Reasonable Diligence Without Formal Extradition:
The Fourth Circuit’s Speedy Trial Framework for Defendants Imprisoned Abroad in United States v. Umar Chaudhry

I. Introduction

In United States v. Umar Farooq Chaudhry, No. 24‑4471 (4th Cir. Dec. 16, 2025), the Fourth Circuit addressed a difficult question at the intersection of constitutional criminal procedure, international extradition, and counterterrorism: when the United States waits more than a decade to bring a defendant to trial because he is imprisoned by a foreign sovereign, what does the Sixth Amendment’s Speedy Trial Clause require?

Chaudhry, a dual U.S.–Pakistani citizen, traveled from Virginia to Pakistan in 2009 as part of a group seeking to join violent jihad in Afghanistan. Pakistani authorities arrested, prosecuted, and imprisoned him for terrorism-related offenses. Only after he completed a decade-long sentence in Pakistan was he extradited to the Eastern District of Virginia, where he faced overlapping federal terrorism charges.

Chaudhry moved to dismiss the U.S. indictment, arguing that the government violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial by failing to pursue his extradition promptly. He contended that the United States deliberately or negligently allowed a ten-year delay while he languished in harsh Pakistani prison conditions. The district court rejected his claim; he then entered a conditional guilty plea preserving his speedy trial challenge for appeal.

The Fourth Circuit, in a published opinion by Judge Quattlebaum joined by Judges King and Wynn, affirmed. The court held that:

Even assuming Chaudhry’s Sixth Amendment right attached when a complaint, arrest warrant, and INTERPOL Red Notice issued in 2009, the government did not violate that right.
Pakistan’s prosecution and imprisonment of Chaudhry, coupled with the terms of the U.S.–U.K.–Pakistan extradition treaty and Pakistan’s historical non-cooperation, provided a valid reason for delay.
The United States made reasonably diligent, good-faith efforts—short of formal extradition—to secure his return, and a formal extradition request during his imprisonment would have been futile.
Chaudhry’s active resistance to extradition and failure to show concrete trial prejudice doomed his Sixth Amendment claim under the Barker v. Wingo balancing test.

The opinion is significant because it clarifies how the Speedy Trial Clause applies when a defendant is in the custody of a foreign sovereign and the extradition treaty itself bars, or practically prevents, earlier surrender. It also articulates a clear rule: the government is not constitutionally required to undertake a formal extradition effort that would be futile, so long as it documents reasonably diligent alternative efforts to secure the defendant’s return.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The “Sargodha Five” and the Jihad Plan

Umar Farooq Chaudhry was born in Pakistan in 1985 and immigrated to the United States as a child, becoming a dual citizen. In 2009, he joined four other young men from the Washington, D.C. area—Ahmed Ameer Minni, Aman Hassan Yemer, Waqar Hussain Khan, and Ramy Said Zamzam—in a plan to travel to Afghanistan to wage violent jihad against U.S. and allied forces.

The plot developed after an online recruiter known as “Saifullah” (“Sword of Allah”) contacted Minni and Yemer via YouTube. With Saifullah’s guidance, they recruited Chaudhry and the others and planned a route through Pakistan into Afghanistan. Before leaving, the group recorded an 11-minute “final message” video in English and Arabic, depicting U.S. military actions and civilian casualties, over which Zamzam narrated an exhortation that jihad had become an individual duty. The video, saved to a USB drive, was intended for eventual upload to YouTube.

In November 2009, the group flew to Pakistan. When contact with Saifullah proved difficult, they independently sought connections to militant groups. Khan and Chaudhry approached a mosque in Hyderabad linked to Jaish-e-Mohammed (“JeM”), a designated foreign terrorist organization. They were directed to a Jamaat-ud-Dawa mosque in Lahore, and ultimately to Sargodha to obtain a reference, using Chaudhry’s relatives as local contacts.

Meanwhile, their families in Virginia reported them missing to the FBI and turned over the USB drive containing the “final message” video.

B. Arrest and Prosecution in Pakistan

On December 9, 2009, Pakistani authorities arrested the group in a house belonging to Chaudhry’s cousin in Sargodha. They possessed notes referencing the Hyderabad mosque, Jamaat-ud-Dawa, and “JeM.”

On December 11, 2009, the FBI interviewed Chaudhry while he was in Pakistani custody. He admitted:

“[W]e came for the sake of Islam to work with the Muslims. . . . I am letting you know that I know about the video. We came here together and the video speaks for us. Whatever the video says, I am for that.”

That same day, the FBI Legal Attaché informed Pakistan’s Minister of Interior that the U.S. intended to bring charges and would seek custody of the five men. However, Pakistan moved quickly to prosecute them domestically.

