Rule of Completeness Can Permit Testimonial Hearsay to Correct Defense Misrepresentation; Security-Guard 911 Calls Are Non-Anonymous for Reasonable Suspicion

Introduction

In People v. Peterson (2025 NY Slip Op 04308), the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, unanimously affirmed a conviction for criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. The case arises from a late-night incident in Buffalo where a security guard observed the defendant point a handgun at a woman, force her into the driver’s seat of a vehicle, and then enter the back seat himself. The guard immediately called 911, providing a description and location of the vehicle. Police stopped the car and recovered a loaded 9mm handgun from the area between the driver’s seat and center console. DNA on the gun matched the defendant.

The appeal presented a suite of issues: whether the 911 call was “anonymous” and insufficient to support a stop; whether any subsequent vehicle search lacked probable cause; whether the court erred in juror removal; whether testimony about an uncharged gun-pointing was unfairly prejudicial Molineux evidence; whether the verdict was supported by legally sufficient evidence and not against the weight of the evidence; whether admission of a woman’s supporting deposition violated the Confrontation Clause; and whether counsel was ineffective for failing to move to dismiss under CPL 30.30.

Two facets of the decision have outsized significance. First, the court clarified that a 911 caller who provides self-identifying details (such as employment role, location, real-time observations, and a traceable callback number) is not “anonymous,” thereby supplying a reliable basis for reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle. Second, and potentially more consequential for evidence law and constitutional criminal procedure, the panel held that otherwise testimonial hearsay could be admitted under the rule of completeness to correct a misrepresentation created by the defense—without violating the Confrontation Clause—while also finding any error harmless in the alternative. This latter holding sits at the cutting edge of post-Crawford and post-Hemphill practice in New York.

Summary of the Judgment

• Suppression: The 911 call was not “anonymous” because the caller identified himself as a security guard at a specific location, described the vehicle contemporaneously, and could be reached at a known phone number. Those features made the tip sufficiently reliable to justify a vehicle stop based on reasonable suspicion that an occupant had committed or was committing a crime.
• Search issue: Any claim that the subsequent vehicle search lacked probable cause was unpreserved (not raised below) and thus not reviewable.
• Juror discharge: The defendant was not adversely affected by the court’s removal of a juror because defense counsel requested the juror’s removal; the issue was thus not properly before the court on appeal.
• Molineux evidence: Testimony that the defendant pointed a gun at the woman was admissible as directly relevant to knowing possession and to explain why officers executed an aggressive traffic stop. Its probative value outweighed any prejudice. The absence of a limiting instruction was unpreserved and the court declined interest-of-justice review.
• Sufficiency/weight: Evidence was legally sufficient to prove knowing possession, and the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence.
• Confrontation Clause: Although the woman’s supporting deposition was testimonial hearsay, its admission was permissible under the rule of completeness to correct a misrepresentation by the defense about what she said. Alternatively, any error was harmless given overwhelming evidence.
• Ineffective assistance: The claim based on failure to move under CPL 30.30 could not be resolved on the record and should be pursued, if at all, via a CPL 440.10 motion.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The court anchored its suppression ruling in prior Fourth Department authority distinguishing truly anonymous 911 calls from “self-identifying” ones:

