“Too Late to Remand”: The Eleventh Circuit’s Unpublished Decision in Albert M. Robinson v. Statewide Wrecker Service, Inc.

1. Introduction

In Albert M. Robinson v. Statewide Wrecker Service, Inc. (11th Cir. July 9 2025, No. 23-11910), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued an unpublished, non-precedential opinion that nonetheless provides a crisp refresher on two recurring removal-jurisdiction themes:

1. The iron-clad 30-day statutory window for raising procedural objections to removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); and
2. The breadth of a district court’s discretion—once all federal claims are dismissed—to dismiss rather than remand any pendent state-law claims.

The controversy began when Albert Robinson’s truck and trailer were towed from a Georgia Walmart parking lot. Multiple iterations of state-court complaints eventually asserted both federal civil-rights violations and a grab-bag of state-law torts against Statewide Wrecker Service, its owners, and several Walmart affiliates. After Walmart and two individual defendants removed the suit, Robinson thrice sought remand—twice withdrawing his motions and once filing too late. The district court dismissed the federal claims with prejudice, declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims, denied Robinson’s third remand motion as untimely, and later denied his Rule 60 motion for relief from judgment. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed across the board.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeals, per curiam, held:

• Robinson forfeited any procedural objections to removal by not pressing his remand motion within § 1447(c)’s 30-day period; withdrawing two timely motions did not toll or revive the deadline.
• The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Robinson’s Rule 60(a) & (b) motion. Using the August 2020 second-amended complaint as the operative pleading, and recognizing Walmart et al. as defendants, was no “clerical error.” Nor did Robinson present new evidence or exceptional circumstances to justify Rule 60(b) relief.
• Once the federal claims were dismissed, the district court acted well within its discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) to dismiss the remaining state-law claims without prejudice rather than remand them.

Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the Northern District of Georgia.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents and Authorities Cited

• Connecticut State Dental Ass’n v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc., 591 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2009) – provides the standard of review (de novo) for denials of remand after final judgment.
• Bainbridge v. Governor of Florida, 75 F.4th 1326 (11th Cir. 2023) – articulates the “clerical-mistake” standard under Rule 60(a) and the abuse-of-discretion standard under Rule 60(b).
• Shipley v. Helping Hands Therapy, 996 F.3d 1157 (11th Cir. 2021) – confirms that failure to move for remand within 30 days forfeits procedural objections to removal.
• Harris-Billups v. Anderson, 61 F.4th 1298 (11th Cir. 2023) – encourages district courts to dismiss remaining state claims once federal claims are gone.
• Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (1988) – recognizes district courts’ discretion either to remand or dismiss state-law claims after federal claims are dismissed.
• Statutes: 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a) (removal jurisdiction), 1447(c) (procedure for remand), 1367(c)(3) (supplemental jurisdiction).
• Rules: Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a) & 60(b) (relief from judgment).

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Procedural Remand Window – § 1447(c):

   Section 1447(c) draws a bright line: any motion to remand based on procedural defects in removal must be filed within 30 days after the notice of removal. Robinson’s September 24, 2020 and October 9, 2020 motions were timely, but he withdrew both, thereby abandoning them. His August 2022 motion, filed nearly two years after removal, was untimely. Citing Shipley, the panel reiterated that litigants who fail to object within the statutory period “forfeit any procedural objections.”

2. Rule 60(a) – No “Clerical Error” to Correct:

   Robinson tried to recast the inclusion of Walmart and others as “defendants” (and hence removers) as a clerical slip. Under Bainbridge, Rule 60(a) reaches only mechanical, ministerial mistakes—not discretionary decisions or legal conclusions. Because Walmart et al. had actually answered the second-amended complaint in state court before removing, their status as defendants was indisputable, and there was no mis-recorded intention for the district court to “correct.”

3. Rule 60(b) – No New Evidence or Fraud Sufficient for Relief:

   Robinson invoked multiple Rule 60(b) grounds, but the district court found no newly discovered evidence, no fraud on the court, and no extraordinary circumstance warranting relief. The appellate panel found no abuse of discretion in that conclusion.

4. Supplemental Jurisdiction – Dismissal vs. Remand:

   Once all federal claims are dismissed, § 1367(c)(3) allows—but does not mandate—remand of residual state claims. The Supreme Court’s Carnegie-Mellon and the Eleventh Circuit’s own precedents (Harris-Billups) encourage, but do not compel, dismissal or remand. The district court elected dismissal without prejudice. Because that choice is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and because dismissal is an accepted and frequently endorsed option, the appellate court upheld it.

3.3 Potential Impact on Future Litigation

Even though the opinion is marked “DO NOT PUBLISH” and therefore not binding precedent under 11th Cir. R. 36-2, it still offers guidance:

• Litigation Tactics: Plaintiffs must decide whether they truly want remand. Filing and later withdrawing a timely remand motion is risky; the clock will not restart.
• Rule 60 Strategy: Attempting to recast a legal decision as a mere clerical mistake under Rule 60(a) is rarely successful. Parties should marshal substantive grounds under Rule 60(b) instead.
• District Courts’ Autonomy: The decision underscores broad discretion to dismiss state claims upon dismissing federal claims, reinforcing the importance for plaintiffs to plead viable federal causes of action if they wish to stay in federal court.
• Removal Practice Clarity: Defendants can rely on the 30-day forfeiture rule to secure federal jurisdiction when plaintiffs sleep on—or abandon—their procedural objections.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Removal (28 U.S.C. § 1441): A mechanism that allows defendants to transfer (remove) a lawsuit filed in state court to federal court if certain jurisdictional prerequisites are met (e.g., federal question or diversity).
• Remand: Sending the case back to state court. If based on procedural defects in the removal process, the motion must be filed within 30 days after removal. If based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, it can be raised at any time.
• Procedural vs. Jurisdictional Defects:
  • Procedural defects include failure to join all defendants, late removal, or improper venue.
  • Jurisdictional defects involve the absence of a valid federal question or diversity. These can be raised at any time, even sua sponte by the court.
• Supplemental Jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1367): Allows federal courts to hear state-law claims tied to the same case or controversy as the federal claims. If the federal claims vanish, the court may dispose of the state claims by dismissal or remand.
• Rule 60(a): Corrects clerical errors—typographical, transpositional, or other mechanical mistakes that cause the judgment to mis-state the court’s original intent.
• Rule 60(b): Provides six grounds for relief from final judgment, including newly discovered evidence, fraud, or any otherwise “extraordinary” reason that justifies relief.
• Abuse of Discretion: A deferential standard of appellate review. A trial court abuses its discretion only if it applies the wrong legal standard, follows improper procedures, makes clearly erroneous factual findings, or reaches a plainly unreasonable conclusion.

5. Conclusion

While unpublished, Robinson v. Statewide Wrecker Service packs two evergreen lessons for federal practitioners:

1. Deadlines Matter. A procedural remand motion withdrawn—or never filed—within the statutory 30-day window cannot be revived years later. Plaintiffs must promptly raise and preserve removal objections or forever hold their peace.
2. Supplemental Jurisdiction Is Discretionary. After disposing of federal claims, district courts may dismiss state-law claims without remand. Plaintiffs cannot compel a federal court to send their leftover state claims back to the state forum.

The decision reiterates the Eleventh Circuit’s faithful adherence to statutory text and precedent on removal, remand, and post-judgment relief. Practitioners who heed these principles will avoid the procedural pitfalls that ultimately doomed Robinson’s attempt to return to state court.