On June 24, 2010, a Pakistani court convicted all five of conspiring to commit terrorist acts in Pakistan and sentenced each to ten years’ imprisonment.

C. The U.S. Charges, Red Notice, and Early Diplomatic Efforts

On December 23, 2009, the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Eastern District of Virginia filed a criminal complaint charging Chaudhry and his co-defendants with conspiring to provide material support to terrorists. A federal arrest warrant issued the same day, and the government promptly sought to unseal the complaint to obtain an INTERPOL Red Notice.

On December 24, 2009, the Legal Attaché informed Pakistan’s Ministry of Interior of the federal charges and provided copies of the arrest warrants, stating that the U.S. sought custody and could arrange air transport within 72 hours. Pakistan responded that a local court had ordered the defendants detained and barred their transfer to any foreign government.

On January 8 and 15, 2010, the United States transmitted a formal diplomatic note through its Embassy in Islamabad. Acknowledging that Pakistan was preparing its own terrorism case, the U.S. urged Pakistan to:

Suspend or defer its criminal proceedings, and
Deport or expel the defendants to the United States “as soon as possible.”

The note expressed concern that if the transfer were “delayed pending lengthy proceedings in Pakistan, or even their service of a sentence of imprisonment in Pakistan,” the U.S. case could be weakened and opportunities to disrupt terrorist networks lost. There is no record of any substantive Pakistani response to this note.

Over the next several months, the Ambassador and the Legal Attaché engaged Pakistani authorities repeatedly, pressing the request that the defendants be transferred to U.S. custody. These efforts continued even after conviction and sentencing in Pakistan, with periodic status checks and reference to the “pending requests for extradition” of the Sargodha group. The INTERPOL Red Notices remained in place throughout.

D. The Extradition Treaty with Pakistan and Structural Obstacles

Extradition between the United States and Pakistan is governed by the 1931 U.S.–U.K. Extradition Treaty, extended to British India in 1942 and carried forward by Pakistan upon independence in 1947. Critically, Article IV provides:

“The extradition shall not take place if the person claimed has already been tried and discharged or punished, or is still under trial in the territories of the High Contracting Party applied to, for the crime or offence for which his extradition is demanded.

If the person claimed should be under examination or under punishment in the territories of the High Contracting Party applied to for any other crime or offence, his extradition shall be deferred until the conclusion of the trial and the full execution of any punishment awarded to him.”

Jeffrey Olson of the DOJ Office of International Affairs (OIA) described Pakistan’s extradition process as multi-layered, slow, and often non-responsive. Extradition requests pass through the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Interior, a magistrate, the federal cabinet, and can be challenged in Pakistan’s courts up to the Supreme Court. Many past U.S. requests had been lost, destroyed, or ignored. In the preceding fifteen years, only two individuals (other than Chaudhry) had been extradited to the United States.

By contrast, Pakistan would sometimes use a more flexible, informal mechanism: “deportation” (or “repatriation”) of foreign nationals by executive action. The United States hoped that, as an American citizen, Chaudhry might be removed via deportation rather than through the treaty’s formal extradition channel.

On December 15, 2009, the Assistant Legal Attaché met with the Director General of Pakistan’s National Crisis Management Center (Interior Ministry). The Director General:

Indicated Pakistan might prefer a formal extradition request, but
Explicitly stated that deportation of the five U.S. citizens was “possible,” albeit politically harder now that intelligence agencies were involved.

He advised that U.S. officials should discuss the matter at a high political level and then submit a formal request, but also stressed that any decision on deportation or repatriation would be a political one.

E. Indictment, Imminent Release, and Formal Extradition

On November 16, 2017, a federal grand jury in the Eastern District of Virginia indicted Chaudhry and his co-defendants on four terrorism-related counts, including conspiracy and attempt to provide material support both to terrorists and to a designated foreign terrorist organization, JeM. New arrest warrants issued the same day.

In late 2019, U.S. officials learned that the Pakistani sentences were approaching expiration. After clarification from Pakistani authorities, Chaudhry’s release date was set for March 29, 2020, later effectively moved up to June 9, 2020 (for reasons not clear in the record).

On June 22, 2020, Pakistan formally informed the United States by diplomatic note that it would not consent to deportation and would require a formal extradition request for Chaudhry. After pandemic-related delays, the U.S. presented a formal request on November 12, 2020.

By that time, however, Chaudhry had already been released from Pakistani custody (June 9, 2020). For more than a year, his extradition request wound its way through Pakistan’s internal processes. Pakistan eventually issued domestic arrest warrants and re-arrested him on August 17, 2022.

