United States v. Ingram: Confirming Broad District-Court Discretion to Impose Upward Variances Beyond Criminal-History Category VI When Guidelines Understate Recidivism and Danger

1. Introduction

The Tenth Circuit’s 2025 decision in United States v. Ingram addresses the hotly contested terrain of substantive reasonableness review for sentences that vary upward from the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. Defendant Reuben Julius Ingram III, a repeat domestic-violence offender and felon-in-possession, received a 180-month sentence—well above the advisory 110–137-month range—after a guilty plea to firearm and fentanyl counts. He challenged the sentence as producing an “unwarranted sentencing disparity” under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). The appellate court affirmed, articulating a robust standard that:

• A correctly calculated Guidelines range, coupled with an on-record explanation of why the range understates recidivism or danger, suffices to satisfy § 3553(a)(6), even when the defendant already sits at criminal-history category VI (the highest category).
• District courts may rely on patterns of dismissed or uncharged conduct that are similar in kind to the instant offense to justify an upward variance, so long as the court articulates why those facts matter under the § 3553(a) factors.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Applying an abuse-of-discretion standard from Gall v. United States, the Tenth Circuit held that:

1. The district court adequately considered all § 3553(a) factors, including sentencing disparities, by correctly computing and “carefully reviewing” the advisory range.
2. The 43-month upward variance (180 months vs. 137-month upper guideline) was substantively reasonable in light of Ingram’s extraordinary and violent criminal history, his expressed intent to continue possessing firearms, and the need to protect the public, promote respect for the law, and deter future crimes.
3. Reliance on dismissed charges, protective-order histories, and prison misconduct did not render the sentence unconstitutional; the Sixth Amendment does not require jury findings on facts the judge uses to select a sentence within the statutory maximum (Redcorn reaffirmed).

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) – Establishes abuse-of-discretion review and deference to district-court balancing of § 3553(a) factors. The panel leaned heavily on Gall to uphold the deference owed to upward variances.
• United States v. Garcia, 946 F.3d 1191 (10th Cir. 2020) – Approved an upward variance where the Guidelines understated criminal history. Garcia supplied direct precedent that correct guidelines computation inherently addresses unwarranted-disparity concerns.
• United States v. Amanda Walker, 74 F.4th 1163 (10th Cir. 2023) – Confirmed that a court need not give equal weight to every § 3553(a) factor and may rely on domestic-abuse recidivism for a variance. The panel analogized Ingram’s pattern of abuse to Walker.
• United States v. Willie Walker, 284 F.3d 1169 (10th Cir. 2002) – A pre-Booker mandatory-Guidelines case limiting departures for criminal history. Ingram argued it foreclosed the variance; the panel distinguished it as departure-specific and pre-advisory.
• United States v. Atencio, 476 F.3d 1099 (10th Cir. 2007) – Clarified the distinction between “departures” (Guidelines-based) and “variances” (statutory factors). Used to show why Willie Walker had limited application.
• United States v. Allen, 488 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 2007) – Vacated a sentence where the district court punished the defendant as if he had committed an entirely different, uncharged crime (child-kidnap solicitation). Ingram invoked this case; the panel rejected the analogy, emphasizing that Ingram’s uncharged conduct was similar and intertwined with the offense of conviction.
• United States v. Redcorn, 528 F.3d 727 (10th Cir. 2008) – Reiterated that sentencing judges may find facts by a preponderance within the statutory maximum; cited to dispose of Ingram’s jury-trial argument.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

The panel’s analysis proceeded in three steps:

1. Standard of Review. Applying Gall, the court asked whether the district judge abused discretion.
   • No procedural error was alleged (Guidelines were correct).
   • Substantive reasonableness turned on the weight assigned to § 3553(a) factors.
2. Consideration of § 3553(a)(6) – Sentencing Disparities. According to Gall, a correct, “carefully considered” Guidelines range itself “necessarily” shows sufficient attention to disparity. Because the district court:
   • explicitly recited all § 3553(a) factors, and
   • explained why deterrence, public protection, respect for the law, and just punishment outweighed disparity concerns,
   the appellate court found no abuse of discretion.
3. Weight of Criminal-History Evidence. The district court concluded that the Category VI designation still undervalued Ingram’s danger because it (i) ignored time-barred convictions, (ii) excluded dismissed domestic-abuse charges (with plausible non-merits dismissals), and (iii) did not capture a demonstrated readiness to use firearms. The panel agreed that a judge may consider patterns of similar, uncharged conduct when it illuminates the same risk factors that animate § 3553(a)(2)(A)–(C).

3.3 Impact of the Judgment

Ingram makes three significant contributions to federal sentencing law:

1. Reaffirmation of Minimal Burden for § 3553(a)(6). So long as a district court correctly calculates and openly reflects on the Guidelines range, it need not provide extensive supplemental discussion about nationwide statistics or every comparator defendant.
2. Green Light for Post-Category VI Variances. Courts may still find that Category VI fails to capture the gravity of a defendant’s criminal trajectory. Expect prosecutors to cite Ingram whenever they seek sentences above the highest advisory range based on recidivism and public-safety factors.
3. Permissible Use of Dismissed/Uncharged Conduct. The decision charts a boundary between relying on similar and intertwined uncharged conduct (allowed) and sentencing the defendant for an entirely different crime (forbidden by Allen).

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Substantive vs. Procedural Reasonableness. • Procedural: Did the court follow correct steps (calculate Guidelines, allow argument, explain)?
  • Substantive: Is the length of the sentence itself a reasonable choice under § 3553(a)?
• Departure vs. Variance. • Departure: A non-Guidelines sentence derived from mechanisms built into the Guidelines Manual (e.g., §§ 4A1.3, 5K).
  • Variance: A sentence outside the range based on the court’s weighing of § 3553(a) factors after Booker made the Guidelines advisory.
• Criminal-History Category VI. The highest rung on the Guidelines’ criminal-history scale. Some judges treat it as a ceiling; Ingram clarifies it is not.
• § 3553(a) Factors. Statutory touchstones for all federal sentences, including seriousness, deterrence, protection of the public, rehabilitation, available options, guideline ranges, disparity avoidance, and restitution.
• Unwarranted Sentencing Disparity. Differences in sentences that lack justification from legitimate sentencing factors. Ingram shows that disparities become warranted if explained by recidivism, danger, or other § 3553(a) concerns.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Ingram confirms that in the post-Booker landscape, district judges possess a “large range of rationally permissible choices.” Even when a defendant already falls in Criminal-History Category VI, an upward variance can survive appellate scrutiny if:

• The Guidelines are correctly calculated and expressly considered,
• Specific facts show the range understates recidivism or danger, and
• The judge ties the variance to concrete § 3553(a) goals such as deterrence, public protection, and respect for the law.

Practitioners should treat Ingram as persuasive authority—especially in the Tenth Circuit—supporting substantial upward variances grounded on violent patterns that the Guidelines’ criminal-history score fails to capture. At the same time, the decision preserves the limitation of Allen: courts may not sentence defendants for entirely different crimes. The net effect is a clarified, balanced framework that values both individualized sentencing and the need to avoid arbitrary excess.