Reaffirming Nonhearsay Course-of-Conduct Statements and Strict Preservation of Cumulative Error: Commentary on Kevasia Tate v. State of Arkansas, 2025 Ark. 186

I. Introduction

The Arkansas Supreme Court’s decision in Kevasia Tate v. State of Arkansas, 2025 Ark. 186, is a detailed evidentiary opinion arising out of a capital-murder conviction. Although the case does not announce a bold new doctrine, it meaningfully clarifies and reaffirms several practical and recurring rules:

How Arkansas courts distinguish hearsay from nonhearsay and apply hearsay exceptions, particularly excited utterances and course-of-conduct (res gestae–type) use.
The permissible scope of expert testimony based on video evidence under Rule 703.
The rules governing a witness’s use of notes or documents under Rule 612.
The continued vitality of the cumulative-error preservation requirement under Munson v. State.

The case also features a significant concurrence that urges a more straightforward, federal-aligned approach to hearsay—emphasizing that questions, commands, and requests generally are not hearsay at all. The majority explicitly resists relying on the Eighth Circuit’s formulation in United States v. Thomas, preferring to ground its analysis in Arkansas precedents.

Because Tate challenged only evidentiary rulings—never the sufficiency of the evidence—the decision is an especially useful guide for trial and appellate lawyers on how to preserve, argue, and respond to evidentiary objections in Arkansas criminal cases.

II. Overview of the Case

A. Parties and Procedural Posture

Appellant: Kevasia Tate, convicted by a Faulkner County jury of:

Capital murder (life without parole);
Two counts of aggravated assault (two concurrent five-year sentences);
A ten-year consecutive sentence for a firearm enhancement.

Appellee: State of Arkansas.

On appeal, Tate did not contest the sufficiency of the evidence. Instead, he attacked six evidentiary rulings, alleging that the trial court had abused its discretion. He also raised a cumulative-error claim. The Arkansas Supreme Court (Justice Webb writing for the Court) affirmed the convictions and sentences.

B. Factual Background (Brief)

On February 26, 2022, Tate and his associate, Tyrius Harris, attended a dice-and-drinking party in Conway. A dispute arose between Tate and David Hood. Before leaving, Tate threatened to come up and air this bitch out. In response:

Hood sought and obtained a gun.
Partygoer Shamika Little told everyone to leave because Tate and Harris said they were coming back to shoot the house up.
Guest Marketus Lowe, feeling uneasy, called Antonio Smith for a ride home.

Tate and Harris left around 1:49 a.m. and returned four minutes later in a light-colored Mustang with headlights off. Harris carried a 9mm Glock; Tate wielded a .40-caliber pistol fitted with a switch converting it to full automatic. As they walked down Neal Street, Hood exited the house, raised his arm toward them, and a gunfight ensued.

Hood was struck by three bullets, one severing his iliac artery. He died about five hours later of blood loss. Police later determined:

Thirty-four 9mm casings: 31 from Harris’s Glock, 3 from Hood’s Taurus 9mm found in the roadway.
Eleven .40-caliber casings: located in a ditch identified as Tate’s firing position.

During the gunfight, Antonio Smith arrived with his two-year-old daughter. His car was riddled with eleven bullet holes; one bullet’s trajectory indicated that, but for the headrest, it would have struck the child’s car seat. The State ultimately nolle prossed the “presence of a child” enhancement, but proceeded with the core charges.

Tate claimed self-defense at trial, but the jury rejected that claim. On appeal, he did not attack that determination; he instead sought reversal based on alleged evidentiary errors.

III. Summary of the Court’s Decision

The Court applied the familiar abuse-of-discretion standard for evidentiary rulings, coupled with a firm requirement that the appellant show prejudice. It:

Upheld admission of Hood’s “I need a gun” request as nonhearsay, admissible to explain Hood’s subsequent conduct (arming himself) and, in any event, not prejudicial to Tate.
Upheld admission of Shamika Little’s “everybody get out of the house” statement through Angela Marshall’s testimony as an excited utterance.
Upheld admission of Little’s statement to Officer Whitley that there was a gunshot victim in the car as another excited utterance closely tied in time and stress to the shooting and subsequent crash.
Upheld expert testimony from Detective Michael Gibbons that the .40-caliber weapon was fully automatic, based on shell casing count and video timing. The Court emphasized both Rule 703 and the appellant’s failure to develop a legally supported challenge.
Rejected Tate’s Rule 612 objection to Officer Francisco Joseph having a paper at the stand, pointing out that no record was made of what the paper was, how it was used, or any request that it be disclosed. Arkansas precedent allows witnesses to use writings to refresh recollection.
Refused to consider Tate’s cumulative-error argument because he did not raise and secure a ruling on a cumulative-error objection at trial, reaffirming Munson v. State, 331 Ark. 41 (1998).

