Third-Circuit Clarifies that Significant Prison Disciplinary History Can Justify an Upward Variance at Post-Taylor Resentencing Despite a Lower Amended Guideline Range

Introduction

United States v. Lukner Rene, No. 24-1528 (3d Cir. Aug. 4, 2025), is a non-precedential opinion that nonetheless supplies valuable guidance on how district courts may balance (i) a substantially reduced advisory Sentencing Guideline range following United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022), and (ii) a defendant’s post-conviction conduct—particularly extensive prison disciplinary infractions—when crafting a new sentence.

The decision re-affirms the deferential, abuse-of-discretion framework for substantive reasonableness set forth in Gall and Tomko, and signals that, on appellate review, a robust record of misconduct while incarcerated may outweigh both the lower amended guideline range and the defendant’s rehabilitative achievements.

Background

Offenses (2009-2010): At age 18, Lukner Rene and co-defendants carried out a series of armed fast-food robberies in the Philadelphia area. He pleaded guilty to conspiracy, six counts of Hobbs Act robbery or attempted robbery, and two § 924(c) firearm counts.
Original Sentencing (2010): A presentence report (PSR) mistakenly treated Rene as a criminal-history category VI offender. The court imposed 240 months, a 53 % downward variance from the erroneous 514-to-546-month range.
Intervening Law – Taylor (2022): The Supreme Court held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not categorically a “crime of violence” under § 924(c). One of Rene’s two § 924(c) counts, premised on an attempt, became invalid.
Joint Motion & Vacatur: The parties agreed to vacate that count and seek a full resentencing.
Amended Guidelines: With the § 924(c) count removed and the criminal-history error corrected (Category I, Offense Level 27), the new advisory range fell to 162–181 months.
Government’s Position: Reinstate the 240-month term because: (a) Rene’s attempt was actually violent; (b) four additional § 924(c) charges were dropped via plea; and (c) Rene amassed 75 disciplinary infractions in prison.
Defense Position: Start with the same 53 % variance applied originally, but to the correct pre-Taylor range (454–471 months), yielding 212 months, then vary downward further in light of rehabilitation and youth at the time of the offense.
Resentencing (Mar. 2024): The district court adopted the defense’s 212-month figure but refused any greater reduction, stressing the “long trail of infractions.”

Summary of the Judgment

On appeal, Rene claimed the new 212-month sentence was substantively unreasonable because the district court (1) undervalued his rehabilitation, youth, and the decreased guideline range, (2) failed to explain why those considerations did not warrant a downward variance, and (3) created unwarranted disparity with co-defendants who received lower terms post-Taylor.

The Third Circuit disagreed and affirmed. Applying the abuse-of-discretion standard, the panel held:

The district court procedurally complied with § 3553(a) (no calculation error, parties heard, reasons articulated).
The court substantively weighed all relevant factors, including the defendant’s age, accomplishments, infractions, co-defendant sentences, need to avoid disparity, and the advisory range—settling on an “appropriate middle ground.”
No precedent requires a district judge to give mitigating factors the weight a defendant desires (Bungar), nor is a within-guideline sentence presumptively reasonable (Gall). Therefore, no reasonable court “would have to” reach a different outcome.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022) — Serves as the catalyst for resentencing. By holding attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence under the categorical approach, Taylor removed one § 924(c) conviction from Rene’s record, drastically reducing his guideline range.
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) — Supplies the two-step analysis (procedural then substantive reasonableness) and the principle that Guidelines are advisory. The Third Circuit relied on the “deferential abuse-of-discretion standard” demanded by Gall.
United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) — Sets the presumption of reasonableness and the “no reasonable sentencing court” test for substantive review. The panel quotes Tomko repeatedly.
United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc) — Provides language on the need for a “reasoned and rational justification.” Used to validate the district court’s § 3553(a) discussion.
United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc) — Clarifies issue preservation for substantive challenges; cited to show Rene preserved his claim.
United States v. Parker, 462 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2006) & United States v. Cifuentes, 863 F.2d 1149 (3d Cir. 1988) — Address sentencing disparities among co-defendants, stating such disparities alone do not prove unreasonableness. The panel used these to reject Rene’s disparity argument.
United States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540 (3d Cir. 2007) — Reiterates that an appellate court does not re-weigh mitigating factors. Invoked to counter Rene’s claim the court undervalued rehabilitation.

