“No Legislative Short-Cut to Article III”: The Second Circuit Rejects “Congressionally-Authorized Representational Standing” and Clarifies Mootness Procedure — Commentary on A.H. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Health, 24-725-cv(L) (2d Cir. 2025)

1. Introduction

In A.H. v. New York State Department of Health the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit delivered a finely-detailed opinion that simultaneously narrows the circumstances in which private organisations may sue on behalf of others and sharpens procedural expectations for mootness dismissals. The litigation was brought by:

• Disability Rights New York (DRNY) – New York’s federally designated Protection & Advocacy (P&A) system.
• Eight institutionalised individuals with developmental disabilities (“Individual Plaintiffs”).

Plaintiffs alleged that state officials violated the Medicaid Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and the Fourteenth Amendment by delaying moves from restrictive institutions to community placements. The district court (Vyskocil, J.) dismissed:

1. DRNY’s claims for lack of standing;
2. the Individual Plaintiffs’ claims as moot (based only on pre-motion letters);
3. a motion by eight additional individuals to intervene.

On appeal the panel (Judges Park, Lee and Pérez) affirmed the dismissal of DRNY’s claims, vacated the mootness dismissal of the Individuals’ claims, and affirmed denial of intervention. Judge Pérez dissented on the standing issue. The decision erects a new doctrinal signpost: Congress cannot bypass Article III’s injury-in-fact requirement by simply conferring “representational standing” on a private entity.

2. Summary of the Judgment

1. DRNY’s Standing: The court held DRNY suffered no injury-in-fact and could not rely on a novel theory of “congressionally authorised representational standing.” The majority read Supreme Court precedent (Spokeo, TransUnion) as foreclosing any statutory grant of standing that eliminates the constitutional injury requirement.
2. Mootness of Individual Claims: The district court erred by dismissing as moot based solely on three-page pre-motion letters. The panel reiterated that absent an “unmistakably clear” jurisdictional defect, parties must receive notice and an opportunity to be heard (Int’l Code Council v. UpCodes).
3. Intervention: Denial of intervention was not an abuse of discretion; the motion was untimely under Rule 24.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016) & TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413 (2021) – reaffirm the “irreducible constitutional minimum” and hold that Congress cannot create standing without concrete harm.
• FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U.S. 367 (2024) – fresh articulation that plaintiffs must answer “What’s it to you?”
• Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013) – private parties authorised by state law lacked standing to defend Proposition 8; relied upon here to analogise DRNY.
• United Food & Commercial Workers v. Brown Group, 517 U.S. 544 (1996) – addressed associational standing; majority distinguished it as not permitting wholesale bypass of injury-in-fact.
• Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) – canonical associational standing test; cited to show DRNY waived reliance on that doctrine.
• International Code Council v. UpCodes, 43 F.4th 46 (2d Cir. 2022) – emphasised necessity of full briefing before sua sponte dismissal; drives reversal of mootness ruling.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

a) Standing

b) Mootness

c) Intervention

3.3 Impact of the Decision

• P&A Systems Nationwide: Private P&As must now plead either organisational injury (e.g., diversion of resources) or classic associational/next-friend bases. Pure “statutory standing” arguments are unlikely to survive in the Second Circuit and may face scepticism elsewhere.
• Congressional Drafting: Legislators cannot assume that empowering entities to “sue” guarantees federal jurisdiction. Statutory schemes may need to create tangible injuries (e.g., financial penalties, loss of grant funds) or house enforcement authority in government officers.
• Disability Advocacy Litigation: Cases seeking systemic relief must carefully cultivate individual plaintiffs whose claims will persist; organisational plaintiffs should document resource diversion to preserve first-party standing.
• Procedural Safeguards for Mootness: District courts in the Second Circuit must provide fulsome process before dismissal, reinforcing UpCodes. Expect more robust hearings and factual records when defendants assert post-filing remediation.
• Intervention Timing: The opinion signals harder scrutiny of late-filed Rule 24 motions, especially where plaintiffs’ underlying claims appear to be resolving.
• Splitting with Other Circuits? Some circuits (e.g., D.C., Fifth) have been more receptive to P&A standing; practitioners should watch for certiorari petitions to resolve potential inter-circuit disagreement.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Article III Standing

Constitutional rule that federal courts hear only real “cases” or “controversies.” Requires (1) injury-in-fact, (2) causation, (3) redressability.

Representational vs. Associational Standing

Associational: traditional route for membership organisations (e.g., unions) to sue on behalf of members.
Representational: umbrella term for anyone suing for someone else—can include next-friend, class representatives, qui tam relators, etc.

“Congressionally Authorised” Standing

Idea that Congress can declare a private actor a proper plaintiff even without personal injury. A.H. rejects this notion as inconsistent with Article III.

Mootness

Even if a case started with standing, later events can end the controversy. If the defendant’s alleged wrongdoing stops and cannot reasonably recur, the court must dismiss—unless exceptions apply.

Inherently Transitory Exception

For claims that naturally expire quickly (e.g., pre-trial detention), courts may hear them because someone is always subject to the same harm.

Voluntary Cessation Doctrine

A defendant’s stopping the challenged conduct does not moot a case if it could easily resume.

5. Conclusion

A.H. v. N.Y. State Department of Health is a significant standing decision with ripple effects beyond disability law. The court makes three core statements:

1. Private organisations cannot rely solely on congressional say-so to litigate on behalf of others; they must satisfy Article III as traditionally understood.
2. District judges must provide adversarial process before declaring claims moot, especially when factual disputes remain.
3. Timeliness under Rule 24 will be strictly applied where litigation has progressed and underlying controversies are in flux.

For advocates, the message is clear: plead concrete organisational harms, maintain live individual claims, and prepare full records on mootness and intervention. For Congress, the decision is a reminder that policy goals must be pursued within constitutional limits—Article III is not waivable. Whether the Supreme Court will eventually refine or repudiate this strict approach to representational standing remains an open and consequential question.