United States v. Watkins (2d Cir. 2025): Expanding “Good-Cause” Hearsay Admissibility Where Domestic-Violence Victims Fear Testifying

1. Introduction

United States v. Watkins, No. 23-7648 (2d Cir. Mar. 28, 2025) is a Summary Order of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirming the revocation of Anthony Watkins’s supervised release and the imposition of a 24-month prison term followed by three years of supervised release. The case is significant because—although non-precedential under the Second Circuit’s Local Rule 32.1.1—it offers the clearest appellate articulation since United States v. Peguero (2022) of how district courts should balance confrontation rights against the “good-cause” showing required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)(C) when domestic-violence victims refuse to testify out of fear.

Key Issues:

Whether the district court abused its discretion by admitting hearsay statements of the victim (A.D.) during a revocation hearing.
Whether the three-year term of supervised release was substantively unreasonable given Watkins’s repeated non-compliance.

Parties:

Appellant: Anthony Watkins (a/k/a “Ace”), pro se at revocation hearings, represented on appeal by the Federal Public Defender.
Appellee: United States of America, represented by the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of New York.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit, in a per curiam Summary Order, affirmed:

The district court’s admission of hearsay evidence—A.D.’s oral statements and signed written statement—following a balancing of Watkins’s confrontation interests against (a) the government’s reasons for not producing A.D. (her fear and non-appearance despite subpoena) and (b) corroborative reliability (photographs and officer testimony).
The substantive reasonableness of a 36-month term of supervised release based on Watkins’s history of violent conduct, repeated violations, and the necessity of protecting the public.

The panel held there was no abuse of discretion in either the Rule 32.1 analysis or the § 3553(a) sentencing determination.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

United States v. Peguero, 34 F.4th 143 (2d Cir. 2022) – Reaffirmed that the Confrontation Clause does not apply to revocation hearings, but Rule 32.1 supplies a confrontation-like safeguard. Watkins relies heavily on Peguero; the Circuit explains why the district court’s approach satisfied Peguero’s two-part balancing (defendant’s interest vs. (i) government’s reason for non-production and (ii) reliability).
United States v. Carthen, 681 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2012) – Recognized that a defendant’s violent history may constitute good cause for hearsay admission where retaliation is possible. The panel analogizes Watkins to Carthen because of Watkins’s domestic-violence history and the victim’s fear.
United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc) – Provides the “range of permissible decisions” standard for substantive reasonableness review, cited to uphold the sentence and supervised release.
United States v. Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2008) – Affirms that appellate courts review sentences for abuse of discretion under § 3553(a) factors, referenced for method of review.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

3.2.1 Hearsay Admissibility under Rule 32.1

Defendant’s confrontation interest: The court acknowledged the importance of confronting adverse witnesses, particularly where imprisonment is at stake.
Government’s reason for non-production: A.D. was subpoenaed but failed to appear; Officer Casullo testified she feared retaliation and had previously refrained from calling police out of fear. The court viewed that fear as credible and typical in domestic-violence matters.
Reliability of hearsay: Photographs documenting severe bruises, timing of those injuries, and sworn written statement signed by A.D. were deemed highly reliable corroboration.

The court concluded that Watkins’s violent history and A.D.’s fear constituted good cause, satisfying Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C). Unlike ordinary hearsay, sworn statements plus contemporaneous photographs added indicia of reliability comparable to in-court testimony.

3.2.2 Substantive Reasonableness of the Supervised-Release Term

Applying § 3553(a) and § 3583(c), the district court emphasized:

Watkins’s repeated, escalating violations.
The need to protect the public, especially intimate partners.
Deterrence and correctional goals outweighing Watkins’s claim that supervision was “futile.”

The Second Circuit found nothing “exceptional” about the case to warrant reversal under the deferential Cavera standard.

3.3 Potential Impact

Even as a non-precedential Summary Order, Watkins is persuasive authority within the Second Circuit and can:

Bolster prosecutors’ arguments that sworn out-of-court statements by domestic-violence victims, corroborated by physical evidence, meet Rule 32.1’s good-cause test.
Signal to probation officers and district courts that documented victim fear can justify hearsay reliance even without direct testimony of that fear at the hearing.
Reinforce wide appellate deference to revocation sentences that prioritize community protection, potentially leading to longer post-release supervision terms for high-risk offenders.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Confrontation Clause vs. Rule 32.1: The Sixth Amendment guarantees face-to-face confrontation of witnesses in criminal trials, but that guarantee does not extend to revocation hearings (they are not new criminal prosecutions). Rule 32.1, however, partially replicates that right by allowing confrontation absent a “good-cause” showing.
Good Cause: A flexible standard requiring the judge to decide whether admitting hearsay is justified because (a) the witness cannot or reasonably should not be produced, and (b) the hearsay is reliable enough to substitute for live testimony.
Summary Order: A non-precedential, often brief decision of the Court of Appeals. Parties may cite it after 2007, but it carries only persuasive—not binding—authority.
Substantive Reasonableness: An appellate inquiry into whether the length and conditions of a sentence fall within the universe of acceptable outcomes under § 3553(a). An “abuse of discretion” is found only where a sentence is shockingly high or low in context.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Watkins underscores the Second Circuit’s willingness to allow hearsay in supervised-release revocation proceedings when victims of domestic violence refuse to testify because of genuine fear—particularly when corroborated by physical evidence. The decision also demonstrates appellate reluctance to second-guess district courts on revocation sentences aimed at protecting the public. Although technically non-precedential, Watkins will likely permeate district-court practice as persuasive authority, making it easier for probation officers and prosecutors to rely on credible out-of-court victim statements and to request robust post-release supervision for recalcitrant defendants.