Snitch-Shaming on Social Media as Obstruction of Justice:
United States v. Heard and the Reach of U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1

I. Introduction

In United States v. Bradley Scott Heard, No. 24‑1778 (6th Cir. Nov. 20, 2025) (not recommended for publication), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed a 180‑month federal sentence for methamphetamine trafficking, rejecting a procedural unreasonableness challenge grounded in alleged guideline errors.

The case is significant primarily for its treatment of two interrelated issues:

• The scope of the obstruction-of-justice enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 when a defendant uses social media to identify a cooperating co-defendant as a “rat.”
• The application of harmless-error review in guideline calculations where the statutory maximum sentence caps the guideline range.

Although the opinion is unpublished and thus not binding precedent in the Sixth Circuit, it meaningfully consolidates and extends prior circuit authority (especially United States v. Kamper and United States v. French) on what constitutes “threatening or intimidating” conduct toward witnesses under § 3C1.1, and clarifies how sentencing errors become harmless when the statutory maximum fixes the effective guideline sentence.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Drug Trafficking Scheme and the Michigan Stop

Bradley Scott Heard operated what the panel described as an “extensive history of drug trafficking across several states,” including Montana, Illinois, California, Wisconsin, and Michigan. His federal conviction stems from methamphetamine possession in Michigan.

In June 2023, Michigan state troopers stopped a vehicle in the Upper Peninsula because the vehicle’s license plate was suspended. The car was registered to passenger Davelle (sometimes spelled Davell) Blackman, seated in the back. After waiving his Miranda rights, Blackman:

• Told officers that the drugs in the car belonged to Heard.
• Explained Heard paid him to help transport methamphetamine.
• Stated Heard intended to sell the methamphetamine.

A canine unit alerted to narcotics odors, and officers discovered over one pound of methamphetamine hidden beneath the center console.

B. From State Custody to Federal Indictment

Heard was arrested on state charges of methamphetamine possession (later dismissed). Police obtained a search warrant for the cell phones of both Heard and Blackman. Heard’s phone connected him to “hundreds” of known methamphetamine dealers and buyers.

While Heard remained in state custody, a federal grand jury returned an indictment charging both Heard and Blackman with:

• Possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, and
• Aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine.

Heard was transferred to federal custody on August 30, 2023, after appearing before a magistrate judge.

C. Blackman’s Cooperation and Heard’s Social Media Retaliation

Blackman initially cooperated with law enforcement by providing incriminating information about Heard’s trafficking activity. That cooperation triggered an aggressive response from Heard.

On October 2, 2023, Heard placed a recorded phone call from custody to his associate, Devine Wilson. He instructed Wilson to post on social media:

• A photograph of Blackman.
• Blackman’s identifying information.
• A message branding Blackman as a “rat.”

Heard explicitly told Wilson he wanted the post on “all social media,” so that “mother f*ckers” on the street would “see the face of dude.” He emphasized the need for pictures so that people would know “who you’re talking about,” because Blackman had changed his name.

The record shows Heard then called his daughter three times the same day to make sure the post went up as directed. The post read, in relevant part:

“Davell Blackman [rat emoji] [thumbs-down emoji] SHARE !!!!”

Attached were:

• Three photographs of Blackman; and
• A police report summarizing Blackman’s statements to law enforcement.

A comment on the post further included Blackman’s booking photo, physical description, and pending charges. Investigators later found the post; it was eventually removed.

D. Blackman’s Proffers and Subsequent Assaults

Blackman continued to cooperate despite this online exposure:

• October 19, 2023: In a proffer interview, Blackman described knowing Heard for 30 years and said Heard had sold drugs since 2006 and methamphetamine since 2021.
• He recounted accompanying Heard on trafficking trips to Los Angeles, Chicago, Montana, and northern Michigan.
• He explained Heard typically bought meth “by the pound” and either shipped via USPS or delivered directly.

On January 18, 2024, Blackman gave another proffer to federal investigators detailing the specific trip that led to the June 2023 traffic stop and seizure.

Heard pleaded guilty on January 25, 2024. Two months later, while in state prison, Blackman was assaulted twice. He reported that:

• The attackers were friends of Heard.
• They called him a “rat” who had “told” on Heard.

The same assailant appeared on video in both attacks. Following the second, Blackman suffered serious injuries:

• Dislocated back.
• Two fractured ribs.
• Blunt trauma to the head.

