United States v. Garcia-Oquendo: The First Circuit Extends Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C)’s Limited Confrontation Right to the Sentencing Stage of Supervised-Release Revocations

Introduction

In United States v. Garcia-Oquendo, Nos. 24-1665 & 24-1666 (1st Cir. 2025), the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit wrestled with the admissibility of hearsay evidence during proceedings to revoke a defendant’s supervised release. Kelvin Garcia-Oquendo, already serving concurrent supervised-release terms stemming from bank-fraud–related convictions, was alleged to have committed fresh identity-theft and fraud offenses. The district court admitted out-of-court statements from two purported victims (Castro and Ortega) through three government witnesses, revoked supervised release, and imposed concurrent prison terms of 21 and 18 months.

On appeal, Garcia argued that allowing those hearsay statements—without live testimony—violated both Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(b) and the Due Process Clause. The First Circuit agreed that Rule 32.1’s procedures were violated but deemed the error harmless because substantial non-hearsay evidence independently supported revocation. Crucially, however, the court confronted a question it had previously left open: does Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C)’s limited right to “question any adverse witness” apply only to the violation (guilt) determination, or also to the subsequent sentencing decision within the same revocation proceeding? Answering in the affirmative, the panel created new circuit precedent: Rule 32.1’s confrontation protection attaches throughout the revocation hearing, encompassing both the finding of violation and the imposition of post-revocation sanctions.

Summary of the Judgment

Violation Phase: The court acknowledged that the district court erred by failing to balance Garcia’s confrontation interests against the government’s reasons for not producing the declarants. Nevertheless, abundant circumstantial evidence (matching addresses, surveillance footage, reversed payments, the defendant’s own admissions) rendered the error harmless.
Sentencing Phase: The First Circuit expressly held—for the first time—that Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C)’s confrontation right applies during sentencing in revocation hearings. Still, any Rule 32.1 error at that stage was harmless for the same reasons.
Outcome: Revocation and concurrent sentences of 21 and 18 months affirmed.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) – Established that parolees facing revocation have a due-process right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses unless good cause exists to deny confrontation.
Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694 (2000) – Clarified that post-revocation sanctions are part of the initial sentence, not a new sentence.
United States v. Ruby, 706 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2013) – Held that Rule 32.1’s confrontation right does not extend to sentencing. The First Circuit explicitly rejects Ruby’s reasoning.
United States v. Combs, 36 F.4th 502 (4th Cir. 2022) – Held that Rule 32.1’s confrontation right does extend to sentencing; adopted by the First Circuit.
First Circuit prior cases – Navarro-Santisteban, Cintrón-Ortiz, Teixeira, etc., provided harmless-error frameworks and underscored the balancing test required under Rule 32.1.

B. Legal Reasoning

Rule-Text and Structure – Rule 32.1(b)(2) enumerates rights for the “revocation hearing” as a unitary proceeding; it does not differentiate between violation and sentencing phases. The inclusion of allocution (Rule 32.1(b)(2)(E))—a quintessential sentencing right—alongside confrontation indicates the protections apply throughout.
Constitutional Background – Although the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause does not apply to revocation proceedings, the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause supplies limited confrontation rights (per Morrissey). Rule 32.1 codifies those rights.
Rejection of Phase-Based Distinction – Citing Johnson, the Court reasoned that post-revocation imprisonment is part of the original sentence; thus, there is no meaningful “new sentencing” stage warranting lesser procedural safeguards.
Balancing Requirement – Even when Rule 32.1 applies, courts may admit hearsay if the “interest of justice” so requires. The district court failed to perform that balancing, necessitating appellate review for harmlessness.
Harmless-Error Analysis – Aligning with Cintrón-Ortiz and Teixeira, the panel required a “high degree of confidence” that the outcome would be unchanged absent the hearsay. Surveillance photos, financial records, and the defendant’s own statements easily cleared that bar.

C. Impact

Binding Precedent in the First Circuit – District judges in Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Puerto Rico, and Rhode Island must now apply Rule 32.1’s balancing test both when deciding whether a violation occurred and when deciding what sanctions to impose.
Inter-Circuit Dynamics – The decision aligns the First Circuit with the Fourth Circuit and creates a deeper split with the Tenth (and arguably the Fifth and Eighth) Circuits, increasing the likelihood of Supreme Court review.
Practical Litigation Effects – Probation officers and AUSAs must be prepared to produce adverse witnesses or articulate “good cause” for non-appearance—even where the violation finding is uncontested—because confrontation objections can now affect sentencing.
Harmless-Error Emphasis – Although the right is expanded, the First Circuit’s rigorous harmless-error standard shows that appellate relief will be rare absent a showing that the hearsay was outcome-determinative.
Guidance on Supervised-Release Policy – The opinion reinforces the notion that revocation proceedings are integral to the original sentence, underscoring Congress’s intent that supervised release be a rehabilitative—not merely punitive—tool whose revocation must be carefully justified.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Supervised Release: A period of community supervision following imprisonment, akin to probation, where the defendant must comply with court-imposed conditions.
Revocation: If conditions are violated, the court may “revoke” supervised release and order the defendant back to prison for up to the statutory caps in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).
Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) Confrontation Right: Gives a releasee a qualified right to question (cross-examine) adverse witnesses at a revocation hearing unless the court finds “the interest of justice” excuses the witness’s absence.
Hearsay: Out-of-court statements offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Normally restricted by the Federal Rules of Evidence, but revocation hearings are more flexible.
Harmless Error: A legal error that does not affect the outcome. An appellate court will not reverse if it is highly confident the result would be the same absent the error.

Conclusion

United States v. Garcia-Oquendo is a watershed case for supervised-release jurisprudence in the First Circuit. While the immediate outcome—affirmance—turns on a straightforward harmless-error assessment, the broader holding reshapes procedural expectations: Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C)’s limited confrontation right now governs all stages of a revocation hearing. This expansion harmonizes revocation procedure with due-process principles, ensures more robust fact-finding before additional incarceration is imposed, and deepens a pre-existing circuit split, signaling possible Supreme Court involvement. Practitioners must, therefore, anticipate confrontation challenges whenever hearsay is pivotal, and district courts must articulate balancing findings on the record to withstand appellate scrutiny.