through the Governor’s appointments created such a textual commitment.

By contrast, the Court finds no comparable textual commitment of apportionment decisions. Article II, Section 4 obliges the General Assembly to apportion, but does not strip courts of their traditional role in enforcing constitutional limits.

2. Interpreting Article II, Section 4 in Context

The Court applies an avowedly original‑public‑meaning approach, citing Scalia & Garner and cases like McNabb v. Harrison, to interpret Section 4.

The key sentence:

Nothing in this Section nor in this Article II shall deny to the General Assembly the right at any time to apportion one House of the General Assembly using geography, political subdivisions, substantially equal population and other criteria as factors; provided such apportionment when effective shall comply with the Constitution of the United States as then amended or authoritatively interpreted.

The Court reasons:

• “Deny” means “refuse to grant” or “withhold.” The clause simply clarifies that neither Section 4 nor Article II withholds from the General Assembly the power to apportion one house using various factors, so long as federal law is obeyed.
• It is “superordinating language” showing which provision prevails “in the event of a clash,” but does not itself create a clash.
• Section 5’s no‑county‑split rule does not “deny” the legislature the use of political subdivisions; in fact, it requires preserving county integrity, which is itself a form of apportioning by political subdivisions.
• The Court refuses to read Section 4 to “impair or destroy” Section 5; instead, the Constitution is read as a “single, unified document.”

3. Historical Context: The Dirksen Amendment

The Court traces Section 4’s origins to the 1966 limited constitutional convention in the shadow of Reynolds v. Sims. Before Reynolds, states often apportioned only one legislative house strictly by population and used other factors for the other house. Reynolds forced both houses to be based “substantially on population.”

Senator Everett Dirksen proposed a U.S. constitutional amendment to restore state discretion to apportion one legislative house using geography or political subdivisions, if approved by voters. The language of Section 4’s final sentences mirrors that proposal; convention debates confirm that Section 4 was an “accommodation” to let Tennessee “take advantage” of a Dirksen‑style amendment if it were ever adopted.

Because that federal amendment never materialized, Section 4 today preserves flexibility but does not displace Section 5. It also conditions any such apportionment on compliance with the federal Constitution. The Court thus finds no textual commitment and no exemption from judicial review.

4. Manageable Standards

The Court rejects the argument that there are no judicially manageable standards:

• Article II, Section 5’s command that “no county shall be divided” is straightforward.
• Federal law partially preempts that command where compliance is impossible (because of equal population or VRA requirements), but only “to the extent” of conflict.
• The Lockert and Lincoln County decisions already developed standards; any prior uncertainty is addressed by the new clarified standard articulated in this opinion.
• Tenn. Code Ann. § 20‑18‑105 gives courts clear remedial mechanisms (time for legislative cure, then interim plan), reinforcing their role.

Accordingly, the Court holds that Wygant’s county‑splitting challenge is justiciable and not barred by the political question doctrine.

B. Standing: Public Rights, Private Rights, and Redistricting

1. The Wilmington Trust Framework

Standing in Tennessee is grounded not in an Article III “case or controversy” clause (which Tennessee lacks) but in:

• The Open Courts Provision (Article I, § 17); and
• The Separation of Powers Provisions (Article II, §§ 1–2).

In Norma Faye Pyles Lynch Family Purpose LLC v. Putnam County and Wilmington Trust, the Court distinguished:

• Private‑rights claims: injuries to “lands, goods, person or reputation.” For these, the Open Courts Provision requires an “injury in law,” not necessarily an “injury in fact.”
• Public‑rights claims: rights “common to all” citizens, enforcement of which is ordinarily entrusted to public officials. To avoid judiciary overreach into legislative or executive domains, plaintiffs must meet a stricter standing test.