Justice Bronni, joined by Justice Hiland (and Chief Justice Baker concurring separately), agreed in the result but wrote to emphasize that the challenged statements were not hearsay at all under Rule 801(c), making reliance on hearsay exceptions unnecessary. His concurrence also criticizes the majority’s adherence to Munson’s cumulative-error preservation rule, although the majority notes that Munson remains binding.

IV. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Roles

1. Standard of Review and Prejudice

Beard v. State, 2020 Ark. 62, 594 S.W.3d 29 – Restates the abuse-of-discretion standard for evidentiary rulings, emphasizing that:
An abuse of discretion is a high threshold that does not simply require error, but requires that the court act improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without due consideration.
Lowery v. State, 2019 Ark. 332, 586 S.W.3d 644; McClanahan v. State, 2010 Ark. 39; Reeves v. State, 374 Ark. 415 (2008) – Explain that an abuse of discretion can be established when the trial court misinterprets or misapplies the law, even if factually reasonable.
Taffner v. State, 2018 Ark. 99, 541 S.W.3d 430 – Reiterates that prejudice is not presumed. The appellant must affirmatively show prejudice caused by the evidentiary ruling.

These precedents frame the entire opinion: even if any ruling was questionable, no reversal would occur without a clear legal misapplication and a showing of prejudice.

2. Hearsay and Its Exceptions

Clemons v. State, 2010 Ark. 337, 369 S.W.3d 710; Bowen v. State, 322 Ark. 483, 911 S.W.2d 555 (1995) – Supply the textbook definition of hearsay under Ark. R. Evid. 801(c): an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
Bliss v. State, 282 Ark. 315, 668 S.W.2d 936 (1984); Jackson v. State, 274 Ark. 317, 624 S.W.2d 437 (1981) – Establish that statements offered to explain a course of conduct or basis of action are nonhearsay, as they are not offered for their truth, but to show why someone acted as they did.
Moore v. State, 317 Ark. 630, 882 S.W.2d 667 (1994) – Lays out the requirements for an excited utterance under Rule 803(2): a statement relating to a startling event, made while the declarant is under the stress of excitement caused by the event.

These cases allowed the Court to classify:

Hood’s “I need a gun” as part of the res gestae/course-of-conduct narrative, and
Little’s two statements as excited utterances closely connected to the shooting and threat.

3. Expert Testimony and Appellate Briefing

Ark. R. Evid. 703 – Permits experts to base opinions on data that might be inadmissible if such data is of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field.
Hollis v. State, 346 Ark. 175, 55 S.W.3d 756 (2001); Dougan v. State, 330 Ark. 827, 957 S.W.2d 182 (1997); Williams v. State, 325 Ark. 432 (1996); Roberts v. State, 324 Ark. 68 (1996); Dixon v. State, 260 Ark. 857 (1977) – Stand for the proposition that arguments lacking supporting authority or convincing analysis will not be considered on appeal unless clearly meritorious without further research.

These authorities justified the Court’s summary rejection of Tate’s challenge to Detective Gibbons’s expert testimony based on surveillance video and ballistic data.

4. Rule 612 and Use of Writings by Witnesses

Ark. R. Evid. 612 – Governs a witness’s use of writings to refresh memory, and grants the adverse party a right to inspect and cross-examine on such writings.
Dillon v. State, 317 Ark. 384, 877 S.W.2d 915 (1994) – Contains dicta cautioning against simply reading aloud from a transcript instead of testifying from memory. Tate relied heavily on this.
Sweat v. State, 307 Ark. 406, 820 S.W.2d 459 (1991) – Clarifies that witnesses may refer to writings before or while testifying; emphasizes trial court discretion and cites McCormick on Evidence approving use of detailed memoranda to support testimony.
Goodwin v. State, 263 Ark. 856, 568 S.W.2d 3 (1978); Smith v. State, 286 Ark. 247, 691 S.W.2d 154 (1985); Wilson v. State, 277 Ark. 43, 639 S.W.2d 45 (1982) – Confirm frequent and permissible use of notes or prior statements by officers to refresh recollection.
Barker v. State, 2014 Ark. 467, 448 S.W.3d 197 – Places the burden on the appellant to bring up a record that demonstrates error.

