United States v. Jackson: Establishing the “Plain-View Vehicle Firearm” Rule for § 2D1.1(b)(1) Sentencing Enhancements

1. Introduction

On 19 August 2025, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit decided United States v. Richard Eugene Jackson, No. 24-5895. The case arose from a methamphetamine trafficking conspiracy in which defendant Richard Jackson was arrested inside a car that contained both large quantities of methamphetamine and a pistol lying in plain view near the gearshift. Although Jackson’s co-conspirator, Terrance Wallace, admitted exclusive ownership of the gun, the district court applied the two-level dangerous-weapon enhancement in § 2D1.1(b)(1) of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (USSG). Jackson appealed, contending that the government failed to establish reasonable foreseeability of the weapon’s presence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, articulating a clear principle: when a conspirator is apprehended in a shared vehicle where a gun is in plain view alongside drugs, the presence of that firearm is per se reasonably foreseeable for purposes of the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement, regardless of prior knowledge or drug quantity.

This commentary unpacks the decision, its doctrinal roots, and its likely influence on future sentencing disputes.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• The panel (Chief Judge Sutton; Judges Clay and Thapar, opinion by Judge Clay) affirmed Jackson’s 128-month sentence.
• The court held that the district court did not clearly err in finding the firearm’s presence “reasonably foreseeable” under an objective test, given:
  • Jackson’s arrest inside the vehicle used for drug sales,
  • the firearm’s location in plain view next to the center console, and
  • its proximity to 370 g of methamphetamine scattered from the car.
• The panel expressly declined to rely on drug quantity and instead rested its decision on the plain-view-in-vehicle fact pattern.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The opinion canvasses, clarifies, and synthesizes a line of Sixth Circuit cases on § 2D1.1(b)(1):

• Mosley (2022) – Restated the two necessary elements: actual/constructive possession and contemporaneity with the offense.
• Barron (2019) – Allowed imputation of a co-conspirator’s firearm if within the scope, in furtherance, and reasonably foreseeable.
• Cochran (1994) – Introduced the “objective evidence” requirement; mere participation is insufficient without some indicia of knowledge or expectation.
• Woods (2010), Wade (2003) – Frequently inferred foreseeability from large drug quantities.
• Martin (2003), Cobbs (2007) – Recognised proximity as relevant but not dispositive.
• Dudeck (2001), Catalan (2007) – Approved enhancements where the defendant was arrested in a room containing a visible gun.
• West (2020) – Upheld enhancement when gun was under a seat in a vehicle.
• Brown (2025) – Clarified mixed standard of review: clear error for foreseeability findings.

Jackson combines and extends these strands. While Dudeck and Catalan involved buildings, the present case deals squarely with a moving vehicle; and unlike West, where the gun was hidden, here it was plainly visible. Hence, the panel crafts a more specific rule: plain-view presence of a firearm in the shared vehicle creates an objectively foreseeable risk as a matter of law.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds in four distinct steps:

1. Standard of Review – Factual determinations (foreseeability) under clear error; interpretations de novo (Brown, Iossifov).
2. Elements for Conspiratorial Imputation – The gun must be (a) within the scope of jointly-undertaken activity, (b) in furtherance thereof, and (c) reasonably foreseeable (Barron, Mosley). Jackson did not contest scope or nexus, only foreseeability.
3. Objective Foreseeability Test – The test is objective; subjective ignorance is irrelevant (Catalan). The panel looked for “objective evidence that a coconspirator would be armed.” It held that arrest in a small sedan with a handgun in plain sight suffices.
4. Application to Facts – • Gun lay beside the gearshift, visible to anyone in front seats.
   • The car was the vessel for drug deliveries; weapon was thus in the “scene of the crime.”
   • Jackson neither presented evidence that the gun was un connected to the drug deals, nor showed it “clearly improbable” that it was so connected (Pryor burden-shifting).

Importantly, the panel deliberately avoided reliance on drug quantity, signalling that visibility and spatial co-location alone are sufficient.

3.3 Likely Impact of the Decision

• Heightened Predictability for Vehicle Cases – Prosecutors can now confidently seek § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancements whenever a firearm is discovered in plain view within a drug-running vehicle, even without proof of prior agreement to arm themselves.
• Plea Negotiations – Defendants may be less able to bargain away the enhancement by disclaiming knowledge; visibility within the car effectively removes that argument.
• Litigation Strategy – Defense counsel will have to focus on the “clearly improbable” prong (e.g., evidence that the firearm belonged to a third party and was completely unrelated) rather than foreseeability.
• Consistency within the Sixth Circuit – Jackson harmonises earlier, seemingly disparate, vehicle cases (West, hidden gun) and room cases (Catalan, visible gun), providing a crisp, bright-line rule.
• Potential Inter-Circuit Tension – Some circuits (e.g., Fifth, Ninth) require stronger links (drug quantity or prior weapon use). The Sixth Circuit’s new plain-view rule may create splits ripe for Supreme Court review.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 2D1.1(b)(1) – A provision adding two offense levels (≈ up to several years) when a defendant possessed a dangerous weapon during a drug crime.
• Constructive Possession – Legal fiction allowing possession to be inferred from control or dominion over an item, even without physical holding.
• Reasonable Foreseeability (Objective Test) – Whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have predicted the weapon’s presence, not whether the defendant actually knew.
• Plain View Doctrine – An item is in “plain view” when it is immediately obvious to an observer; here, it supports foreseeability, though it more commonly arises in Fourth Amendment contexts.
• Preponderance of the Evidence – The government’s burden at sentencing: showing that something is more likely than not (51% certainty).
• Clear-Error Review – Appellate deference to trial-court fact-finding; reversal only if the appeals court is “left with a definite and firm conviction” that a mistake occurred.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Jackson crystallises a straightforward, vehicle-specific rule: when a defendant in a drug-trafficking conspiracy is arrested inside the transaction vehicle and a firearm is plainly visible near the drugs, the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement applies because the weapon’s presence is inherently reasonably foreseeable. The Sixth Circuit’s focus on visibility and spatial proximity, rather than on drug quantity or subjective knowledge, offers prosecutors a clearer pathway and signals to defense counsel that challenges must target the “clearly improbable connection” exception. Going forward, Jackson will likely be cited whenever plain-view firearms are found in cars used for narcotics crimes, shaping plea discussions, evidentiary hearings, and perhaps inviting debate in other circuits over the proper reach of § 2D1.1(b)(1).