For public‑rights claims, Tennessee courts continue to apply the three‑pronged test adopted from federal precedent (City of Memphis v. Hargett, ACLU v. Darnell):

1. A distinct and palpable injury in fact, not conjectural or purely generalized;
2. A causal connection between the injury and the challenged conduct; and
3. Redressability – a favorable court decision will likely remedy the injury.

2. Redistricting as a Public‑Rights Domain

The Court classifies both Wygant’s and Hunt’s suits as public‑rights claims:

• They seek enforcement of structural provisions (Article II, §§ 3, 5) that confer rights “common to all Tennesseans.”
• Enforcement of those provisions is primarily entrusted to public officials: the General Assembly (to draw maps) and election officials (to administer them).
• Both plaintiffs seek only equitable remedies (declaratory and injunctive relief) against government officials.

Accordingly, they must satisfy the three‑element standing test, not merely allege a legal violation.

3. Wygant’s Standing: District‑Specific, Not Statewide

Wygant’s theory is that splitting Gibson County denies him “full‑county representation” and fractures representation such that no single House member represents the entire county, leaving voters uncertain whom to contact on county‑wide issues.

The Court’s analysis:

• Injury in fact:
  • The Court analogizes to the U.S. Supreme Court’s racial gerrymandering standing cases (United States v. Hays, Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama), where voters in a challenged district have standing based on “representational harms” – the way their representative perceives and serves them.
  • Here, the “fractured representation” of Gibson County is a specific, non‑abstract harm: residents no longer have a single representative “fully devoted” to the county’s interests.
  • The Court approvingly cites the Texas Supreme Court’s Abbott v. Mexican American Legislative Caucus, where residents of a county denied the full number of whole districts to which they were entitled under a state county‑line rule had standing to complain of representational harm.
  • Thus, the injury is “distinct and palpable” and presently occurring.
• Traceability and redressability:
  • The injury is caused by the specific split of Gibson County.
  • If the split were eliminated, Gibson could be kept whole in a single district (combined with another county), restoring unified representation.
  • The Court emphasizes that Wygant’s complaint about losing a representative who resides in Gibson County itself does not satisfy causation/redressability: Gibson is too small to form a standalone district, so there is no guarantee a Gibson resident will ever represent it.

However, the Court limits Wygant’s standing to his own county’s split:

• He is not personally harmed by splits in other counties.
• The fact that the remedy for an unconstitutional split might require redrawing the broader map does not expand standing; standing is injury‑focused, not remedy‑focused (Gill v. Whitford principle).

As a result, the Court affirms the trial panel’s ruling that Wygant can only bring a district‑specific challenge to the Gibson County split.

4. Hunt’s Standing: No Concrete Injury from Misnumbering

Hunt offered two related theories:

• That the nonconsecutive numbering of Davidson County’s four Senate districts “diluted” the political weight of her vote relative to residents of other populous counties; and
• That the misnumbering deprived her of the benefits of staggered senator terms (because three of four seats could flip at once).

The Court rejects both.

• No one‑person‑one‑vote or minority vote dilution:
  • Misnumbering does not alter population equality or the number of voters per senator.
  • It does not involve “cracking” or “packing” a protected minority group in violation of the VRA.
  • Therefore, there is no conventional “vote dilution” as understood in Reynolds, Voinovich, or Gill.
• No actual or imminent harm from turnover:
  • The purpose of consecutive numbering is to structure staggered terms and avoid complete simultaneous turnover in a multi‑district county.
  • But Hunt failed to prove that any harmful turnover occurred or is “certainly impending.”
  • In 2022, three senators were on the ballot, but only one seat actually changed hands.
  • Hypothetical future possibilities – that at some unknown future election multiple seats might flip – are too speculative to be “imminent” injuries.
• No delayed vote:
  • Some courts (e.g., State ex rel. Steinke v. Lautenbaugh in Nebraska) have found standing to challenge misnumbering when voters are effectively forced to wait an extra election cycle.
  • Hunt was not delayed; if anything, she voted more frequently: she voted in 2020 (old district) and again in 2022 (new district 17).
• Mismatch between injury and claim:
  • Any discomfort she feels from being represented by a senator she views as disconnected from her county arises from the substantive redrawing of district lines, not from the numbering itself.
  • Renumbering the districts to comply with Article II, Section 3 would not restore her old district or change her representative; thus, any such injury is not causally connected to the alleged constitutional violation and would not be redressed by success on her claim.