Legal Reasoning of the Court

The appellate panel followed the familiar Gall–Tomko framework:

Procedural Soundness. Because the parties agreed the guideline calculation was correct (162–181 months) and the district court provided a thorough record, the panel moved directly to substantive review.
Substantive Reasonableness. The panel asked whether “no reasonable sentencing court” would impose 212 months given the court’s stated reasons. The answer was no.
- The district judge expressly referenced § 3553(a) factors: seriousness of the offenses, need to protect the public, deterrence, and avoidance of disparity.
- The court balanced mitigating factors (youth, family support, educational programs) with aggravating factors (75 infractions, some recent and serious).
- The court offered a logical justification for choosing 212 months: it mirrored the percentage variance originally granted, avoided immediate release (183 months served), and remained below the 240-month term the Government wanted.

Impact of the Judgment

Although labeled “Not Precedential,” the opinion carries several practical implications for federal practitioners:

Post-Taylor Landscape. Defendants securing vacatur of § 924(c) counts will not automatically receive a proportional sentence reduction if serious misbehavior while incarcerated undermines rehabilitation claims.
Weight of Prison Discipline. The Third Circuit signals that a lengthy infraction record—here, 75 incidents—may persuasively justify an upward variance from a lowered advisory range.
Percentage-Based Variance Logic. Defense counsel’s attempt to anchor leniency to the percentage of the original variance (53 %) was turned against the defendant. Counsel should consider that courts may adopt such numbers without granting an additional discount.
Sentencing Disparity Arguments. The case reiterates that intra-case disparity (among co-defendants) is less weighty than national inter-district disparity, especially where conduct and post-sentencing behavior diverge.
Appellate Strategy. On substantive-reasonableness appeals, defendants face an extremely high bar. Unless the district judge clearly ignored key evidence or factors, the Third Circuit is unlikely to upset the sentence.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Hobbs Act Robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951). A federal crime punishing actual or attempted robbery that affects interstate commerce. It frequently serves as the “crime of violence” predicate for firearm enhancements.
18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Adds mandatory consecutive prison terms when a firearm is used “during and in relation to” a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime. Whether an offense qualifies as a “crime of violence” is assessed under the “categorical approach,” focusing on legal elements rather than case-specific facts.
Categorical Approach. A method courts use to decide if the statutory elements of an offense necessarily involve violence. If not, the offense cannot serve as a § 924(c) predicate—even if the actual conduct was violent.
Sentencing Guidelines & Variances. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines provide an advisory range for a given offense level and criminal-history category. A “variance” is when a court departs upward or downward from that range based on the statutory factors in § 3553(a).
Substantive vs. Procedural Reasonableness. Procedural reasonableness asks: Did the court follow the correct steps (calculate the range, consider arguments, explain itself)? Substantive reasonableness asks: Is the length of the sentence defensible given the reasons?

Conclusion

United States v. Rene confirms the broad discretion district courts retain at resentencing, even after pivotal Supreme Court decisions like Taylor sharply lower a defendant’s advisory range. The Third Circuit’s decision underscores three core points:

Appellate courts will rarely disturb a sentence where the district judge methodically engages with § 3553(a), articulates reasons, and grounds an upward variance in concrete, aggravating facts—here, a sizeable record of disciplinary misconduct.
A defendant’s own resentencing arguments can shape the outcome; proposing an “anchor” figure (212 months) gave the court a principled midpoint.
Post-conviction conduct cuts both ways. Educational achievements may help, but persistent infractions can decisively tilt the balance against further leniency.

While not binding precedent, Rene is an instructive roadmap for how the Third Circuit will assess substantive-reasonableness challenges in the wake of guideline-reducing retroactivity and evolving crime-of-violence jurisprudence.