United States v. Coleman: Anders Dismissal of Challenges to ACCA Enhancement and Consecutive Revocation Sentences in the Tenth Circuit

I. Introduction

The Tenth Circuit’s order and judgment in United States v. Coleman (Dec. 4, 2025) is formally nonprecedential, but it offers a clear, tightly applied example of several important doctrines:

The operation of Anders v. California when appellate counsel finds no nonfrivolous grounds for appeal.
The application of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), to federal drug convictions under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a).
The standards for reviewing within-Guidelines sentences (including statutory minimum sentences) and decisions to impose consecutive revocation sentences.
The limits imposed by Tapia v. United States on using rehabilitation as a reason to extend imprisonment.

The case arises from a consolidated appeal: (1) a new federal conviction for being a felon in possession of ammunition, enhanced under ACCA, and (2) a revocation of supervised release based on that new offense. Defense counsel filed an Anders brief asserting that the appeal was wholly frivolous; the Tenth Circuit agreed, granted counsel’s motion to withdraw, and dismissed the appeals.

Although the decision does not announce new doctrine, it crystallizes how settled rules work together in a common but high-stakes scenario: a defendant with multiple federal drug-distribution convictions receiving an ACCA-enhanced 15-year sentence and a consecutive revocation term, and then seeking review via an Anders appeal.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The panel (Judges Hartz, Eid, and Carson) dismissed Jacoby Coleman’s appeals as wholly frivolous after conducting the independent review required by Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Calderon, 428 F.3d 928 (10th Cir. 2005).

The key holdings and determinations are:

Plea validity: The district court fully complied with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b). There were no errors in advising Coleman of his rights, ensuring voluntariness, or establishing a factual basis for the guilty plea to the felon-in-possession-of-ammunition charge under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
ACCA enhancement: Coleman’s six prior federal convictions under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) for possession with intent to distribute cocaine base are “serious drug offenses” under ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(i). Because he admitted that these offenses occurred on separate occasions, he met ACCA’s requirement of at least three qualifying convictions “committed on occasions different from one another.” The district court therefore correctly applied the ACCA enhancement and the resulting 15-year statutory minimum.
Guideline calculations: Once ACCA’s 15-year minimum applied, U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b) made that minimum the Guideline sentence for the ammunition conviction. The Guidelines calculations for supervised release and the supervised-release revocation were also correct.
Consecutive revocation sentence: The district court acted within its discretion, and consistently with U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f), in imposing an 18-month revocation sentence to run consecutively to the 15-year ACCA sentence.
Substantive reasonableness: All prison terms and supervised-release terms were within the applicable Guideline ranges. Applying the presumption of reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentences, the panel found no basis to conclude that the 180-month ACCA sentence, the five-year term of supervised release, or the consecutive 18-month revocation term was substantively unreasonable.
Tapia concern: Although the district court discussed rehabilitative programming, it did so only as a “potential mitigating circumstance” and as an acknowledgment that programming could reduce Coleman’s ultimate time in custody. It did not lengthen the sentence for the purpose of rehabilitation, so there was no violation of Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319 (2011).

Finding no nonfrivolous appellate issues, the Tenth Circuit granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismissed both appeals.

III. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Underlying Conduct and Charges

Coleman pleaded guilty in January 2024 to a superseding indictment charging him under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) with one count of being a felon in possession of ammunition. The indictment specified that he had seven prior felony convictions, including six for possession with intent to distribute cocaine under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a).

At the time of the ammunition offense, Coleman was on federal supervised release from a prior conviction. Commission of the new felony thus triggered revocation proceedings in the earlier case. The appeals therefore involved:

The new § 922(g) ammunition conviction (Appeal No. 24-6258), and
The revocation of supervised release in the earlier case (Appeal No. 24-6253).

B. Sentencing in the District Court

At sentencing:

The government sought an enhanced penalty under ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), on the § 922(g) ammunition conviction. ACCA imposes a 15-year minimum sentence for certain recidivist offenders who violate § 922(g).
The probation office concluded that Coleman qualified for ACCA because of his prior § 841(a) convictions and calculated:
- For the ammunition offense: an advisory Guideline sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment (the ACCA statutory minimum) and 2 to 5 years of supervised release.
- For the supervised-release revocation: a Guideline range of 18 to 24 months’ imprisonment and up to life on supervised release.
Coleman asked that the revocation sentence run concurrently with the ACCA sentence. The district court declined and imposed:
- 180 months’ imprisonment and 5 years of supervised release on the § 922(g) conviction, and
- 18 months’ imprisonment on the revocation, to run consecutively.