The opinion does not expressly hold Heard responsible for the attacks themselves, but they serve as a contextual backdrop for the obstruction-of-justice enhancement and illustrate the real-world consequences of “outing” cooperating witnesses in criminal circles.

E. Presentence Investigation and Guideline Calculations

The initial Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) recommended three guideline enhancements:

1. A two-level enhancement for possession of a firearm.
2. A two-level enhancement for maintaining a drug premises (based on his operations in Montana).
3. A two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice (based on his treatment of Blackman, primarily the social media campaign).

Heard objected to:

• The use of his Montana conduct as “relevant conduct,” and
• The firearm-possession and drug-premises enhancements.

The final PSR:

• Reduced the drug quantity calculation somewhat, but
• Retained all three enhancements (firearm, premises, obstruction).

Heard then added an objection to the obstruction-of-justice enhancement.

F. Sentencing in the District Court

At sentencing, the district court:

• Granted a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility over the government’s objection.
• Found the Montana trafficking was “relevant conduct” supporting the firearm and drug-premises enhancements.
• Applied:
  • +2 for firearm possession;
  • +2 for maintaining a drug premises; and
  • +2 for obstruction of justice.

The court calculated the converted methamphetamine weight attributable to Heard as 35,000 kilograms. It derived that figure from:

1. 8,062 kg – the drugs seized in the June 2023 traffic stop; and
2. 9,072 kg – based on testimony from a known buyer, M.N.; and
3. 18,144 kg – based on Blackman’s testimony regarding one trafficking trip.

Importantly, the district court described those latter two numbers as conservative:

• M.N. actually testified to somewhat larger repeat purchases, but the court credited only approximately one pound in total.
• Blackman discussed multiple trafficking trips, but the court only counted the quantity from a single trip—the one on which Blackman personally accompanied Heard, thereby incriminating himself.

From a guideline perspective:

• The drug quantity alone yielded a base offense level of 36.
• Adding the three two-level enhancements (firearm, premises, obstruction) raised the offense level to 42.
• Subtracting three levels for acceptance of responsibility resulted in a final offense level of 39.
• With a criminal history category of V, the advisory range was 360 months to life, but
• The statutory maximum for the offense was 240 months (20 years), which became the guideline sentence under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(a).

The court also explained an alternative scenario: if it removed the firearm and drug-premises enhancements (tied to Montana relevant conduct), the advisory range would drop to 168–210 months. Heard asked for 120 months. The court rejected that request as inadequate for deterrence and public protection given his “extensive history” of drug trafficking.

Ultimately, the court varied downward from the 240‑month guideline sentence to impose a 180‑month (15‑year) sentence. The judge characterized this as:

“an incremental punishment because things haven’t cleared up in the direction we want them to go, and in some ways have become worse,”

while still allowing Heard “room and opportunity” to reenter the community positively.

III. Summary of the Sixth Circuit’s Opinion

On appeal, Heard argued that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable. Under United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436, 440 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)), a procedurally reasonable sentence requires:

• Correct guideline calculation;
• Treatment of the guidelines as advisory;
• Consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors;
• No reliance on impermissible factors;
• Fact-finding that is not clearly erroneous; and
• A sufficient explanation of the chosen sentence.

Heard claimed five specific errors:

1. Insufficient, unreliable evidence for treating the Montana trafficking as relevant conduct.
2. Clear error in applying the firearm-possession enhancement.
3. Clear error in applying the drug-premises enhancement.
4. Clear error in determining the drug quantity attributable to him.
5. Erroneous application of the obstruction-of-justice enhancement.

The Sixth Circuit:

• Affirmed the district court’s drug-quantity calculation (Issue 4).
• Affirmed the application of the obstruction-of-justice enhancement (Issue 5).
• Held that any error in the remaining contested issues (1–3) would be harmless, given:
  • The statutory maximum cap on the guideline sentence, and
  • The district court’s independent reliance on § 3553(a) factors to select 180 months.

Accordingly, the panel affirmed the 180‑month sentence.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Drug Quantity and the Use of Cooperator Testimony

1. Standard of Review and Governing Principles

The panel reviewed the district court’s drug-quantity findings for clear error, consistent with United States v. Rios, 830 F.3d 403, 436 (6th Cir. 2016). Under this standard:

• The district court’s fact-finding stands unless the appellate court is left with a “definite and firm conviction” that a mistake has been made.
• Credibility determinations and reliability assessments receive especially strong deference. See United States v. Armstrong, 920 F.3d 395, 398 (6th Cir. 2019); United States v. Owusu, 199 F.3d 329, 339 (6th Cir. 2000).

