Same-Day Filiation and Abandonment Petitions After the 2022 Amendments:
Commentary on Matter of Dreyson HH. (Michael GG.), 2025 NY Slip Op 06578

I. Introduction

Matter of Dreyson HH. (Michael GG.) is a Third Department decision that consolidates and clarifies several important points in New York termination of parental rights law, particularly after the 2022 amendments to Domestic Relations Law (DRL) § 111(1)(e). The case sits at the intersection of:

• The timing and necessity of an order of filiation before an abandonment-based termination petition may be filed;
• The definition and proof of “abandonment” under Social Services Law § 384-b;
• The degree to which parental disabilities (here, alleged autism and learning disability) and substance abuse can excuse lack of contact; and
• The limited obligations of social services and foster care agencies to initiate or nurture a relationship in abandonment cases.

The Appellate Division affirms an order of the Essex County Family Court that adjudicated the infant child, born in 2023, to be abandoned by his father and terminated the father’s parental rights. The opinion, authored by Justice Lynch, is particularly significant for its clear holding that:

An abandonment petition may be brought on the same day that an order of filiation is entered, so long as the order of filiation is entered prior to the filing of the termination petition. The statute does not require a six‑month interval between filiation and the petition.

The decision also underscores the rigor of the abandonment doctrine: even where a putative father has not yet been adjudicated as a legal parent, his own delay in establishing paternity will not shield him from a finding of abandonment once he is adjudicated and the statutory elements are met.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Parties

• Child: Dreyson HH., born in 2023.
• Respondent/Appellant: The biological father, Michael GG. (“the father”).
• Petitioner/Respondent on Appeal: Essex County Department of Social Services (DSS).
• Other key party: The child’s mother, whose parental rights were terminated for abandonment in June 2024 (see footnote 1).

B. Key Chronology

1. Birth and Initial Placement (2023)
   • Child is born in 2023.
   • Father is not named on the birth certificate.
   • Mother informs DSS that the appellant is the child’s father.
   • Shortly after birth, DSS files a neglect petition against the mother; the child is placed in foster care.
   • DSS notifies the father that the child is in foster care.
   • The father has one supervised visit in February 2023.
2. Paternity Proceedings
   • March 2023: Paternity proceedings are commenced against the father.
   • He fails to appear for paternity testing multiple times (see footnote 3).
   • April 2024: Father finally appears and submits to DNA testing, after being arrested and jailed for failure to comply with prior testing orders.
   • July 31, 2024: An order of filiation is entered adjudicating him as the father.
3. Termination Proceedings
   • July 31, 2024 (same date): DSS files a petition under Social Services Law § 384-b to terminate the father’s parental rights on the ground of abandonment.
   • Family Court conducts a fact-finding hearing and finds that the father abandoned the child.
   • September 25, 2024: Family Court enters an order terminating the father’s parental rights.
   • The father appeals to the Third Department.

C. The Relevant Abandonment Period

Under Social Services Law § 384-b, abandonment is generally measured during the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of the petition. Here, the petition was filed July 31, 2024, so the relevant period is:

January 31, 2024 through July 31, 2024.

The parties agreed that during this six-month window the father:

• Did not visit the child;
• Did not communicate with the child;
• Did not send gifts or other tokens; and
• Did not contact DSS or the foster care agency to inquire about the child.

III. Summary of the Opinion and Holding

A. No Six-Month Waiting Period After Filiation

The father, through arguments echoed by some practitioners in similar contexts, effectively claimed that an order of filiation must be in place for six months before an abandonment petition can be brought. The court rejects this.

Interpreting DRL § 111(1)(e)(i), as amended by L 2022, ch 828, the Third Department holds:

• An abandonment petition may be brought against “any person adjudicated by a court of this state … to be the father of the child prior to the filing of said petition.”
• The statute requires only that the order of filiation precede the petition in time, not that it exist for any minimum period (such as six months).
• Here, the order of filiation and the abandonment petition were both entered on July 31, 2024, but the filiation order was entered first; thus the statutory condition was satisfied.