• People v. Griffin, 188 AD3d 1701 (4th Dept 2020), lv denied 36 NY3d 1050 (2021): Recognized that a caller who supplies sufficient self-identification and contemporaneous observations, even without a name, may be treated as identified for reliability purposes. In Peterson, the caller’s role (security guard), specific worksite location, real-time description, and traceable phone number aligned with Griffin’s factors.
• People v. Van Every, 1 AD3d 977 (4th Dept 2003), lv denied 1 NY3d 602 (2004): Earlier Fourth Department case accepting tips from self-identifying sources as reliable. Peterson extends that logic to modern 911 settings where caller identity is corroborated through role and traceable contact.
• People v. Hinshaw, 35 NY3d 427 (2020): Court of Appeals clarified that a vehicle stop requires reasonable suspicion that a crime has been, is being, or is about to be committed. Peterson applied Hinshaw to conclude the stop was justified by the security-guard’s immediate, first-hand observations of a gun-pointing and apparent coercion.
• People v. Tyler, 166 AD3d 1556 (4th Dept 2018), lv denied 32 NY3d 1179 (2019): Reinforces that real-time, specific reports of criminal conduct can supply reasonable suspicion for a vehicle stop.
• Preservation authorities: CPL 470.05(2); People v. Jacque-Crews, 213 AD3d 1335 (4th Dept 2023), lv denied 39 NY3d 1111 (2023), stand for the rule that issues not raised in a suppression motion are unpreserved on appeal.
• Juror discharge and adverse effect: CPL 470.15(1); People v. Chapman, 229 AD2d 789 (3d Dept 1996); People v. Rawlinson, 175 AD3d 1109 (4th Dept 2019), lv denied 34 NY3d 983 (2019); People v. King, 137 AD3d 1746 (4th Dept 2016), lv denied 27 NY3d 1134 (2016). Peterson applies these to hold that a party cannot appeal a ruling it requested.
• Molineux and background: People v. Till, 87 NY2d 835 (1995) and People v. Larkins, 128 AD3d 1436 (4th Dept 2015), lv denied 27 NY3d 1001 (2016), allowed uncharged conduct closely probative of possession. People v. Morris, 21 NY3d 588 (2013) and People v. Tosca, 98 NY2d 660 (2002) permit “background” evidence to explain police conduct. Peterson situates the gun-pointing testimony within both categories.
• Molineux balancing: People v. Weinstein, 42 NY3d 439 (2024); People v. Leonard, 29 NY3d 1 (2017); People v. Alvino, 71 NY2d 233 (1987). Peterson expressly conducts the probative-prejudice balancing, finding admission appropriate.
• Limiting instructions and preservation: People v. Hymes, 174 AD3d 1295 (4th Dept 2019), aff’d 34 NY3d 1178 (2020); People v. Williams, 107 AD3d 1516 (4th Dept 2013), lv denied 21 NY3d 1047 (2013). The absence of a defense request precluded appellate complaint about the lack of a limiting instruction; the court declined interest-of-justice review (CPL 470.15[6][a]).
• Sufficiency and weight standards: People v. Contes, 60 NY2d 620 (1983) (legal sufficiency viewed in the light most favorable to the People); People v. Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 (2007) and People v. Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490 (1987) (weight review). Cases like People v. Hailey, 128 AD3d 1415 (4th Dept 2015), lv denied 26 NY3d 929 (2015); People v. Phillips, 109 AD3d 1124 (4th Dept 2013), lv denied 22 NY3d 1090 (2014); and People v. Redmond, 182 AD3d 1020 (4th Dept 2020), lv denied 35 NY3d 1048 (2020) demonstrate how proximity and DNA evidence can establish knowing possession.
• Confrontation Clause and testimonial hearsay: Crawford v. Washington, 541 US 36 (2004); People v. Garcia, 25 NY3d 77 (2015) define testimonial statements and confrontation requirements. Peterson recognizes the deposition as testimonial but admits it via completeness to correct the jury record, citing People v. Torre, 42 NY2d 1036 (1977), and aligning with People v. Rackover, 2025 NY Slip Op 03389 (1st Dept 2025), and People v. Horton, 181 AD3d 986 (3d Dept 2020), lv denied 35 NY3d 1045 (2020).
• Harmless error: People v. Douglas, 4 NY3d 777 (2005); People v. Astacio, 105 AD3d 1394 (4th Dept 2013), lv denied 22 NY3d 1154 (2014).
• Ineffective assistance and speedy trial: People v. Sweet, 79 AD3d 1772 (4th Dept 2010); People v. Bailey, 195 AD3d 1486 (4th Dept 2021), lv denied 37 NY3d 990 (2021); People v. Caban, 5 NY3d 143 (2005). Record-based limits on IAC claims: People v. Dunn, 229 AD3d 1220 (4th Dept 2024); People v. Stoby, 232 AD3d 1298 (4th Dept 2024), lv denied 43 NY3d 947 (2025) (as cited), directing such claims to CPL 440.10 proceedings.

Legal Reasoning

1) The 911 Call Was Not “Anonymous,” Supporting Reasonable Suspicion

The panel differentiates truly anonymous tips from calls with self-identifying markers. Although the caller did not give a name, he:

• identified himself as a security guard at a particular location (tying identity to employment and situs),
• provided contemporaneous description and location of the vehicle (first-hand, real-time observation), and
• used a phone number that officers could trace (accountability).

Those features rendered the call sufficiently reliable to form reasonable suspicion under Hinshaw to stop the vehicle. The reliability derives from accountability and the caller’s basis of knowledge. The court implicitly recognizes the enhanced reliability associated with 911 calls that are traceable and “self-identifying,” especially where the caller’s role and vantage point are specified.

