Voluntary Correction as a Shield: The Second Circuit Re-Emphasizes the High Threshold for Franks Hearings in United States v. Mrabet

Introduction

The Second Circuit’s summary order in United States v. Mrabet, No. 24-1313-cr (June 16, 2025) tackles three common post-trial challenges in federal criminal practice: (1) the denial of a Franks hearing and related suppression motion, (2) the sufficiency of evidence for a firearm charge under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and (3) the adequacy of jury instructions. Although styled as a non-precedential “summary order,” the panel (Judges Lohier, Carney, and Pérez) delivers a concise yet potent reaffirmation of existing doctrines—most notably, the stringent showing a defendant must make before obtaining an evidentiary hearing under Franks v. Delaware.

Parties.
• Appellee: United States of America, represented by the Acting U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York.
• Appellant: Mounir Mrabet, represented by defense counsel Elizabeth M. Johnson.

Key Issues on Appeal.

• Whether alleged misstatements and omissions in search-warrant affidavits justified a Franks hearing or suppression.
• Whether the evidence sufficed to prove possession/use of a “firearm” in furtherance of drug trafficking.
• Whether the district court erred by failing to define “firearm” in its jury instructions.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects:

• Franks Motion: The defendant failed to make the “substantial preliminary showing” that the affiant acted intentionally or recklessly; therefore, no hearing or suppression was warranted.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Videos, text messages, and admissions to an undercover officer provided ample proof that Mrabet possessed and used a firearm in connection with drug trafficking, even though no gun was physically recovered.
• Jury Instruction: Any failure to define “firearm” did not amount to plain error because the instructions as a whole were fair, and overwhelming evidence supported the jury’s finding.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978)
   Established entitlement to a hearing if the defendant shows (1) a false statement or omission made knowingly, intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, and (2) that the statement/omission is necessary to the probable-cause finding. The panel applied this two-prong test and stressed the “substantial preliminary showing” requirement.
2. United States v. Sandalo, 70 F.4th 77 (2d Cir. 2023)
   Reiterated that conclusory allegations or mere negligence cannot trigger a Franks hearing. The Mrabet panel quoted Sandalo extensively, using it to dismiss the defendant’s thin evidentiary proffer.
3. United States v. McKenzie, 13 F.4th 223 (2d Cir. 2021)
   Provided the framework for reviewing district-court findings (clear-error for falsity; de novo for materiality). Guided the appellate standard of review.
4. United States v. DiTomasso, 932 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2019)
   Explained when private conduct becomes attributable to the state for Fourth Amendment purposes. Used to reject the claim that storage-facility employees were government agents.
5. United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2013)
   Clarified that omissions must be “clearly critical” to probable cause to infer recklessness. The panel applied this to deem the prior police visit immaterial.
6. United States v. Castillo, 924 F.2d 1227 (2d Cir. 1991)
   Holds that a firearm need not be recovered physically to sustain a § 924(c) conviction. Reaffirmed to support the sufficiency finding.
7. United States v. Josephberg, 562 F.3d 478 (2d Cir. 2009)
   Sets the deferential standard for sufficiency reviews—viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the government.
8. United States v. Hunt, 82 F.4th 129 (2d Cir. 2023); United States v. Fazio, 770 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2014); United States v. Scott, 979 F.3d 986 (2d Cir. 2020)
   These cases set the contours of plain-error review for jury-instruction challenges.

B. Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. The Franks Threshold

• No Intent or Recklessness Shown. Detective Gurleski’s misstatement (about Mrabet’s hotel occupancy) was voluntarily corrected in a subsequent warrant affidavit, undermining any inference of bad faith.
• Private vs. Government Action. The storage-facility employees’ entry into Mrabet’s unit was deemed private conduct; no facts connected law enforcement to their actions.
• Materiality Prescinded. Because the defendant failed on the intent/recklessness prong, the panel declined to address probable-cause materiality, streamlining its affirmance.

2. Sufficiency of Firearm Evidence

• The panel catalogued corroborative proof: a video of a revolver near drugs and cash, incriminating text messages, and admissions to an undercover officer.
• Following Castillo, the absence of a recovered weapon was immaterial.

3. Jury Instructions

• Plain Error Standard. Because defense counsel did not object contemporaneously, any instructional flaw required a showing that the error was “plain” and affected the trial outcome.
• Outcome Unaffected. Given overwhelming evidence of actual firearms, the absence of a statutory definition for “firearm” did not create a reasonable probability of prejudice.

C. Potential Impact

Although summary orders are non-precedential, they are still citable and often persuasive. Mrabet is likely to influence district-court practice in three ways:

1. Elevating Evidentiary Proffers for Franks Hearings. Defense counsel will have to produce more tangible proof of intentional or reckless falsity; voluntary corrections by an affiant may now be cited by the government to defeat bad-faith allegations.
2. Clarifying Private-Search Doctrine. By stressing the lack of a “sufficiently close nexus,” the order underscores that independent actions by third parties rarely taint subsequent warrants.
3. Reinforcing Sufficiency without Physical Guns. Prosecutors can rely on digital evidence and witness statements to sustain § 924(c) charges, provided contextual links to drug trafficking exist.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Franks Hearing: A mini-trial to test the truthfulness of statements in a search-warrant affidavit. The defendant must first make a strong preliminary showing that law-enforcement officers lied or were reckless and that those untruths mattered.
• Clear-Error vs. De Novo Review: “Clear error” means the appellate court defers heavily to the trial judge’s factual findings unless they are plainly wrong. “De novo” means the appellate court decides the legal issue anew, without deference.
• § 924(c) Firearm Charge: Criminalizes using, carrying, or possessing a firearm “in furtherance of” certain crimes (like drug trafficking). Actual recovery of the gun is unnecessary; credible evidence of its presence and use suffices.
• Plain-Error Review: A stringent appellate standard applied when trial counsel did not object. The error must be obvious, affect substantial rights, and “seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
• Private-Search Doctrine: Searches by private actors are not governed by the Fourth Amendment unless the government directed or was significantly involved in the search.

Conclusion

United States v. Mrabet may not be precedential, but it offers a lucid tutorial on three recurring post-trial issues. The Second Circuit:

• Re-affirmed that mere speculation or negligence cannot unlock a Franks hearing, especially where law-enforcement affiants correct errors on their own initiative;
• Confirmed that digital and testimonial evidence can robustly satisfy the firearm element of § 924(c) even absent a seized weapon;
• Demonstrated the uphill battle defendants face on plain-error review concerning jury instructions.

For practitioners, the decision underscores the critical importance of building a concrete factual record—both when attacking and defending a warrant affidavit—and of raising contemporaneous objections to jury charges. For scholars and courts, the order serves as another data point in the Second Circuit’s continuing effort to harmonize Fourth Amendment doctrine with emerging realities of digital evidence and complex narcotics prosecutions.