These authorities collectively undercut Tate’s Rule 612 argument and support the trial court’s discretion in allowing Officer Joseph to have a paper on the stand.

5. Cumulative Error and Preservation

Munson v. State, 331 Ark. 41, 959 S.W.2d 391 (1998) – Holds that a cumulative-error argument on appeal is not preserved unless:
1. Each alleged error was individually objected to at trial; and
2. A specific cumulative-error objection was made and ruled on by the trial court.

The majority reaffirms Munson and declines to relax this preservation requirement, explicitly noting that it remains binding law until overruled.

6. Alignment with Federal and Other Jurisdictions

Proctor v. State, 349 Ark. 648, 79 S.W.3d 370 (2002) – Cited in the concurrence to support the policy of interpreting Arkansas rules of evidence in reasonable harmony with the Federal Rules and other jurisdictions.
Federal cases cited in concurrence: United States v. Thomas, 451 F.3d 543 (8th Cir. 2006); Love (7th Cir.); Wright (6th Cir.); Lewis (5th Cir.); Deritis (4th Cir. 2025); Lexington (3d Cir.); Oguns (2d Cir.); Vest (1st Cir.); Rivera (11th Cir.); Jackson (10th Cir.); Torres (9th Cir.); Long (D.C. Cir.). These uniformly stand for the proposition that questions, commands, and requests are not hearsay because they are not assertions.

The majority explicitly distances itself from Thomas, deeming its key line on questions/commands to be dicta and not binding, thus signaling a preference to resolve hearsay issues within existing Arkansas doctrinal frameworks rather than by adopting broad federal formulations.

B. Legal Reasoning on the Specific Evidentiary Issues

1. Hood’s Request for a Gun – Hearsay or Not?

Testimony: Witness Marketus Lowe recounted that, after Tate’s threat and departure, Hood said things like:

Hey, man, give me a gun.
Man, I need a gun. You got a gun?

Trial Level: Defense objected on hearsay grounds. The State initially invoked the “present-sense impression” exception; the circuit court overruled the objection.

On Appeal: The Court first agreed that this was not a present-sense impression under Ark. R. Evid. 803(1), because the statements did not describe an event being perceived. However, it upheld admissibility on two bases:

Course of Conduct / Res Gestae (Nonhearsay): Following Bliss and Jackson, the Court treated Hood’s request for a gun as part of the sequence of events explaining why Hood was armed during the resulting gunfight. The statement was used not to prove any factual proposition (e.g., that no one had a gun) but to show why he armed himself.
Lack of Prejudice: It was undisputed that Hood had a gun when the shooting started. That fact arguably supported Tate’s self-defense theory; if anything, the statement’s admission could help the defense. Thus, even if error, there was no prejudice.

Commentary: The majority’s approach is defensible and consistent with older Arkansas precedent. But the concurrence’s approach is cleaner: “give me a gun” is a request, not an assertion; hence it is not hearsay at all. That aligns with the overwhelming federal authority cited by Justice Bronni. The majority’s refusal to adopt the federal “questions and commands are not hearsay” rule leaves Arkansas law more case-specific and less categorical, but it remains workable.

2. Little’s “Everybody Get Out of the House” – Excited Utterance

Witness Angela Marshall testified that, after Tate’s threat to air this bitch out, Shamika Little told everyone they had to get out of the house, while clearly frightened and screaming.

Trial Level: Defense objected on hearsay grounds. The State argued the statement was an excited utterance or present-sense impression. The court heard foundational testimony about Little’s fear and agitation and then overruled the objection.

On Appeal: The Court upheld admission as an excited utterance under Moore:

Startling event: Tate’s heated altercation with Hood and explicit threat to return and shoot.
Temporal proximity: Little’s command came shortly thereafter, within the same unfolding emergency.
Stress and spontaneity: Marshall described Little as scared, frantic, and screaming; the statement was clearly a direct reaction to the threat.

The Court rejected Tate’s argument that the statement was offered solely to prove the truth of what happened that day; instead, it stressed that the statement met all elements of the excited-utterance exception.