2) Probable Cause Challenge to the Search Was Unpreserved

The defendant did not raise a probable-cause challenge to the vehicle search in his suppression motion, and the hearing court did not address it. Under CPL 470.05(2) and Jacque-Crews, the issue was unpreserved and could not be reviewed on appeal. This underscores the necessity of specificity in pretrial motions covering all anticipated grounds.

3) Juror Discharge Was Not Appealable Where Defendant Requested Removal

Appellate review is limited to issues adversely affecting a defendant (CPL 470.15[1]). Having requested the juror’s removal, the defendant could not complain of the result. This is a straightforward application of the invited-error/adverse-effect rule reflected in Chapman, Rawlinson, and King.

4) Admission of Uncharged Gun-Pointing (Molineux) Was Proper and Balanced

The so-called Molineux issue was resolved in favor of admissibility on two grounds:

• Relevance beyond propensity: The gun-pointing was probative of whether the defendant knowingly possessed the firearm recovered moments later (Till; Larkins).
• Narrative/background: The testimony explained why the police acted aggressively when they stopped the vehicle (Morris; Tosca).

The court explicitly weighed probative value against prejudicial effect (Weinstein; Leonard; Alvino), finding the former predominated. The absence of a defense request for a limiting instruction made any challenge to the lack of such an instruction unpreserved (Hymes; Williams).

5) Sufficiency and Weight of the Evidence

Applying Contes, the court concluded there was legally sufficient evidence of knowing possession: the eyewitness account of the defendant’s handling of a handgun, the gun’s recovery in close proximity to the driver, and DNA consistent with the defendant’s profile (Hailey; Phillips; Redmond). Under Danielson and Bleakley, the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence.

6) Confrontation Clause and the Rule of Completeness

The pivotal constitutional question concerned testimony about the woman’s supporting deposition—concededly testimonial hearsay under Crawford and Garcia. The court found no Confrontation Clause violation because the evidence was admitted under the rule of completeness to correct the defense’s misrepresentation to the jury that the woman had not said anyone pulled a gun on her. The court cited Torre—longstanding New York authority allowing the introduction of otherwise inadmissible portions of a statement to prevent a misleading impression when the opponent has cherry-picked or distorted content—and aligned with recent departmental applications like Rackover (1st Dept 2025) and Horton (3d Dept 2020).

Significantly, the court added a robust harmless error holding (Douglas; Astacio): even if completeness could not override confrontation in these circumstances, any error was harmless because the evidence of guilt was overwhelming and there was no reasonable possibility of a different verdict.

7) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and CPL 30.30

The court observed that failure to assert a meritorious CPL 30.30 motion is, standing alone, the sort of egregious misstep that can render representation ineffective (Sweet; Bailey; Caban). However, whether a 30.30 motion would have been meritorious is a fact-intensive inquiry that often turns on information outside the appellate record (e.g., off-calendar filings, discovery stipulations, clock waivers). Citing Dunn and Stoby, the court directed that such claims be pursued in a CPL 440.10 motion, where a full factual record can be developed.

Impact of the Decision

A. Clarification on 911 Caller “Anonymity” and Reasonable Suspicion

Peterson clarifies that, within the Fourth Department, a 911 caller may be treated as identified—and therefore reliable for reasonable suspicion—without giving a personal name, so long as the caller supplies:

• a distinct occupational identity and location (e.g., on-duty security guard at a specific address),
• contemporaneous, first-hand observations, and
• a traceable phone number.

This has practical significance for police response to emergency calls from institutional actors (security, loss prevention, school safety officers) whose roles are readily verifiable and whose calls are typically recorded and traceable. It aligns with broader recognition of 911 reliability for exigent, real-time reporting and will likely be cited in future suppression litigation.

B. A Developing Completeness–Confrontation Interface

The most consequential aspect of Peterson is its endorsement of admitting testimonial hearsay under the rule of completeness to correct defense-created misimpressions. This approach, while grounded in New York precedent like Torre, operates in a constitutional space reshaped by Crawford and the U.S. Supreme Court’s more recent decision in Hemphill v. New York (2022), which cautioned that evidentiary “door-opening” cannot trump the Confrontation Clause’s categorical requirements for testimonial statements.