Chaudhry then actively fought extradition through Pakistani courts for approximately eleven months. Ultimately, he ceased contesting removal, and on July 14, 2023, a Pakistani judge approved his extradition. The federal cabinet followed, and Chaudhry was surrendered to U.S. authorities on December 6, 2023, arriving at Washington Dulles International Airport.

F. District Court Proceedings and Conditional Plea

Chaudhry was arraigned on December 12, 2023. The district court designated the matter as complex and specifically inquired whether Chaudhry wished to insist on a trial within 70 days under the Speedy Trial Act. After consultation with counsel, he waived those statutory rights, and the court found the waiver knowing and voluntary.

On January 11, 2024, Chaudhry moved to dismiss the indictment for violation of his Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights, arguing that the United States failed to make diligent good-faith efforts to secure his earlier return from Pakistan. The district court denied the motion from the bench and later issued a written opinion in June 2024.

On May 2, 2024, Chaudhry entered a conditional guilty plea under Rule 11(a)(2) to one count of conspiring to provide material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, JeM, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. The government agreed to recommend a sentence of time served plus 20 years of supervised release, and Chaudhry preserved his right to appeal the speedy trial ruling. The district court imposed the agreed sentence.

Chaudhry timely appealed. The sole issue: whether the Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Clause was violated.

III. Summary of the Fourth Circuit’s Opinion

The Fourth Circuit applied the Barker v. Wingo four-factor test:

Length of delay;
Reason for delay;
Defendant’s assertion of the right; and
Prejudice to the defendant.

Key holdings:

Length of delay: The delay easily crossed the threshold for being “presumptively prejudicial” for purposes of triggering full Barker analysis. The court assumed, without deciding, that the Sixth Amendment right attached in 2009 when a complaint, arrest warrant, and Red Notice issued (consistent with prior Fourth Circuit precedent in Thomas and Woolfolk), although the Supreme Court’s MacDonald decision would ordinarily peg attachment to indictment or arrest. Either way, the delay far exceeded one year, so this factor weighed in Chaudhry’s favor.
Reason for delay: This was the critical factor. The court held that the delay was primarily due to Pakistan’s prosecution and imprisonment of Chaudhry and the structural and legal barriers to extraditing him sooner. The government was neither deliberately dilatory nor negligent; instead, it acted with reasonable diligence and good faith, repeatedly seeking Chaudhry’s transfer through diplomatic channels and later via formal extradition once Pakistan demanded it. The court emphasized that:
- Article IV of the extradition treaty mandatorily barred Pakistan from extraditing Chaudhry until completion of his sentence.
- Pakistan’s history of ignoring or mishandling extradition requests made early extradition effectively futile.
- The U.S. government was not required by the Constitution to file a formal extradition request that had no realistic chance of success.
This factor weighed strongly in favor of the government.
Assertion of the right: While Chaudhry could not be faulted for failing to assert a speedy trial claim before he became aware of the U.S. charges, his subsequent conduct cut the other way. Once he learned of the charges after his Pakistani release, he went to significant lengths to oppose extradition for nearly a year in Pakistan’s courts and also consented to at least one continuance under the Speedy Trial Act after arraignment. The court treated those actions as inconsistent with vigorously insisting on a speedy trial. This factor weighed against him.
Prejudice: Because the court found no government negligence, it declined to apply the “presumptive prejudice” doctrine of Doggett at the prejudice stage and instead required Chaudhry to demonstrate actual prejudice. He failed to do so. The court rejected:
- His claim that he lost a chance to serve U.S. and Pakistani sentences concurrently as speculative and moot (given his time-served sentence in the U.S.);
- His reliance on harsh Pakistani prison conditions as irrelevant to U.S. pretrial delay (he was imprisoned for Pakistani crimes, not as a pretrial detainee on U.S. charges); and
- His assertion that a co-defendant’s mental breakdown deprived him of a key witness, because he failed to identify what exculpatory testimony was lost.
This factor also weighed against Chaudhry.

Balancing all four factors, the court held that the government did not violate Chaudhry’s Sixth Amendment rights and affirmed the conviction.

IV. Detailed Legal Analysis

A. The Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Framework

The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.” The Supreme Court has long held that the contours of this right are “impossible to determine with precision,” and therefore must be assessed using a “functional analysis” in context. This analysis was crystallized in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).

Under Barker, four factors are balanced:

Length of delay – both as a threshold issue and as a factor.
Reason for the delay – deliberate delay, negligence, neutral reasons, or valid reasons.
Defendant’s assertion of the right – timeliness and vigor.
Prejudice – focusing particularly on impairment of the defense.

No single factor is dispositive; courts must balance them in light of the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant. Deliberate delay to hamper the defense weighs heavily against the government; valid reasons for delay weigh in its favor.

