A Defendant’s Post-Plea Sentencing Misunderstanding Does Not Invalidate a Knowing and Voluntary Appeal Waiver:
Commentary on United States v. Goers (10th Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

This commentary examines the Tenth Circuit’s unpublished order and judgment in United States v. Goers, No. 25-5092 (10th Cir. Dec. 22, 2025), in which the court enforced an appellate waiver contained in a plea agreement and dismissed the defendant’s appeal. Although the decision is not binding precedent (except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel), it has clear persuasive value and further clarifies how the Tenth Circuit applies its en banc framework from United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir. 2004), to appellate waivers.

The central legal question in Goers was whether a defendant’s asserted post-plea misunderstanding about his sentencing exposure—evidenced by a statement at sentencing that he hoped to be home with his family within five years—was sufficient to render his guilty plea and associated appeal waiver unknowing and involuntary, and thereby defeat enforcement of the waiver under Hahn. The court’s answer was no.

The case involves serious child pornography offenses and lengthy sentences, but its broader legal importance lies in its reaffirmation of several recurring principles:

Appeal waivers are generally enforceable if entered into knowingly and voluntarily.
Courts rely heavily on the plea colloquy and written plea documents to assess the voluntariness of a plea and waiver.
Subjective, later-expressed hopes or misunderstandings about the sentence do not, standing alone, invalidate a plea or waiver.
The “miscarriage of justice” exception to enforcing appeal waivers is narrowly construed.

This commentary will summarize the decision, analyze the precedents on which the court relied, explain the legal reasoning in accessible terms, and assess the likely impact on future criminal appeals involving plea agreements and appellate waivers.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Facts and Procedural Background

Grant Stephen Goers pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma to:

Count 1: Production of child pornography, carrying a statutory mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years (180 months).
Count 2: Attempted receipt of child pornography, carrying a statutory mandatory minimum sentence of 5 years (60 months).

His guilty plea was entered pursuant to a plea agreement that included a waiver of his right to appeal (an “appeal waiver” or “appellate waiver”). The district court ultimately sentenced him to:

320 months’ imprisonment on Count 1; and
240 months’ imprisonment on Count 2, to run concurrently with Count 1.

Despite the appeal waiver, Goers filed a notice of appeal. The government moved to enforce the waiver under United States v. Hahn, which governs the enforceability of appellate waivers in the Tenth Circuit.

B. Issues Raised on Appeal

The government contended that:

The appeal fell within the scope of the appeal waiver.
The waiver was knowing and voluntary.
Enforcing the waiver would not result in a miscarriage of justice.

Goers did not contest that his appeal fell within the scope of the waiver. Instead he argued:

His guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because he allegedly did not fully understand the sentencing consequences—specifically the 15-year mandatory minimum—and therefore his appeal waiver was likewise not knowing and voluntary.
Enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice under the fourth Hahn category, namely that the waiver was “otherwise unlawful.”

C. Holding

The Tenth Circuit:

Held that Goers had not demonstrated any error in the plea colloquy or plea agreement process that would show his plea and waiver were unknowing or involuntary.
Rejected his reliance on his own post-plea, sentencing-stage statement (“I've got faith that you'll get me home to my family within five years”) as evidence of misunderstanding.
Concluded that none of the four Hahn “miscarriage of justice” conditions were met, including the “otherwise unlawful” category.
Granted the government’s motion to enforce the appeal waiver and dismissed the appeal.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Role

1. United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc)

Hahn is the foundational en banc decision governing when and how appellate waivers in plea agreements will be enforced in the Tenth Circuit. It created a three-part framework:

Scope: Does the appeal fall within the scope of the waiver?
Knowing and voluntary: Was the waiver (and plea) entered into knowingly and voluntarily?
Miscarriage of justice: Would enforcing the waiver result in a miscarriage of justice?
- Hahn defines four narrow circumstances where enforcement causes a miscarriage of justice:
  1. The district court relied on an impermissible factor such as race.
  2. Ineffective assistance of counsel in negotiating the waiver renders it invalid.
  3. The sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.
  4. The waiver is otherwise unlawful.