Commentary: The majority opts for the hearsay-exception route. The concurrence would characterize “everybody get out of the house” as a command that does not assert any fact and thus cannot be hearsay. Both paths lead to admissibility; the choice between them is doctrinally significant:

The majority’s path keeps the statement within the hearsay framework but saved by an exception.
The concurrence would simplify analysis by classifying much of such trial dialogue as nonhearsay from the outset.

3. Little’s Statement to Officer Whitley – “There’s a Gunshot Victim in the Back Seat”

When Officer Keith Whitley arrived at the car accident scene involving the vehicle transporting Hood, Little—described as frantic, loud, and scared—told him there was a gunshot victim in the back seat, and opened the door to reveal Hood.

Trial Level: Defense raised a hearsay objection; the court summarily overruled after foundational testimony about Little’s emotional state.

On Appeal: The majority found the statement to be an excited utterance:

Little had just witnessed Tate’s threat, the actual shooting, and a car accident during a frantic attempt to get Hood to the hospital.
The statement was made within minutes of the shooting and immediately after the crash.
Her remarks directly related to the source of her excitement and were inherently spontaneous.

The Court therefore held the admission proper and non-abusive of discretion.

Concurring Perspective: Justice Bronni agreed the statement is an assertion (there is a gunshot victim in the back seat), but he contended it was not offered for its truth. Rather, it explained why Officer Whitley looked into the back seat. As such, he viewed it as nonhearsay used to show the basis for the officer’s actions.

Commentary: These two analytical tracks illustrate a recurring evidentiary fork:

One can treat such statements as effect-on-listener / course-of-conduct nonhearsay; or
As hearsay but admissible as excited utterances.

The choice can matter: nonhearsay use often avoids Confrontation Clause problems (in other contexts), and it simplifies the analysis. The majority’s preference for exceptions may keep Arkansas doctrine closer to its own precedents but arguably at the cost of conceptual clarity.

4. Detective Michael Gibbons’s Firearm-Switch Testimony (Rule 703)

Detective Gibbons, an expert on firearms and automatic “switches,” testified that:

Fully automatic pistols can fire about 10 rounds per second.
Semiautomatic pistols typically fire about 1 round per second.
Only 0.8 seconds elapsed between the first and last .40-caliber shots on the surveillance video of Tate’s firing sequence, during which 11 .40-caliber casings were discharged.
Thus, Tate’s .40-caliber weapon must have been fully automatic.

Defense Argument: At trial, Tate argued that Gibbons was not a video expert and could not reliably base his opinion on video footage. On appeal, he acknowledged Rule 703’s allowance for reliance on otherwise inadmissible data but nonetheless asserted the testimony was erroneously admitted.

Court’s Resolution: The Court refused to fully engage the argument, noting:

Rule 703 expressly contemplates expert reliance on data not independently admissible, if reasonably relied on by field experts.
Tate cited no controlling authority and failed to present a convincing, developed argument as to why Gibbons’s reliance on the video was improper.
Under Hollis and related cases, such underdeveloped arguments are not considered.

The trial court’s decision to admit the expert opinion stood.

Commentary: Substantively, the ruling reinforces:

Experts may integrate video analysis and ballistic evidence in forming opinions, even if they are not labeled as “video experts,” so long as they reasonably understand the timing or content as part of their expertise.
On appeal, a mere claim that a witness is not “qualified” in some sub-area, without legal support or a clear demonstration of why that sub-area is distinct and necessary, will not succeed.

5. Officer Joseph’s “Mystery Paper” – Alleged Rule 612 Violation

Defense counsel observed Officer Francisco Joseph had brought a piece of paper to the stand and objected that he might be “testifying off of it.” The State responded that witnesses may bring materials to the stand, and the judge referenced refreshing recollection. The objection was overruled.

Importantly:

Defense never asked to see the paper.
The record does not show what the paper was or how (if at all) it was used during testimony.

On appeal, Tate argued:

The entire testimony was tainted by the trial court’s “misapplication” of Rule 612.
The paper was an undisclosed “mystery document” from which Joseph allegedly testified verbatim.

Court’s Reasoning:

No Record, No Error: Under Barker, the appellant bears the burden to provide a record showing how the error occurred. The record is silent on whether the paper was ever used to refresh memory; thus, no Rule 612 violation is established.
Arkansas Law Allows Use of Writings: The Court points to Sweat, Goodwin, Smith, and Wilson, confirming that officers may consult notes or reports to refresh recollection and even to assist while testifying, at the trial court’s discretion.
Dillon Dicta: The portion of Dillon Tate relied on is labeled as dicta and, read in context with Sweat, supports—not undermines—the permissibility of referring to writings when testifying.