B. Clear and Convincing Evidence of Abandonment

Applying the familiar abandonment standard, the court concludes that DSS proved abandonment by clear and convincing evidence:

• During the six months before the petition, the father made no efforts to visit, communicate with, or support the child, nor did he contact DSS or the foster agency.
• DSS and the agency did not prevent or discourage contact; rather, the father declined offered visits and failed to pursue paternity testing diligently.
• The father’s claimed barriers—belief that proof of paternity was required to visit, alleged autism/learning disabilities, and substance abuse—did not excuse his inaction.

C. The Outcome

The Third Department:

• Affirms Family Court’s finding of abandonment;
• Affirms the order terminating the father’s parental rights; and
• Does so “without costs,” a routine disposition.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Statutory Framework

1. Social Services Law § 384-b – Termination of Parental Rights

Social Services Law § 384-b governs termination of parental rights in New York. Subdivision (4) identifies abandonment as one ground. The statutory policy is to provide children with stable and permanent homes where their natural parents are unable or unwilling to assume parental responsibilities, balanced against the fundamental constitutional interests of parents in the care and custody of their children.

2. Abandonment Standard

The court quotes the now-standard articulation of abandonment (see Matter of Ciara FF. [Robert FF.], 235 AD3d 1162 [3d Dept 2025]; Matter of Jayce G. [Daniel H.], 229 AD3d 857 [3d Dept 2024]):

A finding of abandonment is warranted when it is established by clear and convincing evidence that, during the six-month period immediately prior to the date of the filing of the petition, a respondent evinces an intent to forego parental rights as manifested by his or her failure to visit or communicate with the child or the petitioner, although able to do so and not prevented or discouraged from doing so by the petitioner.

Key components:

• Six-Month Window: Only the six months immediately preceding the filing matter, no matter what came before (unless relevant to context or credibility).
• Clear and Convincing Evidence: A heightened civil standard, higher than “preponderance of the evidence,” but lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
• Ability and Lack of Prevention: The parent must have had the ability to contact and must not have been prevented or discouraged by the agency.

3. DRL § 111(1)(e)(i) – Consent of a Father & the 2022 Amendments

DRL § 111 governs whose consent is required for an adoption, and, by cross-reference in Social Services Law § 384-b(4), which individuals can be respondents in abandonment proceedings.

Under the current version (as amended by L 2022, ch 828, effective Dec. 30, 2022), an abandonment proceeding may be brought against:

any person adjudicated by a court of this state … to be the father of the child prior to the filing of said petition.

The 2022 amendment is critical. Prior case law allowed abandonment/neglect proceedings even when paternity had not yet been established (Matter of Shalena Lee C., 197 AD2d 404 [1st Dept 1993]; Matter of Ursula J., 169 Misc 2d 148 [Fam Ct, Ulster County 1996]). These cases were decided under a prior version of DRL § 111(1)(e). Footnote 2 of the opinion emphasizes:

• Under the prior statute, such proceedings could proceed without prior filiation.
• Under the current statute, an abandonment proceeding may be brought only against someone adjudicated as the child’s legal parent, subject to limited exceptions inapplicable here.

What was unclear—and is resolved here—is whether a temporal “buffer” must exist between filiation and the filing of an abandonment petition. The Third Department answers no.

B. Timing of Order of Filiation and Abandonment Petition

1. The Father’s Implicit Argument

Although the opinion frames it in terms of the attorney for the child’s position, the controversy centers on whether:

The order of filiation had to exist for six months before the father’s parental rights could be terminated on the ground of abandonment.

This theory effectively attempts to tie the abandonment period (six months of no contact) to a period after legal paternity is formally established.

2. The Court’s Interpretation of DRL § 111(1)(e)(i)

The Third Department rejects any such reading. The text—“prior to the filing of said petition”—is taken at face value:

• The only temporal requirement is that adjudication (the order of filiation) come before the filing of the petition.
• It is permissible that both occur on the same date, even within the same proceeding, as long as the order of filiation is entered first in sequence.

