“Emotional Reassurance as ‘Benefit’: The Eleventh Circuit’s Expansive Reading of the Federal Kidnapping Statute in United States v. Marques Deon Jones

Introduction

On 28 July 2025, the Eleventh Circuit released an unpublished per curiam opinion in United States v. Marques Deon Jones. The decision, though not published, squarely addresses two recurring questions under the federal kidnapping statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1):

• What evidentiary showing is necessary to permit a jury to find lack of consent?
• What qualifies as a “ransom or reward or otherwise” benefit to the captor?

The appellant, Marques Deon Jones, challenged the sufficiency of the evidence after he was convicted of firearms-possession offences and one count of kidnapping his girlfriend, P.G. He argued that (1) P.G. voluntarily left work with him and (2) he obtained no cognizable “benefit” within the meaning of § 1201.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that P.G.’s departure was non-consensual and that the “benefit” element was satisfied by Jones’s desire for conversation, companionship, or reassurance that she was not involved with anyone else. In doing so, the panel reinforced—and arguably broadened—the already capacious interpretation of “otherwise” benefit established in prior cases.

Summary of the Judgment

Applying de novo review to the denial of Jones’s Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal, the Court:

1. Reiterated the highly deferential standard for sufficiency challenges: the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, and any reasonable construction supporting guilt will be upheld.
2. Found ample evidence from eyewitness testimony, body-camera footage, and surveillance video to allow a jury to conclude that P.G. did not consent—despite her later attempts to downplay the incident.
3. Held that Jones derived a qualifying benefit—emotional reassurance or companionship—thereby satisfying the “ransom or reward or otherwise” clause of § 1201(a)(1).

On these grounds, the convictions and district-court judgment were affirmed.

Detailed Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• United States v. Gooch, 297 U.S. 124 (1936) – The Supreme Court’s foundational reading that “otherwise” requires only that the captor seeks to “secure some benefit to himself.” Jones relies on this broad benchmark.
• Clinton v. United States, 260 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1958) – The former Fifth Circuit (binding precedent) suggested that “otherwise comprehends any purpose at all.” Jones extends this dictum, confirming that even non-pecuniary, intangible benefits suffice.
• United States v. Lewis, 115 F.3d 1531 (11th Cir. 1997) – Held that kidnapping for “companionship” meets the benefit prong. The panel quotes Lewis to support its holding that reassurance or conversation is enough.
• United States v. Adams, 83 F.3d 1371 (11th Cir. 1996) – Confirmed that the benefit need not be pecuniary or illegal.
• United States v. Gillis, 938 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 2019) – Synthesised earlier cases; footnote 25 reiterated the breadth of “otherwise.” The Jones panel relied on this framework.
• United States v. Chancey, 715 F.2d 543 (11th Cir. 1983) – Cited for the proposition that consent defeats § 1201 liability and that credibility determinations rest with the jury.
• United States v. Clay, 832 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 2016); United States v. Gamory, 635 F.3d 480 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Poole, 878 F.2d 1389 (11th Cir. 1989) – Each articulates the deferential sufficiency-of-evidence standard that framed the panel’s analysis.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a. Lack of Consent

The jury heard two conflicting narratives:

• Prosecution version: Jones assaulted P.G., brandished a firearm, threatened to kill her, and ordered her into the car. Surveillance footage and third-party eyewitness Ryan corroborated this account.
• Defense version: P.G. voluntarily left to diffuse Jones’s anxiety.

The panel held that it was “not enough for a defendant to put forth a reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” Crediting the Government’s evidence, the Court emphasised: (1) P.G. left without clocking out, personal items, or notifying her supervisor; (2) her immediate contemporaneous statements to law enforcement (body-cam) conflicted with her courtroom recantation; (3) visible injuries and distress supported compulsion. Under established precedent, these facts allowed—but did not compel—the jury to disbelieve P.G.’s exculpatory testimony.

b. The “Benefit” Element (“ransom or reward or otherwise”)

Jones argued that he never demanded money, property, or services and thus no “benefit” existed. The panel rejected this narrow construction, invoking:

• Lewis – “companionship” sufficient;
• Adams – benefit need not be pecuniary;
• Clinton – “any purpose at all.”

Here, Jones sought reassurance about P.G.’s fidelity and the opportunity to confront her away from cameras. Such intangible emotional gratification, the Court held, squarely fits within “otherwise.” The decision thus cements the Eleventh Circuit’s view that: Any objective advantage, emotional or otherwise, constitutes a benefit under § 1201.

c. Standard of Review and Rule 29 Denial

The Court reiterated that de novo review of a Rule 29 denial still requires taking all evidence in the Government’s favour; reversal is warranted only when no reasonable jury could convict. That threshold was not met here.

3. Potential Impact of the Judgment

• Lower Evidentiary Threshold for “Benefit.” Prosecutors may charge § 1201 in domestic or relational disputes where the defendant’s objective is merely conversation, closure, or emotional affirmation. Defense counsel must prepare to rebut non-pecuniary benefit theories.
• Consent Assessments Post-Incident. Victims who attempt to minimize incidents later (e.g., to protect the defendant or avoid testifying) will not necessarily defeat kidnapping charges. Real-time statements, corroborative video, and third-party testimony may override recantations.
• Expanded Use in Interstate-Commerce Cases. Because the statute requires only minimal interstate-commerce nexus, federal jurisdiction may attach in many local domestic abductions that employ a cellphone (an “instrumentality of interstate commerce”) or travel a highway. The Jones reasoning may embolden federal prosecutors to intervene.
• Model Jury Instructions and Charging Language. The ruling supplies clear language for trial courts: Intangible satisfaction (companionship, reassurance, sexual access, etc.) is enough to satisfy the benefit prong. Jury instructions will likely reflect this articulation.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Rule 29 Motion for Judgment of Acquittal: A request by the defendant, made during or after the Government’s case-in-chief, asking the court to enter a judgment of not guilty because the evidence is legally insufficient. Denial preserves the question for appeal.
• “Otherwise” Benefit: Under § 1201, the Government need only show that the defendant sought some advantage. Money, property, freedom from arrest, companionship, or mere conversation will suffice.
• Sufficiency of Evidence Standard: On appeal, courts do not re-weigh evidence. If any reasonable jury could convict on the trial record, the verdict stands.
• Unpublished Opinion: An Eleventh Circuit decision designated “DO NOT PUBLISH” is not precedent-binding in future cases under 11th Cir. R. 36-2, but it can still be cited for persuasive value. Even so, its reasoning signals how the court is likely to rule in similar disputes.

Conclusion

United States v. Marques Deon Jones reaffirms the Eleventh Circuit’s expansive approach to the federal kidnapping statute. The panel clarified that:

1. Assessing consent is a quintessential jury function; subsequent victim recantations do not erase earlier demonstrative and testimonial evidence of coercion.
2. The “benefit” element in § 1201(a)(1) is satisfied by any advantage, however intangible—specifically, emotional reassurance or companionship.
3. The sufficiency-of-evidence standard on appeal remains overwhelmingly deferential to jury verdicts.

While unpublished, the opinion offers a robust blueprint for prosecutors and trial courts and a cautionary tale for defense counsel. By treating emotional objectives as cognizable benefits, the Eleventh Circuit has effectively broadened federal kidnapping liability to a host of relational disputes once thought to reside exclusively in state court. Future cases will undoubtedly test the outer limits of this rationale, but for now, Jones stands as a potent, if informal, precedent in the Eleventh Circuit’s kidnapping jurisprudence.