The Court also directly responds to separate opinions (especially Justice Kirby’s partial dissent) that would effectively grant any voter automatic standing to challenge the constitutionality of his or her own district. The majority insists this would “eviscerate” the injury‑in‑fact requirement for public‑rights cases and is incompatible with Wilmington Trust. It emphasizes:

• Many redistricting cases in other jurisdictions simply did not address standing, which has “no precedential effect” on the issue.
• Hunt’s generalized dissatisfaction with the political composition of state government or with a “supermajority” is a classic generalized grievance.

Accordingly, Hunt’s claim is dismissed for lack of standing, and the trial court’s ruling on the Senate map’s unconstitutionality is vacated.

C. The New Substantive Standard for County-Splitting Challenges

1. The Pre‑Wygant Landscape: The Lockert Trilogy and Lincoln County

Before Wygant, Tennessee precedent on county‑splitting was fragmented:

• Lockert I (1982):
  • Statewide challenge to Senate plan under Article II, Section 6.
  • Recognized that federal one‑person‑one‑vote sometimes makes strict compliance with the no‑split rule impossible.
  • Held that the state “plan adopted must cross as few county lines as is necessary to comply with the federal constitutional requirements.”
  • Used a burden‑shifting framework: once plaintiffs showed county splits, the burden shifted to the State to show the Legislature made an “honest and good faith effort” to reconcile federal and state requirements.
• Lockert II (1983):
  • Challenges to revised Senate and House plans.
  • Reaffirmed that state county‑line rules must be enforced “insofar as is possible” and that even a single unjustified county split violates the Constitution.
  • Condemned the House plan for prioritizing near‑perfect population equality over county integrity and offered remedial “guidelines,” including:
    • House map should split no more than 30 counties;
    • No county should be divided more than once;
    • “Urban” counties (Shelby, Davidson, Knox, Hamilton) may only be split to reduce variances or prevent minority vote dilution.
• Lincoln County v. Crowell (1985):
  • District‑specific challenge to the split of Marshall County under the 1984 remedial House plan.
  • All parties agreed the plan satisfied federal law and the Lockert II statewide guidelines; the plaintiffs attacked the particular placement of a county line.
  • On a sparse stipulated record, with no testimony, the Court reversed a lower‑court ruling for the plaintiffs, emphasizing:
    • The plaintiffs had offered no evidence of “bad faith” or “deliberate gerrymandering.”
    • It would be improper to overturn individual lines merely because they “theoretically might have been drawn more perfectly” absent proof of bad faith or improper motives.
• Lockert III (1987):
  • Challenge to split of Shelby County in the 1984 Senate plan.
  • On a record showing that the split helped avoid broader disruptions and protected a majority‑minority district in Davidson County, the Court upheld the plan, finding the legislature had acted in “good faith.”

These cases pulled in different directions: Lockert I/II suggested a plaintiff‑friendly burden shift and tight enforcement of county‑line rules; Lincoln County and Lockert III signaled deference absent proof of bad faith or improper motive.

2. Presumption of Constitutionality and the Rejection of Burden-Shifting

The Court re‑anchors its approach in Tennessee’s strong presumption of constitutionality:

• Every statute carries a presumption of validity; the challenger bears a “heavy burden” to show unconstitutionality.
• Bearing that in mind, it is inconsistent to place an obligation on the State to prove “good faith” once a violation is alleged. The presumption of constitutionality and the challenger’s burden cannot be reconciled with a Lockert I‑style shifting of proof obligations.