The court underscores this point by citing its own precedent where the order of filiation and abandonment petitions were separated by only a few months: Matter of Maria E. [Jermaine D.], 94 AD3d 1357 (3d Dept 2012) (order of filiation around June 2010; abandonment petition September 2010); Matter of Beverly EE. [Ryan FF.], 88 AD3d 1086 (3d Dept 2011) (order of filiation November 2009; petition January 2010). In those cases, the delay was short but noncontroversial. Here, the court clarifies that even same-day filing is permissible.

3. The Father’s “Knowledge of Paternity” Argument

The father argued that he did not have sufficient reason to believe he was the father until the DNA test in April 2024. The court dismantles this argument as:

• Factually inconsistent with his own statements (he told DSS he was “100% sure” he was the father, and later testified he was certain after his February 2023 visit); and
• A self-created problem, since he repeatedly failed to appear for paternity testing and only appeared after his arrest.

Thus, the court frames the timing issue in two layers:

1. Legally, there is no requirement to wait six months after filiation before filing an abandonment petition.
2. Factually, the father cannot invoke late confirmation of paternity as a shield when his own noncompliance delayed that confirmation.

C. Elements of Abandonment and Burden-Shifting

1. Petitioner's Prima Facie Case

Under the standard drawn from cases like Ciara FF. and Jayce G., DSS had to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that:

• During the six-month period (Jan. 31–July 31, 2024);
• The father failed to visit, communicate with, or otherwise maintain contact with the child or DSS;
• He was able to do so; and
• He was not prevented or discouraged by DSS.

The court notes it is undisputed that:

• No visits, no communications, no gifts, and no inquiries occurred during the relevant six months.

This easily satisfies the initial burden, triggering the next step under Matter of Quannie T. [Miayjah R.], 226 AD3d 1119 (3d Dept 2024), and related cases:

Once the agency proves failure to maintain sufficient contact for the statutory period, the burden shifts to the respondent to show either:

• Inability to maintain contact; or
• That the agency prevented or discouraged contact.

2. No Duty to Encourage a Relationship

A recurring theme in Third Department abandonment jurisprudence is reiterated:

The petitioning agency is under no obligation to exercise diligent efforts to encourage a parent (or putative parent) to establish a relationship with the child.

The court cites:

• Matter of Ciara FF. [Robert FF.], 235 AD3d 1162 (3d Dept 2025);
• Matter of Kamariana SS. [Anthony SS.], 227 AD3d 1166 (3d Dept 2024), lv denied 42 NY3d 903 (2024);
• Matter of Lamar LL. [Loreal MM.], 86 AD3d 680 (3d Dept 2011), lv denied 17 NY3d 712 (2011).

This is a crucial doctrinal point: diligent efforts (a concept central to permanent neglect cases) are not required in abandonment cases. The parent bears the burden of initiating and maintaining contact.

D. Alleged Barriers: Agency Conduct, Disability, and Substance Abuse

1. Alleged Agency Requirement of Proof of Paternity

The father testified that the foster agency would not allow visits without proof of paternity. The agency’s program coordinator testified that:

• The agency would not affirmatively schedule visits on its own without proof of paternity;
• However, if the father himself contacted the agency and DSS approved, the agency would not prevent visits.

The court finds the father’s belief—assuming genuine—particularly problematic because:

• Even if he thought he needed a paternity test, he made no efforts to obtain it (compare Matter of Dennym K.J. [Ronnie O.], 215 AD3d 1254 [4th Dept 2023], where failure to follow through on testing undermined a parent’s claim of inability);
• DSS gave him contact information for both DSS and the foster agency;
• DSS’s caseworker spoke with him at court appearances and even offered visits—which he declined.

This evidence supports a finding that:

Any claim that DSS or the agency prevented or discouraged contact is “plainly belied by the record.”

2. Autism and Learning Disabilities

The father described himself as “slightly autistic” and having learning disabilities. However:

• He produced no medical evidence confirming these diagnoses; and
• He certainly produced no evidence that such conditions impaired his ability to maintain a relationship with his child.