When drug quantity is not precisely known, the court must “err on the side of caution” and hold a defendant accountable only for quantities for which it is “more likely than not” that he is responsible. Rios, 830 F.3d at 436.

2. Application to Heard’s Case

Heard argued that the two cooperating witnesses, M.N. (a buyer) and Blackman (a co-defendant), were “unreliable informants,” and that the district court erred in relying on their statements to extrapolate drug quantities beyond the single traffic stop.

The panel rejected this challenge. The district court had:

• Accepted the undisputed amount seized in the traffic stop (8,062 kg converted weight).
• Used only conservative estimates from M.N.’s testimony—approximately a pound’s worth of converted quantity (9,072 kg), even though her account supported higher quantities.
• Credited only one trip from Blackman’s testimony—two pounds (18,144 kg)—specifically the trip on which Blackman himself participated, thus self‑incriminating and lending credibility to his statements.

Importantly, the court discarded other parts of both witnesses’ accounts that might have produced higher totals, demonstrating adherence to the “err on the side of caution” requirement.

On that record, the appellate panel held that:

• The district court’s credibility judgments had a clear foundation in the record, requiring deference under Owusu.
• The conservative approach met the “more likely than not” threshold demanded by Rios.
• Heard failed to demonstrate clear error; his attack amounted to disagreement with the district court’s discretionary weighing of evidence.

The panel analogized to prior affirmances of drug quantity findings in Rios and in United States v. Williams, No. 22‑1522, 2023 WL 5206439 (6th Cir. Aug. 14, 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 520 (2023), where courts similarly relied on testimonial evidence to estimate quantities conservatively.

3. Doctrinal Significance

While not doctrinally revolutionary, this section reinforces several important sentencing principles:

• Cooperator testimony remains a valid—and often central—basis for drug quantity findings. The mere fact that witnesses are cooperating or self‑interested does not undermine the district court’s reliance on them, especially when their statements are internally corroborated or self‑inculpatory.
• “Erring on the side of caution” is satisfied by conservative estimates. The court is not required to accept the lowest possible quantity; it need only avoid speculative inflation beyond what the record reasonably supports.
• Clear-error review is highly deferential. Appellate challenges to guideline drug quantities will rarely succeed where the district judge articulates a coherent, conservative basis for the numbers.

B. Obstruction of Justice and Social Media “Snitch-Shaming”

1. Legal Framework Under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1

Section 3C1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines mandates a two-level enhancement if:

(1) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction, and (2) the obstructive conduct related to (A) the defendant’s offense of conviction and any relevant conduct; or (B) a closely related offense.

Application Note 4(A) lists as “covered conduct”:

“threatening, intimidating, or otherwise unlawfully influencing a co‑defendant, witness, or juror, directly or indirectly, or attempting to do so.”

In United States v. Sykes, 65 F.4th 867, 889 (6th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 576 (2024), the Sixth Circuit reaffirmed that such conduct falls squarely within § 3C1.1’s ambit.

Two additional principles from prior Sixth Circuit cases are central:

• Threat can be indirect and need not be received. In United States v. French, 976 F.3d 744 (6th Cir. 2020), the court held that § 3C1.1 “covers indirect threats delivered through an intermediary, such as Facebook, regardless of whether an intended recipient learns of the threat or actually feels intimidated.”
• Conduct need only be reasonably construed as a threat. In United States v. Kamper, 748 F.3d 728, 744 (6th Cir. 2014), the court explained that the enhancement applies where the defendant’s behavior “can be reasonably construed as a threat,” not only when explicit words of harm are used.

2. The Standard-of-Review Issue

The panel acknowledged an unresolved point in Sixth Circuit law: the precise standard of review for applying guideline enhancements like § 3C1.1 to established facts. As noted in United States v. Histed, 93 F.4th 948, 960 (6th Cir. 2024), the court has sometimes applied clear-error review (United States v. Jackson-Randolph, 282 F.3d 369, 390 (6th Cir. 2002)) and sometimes de novo review (Kamper, 748 F.3d at 744).

Following the approach of French, 976 F.3d at 749, the panel here declined to resolve the conflict because Heard’s objection failed even under the more defendant‑friendly de novo standard.

3. Why Heard’s Conduct Constituted Obstruction

The panel framed Heard’s conduct as inherently threatening and intimidating:

• He called Blackman a “rat” and intentionally exposed his identity to “mother f*ckers on the street.”
• He insisted the post be widely disseminated “on all social media.”
• He used photos and the police report to confirm Blackman’s status as a government cooperator.