Accordingly, the Court expressly:

• Overrules Lockert I “to the extent it adopted such a burden‑shifting approach.”
• Overrules Lockert and Lincoln County to the extent they require inquiry into the legislature’s subjective good or bad faith, deeming it especially difficult and ill‑suited for complex, multi‑factor redistricting decisions by a collective body.

3. The Two-Step Substantive Test Announced in Wygant

The Court articulates a new, unified standard for both statewide and district‑specific county‑splitting challenges:

1. Necessity vis‑à‑vis federal law:
   • The plaintiff must prove that the challenged split(s) were not necessary to comply with:
     • The Equal Protection Clause’s one‑person‑one‑vote requirement; and/or
     • Federal statutes such as the VRA.
   • “Ordinarily,” this will be done by presenting a specific alternative map (or maps) that:
     • Divide fewer counties overall,
     • Eliminate the specific split(s) challenged, and
     • Remain fully compliant with federal requirements.
2. Rational or legitimate basis related to federal compliance:
   • Even if a county split is not strictly “necessary,” it is not unconstitutional so long as the legislature’s decision to split the county is rationally or legitimately related to efforts to comply with federal law.
   • The Court borrows language from state and federal cases applying deferential review to redistricting, emphasizing:
     • The legislature has “principal responsibility” and “primary authority” over reapportionment (Article II, § 4).
     • Courts must not “micromanage” and should uphold legislative choices if the reconciliation of competing federal and state obligations is “fairly debatable and not clearly erroneous, arbitrary, or wholly unwarranted.”
   • The focus is not whether a hypothetically “better” map exists, but whether the actual choice lacks any rational, legitimate connection to federal compliance.

This is a powerful and highly deferential standard. In practice, even a plaintiff who demonstrates that fewer county splits would suffice under federal law must still overcome a rational‑basis‑style presumption in favor of the enacted map.

4. Recharacterizing Lockert II’s “30-County” Limit

The Court also clarifies the status of the famous “30‑county split” language in Lockert II:

• That limit was case‑specific guidance based on evidence in the 1980s record.
• It was not a permanent, statewide “safe harbor” or hard constitutional ceiling.
• To the extent House counsel and legislators treated 30 as a safe harbor, they misunderstood Lockert II. But that mistake alone does not render the map irrational or unconstitutional where federal law and other legitimate policies justify specific splits.

D. Applying the New Standard to the Gibson County Split

1. Step One: Demonstrating Unnecessariness via an Alternative Map

Wygant’s expert, Dr. Jonathan Cervas, produced multiple alternative House plans over the course of litigation. After iteration and critique by the State’s experts (Himes and Sean Trende), he eventually produced “Map 13d_e”:

• It splits 24 counties (six fewer than the enacted plan’s 30 splits);
• It has essentially the same population deviation (9.89% vs. 9.90%);
• It preserves the same 13 majority‑minority districts;
• It pairs the same number of incumbents and preserves a similar share of existing district “cores;” and
• It does not split Gibson County.

After a minor contiguity fix (which all parties agreed was feasible without affecting deviation), Himes conceded that Map 13d_e would be constitutional under federal law.

The Court treats this as sufficient proof that the Gibson County split was not strictly necessary to comply with federal equal population or VRA constraints. Thus, Wygant satisfies step one of the new test.

2. Step Two: Rational or Legitimate Basis for Splitting Gibson

The Court then turns to whether the Legislature still had a rational, legitimate reason – grounded in federal compliance – for splitting Gibson County.

