Second Circuit Reaffirms Limited Duty to Reconcile Minor Statistical Sentencing Gaps and Upholds Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy as a Special Condition of Supervised Release – Commentary on United States v. Ramos-Acevedo

Second Circuit Reaffirms Limited Duty to Reconcile Minor Statistical Sentencing Gaps and Upholds Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy as a Special Condition of Supervised Release – Commentary on United States v. Ramos-Acevedo

1. Introduction

United States v. Ramos-Acevedo, No. 24-1336-cr (2d Cir. July 16, 2025) (summary order), involves a defendant who pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute large quantities of fentanyl and cocaine. He received a bottom-of-the-Guidelines sentence of 135 months’ imprisonment and five years’ supervised release, coupled with a requirement that he undergo cognitive-behavioral therapy (“CBT”).

On appeal, the defendant raised two procedural-reasonableness claims—both unpreserved below—arguing that the district court (1) erroneously assumed that a Guidelines sentence would automatically eliminate nationwide sentencing disparities despite contrary statistical data, and (2) imposed CBT without adequate on-the-record justification. The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that neither claim rose to the level of plain error.

2. Summary of the Judgment

  • Standard Applied: Plain-error review because the defendant failed to object at sentencing.
  • Sentencing Disparity Claim: A 135-month sentence—only 15 months above the five-year national average and 3 months above the median for superficially comparable cases—did not create an unwarranted disparity under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). The court credited the seriousness of fentanyl trafficking and the defendant’s recidivism in justifying the sentence.
  • CBT Condition: The district court’s rationale was self-evident; the defendant’s continued criminality into his mid-forties demonstrated poor decision-making, and Probation had specifically recommended CBT to address that problem.
  • Holding: No clear or obvious error affected substantial rights or undermined the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings; the judgment was therefore affirmed.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

  1. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) – Established abuse-of-discretion review for sentencing and emphasized deference to district courts, cited as the baseline for procedural reasonableness.
  2. United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc) – Reaffirmed Gall and explained that a Guidelines sentence generally reflects proper consideration of § 3553(a)(6).
  3. United States v. Jenkins, 854 F.3d 181 (2d Cir. 2017) – Vacated a sentence 128 months above the highest national comparator in the same Guidelines cell; Ramos-Acevedo distinguished this because the disparity here was modest.
  4. United States v. Irving, 554 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2009) – Noted that concerns about disparity are at a minimum when the sentence falls inside the Guidelines range.
  5. United States v. Hardee, 2025 WL 323339 (2d Cir. Jan. 29, 2025) (summary order) – Upheld a CBT condition where probation recommended it to improve self-regulation; relied upon extensively to approve the identical condition here.
  6. United States v. Jimenez, 2024 WL 1152535 (2d Cir. Mar. 18, 2024) (summary order) – Struck down a CBT requirement when no record basis existed; invoked by the appellant but distinguished.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

(a) Sentencing Disparity Allegation

  • The Second Circuit reiterated that the duty to consider § 3553(a)(6) is modest; implicit satisfaction normally occurs once a court correctly calculates and reviews the Guidelines range.
  • A deviation of 15 or 3 months above statistical averages is far shorter than ten or even five years, making Jenkins inapposite.
  • Record showed the judge was fully aware of the statistical tables in the PSR and purposely imposed the sentence because:
    • The conspiracy involved fentanyl, acknowledged as more lethal than heroin.
    • The defendant had a significant prior federal drug conviction and quickly re-offended.
    • Large, unseized quantities of narcotics suggested broader culpability.
  • The court emphasized that raw averages are unreliable without knowing case-specific enhancements or mitigating factors (Irving).

(b) CBT Special Condition

  • Under Second Circuit precedent (Betts, Bleau, Sims), a district court must articulate an individualized rationale; however, reasoning can be discerned from the record.
  • Probation recommended CBT to address persistent poor judgment; the district judge referenced the defendant’s continued drug trafficking into his forties and the need to work on [his] thinking styles.
  • Condition was therefore reasonably related to rehabilitation and crime-prevention goals, was not unduly restrictive, and avoided vagueness concerns because the therapy type (CBT) and court-approval mechanism were specified.

3.3 Impact on Future Litigation and Sentencing Practice

Although issued as a non-precedential summary order (Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 2d Cir. R. 32.1.1), the decision offers practical guidance:

  1. Statistical Disparities. Defense counsel cannot rely on modest deviations from USSC Judicial Sentencing Information averages to establish plain procedural error where the sentence rests inside the Guidelines and the record supplies individualized justification.
  2. Fentanyl Weighting. Courts may legitimately treat fentanyl distribution as more serious than cocaine (or powder cocaine) distribution even when Guidelines treat them similarly; counsel should anticipate fentanyl-specific aggravation arguments.
  3. Special Conditions Drafting. A CBT requirement will survive challenge if:
    • Probation recommends it with an articulated behavioral objective; and
    • The sentencing judge, even briefly, correlates the therapy to defendant-specific factors (recidivism, poor judgment, violence, etc.).
  4. Plain Error Hurdle. The opinion underscores how difficult it is to satisfy the fourth prong—effect on fairness, integrity, or public reputation—when the sentence lies at the bottom of the Guidelines and includes mainstream rehabilitative conditions.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Plain Error Review: A highly deferential appellate standard applied when trial objections were not preserved. Requires (1) error, (2) that is clear, (3) that affects substantial rights (usually outcome), and (4) that seriously affects judicial integrity.
  • § 3553(a)(6) – “Unwarranted Disparity” Factor: Congress instructs judges to avoid sentences that are arbitrarily higher or lower than those for similarly situated defendants. However, similarity considers more than just offense level and criminal-history category—it includes unique factual aggravators and mitigators.
  • Sentencing Guidelines Range: A numerical span derived from the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines that anchors federal sentencing. A sentence inside the range is normally considered reasonable.
  • Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy (CBT): A structured psychological treatment that seeks to change thought patterns (cognitions) in order to influence behavior. Frequently mandated to reduce recidivism by improving decision-making and impulse control.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Ramos-Acevedo reinforces two key propositions:

  1. A district court that imposes a bottom-of-the-Guidelines sentence generally satisfies its duty to consider sentencing disparities unless the resulting term starkly departs from nationwide data without explanation.
  2. A CBT requirement is permissible when the record—even briefly—connects the defendant’s recidivism or maladaptive thinking to the rehabilitative aims of such therapy and when probation supervision structures the program details.

While the order lacks precedential status, practitioners should note that appellate courts remain reluctant to second-guess modest variance-free sentences or mainstream rehabilitative conditions, especially under plain-error review. Defense counsel must therefore preserve objections at sentencing and marshal more than statistical averages to demonstrate unwarranted disparity.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

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