The court follows a consistent approach seen in:

• Matter of David UU. [Jeanie UU.], 206 AD3d 1502 (3d Dept 2022);
• Matter of Leala T., 55 AD3d 1007 (3d Dept 2008);
• Matter of Alexander V., 179 AD2d 913 (3d Dept 1992).

The pattern is that bare assertions of disability, without medical evidence or a nexus to inability to parent or to maintain contact, will not defeat an abandonment claim.

3. Substance Abuse

The father testified he used drugs from December 2023 until April 2024 but was “clean and sober” thereafter. However:

• DSS records showed a June 2024 drug screen with high levels of cocaine.
• Even under his own version (sober from April), he had the April–July 2024 window—squarely within the abandonment period—to contact the child or DSS and did not do so.

The court adopts the analytical framework used in cases like Matter of Bradyen ZZ. [Robert A.], 216 AD3d 1229 (3d Dept 2023) and Matter of Madelynn T. [Rebecca M.], 148 AD3d 1784 (4th Dept 2017):

A parent’s substance abuse can only excuse abandonment if it permeates the parent’s life to such an extent that contact is not feasible.

Here, there was no evidence that the father’s drug use rendered him incapable of making a phone call, sending a letter, or otherwise manifesting interest in the child. Thus, his substance abuse does not justify the total lack of contact.

E. Precedents and Their Influence

1. Precedents on Abandonment Standard & Burden-Shifting

• Matter of Ciara FF. [Robert FF.], 235 AD3d 1162 (3d Dept 2025)
  Reaffirmed the basic abandonment definition and the absence of any duty on the part of the agency to encourage the relationship. This case essentially provides the template language the court uses here.
• Matter of Jayce G. [Daniel H.], 229 AD3d 857 (3d Dept 2024)
  Cited for the six-month period and the burden-shift: once lack of contact is shown, the parent must prove either inability or that he was prevented/discouraged. The language from Jayce G. is quoted nearly verbatim.
• Matter of Quannie T. [Miayjah R.], 226 AD3d 1119 (3d Dept 2024)
  Cited directly for the burden-shifting framework: once a petitioning agency demonstrates insufficient contact, the burden shifts. This case is doctrinally important because it clearly organizes the evidentiary steps courts must apply.
• Matter of Kamariana SS. [Anthony SS.], 227 AD3d 1166 (3d Dept 2024), lv denied 42 NY3d 903 (2024)
  Again, for the principle that in abandonment cases the agency need not exercise “diligent efforts”—a key distinction from permanent neglect.
• Matter of Joseph D. [Joseph PP.], 193 AD3d 1290 (3d Dept 2021) and Matter of Alexa L. [Nilza L.], 79 AD3d 1290 (3d Dept 2010)
  Both support the idea that complete lack of contact during the statutory period is sufficient to make out the prima facie abandonment case.

2. Precedents on Agency Non-Interference

• Matter of Tiyani AA. [Yani Z.], 232 AD3d 1147 (3d Dept 2024)
  Cited along with Ciara FF. and Lamar LL. to reinforce that agencies need not initiate contact or visitation in abandonment cases.
• Matter of Lamar LL. [Loreal MM.], 86 AD3d 680 (3d Dept 2011), lv denied 17 NY3d 712 (2011)
  A longstanding Third Department precedent on this issue, often used as a foundation for current practice.
• Matter of Derick L. [Michael L.], 166 AD3d 1325 (3d Dept 2018), lv denied 32 NY3d 915 (2019) and Matter of Lily LL. [Eric MM.], 88 AD3d 1121 (3d Dept 2011)
  Both used in Dreyson HH. as examples where the parent’s claims of being discouraged or prevented from contact were contradicted by the record. They provide a template for evaluating such factual disputes.