Several key facts drive the Court’s conclusion:

• Population shifts and equal population constraints:
  • Tennessee’s ideal House district population after the 2020 census is 69,806.
  • Gibson County, with 50,429 residents, is too small to form its own district; it must be combined with another county or counties.
  • Most of Gibson’s neighboring counties (Obion, Weakley, Carroll, Crockett, Dyer) also have populations that cannot be neatly combined with Gibson to hit or closely approximate the ideal without splitting at least one of them.
  • Meanwhile, population growth patterns meant three House seats had to be shifted toward Middle Tennessee.
• VRA constraints in Madison County:
  • Madison County (to Gibson’s south) is home to districts created or reshaped after a successful VRA Section 2 challenge in Rural West Tennessee African‑American Affairs Council v. Sundquist.
  • Himes testified that altering Madison’s House districts risked a new VRA lawsuit and potential minority vote dilution.
  • Thus, attaching Gibson to part of Madison to avoid splitting Gibson was viewed as legally perilous under federal law.
• Core preservation and municipal integrity:
  • “Core preservation” – keeping voters in the same district as in prior maps – is a recognized legitimate goal (Karcher v. Daggett); it limits voter confusion and administrative disruption.
  • The new District 79 was drawn to preserve the “core” of the old District 79, maintaining the bulk of Gibson and the same portion of Carroll County.
  • The split line runs along Highway 45 West and aims to keep most municipalities whole within District 79; only Humboldt is split.
  • The remainder of Gibson is placed in District 82, bridging to Obion and strengthening population deviation and contiguity in West Tennessee.

In light of these considerations, the Court concludes:

• The General Assembly was confronted with multiple legitimate constraints: equal population, VRA compliance in Madison County, and maintenance of established majority‑minority districts.
• Given those constraints, splitting some county in the Gibson region was unavoidable.
• Choosing to split Gibson – rather than jeopardize VRA‑sensitive Madison – while preserving district cores and municipal integrity is a rational, legitimate way to reconcile federal and state demands.

Even though an after‑the‑fact expert was able, over many months, to craft an alternative that split fewer counties and avoided splitting Gibson, the Court holds that:

[T]he mere fact that district lines “theoretically might have been drawn more perfectly” will not by itself establish a constitutional violation.

Because the legislature’s solution is “fairly debatable” and not “clearly erroneous, arbitrary, or wholly unwarranted,” Wygant fails to meet the second prong, and the Gibson County split is upheld.

E. The Senate Consecutive-Numbering Issue: Left for Another Day

On the Senate side, the trial panel had found an Article II, Section 3 violation and ordered the General Assembly to renumber Davidson County’s districts by January 31, 2024, possibly by a simple swap of numbers (to avoid cutting short any incumbent’s term). The State did not defend the plan on the merits, and Hunt’s expert showed that an easy fix was available.

However, because the Supreme Court finds Hunt lacks standing, it does not address:

• Whether nonconsecutive numbering itself violates Section 3 under Tennessee law; or
• The proper remedial approach when misnumbering would affect incumbents’ term lengths.

The Court does hint that other plaintiffs (voters who are forced to wait an extra election cycle, candidates affected by term adjustments, or perhaps officials) might establish standing on different facts. But for now, the misnumbered Davidson County Senate districts remain in force.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. One-Person-One-Vote and Population Deviation

“One person, one vote” is shorthand for the Equal Protection requirement that legislative districts must have roughly equal population so that each vote counts approximately the same. For state legislatures:

• If the difference between the largest and smallest district exceeds 10%, the map is prima facie unconstitutional.
• But even within 10%, states must justify deviations by legitimate policies (e.g., preserving counties, compactness).

“Total population deviation” is the numerical expression of how much the largest and smallest districts differ from the ideal population.

B. Supremacy Clause and Partial Preemption

Under the U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, federal law trumps conflicting state law. In redistricting:

• If it is impossible to satisfy both a federal requirement (e.g., VRA, equal population) and a state rule (e.g., no county splits), federal law “displaces” the state rule to the extent of the conflict.
• But the state rule remains “binding” so far as it does not actually conflict; courts must give it “all possible effect.”