In Goers, Hahn provided both the basic structure of the analysis and the definition of “miscarriage of justice.” The Tenth Circuit applied the Hahn framework step-by-step:

Scope: Because Goers did not argue that his appeal fell outside the waiver, the court did not need to analyze this factor in detail.
Knowing and voluntary: The court examined whether Goers’s plea—and by extension his waiver— was knowing and voluntary by looking at the plea colloquy and the written plea petition.
Miscarriage of justice: The court evaluated whether any of the four Hahn situations applied and concluded they did not.

2. United States v. Porter, 405 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir. 2005)

Porter is cited for the proposition that when a defendant does not argue that an appeal lies outside the scope of the waiver, the appellate court need not address the scope prong in detail. Porter reinforces a practical rule: appellate courts typically confine themselves to the issues actually raised by the parties.

In Goers, because the defendant did not dispute that his appeal fell within the waiver’s scope, the Tenth Circuit, following Porter, effectively treated that Hahn factor as satisfied without extended discussion.

3. United States v. Rollings, 751 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2014)

Rollings elaborates on how courts analyze whether an appellate waiver is knowing and voluntary:

“[I]n considering whether an appellate waiver is knowing and voluntary, we consider whether the defendant entered into the plea agreement knowingly and voluntarily. Where a plea agreement contains a plea and an appellate waiver, we may therefore look to whether the plea was knowing and voluntary in deciding whether the plea agreement was entered knowingly and voluntarily.”

Rollings also addresses the standard of review:

Whether a guilty plea was knowing and voluntary is typically a question of law reviewed de novo.
If defense counsel did not object to the plea’s validity in the district court, the appellate court applies plain error review.

In Goers, because defense counsel did not object to the validity of the plea in the district court, the court applied plain error review, as dictated by Rollings. This significantly raised the defendant’s burden: he had to show not merely some ambiguity or doubt, but an actual error that was “plain.”

4. United States v. Vidal, 561 F.3d 1113 (10th Cir. 2009)

Vidal is an important precedent on how ambiguous statements during the plea colloquy can affect enforcement of appellate waivers. In Vidal, the Tenth Circuit explained:

“Statements made during a plea colloquy that create ambiguity as to the rights being waived may preclude our enforcement of the waiver.”

In Goers, the defendant invoked Vidal to argue that his misunderstanding about the sentence invalidated his waiver. The court explicitly distinguished Vidal:

In Vidal, the magistrate judge’s own statements during the plea colloquy created “a touch of ambiguity” regarding the waiver.
In Goers, there was no claim—and no evidence—of ambiguous or erroneous statements by the magistrate or district judge at the plea hearing. Instead, the defendant relied on his own later statement at sentencing requesting leniency.

Thus, Vidal stands for the rule that court-created ambiguity during the plea colloquy can undermine a waiver. Goers confirms that a defendant’s post-plea expression of hope or misunderstanding, without any corresponding judicial error or ambiguity at the plea stage, does not.

5. United States v. Sandoval, 477 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2007)

Sandoval refines the fourth Hahn “miscarriage of justice” category—where “the waiver is otherwise unlawful.” It emphasizes that:

The inquiry is whether the waiver itself is unlawful, “because of some procedural error or because no waiver is possible.”
For the waiver to be invalid on this ground, the unlawfulness must “seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”

In Goers, the defendant relied on this fourth category. He argued his plea was not knowing or voluntary due to his alleged misunderstanding, and that enforcing the waiver would thereby “seriously affect the fairness and integrity” of the proceedings.

The Tenth Circuit, invoking Sandoval, held that this argument failed because it did not show how the waiver itself was unlawful—there was no procedural error in the waiver process, and no reason why a waiver was impossible. Instead, the defendant’s argument simply repackaged his failed voluntariness argument.

6. United States v. Galloway, 56 F.3d 1239 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc)

Galloway is cited for a procedural rule on ineffective assistance of counsel claims: such claims are generally better raised in collateral proceedings (e.g., post-conviction motions) rather than on direct appeal. The Tenth Circuit has repeatedly held that the record on direct appeal is often inadequate to resolve such claims.

In Goers, the defendant acknowledged that—if his lack of understanding were due to ineffective assistance of counsel—that argument should properly be raised collaterally, not on direct appeal. The court agreed, effectively setting aside any ineffective assistance claim for another forum and further narrowing the issues before it.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. The Hahn Framework Applied

a. Scope of the Waiver

Under Hahn, the first question is whether the appeal falls within the scope of the waiver. Here:

The government argued that the issues raised on appeal were covered by the waiver.
Goers did not dispute this.
Under Porter, the court therefore did not need to analyze this factor in detail.