3. Precedents on Paternity, Testing, and Filiation

• Matter of Dennym K.J. [Ronnie O.], 215 AD3d 1254 (4th Dept 2023)
  Cited in the context of the father’s failure to appear for paternity testing. The Fourth Department in that case also viewed repeated failures to appear for DNA as undermining a parent’s credibility and claimed obstacles.
• Matter of Darrell J.D.J. [Kenneth R.], 156 AD3d 788 (2d Dept 2017)
  Cited in a “compare” posture, indicating that in some cases, conditions imposed by agencies or courts can be so restrictive as to effectively prevent a parent from forming or maintaining a relationship. Dreyson HH. is framed as not one of those cases.
• Matter of Beverly EE. [Ryan FF.], 88 AD3d 1086 (3d Dept 2011) and Matter of Maria E. [Jermaine D.], 94 AD3d 1357 (3d Dept 2012)
  These earlier Third Department cases involved orders of filiation entered a few months before abandonment petitions. Dreyson HH. extends the logic of these cases by explicitly allowing filiation and petition filing on the same day.

4. Precedents on Disability and Substance Abuse as Defenses

• Matter of David UU. [Jeanie UU.], 206 AD3d 1502 (3d Dept 2022); Matter of Leala T., 55 AD3d 1007 (3d Dept 2008); Matter of Alexander V., 179 AD2d 913 (3d Dept 1992)
  Cited to support the need for actual medical or expert evidence showing that a disability affects the parent’s ability to maintain contact—mere assertions are insufficient.
• Matter of Bradyen ZZ. [Robert A.], 216 AD3d 1229 (3d Dept 2023), lv denied 40 NY3d 905 (2023) and Matter of Madelynn T. [Rebecca M.], 148 AD3d 1784 (4th Dept 2017)
  Both supply the “permeates his life” formulation used to assess whether substance abuse excuses failure to contact. Dreyson HH. follows this line by requiring a showing that drug use rendered contact “not feasible.”

5. Precedents Under Prior Versions of DRL § 111(1)(e)

• Matter of Shalena Lee C., 197 AD2d 404 (1st Dept 1993)
  There, the First Department upheld abandonment based in part on the fact that the respondent father never established paternity despite being advised to do so, and gave no indication he would accept parental responsibilities.
• Matter of Ursula J., 169 Misc 2d 148 (Fam Ct, Ulster County 1996)
  A Family Court case where termination on permanent neglect grounds was allowed even though the proceeding was commenced before an order of filiation issued.

Dreyson HH. acknowledges these cases but limits their continuing vitality to the pre‑2022 statutory regime. Post‑amendment, an abandonment petition generally must be brought against an adjudicated legal parent, which modifies the doctrinal landscape those earlier cases occupied.

F. Legislative Context and Clarification of Prior Law

The 2022 amendment to DRL § 111(1)(e) (L 2022, ch 828) appears aimed at:

• Clarifying who qualifies as a “father” whose consent or legal status must be addressed in adoption and TPR proceedings; and
• Bringing more procedural regularity and clarity to the status of putative fathers.

Matter of Dreyson HH. is one of the early appellate decisions expressly applying this revised statute and addressing:

1. Necessity of adjudication: An abandonment petition must be directed to someone already adjudicated to be the legal father (subject to specified exceptions not relevant here).
2. Sufficiency of timing: No particular duration between filiation and petition is required; “prior to filing” literally means “earlier in time,” not “for at least six months.”

Thus, the case establishes a notable post‑amendment rule:

In abandonment cases, a putative father who has delayed or resisted adjudication of paternity cannot rely on that delay to avoid or postpone termination, once the legal filiation is entered and the statutory six-month abandonment period—measured by actual conduct—has run.

G. Impact and Future Implications

1. For Putative Fathers and Counsel

The decision sends a clear message:

• Delaying paternity testing or appearing in paternity proceedings is dangerous for a putative father who may later wish to assert parental rights.
• Once little or no contact has occurred for six months and filiation is entered (even that same day), the door to an abandonment-based TPR is open.
• Self-created delay (e.g., ignoring test orders) will not be treated as a mitigating factor.

Practitioners representing alleged fathers should advise:

• Immediate cooperation with paternity testing orders;
• Documented efforts to contact DSS or the foster agency;
• Prompt requests for visitation, even if filiation is pending; and
• Collection of medical or expert evidence if mental health, disability, or substance abuse is genuinely impairing the ability to maintain contact.

