Second Circuit Endorses “One-Facility / One-Remediation” Rule: Statute of Limitations Under CERCLA Runs from the First Physical Cleanup

I. Introduction

On 17 July 2025, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in ELG Utica Alloys, Inc. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., No. 23-7575, delivered an important precedential opinion on the interplay between CERCLA’s six-year statute of limitations for “remedial actions” and multi-phase clean-ups occurring on a single contaminated property.

ELG Utica Alloys (“ELG”), a scrap-metal recycler and successor to earlier operators, performed environmental remediation on a 23-acre site in Utica, New York. After a first round of excavation and groundwater extraction in 2007 (“Phase 1”), ELG executed a 2015 consent order with New York authorities to commence additional remediation on another portion of the property (“Phase 2”). ELG sued a group of former customers under Sections 107(a) and 113(f) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) seeking contribution for Phase 2 costs. Defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that the six-year limitations period began in 2007 and had expired before the 2016 filing. They also sought sanctions for ELG’s shredding of over 23,000 pounds of potential evidence.

The District Court granted summary judgment and imposed spoliation sanctions. The Second Circuit affirmed in full, creating a clear rule that where (1) the contamination derives from common sources across a single “facility,” and (2) later clean-up steps merely extend the original remedial effort, the limitations clock starts once—at the first on-site construction activity.

II. Summary of the Judgment

Single Facility Finding: The court held that the entire 23-acre property constituted one CERCLA “facility” because the contamination was common and the site had been under unified ownership, management, and use.
Remedial vs. Removal: The 2007 excavation and groundwater pumping were characterized as “remedial,” not “removal,” because they followed years of investigation and aimed at permanent resolution, not emergency abatement.
Statute of Limitations: Applying the “single-remediation principle” (previously articulated in MPM Silicones), the court ruled the six-year period began with the 2007 physical clean-up. ELG’s 2016 lawsuit was therefore untimely.
Spoliation Sanctions: Affirmed an agreed-upon $300,000 sanction after finding ELG grossly negligent in shredding documents despite foreseeable litigation.
Outcome: Judgment for all defendants; case remanded solely for entry of the stipulated sanction order.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

MPM Silicones, LLC v. Union Carbide Corp., 966 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2020)
• Established the “single-remediation principle”: subsequent phases that further the same clean-up do not restart the limitations clock.
• The panel relied heavily on this doctrine to reject ELG’s argument that the 2015 consent order initiated a new claim period.
New York State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. FirstEnergy Corp. (“NYSEG”), 766 F.3d 212 (2d Cir. 2014)
• Clarified the distinction between “removal” and “remedial” actions.
• Cited for the proposition that interim remedial measures (IRMs) can be remedial and thus trigger §9613(g)(2)(B).
Schaefer v. Town of Victor, 457 F.3d 188 (2d Cir. 2006)
• Defined statutory starting points for removal (completion) and remedial (initiation) actions. The Second Circuit invoked this timing framework in affirming the District Court.
Axel Johnson, Inc. v. Carroll Carolina Oil Co., 191 F.3d 409 (4th Cir. 1999), U.S. v. Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d 307 (6th Cir. 1998), and other circuit cases
• Used to justify treating the whole property as a single facility when contaminants are pervasive and operations unified.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Defining the “Facility”
The court referenced CERCLA’s broad definition of “facility” (42 U.S.C. §9601(9)), concluding the relevant “area” comprised the entire 23 acres. Key factors:
- Contamination (PCBs, TCE) was ubiquitous and stemmed from the same historical operations;
- Single ownership/control since 1984;
- DEC’s administrative bifurcation in 1998 was for convenience, not because the property was naturally divisible.
Classification of the 2007 Works
The panel endorsed the District Court’s finding that the 2007 excavation and groundwater removal were “remedial” because they were long-planned and intended to permanently remove source contamination, not merely address an imminent threat.
Triggering the Limitations Period
Under §9613(g)(2)(B), the six-year period begins on “initiation of physical on-site construction” of remedial action. The first shovel turned in 2007—therefore, 2007 + 6 = 2013, ending ELG’s window.
Application of the Single-Remediation Principle
The court found Phase 2 (2015-present) was simply a continuation of Phase 1, both targeting the same contaminants on the same facility. Allowing each phase to reset the clock would “endlessly postpone” litigation, contrary to MPM Silicones.
Spoliation Analysis
Following the familiar three-part test (Klipsch Grp.), the court found: duty to preserve (foreseeable litigation), gross negligence (23k lbs destroyed without hold), and relevance presumed from culpability—fully justifying sanctions.

C. Potential Impact of the Decision

Timing of Contribution Actions: Parties responsible for environmental response costs within the Second Circuit must now assume that any first physical remedial effort on any part of a site starts the six-year clock for all subsequent remedial phases, unless later contamination is truly distinct.
Facility Definition: The decision strengthens a broad, functional approach to “facility,” emphasizing common ownership, use, and contaminant spread over administrative site boundaries.
Strategic Litigation Behavior: PRPs (potentially responsible parties) who fund clean-ups can no longer defer contribution suits until a final remedy is selected; they must file within six years of the earliest remedial construction.
Regulatory Coordination: State agreements splitting sites or sequencing work do not control federal limitation periods; regulated entities must independently track CERCLA deadlines.
Document Preservation: The affirmation of heavy sanctions underscores that companies engaged in environmental disputes must institute prompt litigation holds, even before formal lawsuits commence.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

CERCLA §107(a) vs. §113(f): Section 107(a) allows cost recovery and contribution claims for parties that themselves incur clean-up expenses. Section 113(f) provides a separate contribution action after a party is sued under §106 or §107. ELG relied on §107(a).
Removal vs. Remedial Action: Removal: Short-term, emergency measures to mitigate immediate hazards (e.g., drum removal, fence erection).
Remedial: Long-term, permanent solutions such as excavation, pump-and-treat, capping; usually follow detailed studies and regulatory approvals.
Statute of Limitations (§9613(g)(2)): For remedial actions: 6 years from the start of on-site construction. For removal actions: 3 years from completion. The clock does not reset for each interim step of the same remediation.
Single-Remediation Principle: A doctrine (Second Circuit) holding that later phases of a clean-up aimed at the same contamination do not trigger new limitations periods. Prevents indefinite serial litigation.
Spoliation Sanctions: Court-ordered remedies (monetary, adverse inference, dismissal) when a party destroys or fails to preserve evidence needed for reasonably foreseeable litigation.

V. Conclusion

ELG Utica Alloys cements a stringent temporal rule for CERCLA contribution claims in the Second Circuit: where contamination is unified and remedial activity begins, the six-year clock ticks for the entire clean-up, irrespective of later administrative orders or phased implementation. Combined with the court’s expansive view of “facility” and its willingness to penalize discovery abuses, the decision will reshape both litigation strategy and project-planning for environmental practitioners. Potentially responsible parties must swiftly evaluate contribution rights once dirt is first moved, and they must implement robust document-preservation protocols at the earliest hint of regulatory action. Failure on either front can, as this case shows, be fatal.