Commentary: This ruling teaches two practical lessons:

Trial practice: If defense counsel suspects improper reliance on a document, counsel must:
- Ask for production of the document under Rule 612.
- Develop a clear record of how the witness uses the document.
Appellate practice: Without that record, the appellate court—bound by Barker—will presume regularity rather than speculative error.

6. Cumulative Error – Strict Preservation Required

Tate argued that even if individual rulings did not warrant reversal, their cumulative effect did.

The Court, citing Munson v. State, stated:

An appellant asserting a cumulative-error argument must show that there were objections to the alleged errors individually and that a cumulative-error objection was made to the trial court and a ruling obtained.

Tate did not raise a cumulative-error objection at trial, nor did he obtain a ruling on such an objection. Consequently, the argument was not preserved for appellate review.

Majority’s Note: The Court explicitly responds to a concurring justice’s footnote disagreeing with Munson, stating that Munson remains binding Arkansas law until overruled. This reinforces a strong form of stare decisis on procedural preservation rules.

Commentary: The requirement of a specific cumulative-error objection is stricter than what some jurisdictions demand. It forces trial counsel to:

Identify multiple rulings as collectively prejudicial; and
Ask the trial court to consider their aggregate impact.

This may be difficult in fast-moving trials, but the Court clearly prefers that these claims be vetted in the trial court before being raised on appeal.

C. Impact of the Opinion on Arkansas Law and Practice

1. Hearsay Doctrine and Trial-Level Objections

Tate underscores several key points for hearsay analysis:

Effect-on-listener and course-of-conduct uses remain powerful nonhearsay tools. Statements like Little’s comment to Officer Whitley can be admitted to show why an officer acted as he did. Similarly, Hood’s request for a gun can be admitted to show why he obtained a weapon.
Excited utterance remains a robust, flexible hearsay exception. The Court focuses on the emotional state and timing rather than overly rigid time limits.
The concurrence’s detailed citation to federal cases may encourage future litigants to more aggressively argue that questions, commands, and requests are nonhearsay under Arkansas Rule 801, pressing the Court to eventually adopt or reject that view explicitly.

2. Expert Testimony Based on Technology and Indirect Data

The opinion signals that Arkansas courts will allow experts, particularly in firearms and forensic disciplines, to:

Draw inferences from video timing, shell-casing distribution, and firing patterns;
Testify to weapon characteristics (e.g., automatic vs. semiautomatic) based on such indirect evidence;
Rely on this data under Rule 703, even if the raw video is not itself introduced or explained by a separate “video expert.”

Defense attorneys challenging similar testimony must therefore:

Question whether the data is in fact the kind reasonably relied on by experts in that discipline; and
Provide authority or expert counter-evidence, not just bare assertions of irrelevance or lack of qualifications.

3. Witnesses Using Writings – Practical Boundaries

Tate reaffirms permissive use of writings during testimony:

Witnesses, especially officers, may bring reports or notes to the stand.
Rule 612 safeguards the opponent’s right to inspect such writings, but that right must be invoked.
The trial court retains discretion to allow “consulting while speaking,” particularly with lengthy or detailed matters, as endorsed in Sweat and McCormick on Evidence.

The ruling cautions defense counsel that a mere observation of a document’s presence is insufficient to create reversible error; counsel must build a factual record of misuse or denial of access.

4. Cumulative Error – A High Procedural Bar

By doubling down on Munson, the Court makes clear:

Cumulative-error arguments are waived unless explicitly raised as such in the trial court.
This applies even in cases as serious as capital murder with life-without-parole sentences.

For appellate practitioners, this underscores the importance of:

Thinking about “clusters” of rulings during trial;
Specifically articulating that their combined impact has deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and
Obtaining an explicit ruling to preserve the cumulative-error point.

5. Clarifying the Role of Prejudice in Evidentiary Appeals

Tate is a practical reminder that:

Harmless error is the norm in evidentiary challenges without a concrete showing of prejudice.
Generalized claims that rulings “tainted” the case or affected “perceptions” will typically fail.
Appellants should tie each evidentiary ruling to specific, plausible changes in the trial’s outcome (e.g., undermining a key defense, bolstering a critical element, or resolving a close credibility contest).