Two additional Supreme Court decisions frame the analysis here:

Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969) – When a defendant is imprisoned by another sovereign, the prosecuting sovereign has a constitutional duty to make “diligent, good-faith” efforts to bring him to trial; it cannot simply ignore him until his other sentence ends.
Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992) – Long delays attributable to government negligence can create a presumption of prejudice at the fourth Barker factor, obviating the need for a concrete showing of prejudice in some circumstances. Doggett also underscores that courts must give “considerable deference” to a district court’s assessment of whether the government was negligent.

Against this backdrop, Chaudhry applies and subtly extends Fourth Circuit precedent on speedy trial rights when a defendant is in the custody of another sovereign.

B. First Factor: Length of Delay and When the Right Attaches

1. Attachment of the Sixth Amendment Right

In MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1 (1982), the Supreme Court held that the Speedy Trial Clause is triggered when a defendant is “indicted, arrested, or otherwise officially accused.” Pre-accusation delay is governed instead by the Due Process Clause and statutes of limitation.

In prior Fourth Circuit decisions, however, the court held that a combination of a federal complaint, arrest warrant, and detainer (or similar mechanism) can trigger the Sixth Amendment even before indictment or federal custody:

United States v. Thomas, 55 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 1995) – A federal detainer and warrant lodged while the defendant was in state custody triggered speedy trial rights.
United States v. Woolfolk, 399 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 2005) – Reinforced Thomas: a detainer, complaint, and warrant together can amount to an “official accusation.”

In Chaudhry, the government obtained a complaint, arrest warrant, and Red Notice in December 2009, but did not indict until 2017. The court explicitly acknowledged potential tension between Thomas/Woolfolk and MacDonald, but sidestepped resolving it. Instead, it:

Assumed, consistent with Thomas, that Chaudhry’s Sixth Amendment right attached in 2009; and
Held that, even on that defendant‑favorable assumption, the claim failed.

This preserves, but does not expand, the Thomas/Woolfolk doctrine and leaves for another day a direct reconciliation with MacDonald.

2. Presumptively Prejudicial Delay as a Threshold

The court reiterated that the “length of delay” has a double role:

As a threshold trigger: a delay approaching one year is generally “presumptively prejudicial” in the sense that it warrants a full Barker analysis; and
As one of the four balancing factors.

Here, using either 2009 or 2017 as the starting point, the delay to Chaudhry’s 2023 arrival and post‑arraignment proceedings greatly exceeded one year. Accordingly, the first factor favored Chaudhry and allowed the court to move to the remaining Barker factors.

The court’s real work occurs in the second, third, and fourth factors.

C. Second Factor: Reasons for Delay – Foreign Imprisonment, Futility, and Reasonable Diligence

1. “Other Sovereign” Prosecutions as a Valid Reason

The court began with an established principle: where another sovereign—federal, state, or foreign—is prosecuting or imprisoning the defendant, that other prosecution is often a valid reason for delay under Barker, provided the prosecuting sovereign still fulfills its duty to make “diligent, good-faith” efforts to bring the accused to trial. See:

Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969);
United States v. Grimmond, 137 F.3d 823 (4th Cir. 1998);
Thomas, 55 F.3d at 150 (recognizing the state prosecution as a valid basis to delay federal trial).

In Grimmond, the Fourth Circuit held that a defendant’s lawful incarceration by another sovereign for a different crime can justify delay unless he shows a “credible possibility” that concurrency of sentences or similar benefits were lost due to the delay. In Chaudhry, the court extended that logic into a more complex international context, with both:

A formal extradition treaty restricting premature surrender; and
A pattern of foreign non-cooperation with U.S. extradition requests.

2. Formal Extradition Not Required When It Would Be Futile

A central question was whether the United States was constitutionally required to file a formal extradition request for Chaudhry during his Pakistani incarceration, despite indicators that such a request would likely fail.

Drawing from out-of-circuit authority, the court endorsed a nuanced rule:

Formal extradition is not required to show reasonable diligence where such a request would be futile.
The government may satisfy its Smith v. Hooey duty through alternative good-faith efforts (e.g., seeking deportation, sending diplomatic notes, obtaining a Red Notice), provided they are reasonable in light of legal and practical constraints.

The court cited:

United States v. Diacolios, 837 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1988) – No case law requires a formal extradition request before due diligence can be found; futility can excuse the lack of a formal request.
United States v. Walton, 814 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1987) – Informal requests and communications can demonstrate due diligence under the Speedy Trial Act.
United States v. Valencia-Quintana, 136 F. App’x 707 (5th Cir. 2005) – The government is not negligent merely because it could have pursued more aggressive methods.