The district court—whose characterization the panel adopted—described this as invoking the “law of the street,” sending a clear message:

“take care of this. Let’s shut this guy up.”

The appellate court concluded:

• Heard’s conduct fits squarely within Application Note 4(A): it was an attempt to threaten and intimidate a co-defendant and witness.
• The messaging was not merely descriptive but accusatory and laden with street implications of retribution.
• The public nature of the post mirrors the facts in French, where such online exposure was deemed threatening to the cooperator and anyone else contemplating cooperation.

The panel reinforced two key doctrinal points from Kamper and French:

1. “Snitch-labeling” is inherently threatening in custodial/criminal contexts. In Kamper, calling someone a “rat and a snitch” in prison was held to be an indirect threat because it invoked widely understood prison norms that “snitches are not well‑received.”
2. Social media posts about cooperators can obstruct justice even absent direct communication to the witness. In French, exposing a cooperator as a “rat” on Facebook, accompanied by discovery documents showing cooperation, was treated as a threat both to that witness and to “anyone who had been cooperating with the government.”

Heard falls squarely in the overlap of these principles: a defendant publicly uses social media to brand a co‑defendant as a “rat,” with identifying information, in order to mobilize street retribution during the pendency of criminal proceedings.

4. Distinguishing Purely Retaliatory Conduct: The Role of Timing and Purpose

Heard argued that he did not intend to intimidate or influence anyone; he was merely venting in retaliation against Blackman for cooperating. He invoked United States v. Turner, 738 F. App’x 856 (6th Cir. 2018), where the court declined to apply § 3C1.1 to a murder-for-hire plot.

In Turner:

• The defendant asked a fellow inmate to kill an informant, but crucially,
• He insisted the killing take place after his own sentencing and imprisonment.

On those facts, the panel in Turner concluded:

• No one disputed that the defendant’s actions were purely retaliatory.
• The contemplated killing would have occurred only after the completion of the investigation, prosecution, and sentencing.
• Accordingly, the conduct did not obstruct “the administration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing” of the defendant’s offense as § 3C1.1 requires.

The Heard panel distinguished Turner on two grounds:

1. Disputed characterization: Here, the government did not concede the conduct was purely retaliatory; the record suggested an intent to influence or chill Blackman’s cooperation.
2. Timing: Heard’s social media campaign occurred:
   • Immediately after indictment;
   • Before his guilty plea;
   • Before Blackman’s federal proffer; and
   • Before sentencing.
   At the time of the posts, Blackman remained in a posture to continue assisting law enforcement (as he in fact did), and the prosecution and sentencing were still ongoing.

In other words, whereas Turner’s contemplated retaliation was temporally and functionally divorced from the proceedings, Heard’s conduct was timed to affect ongoing cooperation and the unfolding case. That connection to the “investigation, prosecution, [and] sentencing” brought the conduct squarely within § 3C1.1.

5. The Emerging Rule

Taken together with Kamper and French, Heard strengthens an emerging rule in the Sixth Circuit:

Publicly branding a co-defendant or witness a “rat,” “snitch,” or similar term on social media, accompanied by identifying information and contextualized in criminal street culture, during the pendency of a case, is reasonably construed as a threat or intimidation and constitutes obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.

Additionally, the case narrows the room for defendants to escape § 3C1.1 by re-labeling their conduct as “retaliation.” Where:

• The conduct occurs during or before sentencing; and
• The target is a cooperating witness whose continued cooperation still matters;

the court will treat such activities as obstructive, not merely retaliatory.

C. Harmless Error, Statutory Maximums, and Guideline Appeals

1. Harmless Error in Sentencing: General Principles

Even when a district court misapplies the sentencing guidelines, an appellate court may affirm if the error is harmless. Several principles structure this inquiry:

• Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S. 189 (2016), held that guideline miscalculations typically affect a defendant’s “substantial rights,” but recognized that an error is harmless if the record shows the same sentence would have been imposed regardless.
• United States v. O’Georgia, 569 F.3d 281, 288 (6th Cir. 2009), held that if a district court independently justifies its chosen sentence under § 3553(a), an erroneous guideline “departure” may be harmless.
• United States v. Faulkner, 926 F.3d 266, 275 (6th Cir. 2019), emphasized that errors not affecting the ultimate guideline range or sentence imposed are harmless.
• United States v. Tobias, 101 F.4th 473, 482 (6th Cir. 2024), explained that an error is harmless when:
  • The record shows the court believed the sentence was appropriate irrespective of the guideline range; or
  • The court clearly based the sentence on factors independent of the guidelines.
  Tobias also stressed that the government bears the burden of proving harmlessness “with certainty.”
• United States v. Grams, 566 F.3d 683, 687 (6th Cir. 2009), approved a harmless-error finding where the statutory maximum fixed the effective guideline sentence, making certain guideline disputes moot.