Functionally, this meant that the enforceability dispute centered on the second and third Hahn factors: whether the waiver was knowing and voluntary, and whether enforcing it would cause a miscarriage of justice.

b. Knowing and Voluntary Nature of the Plea (and Waiver)

The court, following Rollings, recognized that assessing whether the waiver was knowing and voluntary required examining whether the underlying guilty plea was knowing and voluntary.

Standard of Review: Because defense counsel did not object to the plea’s validity in the district court, the Tenth Circuit reviewed for plain error. This is significant:

On plain error, the defendant must show:
1. An error, and
2. That the error is plain (i.e., clear or obvious under current law).
Only after these first two prongs are satisfied would the court then consider whether:
1. The error affected substantial rights; and
2. The error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

The court concluded that Goers failed at the very first step—he had not identified any error at all in the plea proceedings.

Defendant’s Argument: Goers argued:

“[He] did not have a full understanding of the potential sentencing consequences of his guilty plea, and that lack of understanding renders his plea, and hence the appeal waiver[,] invalid as not being knowing and voluntary.”

This contention relied almost entirely on a single statement he made at sentencing:

“I've got faith that you'll get me home to my family within five years . . . .”

From this statement, he asked the court to infer that he did not understand the 15-year mandatory minimum sentence attached to Count 1.

The Court’s Response: The Tenth Circuit found this argument inadequate for several reasons:

Record evidence contradicting claimed misunderstanding. The record showed:
- Both the magistrate judge and the district judge “noted the applicable statutory sentencing ranges for the two offenses.”
- Goers confirmed that he:
  - Understood the possible consequences of his plea;
  - Had discussed the facts, possible defenses, and possible punishment with his attorney;
  - Had reviewed and initialed each page of his plea petition, which:
    - Set out the statutory minimums and maximums; and
    - Explicitly informed him that:
      - Count 1 carried a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years; and
      - Count 2 carried a mandatory minimum sentence of 5 years.
  - Signed the petition acknowledging that he had been informed of, and understood, those minimum sentences.
No identified judicial error. The defendant did not point to any error by the magistrate judge or district judge during the plea proceedings. He did not claim, for example:
- That he had been misinformed about the mandatory minimums;
- That the court misstated the sentencing range; or
- That he was pressured or coerced in some impermissible way.
Post-plea statement vs. plea-stage understanding. The statement at sentencing was a post-plea remark expressing hope for leniency, not evidence of what he understood at the time of the plea. It did not undercut the extensive evidence from the plea proceedings that he had been properly informed.
Unsupported speculation. The court observed that Goers’s suggestion that his lack of understanding was “whether the product of ineffective assistance of counsel or otherwise” was an unsupported statement. It did not cite record evidence of misadvice or misunderstanding at the time he entered his plea.

Taken together, the record established that the plea—and therefore the waiver—was knowing and voluntary. Goers’s own later hope for a lighter sentence could not retroactively invalidate it.

c. Miscarriage of Justice Analysis under Hahn

Having concluded that the waiver was knowing and voluntary, the court turned to whether enforcing it would result in a “miscarriage of justice” under Hahn.

The court recited the four Hahn categories:

The district court relied on an impermissible factor such as race.
Ineffective assistance of counsel in negotiating the waiver rendered it invalid.
The sentence exceeded the statutory maximum.
The waiver was otherwise unlawful (as clarified by Sandoval).

Application to Goers:

First and third categories:
- Goers conceded that the court did not rely on an impermissible factor such as race.
- He also conceded that his sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum.
Second category (ineffective assistance):
- He acknowledged that any ineffective assistance of counsel claim would be “better suited for a collateral proceeding,” consistent with Galloway.
- The Tenth Circuit therefore did not address ineffective assistance as a basis for avoiding the waiver on direct appeal.
Fourth category (“otherwise unlawful”):
- This was his primary remaining argument: he claimed that because his plea was allegedly unknowing and involuntary, enforcing the waiver would “seriously affect the fairness and integrity” of the proceedings.
- Relying on Sandoval, the court emphasized that this category concerns whether the waiver itself is unlawful— either due to a procedural defect or because no waiver is legally possible in the circumstances.
- Goers failed to identify any procedural error in the waiver’s execution or to explain why a waiver was legally impossible.
- His argument merely repeated his failed claim that his plea was unknowing; it did not show a defect in how the waiver was obtained or structured.