By contrast, the cases Chaudhry relied on—United States v. Pomeroy, 822 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1987), and United States v. Heshelman, 521 F. App’x 501 (6th Cir. 2013)—involved situations where the United States almost entirely failed to seek return: it “held [a request] in abeyance” (Pomeroy) or did not seek a Red Notice or any formal mechanism because it hoped the defendant would voluntarily return (Heshelman). The Fourth Circuit distinguished these as examples of actual governmental inaction, unlike here.

3. Interpreting Article IV: “Shall Not Take Place” as Mandatory

A substantial part of the court’s futility analysis turned on the text of Article IV of the extradition treaty. The court observed that:

“The extradition shall not take place if the person claimed has already been tried and discharged or punished, or is still under trial … for the crime or offence for which his extradition is demanded. … [His] extradition shall be deferred until the conclusion of the trial and the full execution of any punishment awarded to him.”

Emphasizing the word “shall,” and citing Kingdomware Technologies, Inc. v. United States, 579 U.S. 162 (2016), the court concluded this language is mandatory, not discretionary. Therefore:

Pakistan, under its treaty obligations, could not lawfully extradite Chaudhry before the completion of his sentence for the offense at issue.
Any formal extradition request by the U.S. during that period would have been virtually certain to fail.

Chaudhry cited Beukes v. Pizzi, 888 F. Supp. 465 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), where the United States declined to enforce a similar “shall be deferred” clause in a treaty with South Africa, but the Fourth Circuit found that case inapposite. Beukes concerned who had standing to invoke a treaty provision (the defendant or the sovereign), not whether the clause was mandatory.

Importantly, the court did not say Pakistan legally could not waive Article IV; rather, based on the treaty’s terms and practice, the U.S. reasonably believed Pakistan would insist on applying it. That belief made a pre‑sentence extradition request sufficiently futile that the Constitution did not demand it.

4. Pakistan’s Track Record and the Local Court Order

The futility assessment was reinforced by:

– As Olson testified, most U.S. extradition requests to Pakistan in recent years had been lost, destroyed, heavily delayed, or met with silence. Only two individuals (besides Chaudhry) had been successfully extradited in fifteen years.
A specific local court order – Early in the case, a Pakistani court had issued an order barring transfer of the Sargodha group to any foreign government. That order remained in force during Chaudhry’s sentence.

Taken together, these facts made it reasonable for U.S. officials to pursue more flexible mechanisms—especially deportation—and to conclude that pushing a formal extradition request before sentence completion would not succeed.

5. The United States’ Diligent, Good-Faith Efforts

The Fourth Circuit credited a substantial record of governmental activity:

Prompt notification to Pakistan of the intent to prosecute Chaudhry in the U.S.
Early request for transfer and follow‑up meetings with high‑level Pakistani officials.
Preparation of a detailed diplomatic note seeking suspension of Pakistani proceedings and deportation or expulsion.
Securing an arrest warrant and INTERPOL Red Notice.
Repeated status inquiries and diplomatic pressure over the years.
Rapid pivot to formal extradition once Pakistan, in June 2020, expressly required it.

Against that backdrop, the court rejected the notion that the U.S. was either deliberately stalling or negligent. It emphasized that the Constitution does not require pursuing “every available option” or the most aggressive conceivable strategy; it demands reasonable diligence under the circumstances. Here, the combination of legal constraints, diplomatic realities, and documented efforts rendered the delay valid under Barker.

6. Alleged Illegitimacy of the Pakistani Conviction

Chaudhry argued that his Pakistani prosecution was “fraudulent” and “illegitimate,” allegedly based on fabricated evidence about planned attacks on Pakistani targets. He contended that the government could not claim Pakistan’s sentence as a legitimate basis for U.S. delay unless it proved that conviction was valid.

The court found this argument unpersuasive for two reasons:

The Pakistani charges (conspiracy to commit terrorist acts in Pakistan and providing support to a terrorist organization) closely mirrored the U.S. charges and Chaudhry’s later stipulations, undermining the assertion that they were inherently “fraudulent.”
Even if Pakistan had fabricated evidence, that would more likely have made it less willing to extradite Chaudhry before sentence completion, further underscoring the futility of early extradition efforts rather than undermining them.

The court therefore declined to treat the alleged illegitimacy of the foreign conviction as a factor weighing against the government under Barker.

Overall, the second factor—reasons for delay—strongly favored the government.

D. Third Factor: Assertion (or Avoidance) of the Right

The third Barker factor examines “the timeliness and vigor” with which the defendant asserts his speedy trial right. A failure to assert is not dispositive, but is “entitled to strong evidentiary weight” in the balance.