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Hearsay and Nonhearsay Uses

Hearsay (Ark. R. Evid. 801(c)): An out-of-court statement, offered to prove the truth of what it asserts.
Nonhearsay Effect-on-Listener: A statement offered only to show its impact on the person who heard it, explaining that person’s subsequent behavior (e.g., why an officer searched a car; why a victim fled).
Nonhearsay Course of Conduct / Res Gestae: A statement admitted as part of the unfolding events, to make sense of actions taken, not to prove the literal truth of the statement.
Requests, Questions, Commands (concurrence’s view): These typically do not assert facts; they merely ask or direct. Since they don’t assert anything, they cannot be hearsay.

B. Present-Sense Impression vs. Excited Utterance

Present-Sense Impression (Rule 803(1)): A statement that describes or explains an event while the declarant is perceiving it or immediately thereafter. It focuses on contemporaneity.
Excited Utterance (Rule 803(2)): A statement relating to a startling event, made while the declarant remains under the stress of that event. It focuses on stress and spontaneity more than exact timing.
In Tate, the Court correctly rejected present-sense impression for Hood’s “I need a gun,” but embraced excited utterance for Little’s commands and statements.

C. Rule 703 – Bases of Expert Opinion

Experts may rely on data or facts that are not themselves admissible at trial, if such data is ordinarily relied on by experts in that field.
The key questions:
- Is the data of a type experts typically use?
- Does the expert reasonably apply methodology to that data?
In Tate, shell casing counts plus video timing qualified as such data for a firearms expert.

D. Rule 612 – Writings Used to Refresh Memory

When a witness uses a writing to refresh memory while testifying:
- The adverse party is generally entitled to inspect the writing.
- They may cross-examine the witness about it and introduce relevant parts into evidence.
This protection must be affirmatively invoked; the court will not automatically demand production.
Arkansas precedent is friendly to allowing officers and other witnesses to refer to notes or reports to maintain accuracy, subject to judicial discretion.

E. Cumulative Error

“Cumulative error” means that multiple individual errors—each perhaps harmless alone—together deprived the defendant of a fair trial.
Under Munson and reaffirmed in Tate:
- Each alleged error must have been individually objected to; and
- Counsel must explicitly raise and secure a ruling on a cumulative-error objection in the trial court.
Failure to do so bars cumulative-error review on appeal.

VI. Conclusion: Significance of Tate in Arkansas Evidence Law

Kevasia Tate v. State of Arkansas is not a dramatic reshaping of Arkansas law, but it is an important consolidating decision. It:

Reaffirms the high bar for overturning evidentiary rulings (abuse of discretion plus prejudice).
Clarifies that statements used to explain conduct—like Hood’s request for a gun— are admissible as part of the narrative, while spontaneous crisis reactions qualify as excited utterances.
Signals strong continuity in Arkansas’s approach to writings used by witnesses under Rule 612 and underscores the necessity of creating a record to challenge such use.
Confirms the admissibility of technically sophisticated expert testimony based on video and ballistic evidence, under Rule 703, absent a well-developed challenge.
Reasserts, perhaps more strongly than before, that cumulative-error arguments must be preserved as such at trial under Munson.

The concurring opinion invites Arkansas courts to align more openly with the federal consensus that questions, commands, and requests are nonhearsay and to simplify hearsay analysis by focusing more rigorously on whether statements are assertions and for what purpose they are offered. Whether the Court will eventually move in that direction remains to be seen; for now, the majority’s approach keeps Arkansas hearings within a familiar framework of traditional hearsay exceptions and effect-on-listener reasoning.

For practitioners, Tate is a roadmap:

For prosecutors, on how to lay foundations for excited utterances and course-of-conduct evidence, and how to present modern expert testimony.
For defense counsel, on how carefully and concretely objections must be framed, supported, and recorded—and why generic prejudice claims and underdeveloped arguments will rarely gain traction on appeal.

In the broader context of Arkansas criminal procedure, Tate stands as a firm reminder that evidentiary rulings are largely entrusted to the trial judge’s discretion, and that appellate relief is available only to those appellants who combine precise trial objections, a robust factual record, and rigorous appellate arguments grounded in authority.

Reaffirming Nonhearsay Course-of-Conduct Statements and Strict Preservation of Cumulative Error: Commentary on Kevasia Tate v. State of Arkansas (2025 Ark. 186)