2. How Harmless Error Operated in Heard

The Sixth Circuit concluded that, even assuming the district court erred in:

1. Treating Montana trafficking as relevant conduct (Issue 1);
2. Applying the firearm enhancement (Issue 2); and
3. Applying the drug-premises enhancement (Issue 3);

those errors would not warrant resentencing because:

a. Independent § 3553(a) Justification

The district court articulated a clear, guideline-independent rationale for choosing 180 months:

• It emphasized Heard’s “significant criminal history” and the fact that prior imprisonment had not deterred him.
• It explicitly balanced punishment, deterrence, public protection, and rehabilitation, concluding that the statutory maximum of 240 months was “too much,” but Heard’s requested 120 months would not adequately “protect the public.”
• It described 180 months as a tailored, “incremental punishment” responsive to Heard’s continued and escalating criminal conduct.

These explanations demonstrated that the sentence rested squarely on § 3553(a) considerations, not solely on the mechanical output of the guidelines.

b. The Statutory Maximum Cap and Unchanged Guideline Sentence

More technically, the panel showed that even without the disputed enhancements, the guideline sentence would remain the same due to the statutory maximum. This analysis hinged on the interaction between:

• The converted drug quantity (35,000 kg);
• The obstruction-of-justice enhancement; and
• The statutory maximum of 240 months.

The court reasoned as follows:

1. With the 35,000‑kilogram drug quantity, Heard’s drug-based offense level is 36.
2. Add +2 for obstruction of justice under § 3C1.1; this yields a total (pre-acceptance) offense level of 38.
3. Subtract 3 levels for acceptance of responsibility; the resulting offense level is 35.
4. At offense level 35 and criminal history category V, the guideline range is 262–327 months.
5. Because the statutory maximum is 240 months, U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(a) provides that the guideline sentence is 240 months.

Thus, even eliminating the allegedly erroneous firearm and drug-premises enhancements:

• The advisory range would still exceed 240 months.
• By operation of § 5G1.1(a), 240 months would again be the guideline sentence.
• The district court would still be varying downward from 240 to 180 months.

Under Grams and related cases, when a statutory cap yields the same guideline sentence even after removing an alleged error, the error is harmless: the defendant’s guideline position on remand would be unchanged.

3. Practical Implications

Heard illustrates two important cautionary points for guideline appeals:

• Statutory maximums often limit the practical value of disputing high-end enhancements. Once the combined offense level produces a guideline minimum above the statutory maximum, higher or lower enhancements often become academic. Unless an appellant can also attack the baseline (e.g., drug quantity) or argue for substantive unreasonableness, guideline challenges alone may not secure resentencing.
• District courts that articulate robust § 3553(a) analyses insulate their sentences. Where the district judge explains in detail why a particular term is appropriate based on history, deterrence, and public protection, appellate courts are far more willing to find guideline errors harmless.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. “Converted Drug Weight”

Under the drug-trafficking guideline, U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, different drugs are converted to a common measure (often marijuana or “converted drug weight” equivalents) to standardize punishment across substances. For methamphetamine, the tables specify conversion ratios that assign higher weights to purer or more potent forms.

In Heard, the court used “converted” quantities—8,062 kg, 9,072 kg, and 18,144 kg—to place Heard’s crimes within the guideline range. The actual physical amount of methamphetamine was in pounds and ounces, but once converted, the total of roughly 35,000 kg placed him in a very high offense level bracket.

2. Relevant Conduct

Under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, a sentencing court considers not only the offense of conviction but also “relevant conduct,” including acts that are part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan, even if not charged or not resulting in conviction.

Here, the government argued that Heard’s Montana drug operations were relevant conduct, supporting:

• A firearm enhancement; and
• A drug-premises enhancement.

The panel did not decide whether this was correct because, in light of its harmless-error analysis, even excluding that conduct would not change the effective guideline sentence.