1. While Unaware of the Charges

For the period from 2009 until at least 2018, the record suggested that Chaudhry was unaware that U.S. charges were pending, though he did inquire once during a consular visit whether any such charges existed. Consistent with Doggett and other precedents, the court held that he could not be faulted for failing to assert speedy trial rights while he was unaware of the prosecution.

2. After Learning of the Charges: Fighting Extradition

The picture changed dramatically once Chaudhry learned of the U.S. indictment (his counsel indicated he was contesting extradition by August 2020). From that point:

Chaudhry did not demand a prompt U.S. trial; instead, he fought extradition in Pakistan for approximately eleven months after his re‑arrest in August 2022.
Courts—including a prior Fourth Circuit unpublished decision (In re Bramson, 107 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 1997)) and district court cases—have treated resistance to extradition as the “opposite of insisting on a speedy trial.”

Relying on that line of authority, the court concluded that Chaudhry’s litigation strategy in Pakistan weighed against him: he was trying to avoid trial altogether, not trying to hasten it.

3. Post-Arraignment Conduct in the Eastern District of Virginia

After his arrival in the U.S. in December 2023, Chaudhry:

Filed his Sixth Amendment motion within about a month (January 11, 2024); but
Also waived his Speedy Trial Act right to a trial within 70 days and did not insist on immediate trial.

The court acknowledged that statutory (Speedy Trial Act) and constitutional speedy trial rights are distinct, but “obviously related.” His waiver of statutory protections did not defeat his constitutional claim, but it did further undercut the idea that he was pressing for a speedy resolution.

Weighing the entire timeline, the court held that Chaudhry:

Was excused from assertion while unaware of the charges, but
Took actions inconsistent with a desire for a speedy trial as soon as he knew of the indictment—i.e., he tried to avoid U.S. jurisdiction entirely.

This factor therefore counted against him.

E. Fourth Factor: Prejudice – Loss of Defense, Anxiety, and Harsh Foreign Custody

1. Two Uses of “Presumptive Prejudice”

The court took care to clarify a terminological confusion that runs through post‑Doggett case law: the phrase “presumptive prejudice” is sometimes used in two different senses:

Triggering presumption (Factor 1): A delay approaching one year is “presumptively prejudicial” in the threshold sense—it justifies proceeding to full Barker analysis. This is a relatively low bar.
Substantive presumption (Factor 4): A different, more consequential presumption can arise when prolonged delay is due to government negligence. In that setting, some circuits allow the defendant to benefit from a presumption that his defense was impaired, shifting the burden to the government to rebut prejudice, as in Doggett.

In Chaudhry, the first type of presumption (threshold) was undisputed. But the second depended on whether the delay resulted from government negligence. Because the court found the government acted with reasonable diligence—not negligence—no presumption of prejudice applied at the fourth factor. Chaudhry therefore had to show actual prejudice.

2. Evaluating Claimed Prejudice

The Supreme Court in Barker identified three core interests the speedy trial right protects:

Preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration;
Minimizing anxiety and concern of the accused; and
Limiting impairment of the defense (the most critical).

Chaudhry asserted several types of prejudice:

a. Lost Opportunity for Concurrent Sentences

Chaudhry argued that had the United States proceeded faster, he might have served his U.S. and Pakistani sentences concurrently. The court rejected this for two reasons:

There was no “credible possibility” shown that any U.S. court would actually have imposed a concurrent sentence or that Pakistan would have allowed it, especially under Article IV.
Chaudhry ultimately received a time-served sentence in the United States—no additional incarceration beyond the Pakistani term—so any lost concurrency was abstract.

Consistent with Grimmond, Lozano, and Uribe-Rios, the court treated speculative concurrency arguments as insufficient.

b. Harsh Pakistani Prison Conditions

Chaudhry described inhumane conditions and suffering in Pakistani prison. The court did not dispute the hardship but concluded that:

His incarceration was for Pakistani offenses, under Pakistani authority; it was not “pretrial incarceration” for the U.S. charges.
His treatment and the conditions in Pakistan were a product of Pakistan’s penal system and its own prosecution, not a result of U.S. delay in bringing him to trial.

In line with Grimmond and Ghailani, the court held that such foreign imprisonment—however harsh—is not properly attributable to the U.S. for Sixth Amendment prejudice analysis where the foreign incarceration would have occurred regardless of U.S. prosecution timing.

c. Anxiety and Concern

To the extent Chaudhry claimed anxiety from the pending U.S. charges, the court noted prior precedent (Lozano; Lloyd) holding that a defendant generally cannot claim prejudice based on anxiety over charges of which he was unaware. While he speculated that charges might exist, the court did not see this as the type of specific, demonstrable anxiety the Sixth Amendment contemplates.

d. Impaired Defense: Co-Defendant’s Mental Breakdown

Finally, Chaudhry argued that the delay impaired his defense because co-defendant Yemer suffered a severe mental breakdown during the ten-year period and thus became unavailable as a witness.