C. The Anders Brief and Appeals

On appeal, Coleman’s appointed counsel concluded, after “conscientious examination” of the record, that there were no nonfrivolous issues to pursue. Following Anders v. California, counsel:

Moved to withdraw; and
Filed an Anders brief identifying any potential arguments that might arguably support the appeal:
- a challenge to the ACCA enhancement, and
- a challenge to the substantive reasonableness of the sentences, including the decision to run the revocation sentence consecutively.

Coleman did not respond to the Anders brief despite being notified of his right to do so. The government chose not to file a brief. Under Calderon, the Tenth Circuit was nonetheless obligated to perform an independent review of the entire record to determine whether the appeals were “wholly frivolous.”

IV. Precedents and Authorities Applied

A. Anders v. California and United States v. Calderon

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), established the procedures that govern when appointed counsel believes an appeal is frivolous. Counsel may not simply withdraw and abandon the client. Instead, counsel must:

Conduct a “conscientious examination” of the case;
Determine that the appeal is “wholly frivolous”; and
File a brief “referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal,” while moving to withdraw.

The court then independently reviews the entire record to determine whether any nonfrivolous issues exist. If none do, the court may permit withdrawal and dismiss the appeal.

In United States v. Calderon, 428 F.3d 928 (10th Cir. 2005), the Tenth Circuit applied Anders in the federal context and clarified that the appellate court’s duty is to “conduct a full examination of the record.” In Coleman, the panel expressly cites Calderon and follows this protocol.

B. Plea Colloquy and Rule 11(b)

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b) requires the court to:

Ensure the defendant understands the nature of the charge, the rights being waived, and the consequences of pleading guilty;
Confirm that the plea is voluntary and not the product of force, threats, or improper promises; and
Establish that there is a factual basis for the plea.

The panel notes that “we see no error in the plea proceeding” and that the required Rule 11(b) steps occurred. Even though the Anders brief focused on sentencing issues, the Tenth Circuit, as part of its independent review, also checked the validity of the plea. This is typical in guilty-plea Anders cases; a defective Rule 11 colloquy could be a nonfrivolous ground for appeal even if sentencing issues are weak.

C. ACCA and “Serious Drug Offenses”

The Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), provides:

In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) of this title and has three previous convictions ... for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one another, such person shall be ... imprisoned not less than fifteen years.

ACCA defines “serious drug offense,” in relevant part, as:

an offense under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.) for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law.

See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(i).

Coleman’s prior convictions were under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) for possession with intent to distribute cocaine base. Those are federal offenses under the Controlled Substances Act. The panel simply notes that such convictions are “serious drug offenses under the ACCA.” Because:

They are federal CSA offenses, and
The statutory maximum penalties for those drug-distribution offenses exceed ten years,

each conviction plainly fits the definition of “serious drug offense.” This makes any argument to the contrary essentially frivolous in an Anders context.

Additionally, ACCA requires that the prior convictions be “committed on occasions different from one another.” The panel underscores a critical fact: the district court applied ACCA “only after Defendant acknowledged that his six prior drug convictions ... ‘occurred on separate occasions.’” That admission largely forecloses any viable factual dispute over ACCA’s “occasions” requirement.

D. Sentencing Guidelines and Mandatory Minimums

The panel cites U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b), which provides:

Where a statutorily required minimum sentence is greater than the maximum of the applicable guideline range, the statutorily required minimum sentence shall be the guideline sentence.

Because ACCA mandated a 15-year minimum, and that minimum exceeded the otherwise-applicable Guideline range for Coleman’s § 922(g) offense, § 5G1.1(b) made 180 months the effective Guideline sentence. Thus, once ACCA applied, the district court had no discretion to go below 15 years absent a government motion for substantial assistance or some other statutory mechanism not present here.

E. Procedural and Substantive Reasonableness

The panel invokes United States v. Sanchez-Leon, 764 F.3d 1248 (10th Cir. 2014), to frame procedural reasonableness: a sentence is procedurally reasonable if the court properly calculates the Guideline range, considers the statutory factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), bases its findings on reliable facts, and adequately explains the sentence.

For substantive reasonableness, the panel cites United States v. Chavez, 723 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 2013), which holds, among other things:

Substantive reasonableness asks whether the length of the sentence is reasonable in light of all the circumstances and the § 3553(a) factors.
The same basic standard applies when reviewing a decision to impose a consecutive or concurrent sentence.
A sentence within the properly calculated Guideline range is presumptively reasonable.