2. For Social Services and Foster Care Agencies

The decision reinforces that agencies:

• Need not make “diligent efforts” to foster the parent–child relationship when asserting abandonment, unlike in permanent neglect cases;
• Should still document any offers of visitation, communication, or services, as that documentation will be critical in rebutting claims that the agency discouraged or prevented contact;
• Can proceed with TPR once the six-month period of noncontact is established and an order of filiation has been obtained—without any additional statutory waiting period.

3. For Courts

Trial and appellate courts gain:

• A clear interpretation of DRL § 111(1)(e)(i) post‑2022: “prior to the filing” is not a substantive waiting requirement;
• Guidance on evaluating claimed barriers—especially uncorroborated disability or substance abuse—and distinguishing between real and self-inflicted obstacles; and
• A reaffirmation of the strictness of abandonment standards in the interest of providing children with timely permanency.

V. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

A. “Abandonment” in Plain Terms

In this context, “abandonment” does not require that a parent say, “I give up this child.” Instead, the law looks at what the parent does (or fails to do):

• If a parent has the ability to visit, call, write, send gifts, or otherwise show interest in the child;
• And for six months, does nothing at all;
• And the agency has not blocked or discouraged those efforts;
• The law treats that silence and inaction as evidence that the parent has chosen to give up parental rights.

The bar is high for the agency (clear and convincing evidence), but once total non-contact is shown, it is very difficult for the parent to rebut.

B. “Order of Filiation”

An order of filiation is a court order that formally declares a person to be the legal parent (here, the father) of a child. It matters because:

• Legal parents have specific rights (e.g., to consent or object to adoption) and responsibilities (e.g., child support);
• After the 2022 amendment, certain termination proceedings (like abandonment) can only proceed against people who have been adjudicated legal parents; and
• Without filiation, someone is just a “putative” father, without the full legal status.

C. “Clear and Convincing Evidence”

This is an evidentiary standard, roughly:

• More than “50% likely” (the usual civil standard: preponderance of evidence).
• Less than “beyond a reasonable doubt” (the criminal standard).
• It means the evidence must make it highly probable that the fact (here, abandonment) is true.

D. “Diligent Efforts” vs. Abandonment

In permanent neglect cases, agencies must prove they made “diligent efforts” to help the parent (e.g., services, visitation, counseling). In abandonment cases:

• The agency does not have to prove it worked to help the parent maintain a relationship.
• The focus is on what the parent did:
• Did they try to stay in contact?
• Or did they effectively disappear?

VI. Conclusion

Matter of Dreyson HH. (Michael GG.) is a significant post‑2022 amendment decision that clarifies New York abandonment law in three main ways:

1. Timing of Filiation and Abandonment Petitions:
   It definitively holds that DRL § 111(1)(e)(i) requires only that an order of filiation be entered before an abandonment petition is filed, even if on the same day. There is no statutory six‑month waiting period between filiation and a termination petition.
2. Strict Application of the Abandonment Standard:
   The decision reinforces that a total absence of contact in the six months before the petition, combined with no credible evidence of inability or agency interference, will sustain a finding of abandonment. Agencies have no duty to “chase” parents or create a relationship in this context.
3. Limited Role of Self-Created Barriers:
   The father’s failure to appear for paternity testing, his unsubstantiated claims of disability, and his unproven narrative about being drug-free all fail to excuse his inaction. The court treats such self-created or uncorroborated obstacles as insufficient to defeat an otherwise clear abandonment case.

In the broader legal landscape, Dreyson HH. advances child-protective and permanency goals by preventing putative fathers from using procedural or self-induced delays in establishing paternity as a shield against termination. At the same time, it preserves due process safeguards by insisting on:

• A prior adjudication of paternity (post‑2022 amendments);
• Clear and convincing proof of non-contact during the statutory period; and
• Consideration of claimed barriers, though with a demanding evidentiary threshold.

Practically, the decision will likely make abandonment-based terminations both more predictable and more firmly anchored in the parent’s concrete conduct during the six months before filing, rather than in the formal timing of legal parentage.