The court carefully acknowledged that the loss or unavailability of a defense witness can be a serious form of prejudice. However, it found Chaudhry’s claim too vague:

He did not identify what specific testimony Yemer would have offered.
He did not show that such testimony would have been exculpatory or materially helpful.
He provided no concrete link between the delay and any specific loss to his defense strategy.

Cases such as Lewis, Bass, and Koller require a defendant alleging lost witness testimony to specify, with some particularity, what the witness would have said and why it matters. Chaudhry did not meet that standard.

Because he demonstrated neither presumptive nor actual prejudice, the fourth factor favored the government.

V. Clarifying Complex Concepts and Terminology

A. Extradition vs. Deportation

Extradition is a formal, treaty-based process where one sovereign hands over a person to another sovereign to face charges, typically involving:

A treaty basis;
A formal diplomatic request;
Judicial review in the requested state; and
Final executive decision by that state’s government.

Deportation (or expulsion), by contrast, is an internal immigration or executive action by the requested state, removing an individual from its territory. It is not treaty‑driven and often involves fewer formal safeguards or procedural steps, but depends heavily on the deporting state’s domestic law and political choices.

In Chaudhry, the United States initially pursued deportation because:

Pakistan had informally used deportation to move foreign suspects;
Deportation could be faster than treaty extradition; and
Article IV’s bar on extraditing someone under sentence made formal extradition unlikely to succeed, whereas deportation, as a unilateral Pakistani measure, might arguably have been undertaken despite the treaty.

B. INTERPOL Red Notice

A Red Notice is a request circulated by INTERPOL at the request of a member country, asking other members to identify or provisionally arrest a person based on a valid national arrest warrant. It is not an international arrest warrant, but often functions similarly in practice by:

Alerting foreign law enforcement to the existence of charges and a warrant;
Providing identifying information; and
Forming a basis under many national laws for arrest or immigration detention.

In Chaudhry, the Red Notice was a critical step in documenting U.S. diligence and ensuring Chaudhry could be stopped if he left Pakistan or was located elsewhere.

C. Speedy Trial Act vs. Sixth Amendment Right

The Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq., is a federal statute that requires criminal trials to commence within specified time periods (typically 70 days from indictment or first appearance), subject to numerous exclusions and continuances. Defendants can waive or consent to continuances under that Act.

The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is a constitutional guarantee. Violations are assessed under Barker. While related, the Act and the Amendment are legally distinct:

A violation of one does not automatically imply a violation of the other.
Waiver of Speedy Trial Act deadlines does not automatically waive the constitutional right, but it is relevant to the Barker analysis of how vigorously the defendant asserted his right.

D. The Two Senses of “Presumptive Prejudice”

As noted above, “presumptive prejudice” can mean:

A threshold concept for factor one – a delay long enough to trigger full Barker inquiry.
A substantive presumption at factor four – where long delay caused by government negligence relieves the defendant from proving specific prejudice.

In Chaudhry, the first sense was present; the second was not, because the court found no negligence.

E. “Futility” in the Extradition Context

In constitutional law, the government is generally not required to undertake actions that would be futile – i.e., actions with no realistic prospect of achieving the legally relevant goal.

Applied here:

The government’s duty under Smith v. Hooey is to make a “diligent, good-faith effort” to bring a defendant to trial.
That duty does not compel prosecutors or the State Department to file a formal extradition request that is nearly certain to be rejected due to treaty language, foreign practice, and a standing foreign court order.
Instead, they may attempt other reasonable methods, such as diplomatic lobbying, status inquiries, and seeking deportation, to satisfy their constitutional obligation.

VI. Impact and Future Implications

A. For Cross-Border and Terrorism Prosecutions

Chaudhry is particularly important for cases involving:

Defendants captured and prosecuted first by foreign allies;
Multi-jurisdictional terrorism investigations; and
Countries with formal extradition treaties that restrict surrender of individuals who are under prosecution or serving foreign sentences.

It signals that the Fourth Circuit will grant substantial leeway to U.S. authorities where:

The foreign state has clear legal grounds—under treaty or domestic law—to refuse extradition until completion of its own proceedings; and
The U.S. can document a pattern of futile or ignored extradition attempts with that state.