In Coleman’s case:

The 180-month ACCA sentence was both the statutory minimum and the Guideline sentence under § 5G1.1(b).
The five-year supervised-release term was within the Guideline range (2–5 years).
The 18-month revocation sentence, imposed consecutively, fell within the 18–24 month revocation range and accords with the Guideline policy statement in U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f), which generally recommends consecutive terms.

The panel emphasizes that the district court expressly considered all of the § 3553(a) factors. Given that all components of the sentence were within the applicable Guideline ranges and that ACCA mandated the 15-year minimum, there was no plausible basis to overcome the presumption of reasonableness.

F. Consecutive Revocation Sentences and U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f)

U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f) provides, in essence, that any term of imprisonment imposed upon revocation of supervised release “shall be ordered to be served consecutively to any sentence of imprisonment that the defendant is serving,” whether or not the sentence results from the conduct underlying the revocation.

Although Chapter 7 policy statements are advisory, not mandatory, they strongly influence the reasonableness analysis. The Tenth Circuit notes that Coleman’s revocation sentence, and the decision to make it consecutive, were “within the guidelines,” invoking § 7B1.3(f).

Under Chavez, a district court’s decision to impose a consecutive sentence is reviewed under the same substantive-reasonableness standard. Here, the court followed the Guidelines’ default presumption in favor of consecutivity, making it difficult to argue that the consecutive 18-month term was unreasonable.

G. Tapia v. United States and Rehabilitation

In Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319 (2011), the Supreme Court held that a sentencing court may not “impose or lengthen a prison term in order to promote a criminal defendant’s rehabilitation.” While judges may discuss rehabilitation and recommend programs, they cannot use rehabilitation as a basis to extend the length of imprisonment.

The Anders brief in Coleman flagged a possible concern that the district court’s comments about correctional programming might have run afoul of Tapia. The Tenth Circuit quotes the pertinent language from Tapia and then explains:

The district court did “take into account the possible need to provide correctional treatment,” but only “as a potential mitigating circumstance” or as an acknowledgment that “some programming could reduce Defendant’s overall sentence.”
The court did not make the sentence longer to ensure program availability or completion.

In other words, the district court used rehabilitative considerations as a reason not to increase the sentence (a mitigating factor), which is permissible, rather than as a justification for prolonging imprisonment, which is forbidden by Tapia. The panel therefore rejects any Tapia-based challenge as frivolous.

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning in Depth

A. Structured Application of the Anders Framework

The opinion is structured to mirror the logical steps of an Anders review:

Confirm the plea’s validity: The panel independently confirms that the Rule 11 colloquy was proper and the guilty plea valid.
Evaluate potential procedural sentencing error: The court checks Guideline calculations, ACCA application, consideration of § 3553(a) factors, and adequacy of explanation.
Evaluate potential substantive sentencing error: The court considers the total length of the sentence and the consecutive nature of the revocation term under the § 3553(a) framework and the presumption of reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentences.
Address any flagged specialized issue: The panel directly confronts the Tapia issue raised in the Anders brief.

The court’s conclusion that no nonfrivolous issues exist is not a mere summary assertion; it is the product of this systematic review. This illustrates the high bar a defendant faces in an Anders appeal where the record shows:

a valid plea,
uncomplicated ACCA eligibility, and
sentences that are both within the Guidelines and dictated in part by a statutory minimum.

B. Why the ACCA Challenge Is Wholly Frivolous

The potential ACCA argument was essentially limited to two possible angles:

Whether Coleman’s § 841(a) convictions count as “serious drug offenses.”
Whether those convictions occurred on separate “occasions.”

On the first, the law is straightforward: a federal § 841(a) conviction for a cocaine-distribution offense is a textbook example of a “serious drug offense” under § 924(e)(2)(A)(i). There is no plausible argument that such convictions fall outside the statute. Any attempt to argue otherwise would contradict the plain text of ACCA and well-settled case law, rendering that argument frivolous.

On the second, the factual dispute is foreclosed by Coleman’s own admission at sentencing that his six § 841(a) convictions “occurred on separate occasions.” Even after the Supreme Court’s decision in Wooden v. United States, which clarified the “occasions” analysis, a defendant’s unambiguous concession that the offenses occurred on separate occasions leaves virtually no room for an appellate argument.

Given this record, the panel correctly concludes there is no nonfrivolous basis to challenge ACCA’s application.

C. Why the Sentencing and Consecutivity Challenges Are Frivolous

For substantive reasonableness, the central points are:

The 180-month sentence is both within the Guideline range and the minimum sentence permitted by statute (ACCA). Argue as one might about the fairness of ACCA’s severity, no sentencing court in this case had legal authority to impose less than 15 years absent specific statutory exceptions not present here.
The five-year term of supervised release is within the advisory range and well within the statutory limits.
The 18-month revocation term is within the 18–24 month range and aligns with § 7B1.3(f)’s presumption of consecutivity. Given that the Guidelines recommend consecutive terms for revocations, and that the district court considered § 3553(a), there is no substantive reasonableness argument with traction.