Accordingly, the court held that enforcing the waiver would not result in a miscarriage of justice. With all three Hahn prongs satisfied, the court enforced the waiver and dismissed the appeal.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Appeal Waiver / Appellate Waiver

In many federal plea agreements, the defendant agrees to “waive” (give up) the right to appeal some or all aspects of the conviction or sentence. This is called an appeal waiver.

The rationale is that the defendant gets some benefit from the plea agreement (for example, dismissal of other counts, recommendations for reduced sentencing, or certainty), and in exchange the government gets finality—the defendant will not later challenge the result on direct appeal, except in limited, specified ways.

Courts will enforce such waivers so long as:

They are made knowingly and voluntarily; and
Enforcing them will not cause a miscarriage of justice.

2. Mandatory Minimum Sentence

A mandatory minimum is the lowest sentence a judge is legally allowed to impose for a particular crime. For example:

Count 1 (production of child pornography) carried a 15-year mandatory minimum.
Count 2 (attempted receipt of child pornography) carried a 5-year mandatory minimum.

Even if the judge believes a shorter sentence would be sufficient, the judge cannot lawfully go below the mandatory minimum unless specific statutory mechanisms (such as certain substantial assistance provisions) apply.

3. Knowing and Voluntary Plea

A guilty plea must be:

Knowing: The defendant must understand the nature of the charges, the rights being waived (including the right to trial), and the potential consequences (including statutory minimum and maximum sentences).
Voluntary: The plea must be the product of the defendant’s free choice, not coerced or improperly induced.

To ensure this, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires judges to conduct a detailed plea colloquy—a question-and-answer session with the defendant to confirm understanding and voluntariness.

Written plea petitions—like the one Goers signed and initialed—are another tool used to document that the defendant was informed of, and acknowledged, the key consequences.

4. Plain Error Review

When a defendant did not object to a particular issue in the district court (for example, the voluntariness of the plea), the appellate court reviews the claim only for plain error. Under this standard the defendant must show:

There was an error;
The error was plain (clear or obvious under current law);
The error affected the defendant’s substantial rights (usually meaning it affected the outcome); and
The error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

This is a demanding standard. In Goers, the court found that he failed even to identify a genuine error in the plea process, so his claim necessarily failed.

5. Miscarriage of Justice and “Otherwise Unlawful” Waiver

Under Hahn, even if a waiver is knowing and voluntary, a court will not enforce it if doing so would cause a miscarriage of justice. The four categories are narrowly drawn.

The fourth category—where the waiver is “otherwise unlawful”—can be confusing. As Sandoval explains, this does not mean any legal error in the case allows the defendant to escape the waiver. Rather:

The focus is on whether the waiver itself is unlawful—because, for example, it was procured in a way that violated procedural rules or because, in the circumstances, no waiver could validly be made.
General complaints about the fairness of the sentence or about unrelated errors do not automatically make a waiver “otherwise unlawful.”

In Goers, the defendant’s argument under this category merely repeated his failed claim about his understanding of the plea’s consequences; it did not identify a defect in the waiver itself.

6. Collateral Proceedings and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (e.g., that defense counsel failed to adequately explain the consequences of the plea) are usually raised in collateral proceedings—such as a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255— rather than on direct appeal.

This is because:

The trial record often does not reveal the full extent of defense counsel’s advice and strategy.
Collateral proceedings allow for evidence outside the trial record (e.g., affidavits, testimony) to be considered.

Following Galloway, the Tenth Circuit again emphasized this preference. To the extent Goers suggested that any misunderstanding stemmed from ineffective assistance, the court recognized that such claims are better addressed in a separate, collateral proceeding.

V. Impact and Significance

1. Reinforcement of a Rigorous Approach to Appeal Waivers

United States v. Goers reinforces the Tenth Circuit’s strong tendency—rooted in Hahn—to enforce appeal waivers when the record shows a clear plea colloquy and detailed written plea documents.