For terrorism cases in particular, this may encourage:

Early and thorough documentation of all contacts with foreign authorities regarding custody and potential transfer;
Strategic use of deportation and immigration tools alongside, or in place of, formal extradition requests when the treaty structure makes early extradition unlikely; and
Reliance on time-served sentences or substantial credit for foreign incarceration when the defendant is ultimately tried in the United States.

B. For Defendants and Defense Counsel

Chaudhry also carries cautionary lessons for defense lawyers:

Resisting extradition will likely be treated as a factor against the defendant under the third Barker factor. A defendant cannot both vigorously fight removal and then later claim the government violated his right to a speedy trial by not bringing him to trial sooner.
Vague claims of prejudice—especially regarding lost witnesses—are unlikely to suffice. Counsel must be prepared to offer specific, credible proffers of:
- What the witness would have said;
- How delay caused unavailability or memory loss; and
- Why the testimony would materially aid the defense.
If there is evidence that early formal extradition might have succeeded notwithstanding treaty language and foreign practice, counsel should develop that factual record early and thoroughly.

C. For Treaty Interpretation and International Practice

The court’s treatment of Article IV underscores that U.S. courts will read “shall not” language in extradition treaties as mandatory, aligning treaty interpretation with ordinary interpretive principles applied to domestic statutes.

At the same time, Chaudhry implicitly recognizes the “comity” and sovereignty issues that arise when U.S. courts evaluate foreign prosecutorial legitimacy or internal decision-making:

The court declined to second‑guess the legitimacy of Pakistan’s prosecution based on press reports and a family declaration, especially where the U.S. charges and factual stipulations closely tracked the foreign charges.
It also avoided pronouncing on whether Pakistan could have waived Article IV; instead, it focused on what the United States could reasonably predict Pakistan would do.

D. Standard of Review for Government “Negligence” in Delay

The Fourth Circuit acknowledged but did not resolve a jurisprudential question: when reviewing the reason for delay factor, particularly whether the government was negligent, should appellate courts apply:

De novo review (as for constitutional questions); or
Clear error/“considerable deference”, as suggested by Doggett and followed by most other circuits?

The panel assumed de novo review “even if” that standard applied but still found the government acted reasonably. Future panels may need to more definitively reconcile the Supreme Court’s “considerable deference” language with Fourth Circuit precedent on constitutional review standards. In practice, however, Chaudhry indicates that even under a demanding standard, detailed evidence of diplomatic efforts will often suffice to defeat a negligence finding.

E. Human Rights Concerns and Practical Limits of the Sixth Amendment

Finally, the case highlights a gap between human rights concerns and the reach of the U.S. Constitution. Chaudhry unquestionably suffered severe consequences: ten years in a Pakistani prison under conditions he describes as inhumane. Yet:

Because that imprisonment was for Pakistani crimes and would have occurred regardless of U.S. charging decisions, it did not qualify as “oppressive pretrial incarceration” for Sixth Amendment purposes.
The Constitution’s speedy trial protections are not a general remedy for harsh treatment by foreign sovereigns, even when the U.S. is planning its own prosecution in parallel.

This underscores that while the Sixth Amendment constrains U.S. prosecutorial choices, it does not provide a vehicle for broad review of foreign criminal justice systems or detention conditions.

VII. Conclusion

United States v. Umar Chaudhry is a significant Fourth Circuit decision at the intersection of speedy trial doctrine, extradition law, and international counterterrorism enforcement. The court held that:

Even a decade-long delay between initial accusation and trial does not violate the Sixth Amendment where the delay is primarily attributable to a foreign sovereign’s prosecution and imprisonment, and where U.S. authorities act with reasonably diligent, good-faith efforts to secure the defendant’s return.
Formal extradition is not constitutionally required when the applicable treaty text and foreign practice make such a request effectively futile; documented attempts to obtain deportation and sustained diplomatic engagement can suffice.
A defendant’s active resistance to extradition weighs against him under the speedy trial analysis; one cannot both evade jurisdiction and claim the government was too slow in bringing him to trial.
Harsh foreign incarceration not attributable to U.S. delay, and speculative prejudice such as potential concurrency or vaguely described lost testimony, will not meet the prejudice requirement absent government negligence.

In doctrinal terms, Chaudhry reinforces an important principle: the Speedy Trial Clause requires reasonable diligence, not the pursuit of futile acts, particularly in a complex international environment governed by treaties and comity. For future cross-border prosecutions, especially terrorism cases involving foreign custody, this decision provides a detailed roadmap of how the Fourth Circuit will evaluate government conduct and defendants’ strategic choices under the Barker framework.

Reasonable Diligence Without Formal Extradition: The Fourth Circuit’s Speedy Trial Framework for Defendants Imprisoned Abroad in United States v. Umar Chaudhry