Appellate courts are extremely reluctant to declare a sentence substantively unreasonable when:

It falls within the Guideline range;
It is dictated in part by a statutory minimum; and
The record shows full consideration of § 3553(a).

In that setting, a defendant must usually point to some extraordinary circumstance or a clearly irrational weighing of the factors. No such circumstance appears here, and counsel appropriately characterized any challenge as frivolous.

D. Tapia as a Narrow, Fact-Sensitive Constraint

The panel’s treatment of Tapia highlights a practical distinction:

Impermissible: Extending a sentence to ensure the defendant can complete a rehabilitation or treatment program (e.g., “I am going to add two years so you can finish drug treatment in prison”).
Permissible: Acknowledging the availability or usefulness of programs as part of the overall sentencing explanation, particularly as a reason not to impose a longer sentence than the court otherwise might.

The district court in Coleman did not say it was lengthening the sentence to secure treatment. Instead, it “took into account the possible need to provide correctional treatment” only “as a potential mitigating circumstance” and noted that certain programming could reduce Coleman’s effective time in custody. The Tenth Circuit treats this as well within the limits drawn by Tapia.

Consequently, any argument that the district court violated Tapia by impermissibly basing sentence length on rehabilitation is untenable, and thus frivolous.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. What Is an Anders Appeal?

An Anders appeal occurs when appointed defense counsel believes that no nonfrivolous issues exist to support the defendant’s appeal. Instead of filing a standard merits brief, counsel:

Files a motion to withdraw;
Submits an Anders brief pointing out any possible issues, even if counsel believes they are weak; and
Serves that brief on the defendant, who may file a pro se response.

The appellate court then independently reviews the record. If it finds any arguable (nonfrivolous) issues, it denies the withdrawal motion and orders full briefing. If it finds none, it allows counsel to withdraw and dismisses the appeal. “Frivolous” in this context means not just unlikely to prevail, but lacking any reasonable legal basis.

B. What Is ACCA and a “Serious Drug Offense”?

The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), enhances the sentence of a felon who unlawfully possesses a firearm or ammunition under § 922(g) if he has three prior convictions for certain drug or violent felonies committed on separate occasions. The enhancement is severe: a mandatory minimum of 15 years in prison, with a maximum of life.

A “serious drug offense” includes certain federal drug crimes, such as distribution or possession with intent to distribute controlled substances, that carry a potential maximum penalty of ten years or more. Federal convictions under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) for distributing or possessing with intent to distribute cocaine routinely meet this definition.

C. How Do Mandatory Minimums and the Guidelines Interact?

The Sentencing Guidelines typically produce an advisory range based on offense level and criminal history. However, when a statute imposes a mandatory minimum that is higher than the top of the Guideline range, U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b) makes that minimum the effective Guideline sentence. The judge cannot lawfully go below the mandatory minimum absent a specific statutory mechanism (such as substantial-assistance relief).

In Coleman’s case, ACCA’s 15-year minimum exceeded the otherwise-applicable Guideline range, so 180 months became both the minimum sentence the judge could impose and the Guideline sentence for review purposes.

D. What Is “Substantive Reasonableness”?

After ensuring that the correct procedures and calculations were used (procedural reasonableness), appellate courts examine whether the length of the sentence is reasonable in light of:

The nature and seriousness of the offense;
The defendant’s history and characteristics;
The need to deter, to protect the public, and to provide just punishment; and
Other factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

A sentence within the properly calculated Guideline range is presumed reasonable on appeal. Overcoming that presumption requires showing that the sentence is disproportionately harsh or otherwise out of step with the § 3553(a) factors.

E. What Is Supervised Release and Revocation?

Supervised release is a period of monitoring after a defendant leaves prison, with conditions such as reporting to a probation officer, avoiding new crimes, and sometimes undergoing treatment or testing. If the defendant violates those conditions—especially by committing a new crime—the court may revoke supervised release and impose a new prison term.

Guideline policy statements (Chapter 7) typically recommend that a revocation sentence run consecutively to any sentence imposed for the new crime. The theory is that revocation punishes the breach of trust inherent in violating supervision, which is distinct from the new crime itself.

F. What Did Tapia Prohibit?

Tapia v. United States holds that a judge may not increase or impose a prison sentence for the purpose of promoting a defendant’s rehabilitation (for example, to ensure completion of a prison drug program). Judges can still:

Discuss rehabilitation;
Recommend programs; and
Consider treatment needs in deciding, for example, whether to vary downward.

