United States v. Henry De Jesus Lopez Londoño
“Mi Sangre”

Eleventh Circuit, No. 18-12888 – Opinion filed 20 August 2025 (unpublished)

Introduction

The case arises from the conviction of Henry De Jesus Lopez Londoño—a Colombian paramilitary figure known as “Mi Sangre”—for one count of conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine knowing it would be imported into the United States (21 U.S.C. §§ 959(a)(1), 960(b)(1)(B), 963). After being extradited from Argentina, Londoño asserted two primary trial defences:

• Public-authority / innocent-intent defence: he allegedly worked as a confidential informant for U.S. agencies (ICE, DEA, IRS) and was authorised to infiltrate the Urabeños cartel.
• Rule-of-specialty defence: the United States supposedly exceeded the terms of Argentina’s extradition grant by trying him on facts different from those presented in the extradition request.

He also challenged the government’s destruction of phones and deletion of an e-mail account, suppression of supposed Brady material, and several evidentiary and jury-instruction rulings. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed across the board, generating a comprehensive opinion that stitches together doctrines of due process, discovery, extradition law, and trial procedure. Its most significant contributions are:

1. Clarifying when destruction of “potentially useful” evidence violates due process and when a defendant is entitled to an adverse-inference instruction;
2. Re-affirming that the rule of specialty limits only the charges, not the evidentiary breadth, of a U.S. prosecution following extradition.

Summary of the Judgment

The panel (Rosenbaum, Newsom, Grant, JJ.) unanimously rejected five appellate claims:

1. Due-process / spoliation: Destruction of agents’ BlackBerry phones and disabling of a shared “live.com” e-mail account did not violate due process because (1) the evidence was, at most, “potentially useful,” (2) the defence had other means to obtain comparable information, and (3) no bad faith appeared.
2. Evidentiary exclusions: The district court acted within its discretion in excluding large batches of unredacted agency e-mails, Argentine immigration files, and certain impeachment attempts. Cross-examination limits satisfied the Sixth Amendment.
3. Jury instructions and communications: The court properly declined to give a spoliation adverse-inference instruction and correctly directed the jury back to the credibility instruction when jurors asked whether “one witness” was enough to convict.
4. Rule of specialty: Trying Londoño on the same conspiracy count for which Argentina extradited him—while introducing broader proof—did not breach the treaty.
5. Brady disclosures: Post-trial unredacted documents contained no material, favourable information beyond what the defence already possessed or could equally access.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984) & Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988) – foundational split between “apparently exculpatory” versus “potentially useful” evidence and the requirement of bad faith in the latter category. The Court applies these to conclude that the BlackBerry messages were only “potentially useful,” hence bad faith was required (and absent).
• Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544 (2004) – underscores necessity of bad faith where exculpatory value is not evident ex ante.
• United States v. Revolorio-Ramo, 468 F.3d 771 (11th Cir. 2006) – Eleventh Circuit synthesis of Trombetta/Youngblood; panel quotes extensively for the two-prong “constitutional materiality” test.
• Extradition/Rule-of-Specialty line: United States v. Bowe, 221 F.3d 1183 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567 (11th Cir. 1995); Gallo-Chamarro duo, 48 F.3d 502 & 233 F.3d 1298 – establish that specialty restricts charges, not proof, and permits use of evidence relating to dismissed or uncharged conduct so long as the tried offence matches the extradition grant.
• United States v. Funches, 135 F.3d 1405 (11th Cir. 1997) – relied on to exclude Argentine “political persecution” documents offered solely to encourage jury nullification.
• United States v. Frank, 599 F.3d 1221 (11th Cir. 2010) – explains that absence of binding precedent defeats a “plain error” claim; applied to deny relief for the missing adverse-inference instruction.

B. Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Destroyed phones & e-mail account
   • Classified the evidence as merely “potentially useful” because its exculpatory content was not obvious when destroyed.
   • Equal access: Londoño himself had sent or received every message; he could have preserved them.
   • Routine deletion / tech upgrade demonstrated lack of bad faith.
   • Therefore, no due-process violation and no entitlement to adverse-inference.
2. Evidentiary rulings
   • Bulk admission of agency e-mails was refused because they contained layers of hearsay and irrelevant strings; defendant never followed court’s order to produce clean redactions.
   • Informant e-mails not admissible under Rule 801(d)(2) because circuit has never recognised informants as government “agents” for hearsay purposes—an unresolved doctrinal gap.
   • Argentine asylum files were cumulative and aimed at nullification.
3. Spoliation instruction
   • No Eleventh Circuit or Supreme Court precedent requires a criminal-case adverse-inference instruction; absence therefore cannot be “plain error.”
4. Jury question on “one witness”
   • Court properly redirected jury to standard credibility instruction; reminder that counsel’s arguments are not evidence cured any potential confusion.
5. Rule of specialty
   • Treaty language bars prosecution for different offences, not for trying the same offence with broader or different proof.
   • Argentina surrendered Londoño specifically for the § 959 conspiracy; the U.S. tried—and the jury convicted—on exactly that count.
6. Brady material
   • Unredacted versions supplied post-trial revealed nothing material; most redactions were personal identifiers or duplicative summaries already known to the defence.
   • Speculative “belief” that more documents existed is insufficient under Jordan.

C. Potential Impact of the Decision

• Spoliation Doctrine: Reinforces a high bar for criminal defendants claiming due-process violations based on lost or destroyed electronic evidence. Unless the exculpatory value is obvious before destruction and no comparable evidence exists, defendants must prove bad faith—a steep requirement.
• Adverse-Inference Instructions: Signals that, absent binding precedent, a failure to give a spoliation instruction will rarely amount to reversible error, effectively discouraging tactical requests unless egregious misconduct is evident.
• Extradition Litigation: Solidifies Eleventh Circuit stance that prosecutors may use evidence well beyond the four corners of extradition papers, so long as the statutory charge matches the extradition order.
• Informant E-mails & Rule 801(d)(2): By acknowledging—yet not resolving— the split over whether a paid informant can be a “party-opponent,” the panel leaves the issue open for a future precedential opinion, but the practical message is clear: litigants must be ready to satisfy ordinary hearsay exceptions rather than rely on the agency-theory shortcut.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Public-Authority Defence (Rule 12.3)
  The defendant claims he acted under actual or apparent authorisation from law-enforcement or intelligence agencies. If true, it can excuse conduct that would otherwise be criminal.
• Doctrine / Rule of Specialty
  International courtesy principle embedded in treaties: a person extradited may be prosecuted only for the crime(s) for which the surrendering country agreed. It does not confine the prosecution’s evidentiary narrative.
• Spoliation & Due Process
  • “Constitutionally material” evidence – plainly exculpatory, obvious value, irreplaceable.
  • “Potentially useful” evidence – uncertain value. Destruction violates due process only if government acted in bad faith (intentional, to disadvantage defendant).
• Brady v. Maryland
  Prosecutors must disclose information favourable to the accused that is “material”—likely to change the outcome. Mere helpfulness or speculative value is not enough, and the duty is tempered by whether the defence already has, or could get, the information.

Conclusion

United States v. Lopez Londoño is a sweeping affirmance that consolidates several important procedural doctrines. For practitioners, the case delivers three practical lessons:

1. Document preservation claims require both obvious exculpatory value and proof of bad faith. Routine IT upgrades or negligence, without more, will not suffice.
2. The rule of specialty is charge-specific, not fact-specific. Prosecutors may —and likely will—present new witnesses or episodes as long as they relate to the extradited offence.
3. Bulk e-mail dumps and foreign-language records must be curated, redacted, and tied to a hearsay exception; otherwise, district courts have discretion to exclude them without infringing a defendant’s right to present a defence.

Although unpublished, the opinion offers authoritative guidance inside the Eleventh Circuit and persuasive weight elsewhere, particularly on spoliation and specialty issues that recur in transnational criminal litigation.