Key takeaways for future cases:

Written plea petitions matter greatly. The court relied heavily on the fact that Goers had:
- Initialed each page of a plea petition;
- Acknowledged he had discussed the case and potential punishment with counsel; and
- Signed a statement explicitly recognizing the statutory mandatory minimums.
Plea colloquy statements carry substantial weight. Explicit oral advisements by the magistrate and district judges regarding the statutory sentencing ranges helped defeat any later claim of misunderstanding.
Later subjective hopes or beliefs are not enough. A defendant’s aspirational statements at sentencing (e.g., hoping to be home within five years) do not, by themselves, undermine the earlier record establishing that the plea and waiver were informed and voluntary.

2. Clarification of Vidal’s Limits

By distinguishing Vidal, Goers clarifies:

Source of ambiguity matters. Ambiguity arising from the court’s own statements at the plea colloquy can be fatal to waiver enforcement (as in Vidal).
Defendant-generated ambiguity after the plea does not. A defendant’s later comments, unmoored from any judicial error or ambiguity at the plea stage, will not ordinarily preclude enforcement.

This is important practical guidance for defense counsel and prosecutors:

Defense counsel should be attentive to any potentially confusing statements by judges during plea colloquies.
Prosecutors and courts can rely more confidently on plea records where the only “ambiguity” arises from later defendant statements at sentencing or afterward.

3. Narrowing of “Otherwise Unlawful” Miscarriage-of-Justice Arguments

Goers, consistent with Sandoval, reaffirms a narrow view of the “otherwise unlawful” prong:

It is not enough to argue that the result is harsh, that the defendant regrets his decision, or that he subjectively misunderstood some aspect of sentencing.
The defendant must show something specifically wrong with the waiver itself—such as serious procedural irregularities in how it was negotiated, explained, or entered.

This rigor strengthens the predictability and enforceability of plea agreements and supports finality in criminal judgments, while still leaving room for relief where there is genuine procedural unlawfulness or egregious injustice.

4. Procedural Significance for Ineffective Assistance Claims

Although not fully developed in the opinion, the decision’s reference to Galloway underscores once again that ineffective assistance of counsel claims relating to plea advice are generally left for collateral review.

Practical implication:

Defendants who believe their counsel did not adequately explain the consequences of a plea or appeal waiver should be advised that direct appeal is typically not the appropriate vehicle for those claims.
Instead, they must usually seek relief through a properly filed collateral proceeding in the district court.

5. Persuasive—but Not Binding—Authority

The panel explicitly notes that this order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. However:

It may be cited for its persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1.
It adds to a consistent line of Tenth Circuit authority applying Hahn in a strict and structured manner.

Thus, while future panels are not obligated to follow Goers, its reasoning will likely be influential in similar appellate-waiver cases, especially those involving alleged sentencing misunderstandings that are contradicted by a robust plea record.

VI. Conclusion

United States v. Goers is a significant addition to the Tenth Circuit’s jurisprudence on the enforcement of appeal waivers, even though it is an unpublished order and judgment. It stands for the proposition that:

A defendant’s post-plea, subjective misunderstanding or hopeful statement about his sentence—without any identified judicial error or ambiguity at the plea stage—does not render a guilty plea or appeal waiver unknowing or involuntary and does not, by itself, create a miscarriage of justice under Hahn.

By:

Applying Hahn, Rollings, Vidal, Sandoval, and Galloway in a clear, structured way;
Reaffirming the importance of the plea colloquy and written plea petition in assessing voluntariness;
Clarifying that the “otherwise unlawful” exception focuses on defects in the waiver itself; and
Emphasizing the limitations of plain error review and the proper channel for ineffective assistance claims,

the Tenth Circuit underscores a stable and relatively strict regime for the enforcement of appellate waivers. In doing so, the court promotes finality in criminal proceedings while preserving targeted avenues—such as collateral review and narrow miscarriage-of-justice exceptions—for truly exceptional cases.

For practitioners, Goers serves as a reminder of the importance of:

Ensuring that defendants are fully and accurately advised of mandatory minimums and sentencing ranges;
Creating a clear, detailed record at the plea colloquy and in written plea agreements; and
Recognizing that subjective post-plea statements, without more, are unlikely to defeat an otherwise valid appeal waiver.

A Defendant’s Post-Plea Sentencing Misunderstanding Does Not Invalidate a Knowing and Voluntary Appeal Waiver: Commentary on United States v. Goers (10th Cir. 2025)