“When Protection Outweighs Rehabilitation” –
Supreme Court of West Virginia Affirms Immediate Termination of Parental Rights Where the Abusing Parent Persistently Maintains a Violent Relationship and Rejects Offered Services

Introduction

In In re B.H., S.H., E.H., and N.H., No. 24-100 (W. Va. June 26, 2025), the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia confronted a familiar but wrenching dilemma of child-protection law: whether a trial court must keep extending “second chances” to a parent battling substance use and intimate-partner violence, or whether the safety of the children demands a definitive end to the parental relationship.

Petitioner Mother L.H. asked the high court to reverse the circuit court’s order that terminated her parental rights to three children (B.H., E.H. & N.H.) and her custodial rights (as a psychological parent) to a fourth child (S.H.). She argued that the lower court should have granted her a post-adjudicatory or post-dispositional improvement period—West Virginia’s statutory mechanism that allows parent-focused rehabilitation instead of outright termination.

The Supreme Court, applying long-standing but now clarified precedents, affirmed. The opinion crystallises a tightening principle: where an abusing parent steadfastly preserves a violent relationship and repeatedly rebuffs court-ordered services, the courts may bypass lesser dispositional alternatives and proceed directly to termination in order to serve the children’s best interests.

Summary of the Judgment

• The Court reviewed the circuit court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo (citing Syl. pt. 1, In re Cecil T.).
• It held that ample evidence showed Petitioner’s failure to follow through with treatment, continued association with her violent partner, dishonesty, and non-appearance at key hearings.
• Under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d)(3) & (c)(6) and the precedents in In re Tonjia M., In re Kristin Y., and In re R.J.M., the circuit court had discretion to deny improvement periods and terminate parental rights.
• The Supreme Court rejected the mother’s invitation to re-weigh evidence, emphasizing its deferential review role (In re D.S.).
• Accordingly, the termination order dated January 22, 2024, was affirmed in all respects.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. In re Tonjia M., 212 W. Va. 443, 573 S.E.2d 354 (2002)
   Held that circuit courts have discretion to deny an improvement period when “no improvement is likely.” The present Court leaned heavily on this discretion, noting Petitioner’s decade-long pattern of non-compliance.
2. Syllabus Point 5, In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011)
   Authorised termination without using lesser alternatives when no reasonable likelihood existed that conditions could be corrected. This doctrine underpinned the circuit court’s—and now the Supreme Court’s—decision to bypass further improvement periods.
3. Syllabus Point 1, In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980)
   Stated that courts need not “exhaust every speculative possibility of parental improvement.” The Judgment invokes this line to rebut the mother’s plea for more time in treatment.
4. Statutory Framework: W. Va. Code § 49-4-604
   Subsection (d)(3) enumerates circumstances where “no reasonable likelihood” exists, including failure to follow a case plan. Subsection (c)(6) authorises termination upon such findings. The Supreme Court determined the Petitioner squarely fitted the statutory criteria.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The Court's analysis marched through a three-step logic:

1. Establishing persistent non-compliance. Evidence showed Petitioner ignored drug testing, left inpatient treatment early with her violent partner, and violated sober-living rules.
2. Evaluating statutory criteria. Under § 49-4-604(d)(3) Petitioner’s failure to follow the case plan equated to “no reasonable likelihood” of correction. That statutory finding triggers § 49-4-604(c)(6), permitting termination.
3. Balancing best interests. The circuit court found further exposure to the boyfriend’s violence imperilled the children. Because permanency and safety are “paramount” interests, termination became the least restrictive appropriate remedy.

C. Potential Impact on Future Cases

• Reinforced Deference to Trial Courts. Appellate courts will seldom disturb findings that a parent is unlikely to improve, so long as the record documents repeated failures and safety risks.
• Clarification on Psychological-Parent Rights. The opinion underscores that psychological or custodial rights (here as to child S.H.) may also be terminated when the statutory factors are met.
• Tightening Window for Last-Minute Reform. Parents entering treatment only after protracted non-compliance face steeper hurdles in securing improvement periods, particularly when violent partners remain in the picture.
• Elevation of Domestic-Violence Considerations. Maintaining a dangerous relationship, even absent direct harm to children, can itself satisfy the “abuse or neglect” threshold and justify termination.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Improvement Period (IP)

A statutorily authorised span (usually six months) during which the parent receives services (therapy, drug treatment, etc.) and must demonstrate progress. Courts may grant pre-, post-adjudicatory, or post-dispositional IPs.

No Reasonable Likelihood of Correction

A statutory test asking whether the parent, within the near future, can remedy the conditions that led to abuse or neglect. Factors include sustained non-compliance, severe substance addiction, or ongoing domestic violence.

Least Restrictive Dispositional Alternative

The doctrine obliges courts to consider options less drastic than termination (guardianship, temporary custody changes, etc.). However, if the statutory “no reasonable likelihood” threshold is met, termination may become the least restrictive adequate means to protect the child.

Psychological Parent

A person who, though not a biological or adoptive parent, has formed a parent-like bond with the child. Such rights, once established, can be terminated under the same statutory framework applicable to biological parents.

Conclusion

In re B.H. et al. does not invent new doctrine but sharpens two critical themes in West Virginia child-protection jurisprudence: (1) courts may move decisively to termination when a parent persists in a violent partnership and rebuffs rehabilitative services, and (2) even psychological-parent rights fall when the statutory criteria for termination are satisfied.

The decision signals to litigants that good-faith engagement with offered services and a clean break from violent partners are indispensable predicates to maintaining parental ties. Conversely, when a parent’s choices chronically endanger children, West Virginia courts are neither required—nor permitted—to gamble with the children’s safety by prolonging proceedings.