C. Voting Rights Act and Majority-Minority Districts

Section 2 of the VRA forbids voting plans that dilute the voting strength of racial minorities. This has two main effects:

• It can require states to maintain or create districts where minority voters form a majority and can elect their candidate of choice (“majority‑minority” districts).
• It limits the ways states can redraw lines around historically protected districts (like those in Madison County created after Rural West Tennessee African‑American Affairs Council).

At the same time, the Equal Protection Clause also forbids racial gerrymandering – making race the predominant factor in line‑drawing without a compelling justification. States are thus forced to “consider race just enough” – a difficult line that the Court acknowledges.

D. Political Question vs. Standing

Both doctrines limit courts, but in different ways:

• Political question: asks whether the issue is assigned by the Constitution to another branch or lacks manageable standards altogether. If yes, courts must stay out regardless of who sues.
• Standing: assumes the issue can be decided by courts, but asks whether this particular plaintiff is the right person to bring it. It focuses on concrete injury, causation, and redressability.

In Wygant, the Court says:

• County‑splitting challenges are not political questions; courts have standards and remedies.
• But standing still strictly regulates who can bring such challenges.

E. Public Rights vs. Private Rights

A private right is a personal right to property, bodily integrity, or reputation. A public right involves rights that belong to the community as a whole (e.g., structural limits on government, voting rules).

• Private‑rights claims can be brought by individuals with a legal injury, even if harm is not factually large.
• Public‑rights claims require a special, concrete injury; mere disagreement with government policy or a general interest in legality is not enough.

Redistricting claims that target the structure of districts or maps are public‑rights claims, because they implicate interests common to all voters and the political order as a whole.

F. Representational Harm vs. Vote Dilution

• Representational harm:
  • Occurs when the configuration of a district affects how a representative perceives and serves constituents (e.g., believing they represent only one racial group or a fragmented county).
  • It justified standing in racial-gerrymandering cases and, here, in Wygant’s challenge to the split of his own county.
• Vote dilution:
  • Occurs when a plan makes some votes count less than others by giving them fewer representatives per person (Reynolds), or by cracking/packing minority voters so they cannot elect their preferred candidate (VRA claims).
  • Misnumbering, standing alone, does not change vote weight or minority electoral opportunity, so it is not classic dilution.

VI. Impact and Future Implications

A. On Future Redistricting Litigation in Tennessee

Wygant makes redistricting challenges significantly harder to bring and to win in Tennessee state courts.

1. Narrower Standing

• No automatic statewide standing:
  • Individual plaintiffs can challenge only the configurations that directly injure them – typically their own house or senate district, or the splitting of their own county.
  • Statewide structural challenges to “too many county splits” or global partisan gerrymander theories will likely require either:
    • A set of plaintiffs from multiple districts/counties; and/or
    • Alternative theories of injury (possibly including candidates or officials).
• Higher bar for procedural/technical violations:
  • As Hunt’s claim shows, plaintiffs alleging purely procedural or numbering violations must show concrete, election‑related harm (e.g., delayed voting opportunity, actual loss of staggered representation), not just that the text was violated.
• Organizational plaintiffs:
  • Organizations wishing to challenge maps will likely need to identify specific members whose individual injuries satisfy the three‑part test.

2. Substantive Deference

• Requirement of a fully compliant alternative map:
  • Most successful county‑splitting challenges will require expert testimony and alternative statewide maps that meet both federal and state criteria while eliminating the challenged splits.
  • This increases the cost and complexity of litigation and favors well‑resourced plaintiffs.
• Rational‑basis‑like second prong:
  • Even with a valid alternative map in hand, plaintiffs must overcome strong deference to the legislature’s policy judgments regarding how best to comply with federal law while pursuing legitimate redistricting goals.
  • It will not be enough to show that another map is “better” on county splits; challengers must show that the chosen split lacks any rational, federal‑compliance‑related rationale.

Taken together, these changes mean that successful county‑splitting claims will likely be rare and reserved for egregious deviations from both federal requirements and the state’s own goals, with no analytically defensible justification.