The key line is that rehabilitation cannot be a reason to make the prison term longer than it otherwise would have been. Coleman confirms that merely considering programming as a potential mitigation or a practical reality does not violate Tapia.

VII. Impact and Broader Significance

A. Limited Formal Precedent, Real Persuasive Value

The opinion explicitly states that it is “not binding precedent,” except under limited doctrines like law of the case. However, it can be cited for its persuasive value. In practice, it signals how the Tenth Circuit is likely to treat similar issues in future:

ACCA and federal drug convictions: Multiple § 841(a) convictions for cocaine distribution or possession with intent remain straightforward ACCA predicates. Attempts to argue otherwise in the absence of some unusual legal wrinkle are likely to be deemed frivolous.
“Separate occasions” admissions: A defendant’s explicit acknowledgment that prior offenses occurred on “separate occasions” effectively eliminates a fertile line of ACCA defense. Defense counsel should be cautious about such stipulations if there is any good-faith argument that the offenses are part of a single occasion under current law.
Consecutive revocation sentences: When a revocation term is within the Guideline range and imposed consecutively, consistent with § 7B1.3(f), it will be very difficult to mount a successful substantive reasonableness challenge in the Tenth Circuit.
Tapia compliance: Sentencing judges in the Tenth Circuit can discuss rehabilitation and BOP programming as mitigating factors or neutral observations without violating Tapia, so long as they do not use rehabilitation to justify lengthening the term of imprisonment.
Scope of Anders review: The panel’s structured analysis shows that Rule 11 compliance, Guideline calculations, ACCA eligibility, § 3553(a) reasoning, and Tapia concerns all fall within the court’s independent review in an Anders case.

B. Practical Guidance for Practitioners

For defense counsel:

When ACCA eligibility is as clear as it is here—federal CSA convictions, admitted separate occasions—counsel correctly perceives that any contrary argument would be frivolous.
Before entering stipulations about “separate occasions,” counsel should consider the long-term impact, particularly in light of evolving case law on that phrase.
In revocation cases, requests for concurrent sentences will often be uphill when the Guidelines strongly favor consecutivity absent unusual mitigating facts.
In close Tapia cases, counsel should scrutinize the sentencing transcript for whether the court is actually extending imprisonment for rehabilitation, as opposed to merely discussing it.

For district judges:

The opinion implicitly approves a sentencing explanation that:
- Recognizes statutory constraints (like ACCA minimums),
- Ties the sentence to the § 3553(a) factors, and
- Distances itself from any implication that rehabilitation is lengthening imprisonment.
Carefully framing references to programming as mitigation or neutral background, not as justification for a longer sentence, is both safe and consistent with Tapia.

C. Systemic Observations

Coleman illustrates how powerful ACCA remains as a sentencing tool: once triggered, it largely forecloses meaningful appellate arguments about the length of imprisonment, at least where the district court imposes the statutory minimum and follows the Guidelines on related issues like supervised release and revocation.

At the same time, the case underscores the role of the Guidelines as a stabilizing reference point: a within-Guidelines sentence, particularly one anchored by a statutory mandatory minimum, is strongly protected from appellate revision, and, in the Anders framework, is likely to be deemed immune from nonfrivolous attack.

VIII. Conclusion

United States v. Coleman does not announce new doctrine, but it offers a clear, integrated application of several important sentencing and appellate principles:

ACCA’s enhancement applies straightforwardly to multiple federal § 841(a) convictions for cocaine distribution, especially where the defendant admits they occurred on different occasions.
Once ACCA’s 15-year minimum applies, U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b) makes that minimum the Guideline sentence, severely narrowing any room for sentencing leniency and appellate challenge.
Within-Guidelines sentences—particularly those rooted in a statutory minimum—and consecutive revocation terms aligned with § 7B1.3(f) are presumptively reasonable and extremely difficult to overturn.
Tapia prohibits lengthening prison to promote rehabilitation, but does not bar sentencing courts from considering treatment needs as mitigation or discussing available programs.
Under the Anders framework, where the record shows a proper plea, correct Guideline calculations, a valid ACCA enhancement, and careful § 3553(a) analysis, an appeal may properly be declared wholly frivolous and dismissed.

In the broader legal landscape, Coleman serves as a practical roadmap of how the Tenth Circuit evaluates ACCA-enhanced sentences and revocation decisions in the Anders context, and it provides nuanced guidance on how sentencing judges may safely discuss rehabilitative programming without transgressing the boundaries set by Tapia.