United States v. Haddad, Jr.: The Seventh Circuit Clarifies Plain-Error Review and Anders Procedure in Supervised-Release Revocations
1. Introduction
In United States v. Ronald Haddad, Jr., Nos. 24-2855 et al. (7th Cir. June 27 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit confronted a familiar, but deceptively intricate, set of questions: (1) When must court-appointed counsel seek leave to withdraw under Anders v. California; (2) what quantum of proof suffices to sustain a revocation of supervised release; (3) how does forfeiture affect a defendant’s ability to challenge evidentiary or procedural defects on appeal; and (4) what constitutes “plain error” when a sentencing judge briefly references impermissible factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
The court’s non-precedential disposition nevertheless crystallises several important principles that will likely guide future litigants and district courts:
- The Seventh Circuit re-affirms that Anders safeguards apply to revocation appeals even though the right to counsel is not constitutionally absolute in that context.
- A single proven violation—here, a state criminal trespass conviction—can by itself justify revocation, rendering alleged defects in additional violations largely academic.
- Where a defendant forfeits his right to object (e.g., by not requesting confrontation of an adverse witness), review is limited to the demanding four-part plain-error standard of Olano.
- Brief reliance on impermissible sentencing considerations (seriousness of the offence; respect for the law) does not merit reversal if (i) the sentence is within the Chapter 7 policy-statement range, and (ii) permissible factors clearly drive the outcome.
2. Summary of the Judgment
Judge Easterbrook, writing for the court, granted appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismissed Haddad’s consolidated appeals for want of any non-frivolous issue. The panel held:
- The evidence—Haddad’s undisputed state conviction for criminal trespass and his partial admissions regarding aggravated battery—satisfied the low preponderance standard for revocation.
- Any challenge to the use of a police report, or to the judge’s cursory mention of improper § 3553(a) factors, was forfeited and would fail plain-error review because the outcome was not affected.
- The six-month imprisonment and 2½-year supervised-release terms were within statutory and Guidelines limits and were adequately explained.
- Haddad waived objection to his supervised-release conditions, and minor oral-written discrepancies favoured him, eliminating prejudice.
- Three pro se appeals were either untimely or duplicative and were therefore dismissed.
3. Analysis
3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence
- Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) – Provides the template for counsel’s withdrawal when no non-frivolous issues exist. Though Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) holds there is no categorical right to counsel at revocation, the Seventh Circuit follows the Anders protocol “as a matter of practice” (Brown, 823 F.3d 392).
- United States v. Perez, 99 F.4th 972 (7th Cir. 2024) – Confirms that revocation violations must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt.
- Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993) – Four-part plain-error framework, crucial once Haddad failed to timely object.
- Esteras v. United States, U.S. Sup. Ct. 2025 – Restricts sentencing judges to the subset of § 3553(a) factors listed in § 3583(e). Haddad invoked it to challenge the court’s mention of seriousness/respect-for-law.
- Kappes, 782 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2015) – Illustrates over-broad conditions of supervised release; referenced to show that omitted conditions actually benefitted Haddad.
These authorities collectively shaped the panel’s roadmap: start with Anders screening; verify evidentiary sufficiency; apply forfeiture/ plain-error when objections were absent; and finally assess substantive reasonableness under the deferential “presumption of reasonableness” for within-Guidelines sentences (Yankey, 56 F.4th 554).
3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning
- Evidence of Violations. A pending state conviction satisfies the preponderance standard; the court also relied on Haddad’s concessions and a police report to corroborate the Grade B battery violation.
→ Even if the police report were excluded, the Grade C trespass alone justified revocation. - Forfeiture & Plain-Error. Because Haddad (i) did not demand confrontation of the officer, and (ii) did not object to the judge’s
sentencing remarks, he forfeited both issues. Under Olano:
- Any error was not “plain” because prevailing law permitted reliance on such evidence (Lopez-Hernandez, 687 F.3d 900).
- No “reasonable probability” of a different outcome existed given the identical guideline ranges.
- Sentencing Analysis.
- Guideline Policy Statement Range: 4-10 months (Grade B; CH I).
- Statutory ceiling: 2 years (§ 3583(e)(3)).
- The judge’s six-month term sat at the low end and was primarily justified by deterrence and the defendant’s repeated non-compliance—permissible § 3583(e) factors.
- Any fleeting reference to seriousness or respect-for-law was harmless given the focus on permissible factors.
- Conditions of Release & Clerical Discrepancies. Haddad waived objections; missing conditions in the written judgment only lessened his obligations, causing no prejudice.
- Pro se Appeals & Timeliness. A represented litigant may not simultaneously litigate pro se; the untimely notice (No. 25-1484) compelled dismissal under Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1).
3.3 Likely Impact of the Judgment
Although designated “non-precedential,” the decision is instructive in at least three ways:
- Reinforcing Strict Plain-Error Constraints. Defendants who keep silent at revocation hearings will face steep hurdles on appeal—especially when another uncontested violation fully sustains revocation.
- Clarifying Post-Esteras Sentencing Scrutiny. District courts may mention impermissible § 3553(a) factors in passing without reversal, so long as the record shows those factors did not drive the ultimate sentence.
- Encouraging Early Objections. By highlighting waiver (conditions) and forfeiture (evidence, sentencing factors), the opinion underscores the tactical importance of contemporaneous objections at the district-court level.
4. Complex Concepts Simplified
- Anders Brief: A document filed by defense counsel stating that, after a thorough review, no non-frivolous appeal issues exist. Counsel simultaneously seeks permission to withdraw, and the appellate court independently confirms the assessment.
- Preponderance of the Evidence: Proof that something is more likely than not; a far lower bar than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
- Grade A/B/C Violation: The Sentencing Guidelines classify supervised-release violations by severity. Grade B is more serious than Grade C and yields a higher recommended prison range.
- Forfeiture vs. Waiver: Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right (cannot be revived on appeal); forfeiture is the unintentional failure to assert a right (reviewable only for “plain error”).
- Plain Error: An obvious mistake that affects substantial rights and seriously undermines the fairness or integrity of judicial proceedings.
5. Conclusion
United States v. Haddad serves as a compact primer on supervised-release law, Anders practice, and plain-error review. Its central lessons are:
- One firmly-proven violation is enough to sustain revocation; piling on additional, possibly contested, violations rarely changes the appellate outcome.
- Silence equals forfeiture. Without timely objections, appellate courts will apply the stringent plain-error test, rarely granting relief.
- Even after the Supreme Court’s tightening of permissible revocation factors in Esteras, harmless references to barred considerations do not automatically invalidate a sentence.
By methodically applying these principles, the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its commitment to both procedural rigor and practical finality in revocation cases. Defense counsel, prosecutors, and district judges alike would do well to study Haddad’s roadmap for handling evidentiary proof, objections, and sentencing explanations in the supervised-release arena.
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