3. Obstruction of Justice Under § 3C1.1

Obstruction enhancements apply when a defendant:

• Interferes with witnesses;
• Destroys or alters evidence;
• Commits perjury; or
• Otherwise attempts to impede the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of his offense.

In practical terms, branding someone a “snitch” or “rat” in criminal circles—especially in custody or on social media—can be life‑threatening. Courts in the Sixth Circuit now routinely treat that behavior as an attempt to intimidate or influence witnesses, thus triggering § 3C1.1.

4. Procedural vs. Substantive Reasonableness

A federal sentence can be challenged on:

• Procedural grounds – Did the court correctly calculate the guideline range, treat the guidelines as advisory, consider § 3553(a), avoid clear factual error, and adequately explain its reasoning?
• Substantive grounds – Is the length of the sentence reasonable in light of the § 3553(a) factors—i.e., is it “greater than necessary” to achieve punishment, deterrence, public protection, and rehabilitation?

Heard attacked only the procedural aspects; the panel accordingly focused on guideline calculations and application of enhancements, not on whether 180 months was substantively excessive.

5. Harmless Error in Guideline Calculations

“Harmless error” means that even if the court made a mistake, that mistake did not affect the outcome. In sentencing:

• If eliminating an enhancement would not change the guideline range (or the statutory maximum sentence that effectively caps the range), an error related to that enhancement may be harmless.
• If the district court clearly states it would impose the same sentence even under an alternative guideline calculation, that too may render an error harmless, provided the explanation is adequate under § 3553(a).

That is precisely what happened in Heard: the court’s explanation and the statutory cap made disputes about certain enhancements non‑outcome‑determinative.

VI. Impact and Broader Significance

A. Strengthening Protection for Cooperating Witnesses

The opinion reinforces a strong judicial stance against intimidation of cooperators:

• Labeling someone a “rat” on social media with identifying information is not viewed as mere venting; it is treated as an actionable threat.
• The court accepts, and even adopts, the district judge’s recognition of “the law of the street”—acknowledging that such posts function as calls for retribution in criminal subcultures.

This has two major effects:

1. It provides additional doctrinal support for applying § 3C1.1 in cases involving online “doxxing” or public “snitch-shaming.”
2. It signals to defense counsel that advising clients to refrain from public commentary about cooperators—especially on social media—is critical to avoid substantial guideline increases.

B. Clarifying the “Retaliation vs. Obstruction” Distinction

By limiting Turner to its unique facts, Heard makes clear that the “purely retaliatory” exception is narrow. To fall outside § 3C1.1:

• The conduct must occur after the criminal proceedings have concluded, and
• It must lack any plausible capacity to affect cooperation, investigation, prosecution, or sentencing.

When conduct occurs during an ongoing investigation or sentencing process, courts are likely to see it as obstructive even if the defendant characterizes it as emotional or retaliatory.

C. Sentencing Appeals in High-Quantity Drug Cases

For defendants with very large drug quantities and long statutory maximums, Heard illustrates a recurring reality:

• Once the offense level is high enough that the guideline range exceeds the statutory maximum, minor disputes over additional enhancements will often be moot.
• Successful appellate challenges may require attacking more fundamental pieces of the calculus, such as:
  • The reliability of drug quantity evidence itself;
  • The validity of major enhancements (like obstruction) that substantially affect the base level; or
  • The substantive reasonableness of the sentence.

VII. Conclusion

United States v. Bradley Scott Heard affirms a 180‑month methamphetamine sentence against a procedural unreasonableness challenge, but its lasting significance lies in three doctrinal clarifications:

1. Drug quantity determinations based on cooperator testimony will be upheld when the district court uses conservative estimates and articulates a reasoned credibility assessment.
2. Publicly branding a co-defendant as a “rat” on social media during pending proceedings, with identifying material, is obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. The decision deepens the line of cases—Kamper, French, and now Heard— treating such conduct as inherently threatening and intimidating, and distinguishes the narrow “pure retaliation” exception seen in Turner.
3. Guideline errors are harmless when the statutory maximum caps the guideline sentence and the district court independently justifies its chosen sentence under § 3553(a). In such circumstances, disputes over certain enhancements, especially at the high end of the range, may not yield a remand.

Though unpublished, Heard provides persuasive authority within the Sixth Circuit on the interaction between online conduct and obstruction of justice, reinforces strict protection for cooperating witnesses, and serves as a cautionary guide for both defendants and practitioners in high-quantity drug cases regarding the practical limits of guideline-based sentencing appeals.