B. On Legislative Behavior in Future Cycles

The decision also sends important signals to the General Assembly:

• No “30-split” safe harbor:
  • Legislators and staff can no longer treat the statutory “no more than 30 counties are split” guideline as a constitutional shield.
  • They must justify each split in light of federal constraints and state policies.
• Documented criteria and justifications matter:
  • Himes’s testimony about core preservation, VRA sensitivity, and population dynamics played a central role in persuading the Court that Gibson’s split had a rational basis.
  • Future map‑drawers would be well‑advised to articulate and document similar justifications contemporaneously.
• Technical constitutional requirements (like numbering):
  • Although Hunt lacked standing, the Court’s analysis highlights the existence of the Article II, Section 3 requirement and notes that simple fixes are often available.
  • The General Assembly may choose to voluntarily correct such issues in future cycles to avoid a case with a better‑situated plaintiff.

C. On Tennessee Constitutional Interpretation

Wygant continues and deepens a trend in Tennessee’s highest court toward:

• Original‑public‑meaning textualism:
  • The Court carefully parses the language of Article II, Section 4, uses Founding and 1960s dictionaries, and reviews debates from the 1965 limited convention.
  • It treats convention records as context rather than binding “intent,” aligning with modern methodological norms.
• Structural separation of powers and judicial modesty:
  • Drawing on Wilmington Trust, Bredesen, and U.S. Supreme Court standing cases like Clapper and Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, the Court reaffirms that courts should not become roving commissions to police the political branches.
  • Instead, they enforce clear constitutional limits when plaintiffs with concrete injuries bring justiciable claims, but they defer where the legislature’s choices are fairly debatable and grounded in competing constitutional commands.

D. Interaction with Federal Redistricting Developments

The opinion is also framed against ongoing federal debates:

• The Court notes the complexity created by recent and pending U.S. Supreme Court cases on race and the VRA (e.g., Allen v. Milligan, Alexander v. SC NAACP, and forthcoming Louisiana v. Callais), underscoring that state map‑drawers face constantly evolving federal constraints.
• By tying the second prong of its county‑splitting test to rational, legitimate pursuits of federal compliance, the Court tries to give the General Assembly breathing room in navigating that shifting terrain.

VII. Conclusion: Key Takeaways

Wygant v. Lee is a watershed redistricting case in Tennessee. It does not dramatically reorder districts on the ground – Gibson County remains split, and the misnumbered Senate districts in Davidson County remain for now – but it reshapes the legal landscape in which all future maps will be drawn and litigated.

Key takeaways include:

• Standing in redistricting cases is narrow and individualized:
  • Voters can challenge the configuration of their own district (or their own county’s split) based on concrete representational harms.
  • They cannot simply litigate global map features or procedural irregularities absent a distinct, redressable injury.
• County‑splitting claims now follow a rigorous, two-step test:
  • Challengers must show splits are unnecessary to federal compliance, usually via carefully crafted alternative maps.
  • They must then show the legislature lacked any rational, legitimate federal‑compliance‑related reason for the split.
  • Subjective “good faith” and “bad faith” are no longer the lodestars; rational, objective justifications are.
• Article II, Section 4 does not immunize the legislature from judicial review:
  • The General Assembly retains broad discretion, but it must still respect state constitutional constraints insofar as they do not conflict with federal law.
• Technical constitutional requirements like consecutive numbering remain enforceable, but only in concrete disputes:
  • The Senate map’s misnumbering remains a live constitutional issue, but only plaintiffs with genuine harm will be able to force judicial correction.

In the broader legal context, Wygant stands as a strong affirmation of legislative primacy in redistricting, tempered by a clear, though deferential, judicial standard for enforcing state constitutional rules about county integrity. It embeds Tennessee more firmly in a national trend of tightening standing doctrines and insisting on rational‑basis style deference in structural challenges to democratically enacted maps, while still preserving a limited but meaningful role for state courts as guardians of constitutional apportionment principles.