United States v. Glenn: The Sixth Circuit Narrows the Admissibility of Law-Enforcement “Expert” Translation of Ordinary Text Messages

Introduction

United States v. Devante Glenn, No. 23-3926 (6th Cir. July 28 2025) addresses a recurring evidentiary question in federal drug prosecutions: when may a police officer testify as an “expert” to interpret seemingly innocuous words in text messages? Devante Glenn’s 2017 carfentanil distribution case turned almost entirely on cell-phone messages exchanged with overdose victim Renee Ducatman. At trial, the government relied heavily on Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigations Agent Orlando Almonte, who told the jury—under the mantle of Rule 702 expertise—that everyday phrases such as “I’m excited,” “I got you,” and photographs of an iPad and Hermès box in fact referred to the sale of lethal fentanyl analogues. The jury convicted; the district court sentenced Glenn to 240 months.

On appeal, the Sixth Circuit—Judge Gilman writing for the majority, Judge Stranch concurring, and Judge Larsen dissenting—vacated the conviction and remanded for a new trial. The panel held that most of Agent Almonte’s testimony was inadmissible because it translated ordinary English rather than drug jargon, violated Rule 702’s reliability/helpfulness requirements, and was not harmless. The court also found the government’s evidence, including the improper testimony, legally sufficient so retrial is not barred by double jeopardy.

Summary of the Judgment

Issue 1 – Expert Testimony: Whether a law-enforcement officer may testify as an expert interpreting common words in text messages when almost no coded drug terminology is present. The Sixth Circuit said no.
Issue 2 – Harmless Error: Whether admitting the testimony was harmless. The court said no; the case hinged on the messages.
Issue 3 – Sufficiency / Double Jeopardy: Whether evidence (including the erroneously admitted testimony) was sufficient so the government may retry Glenn. The court said yes.
Disposition: Conviction VACATED; case REMANDED for new trial.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

United States v. Freeman, 730 F.3d 590 (6th Cir. 2013)
Key authority for rejecting testimony that “spoon-feeds” the jury. Glenn relies heavily on Freeman’s admonition that jurors can interpret ordinary language unaided.
United States v. Young, 847 F.3d 328 (6th Cir. 2017) & United States v. Kilpatrick, 798 F.3d 365 (6th Cir. 2015)
Both approve expert interpretation of coded drug jargon. The Glenn court distinguished them because the messages here lacked such jargon.
United States v. Maya, 966 F.3d 493 (6th Cir. 2020)
Reaffirms that law-enforcement expertise is admissible when it helps the jury with specialized terms or practices. Glenn clarifies that help is absent when language is plain.
United States v. Haywood, 280 F.3d 715 (6th Cir. 2002)
Sets harmless-error standard: whether verdict was “substantially swayed.” Adopted verbatim by Glenn majority.
Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33 (1988) & Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)
Provide framework for sufficiency review when evidence is later deemed inadmissible.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Rule 702 Gatekeeping.
• An expert must supply “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge” helpful to the jury.
• Agent Almonte’s training permitted him to decipher drug slang, but the texts contained little to none. Words like “excited,” “waiting,” or “on my way” mean to lay jurors exactly what they mean to cops.
• Because no methodology was articulated beyond Almonte’s “experience,” the reliability prong also failed.
Overlap of Lay and Expert Testimony.
When an officer in effect summarizes the prosecution theory, the danger is that jurors perceive investigative knowledge they do not possess. Glenn reiterates Freeman’s warning but goes further: expert gloss on ordinary language is generally impermissible.
Harmless-Error Analysis.
• The majority treated the case as close: the jury deliberated a day and reported deadlock.
• Physical evidence was slim; the only tie between Glenn and the fatal dose was the ambiguous phone record.
• Almonte’s authoritative narrative could easily have tipped the balance.
Sufficiency and Double Jeopardy.
Even counting the improper evidence, a rational juror could convict, so retrial is permissible. The panel articulated the “including the tainted evidence” rule from Lockhart.

3. Likely Impact of the Decision

Glenn tightens the Sixth Circuit’s evidentiary reins in three practical ways:

Narrow Scope for “Drug Jargon” Experts. Prosecutors must now show that the challenged messages truly contain specialized vocabulary or coded references. Routine words will no longer suffice.
Heightened Relevance Inquiry. District courts within the circuit must conduct more granular Daubert-style gatekeeping when officers try to translate text-speak.
Template for Defense Objections. The defense bar gains a roadmap for challenging officer experts: object that (1) the testimony translates ordinary language, (2) no methodology is described, and (3) the jury is competent to interpret on its own.

Beyond drug cases, Glenn may affect prosecutions involving social-media messages, encrypted chats, and any context where an officer seeks to act as a linguistic intermediary.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 702, Federal Rules of Evidence: Establishes criteria for expert testimony—helpfulness, adequate data, reliable methodology, and reliable application.
“Harmless Error” vs. “Reversible Error”: Even if a trial court errs, an appellate court will not reverse if confident the verdict was not substantially affected. Glenn holds the error was consequential.
“Dope Sick”: Street phrase meaning drug-withdrawal symptoms—nausea, anxiety, physical pain—occurring hours after last opioid use.
Daubert Gatekeeping: The trial judge acts as a filter to admit only reliable, helpful expert evidence. Glenn stresses that this duty applies with equal force to police “experts.”
Double Jeopardy & Sufficiency Review: The Constitution bars retrial after acquittal or when evidence at the first trial was insufficient. If evidence was sufficient (even if some later excluded), retrial is allowed. Glenn applies this principle.

Conclusion

United States v. Glenn is the Sixth Circuit’s most emphatic statement to date that law-enforcement expertise has limits. When a jury can read words for itself, an officer may not usurp the interpretive role merely by invoking experience. The ruling safeguards the jury’s province, sharpens Rule 702’s edge, and signals to trial courts that expert testimony must add bona fide specialized insight—not advocacy dressed in uniform. Going forward, federal prosecutors in Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee will need to vet their case agents’ proposed testimony with greater care, and defense counsel will cite Glenn whenever the government tries to convert ordinary speech into coded incrimination through an “expert” witness.