Villarino II and the CAFA Threshold: Eleventh Circuit Requires Determination of Amount-in-Controversy Before Merits Dismissal

1. Introduction

In Shane Villarino v. Kenneth Joekel, No. 24-11124 (11th Cir. 2025), the Eleventh Circuit confronted an increasingly common procedural tangle: a removed class action straddling questions of federal subject-matter jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), the rule against claim splitting, and personal jurisdiction over out-of-state corporate officers. The plaintiffs—day laborers who allege that Pacesetter Personnel Service failed to provide potable water and restroom facilities at a Florida “labor hall” in violation of the Florida Labor Pool Act (FLPA)—had already litigated related federal wage claims in Villarino I. After the district court (Judge Moore) dismissed the newly-filed action for improper claim splitting and for lack of personal jurisdiction over two Texas-based individual defendants, the plaintiffs appealed.

The Eleventh Circuit vacated the dismissal of the corporate defendants, holding that the district court must first determine—by a preponderance of the evidence—whether CAFA’s $5 million amount-in-controversy requirement is satisfied when the plaintiffs dispute it. Only after confirming its own subject-matter jurisdiction may a district court reach merits-based grounds such as claim splitting. At the same time, the court affirmed dismissal of the two individual defendants, reinforcing Florida’s corporate-shield doctrine and its limited exceptions.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Subject-Matter Jurisdiction (CAFA) – Pacesetter’s removal depended on CAFA; plaintiffs challenged the $5 million amount-in-controversy. The district court ruled on claim splitting without resolving the challenge. The Eleventh Circuit held this was error and remanded for specific factual findings on CAFA jurisdiction.
Claim Splitting – Because the case is remanded, the appellate court declined to reach whether the dismissal with prejudice for claim splitting was substantively correct.
Personal Jurisdiction – The panel affirmed dismissal of individual defendants Joekel and Plotkin, finding that their alleged conduct fell squarely within the protection of Florida’s corporate-shield doctrine; no tortious acts in Florida or intentional-misconduct exceptions applied.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

University of South Alabama v. American Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405 (11th Cir. 1999) – Established the imperative that federal courts confirm subject-matter jurisdiction before addressing the merits. The panel used this case as the cornerstone for vacating the dismissal.
Dudley v. Eli Lilly & Co., 778 F.3d 909 (11th Cir. 2014) – Provides the burden-of-proof standard (preponderance of the evidence) when CAFA jurisdiction is disputed. Guided the court’s remand instructions.
Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza II, Inc., 608 F.3d 744 (11th Cir. 2010) – Clarifies that the jurisdictional analysis freezes at the time of removal; post-removal events do not affect CAFA jurisdiction.
Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574 (1999) – Recognizes that courts may dismiss on threshold non-merits grounds (e.g., personal jurisdiction) without first establishing subject-matter jurisdiction. The panel relied on Ruhrgas to affirm dismissal of the individual defendants even while remanding on CAFA.
Doe v. Thompson, 620 So.2d 1004 (Fla. 1993), and Kitroser v. Hurt, 85 So.3d 1084 (Fla. 2012) – Florida Supreme Court cases articulating and refining the corporate-shield doctrine, cited to affirm that merely corporate conduct will not establish long-arm jurisdiction over officers.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

“Because Appellants disputed the notice of removal’s allegation, it then fell to the district court to discern whether the amount in controversy had been established.” – Per Curiam Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning unfolds in two tracks:

Jurisdiction First, Merits Second. The panel reiterated that Article III courts are powerless to act without statutory authority. Once the plaintiffs put Pacesetter’s CAFA calculations in issue—mainly by invoking Judge Singhal’s earlier Article III concerns—the district court was duty-bound to make factual findings on class size, statutory penalties, and aggregate damages. Skipping that step and dismissing with prejudice for claim splitting was reversible error.
Personal Jurisdiction as a Threshold Gatekeeper. Invoking Ruhrgas, the court noted that personal-jurisdiction defects can be resolved first. Still, plaintiffs failed to plead any conduct by Joekel or Plotkin that pierced the corporate shield:
- No allegations they personally provided or denied water/restrooms in Florida.
- No intentional tort counts (e.g., fraud, IIED) were pleaded.
- Travel to Florida “four or five times a year” for corporate purposes does not satisfy Fla. Stat. §48.193(1)(a).
Consequently, dismissal of these defendants stood even though the overarching subject-matter jurisdiction remains open.

3.3 Potential Impact of the Judgment

CAFA Litigation – District courts in the Eleventh Circuit must now directly confront disputed amount-in-controversy questions before disposing of a removed class action on the merits. Expect more evidentiary hearings and written findings early in the life of CAFA removals.
Strategic Pleading & Forum Shopping – Plaintiffs contemplating parallel federal and state actions must heed the court’s signal: while claim splitting remains viable doctrine, it cannot be applied until federal jurisdiction is firmly established. Conversely, defendants cannot rely on claim-splitting motions as a shortcut around CAFA scrutiny.
Corporate-Officer Liability – The reaffirmation of Florida’s corporate-shield doctrine, coupled with the narrow reading of its exceptions, makes it harder to anchor non-resident officers to Florida courts absent well-pleaded tortious conduct. Counsel should plead specific in-forum acts or intentional torts if they hope to keep individual defendants in the case.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

CAFA Amount-in-Controversy – Under CAFA, federal courts obtain jurisdiction if (a) any class member is minimally diverse from any defendant; (b) the class has 100+ members; and (c) the aggregate amount the entire class could recover is more than $5 million. The defendant must plausibly allege this in the removal notice; if the plaintiff contests, the court must decide by “preponderance of the evidence.”
Claim Splitting – A doctrine derived from res judicata principles that bars a plaintiff from maintaining multiple suits arising from the same nucleus of operative facts. An exception exists where the first court explicitly reserves the right to sue elsewhere, as plaintiffs argued here.
Corporate-Shield Doctrine – Florida rule shielding corporate officers from personal jurisdiction in Florida courts when actions complained of were performed solely in a corporate capacity. Exceptions: (1) tortious acts committed while physically present in Florida; (2) intentional misconduct specifically directed at Florida residents.

5. Conclusion

Villarino II crystallises an essential procedural sequence for CAFA cases in the Eleventh Circuit: a district court must establish the statutory prerequisites for federal jurisdiction—particularly the amount-in-controversy—before it may issue a dismissal on merits-based theories such as claim splitting. The decision simultaneously affirms the protective reach of Florida’s corporate-shield doctrine, underscoring the need for concrete, tort-based allegations to hale non-resident officers into court. Going forward, litigants and courts alike must devote early attention to evidentiary showings on CAFA jurisdiction, while plaintiffs targeting individual corporate actors should plead detailed in-state misconduct or intentional torts to survive jurisdictional challenges.