Peterson sides with a line of departmental cases (e.g., Rackover; Horton) that permit completeness-based admission to restore accuracy when the defense has invited a false or distorted record before the jury. Notably, the panel built in a harmless-error backstop, signaling sensitivity to constitutional risk. The decision will likely be cited by prosecutors when defense questioning or argument mischaracterizes an absent declarant’s statements. Defense counsel should anticipate that misstatements about testimonial content—or selective introduction of such content—could prompt admission of the remainder, even if otherwise excludable.

At the same time, Peterson may invite further appellate scrutiny, including at the Court of Appeals, to harmonize New York’s completeness doctrine with Hemphill’s Confrontation Clause limits. Key future questions include:

• Must the defense have introduced part of the specific statement to trigger completeness, or is a general mischaracterization sufficient?
• Does completeness allow substance for its truth or only for context (and how does that square with Crawford)?
• What constitutes a “misrepresentation” sufficient to lift confrontation barriers?

C. Preservation and Trial Practice

Peterson underscores evergreen practice points:

• Raise all suppression grounds in the written motion (search probable cause challenges can be forfeited if not presented).
• Request limiting instructions contemporaneously for Molineux/background evidence to preserve the issue.
• Exercise care when characterizing out-of-court statements; mischaracterizations may “open the door” under completeness.
• For CPL 30.30/IAC claims, build a record or preserve the claim for CPL 440.10, where factual development is possible.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Anonymous vs. self-identifying 911 calls: A truly anonymous call comes from an unknown person with no way to verify identity. A self-identifying call includes details (role, location, callback number) that make the caller traceable and accountable, increasing reliability.
• Reasonable suspicion vs. probable cause: Reasonable suspicion is a specific, articulable belief that crime is afoot—enough to justify a stop. Probable cause is a higher standard (fair probability) needed for arrests and searches (subject to exceptions).
• Molineux evidence: Evidence of uncharged crimes or bad acts is generally inadmissible to prove propensity, but may be admitted for other purposes (e.g., intent, identity, knowledge, background) if probative value outweighs prejudice, often with a limiting instruction.
• Background or narrative evidence: Context that helps the jury understand why police took certain actions (e.g., executing a high-risk stop) even if it incidentally references uncharged conduct.
• Confrontation Clause and testimonial hearsay: Under Crawford, testimonial statements (e.g., formal statements to police) are inadmissible against a criminal defendant unless the declarant testifies or the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine. Completeness aims to prevent misleading use of partial statements, raising tension with confrontation rules when the declarant is unavailable.
• Rule of completeness: If one side introduces or misrepresents part of a writing or statement, the court may allow the other side to introduce additional portions to place it in proper context or correct a distortion. Peterson applies this even where the additional portion is testimonial.
• Preservation: Appellate courts typically review only issues that were timely and specifically raised before the trial court. Failure to request a ruling or instruction, or to object, can forfeit appellate review.
• Harmless error: Even if a legal error occurred, a conviction will be affirmed if there is no reasonable possibility the error affected the verdict, considering the strength of the evidence.
• CPL 30.30 (statutory speedy trial): For felonies, the People must be ready for trial within six months, subject to excludable time. Failure to move to dismiss when the clock has run can support an ineffective assistance claim, but such claims often require off-the-record facts and are suited to CPL 440.10 motions.

Conclusion

People v. Peterson is a comprehensive memorandum affirmance that nonetheless advances two notable clarifications. First, it reinforces that not all unnamed 911 callers are “anonymous.” Where a caller provides occupational identity, a specific location, a traceable number, and contemporaneous observations, the call may be treated as reliable for reasonable suspicion. That holding will resonate in cases involving institutional callers and real-time reporting of violent conduct.

Second, and more provocatively, the Fourth Department holds that testimonial hearsay can be admitted under the rule of completeness to correct a misrepresentation created by the defense without violating the Confrontation Clause—while also finding harmless error as a fallback. This approach, echoing recent departmental decisions, sets an important marker in the evolving balance between evidentiary fairness (avoiding jury misimpressions) and Sixth Amendment confrontation rights post-Crawford and Hemphill.

For practitioners, Peterson offers practical guidance: build complete suppression records, preserve instructional requests and objections, avoid mischaracterizing out-of-court statements, and pursue record-dependent ineffective assistance claims via CPL 440.10. For appellate courts, the decision may foreshadow further refinement at the Court of Appeals on how far the rule of completeness can go when the missing context is a testimonial statement from an unavailable declarant.

In sum, Peterson both stabilizes police-practice doctrine on 911-based stops and pushes the jurisprudential conversation forward on the completeness–confrontation interface. Its dual holdings are poised to influence trial tactics and appellate litigation throughout New York.