Propensity for Violence as a Justification for Significant Upward Variances in Felon-in-Possession Sentences: Commentary on United States v. Ware

I. Introduction

In United States v. Kentravious Montrell Ware, No. 24‑14107 (11th Cir. Dec. 4, 2025) (per curiam) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a 30‑month sentence imposed for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court had varied upward from an advisory Guidelines range of 12–18 months, citing the seriousness of Ware’s conduct and his longstanding pattern of violence, despite his lack of prior firearm offenses.

On appeal, Ware challenged only the substantive reasonableness of his sentence, arguing that the almost 30‑month term represented an “extreme” and unnecessary upward variance and that it created unwarranted sentencing disparities. The Eleventh Circuit rejected those arguments and affirmed.

Although the decision is marked “NOT FOR PUBLICATION” and thus is non‑precedential under Eleventh Circuit rules, it is nevertheless instructive for federal sentencing practice. It reinforces several important points:

The expansive deference appellate courts give to district judges on substantive reasonableness review.
The ability of sentencing courts to place heavy weight on a defendant’s propensity for violence, even when prior offenses are already counted in the Guidelines and even when there is no prior history of gun crimes.
The rejection of any mathematical “percentage” approach to assessing the reasonableness of an upward variance, especially where the Guidelines range is low.
The demanding standard for establishing “unwarranted sentencing disparities” under § 3553(a)(6).

This commentary analyzes the opinion, situates it against the cited precedents, explains the legal reasoning, and assesses its likely impact on future felon‑in‑possession and upward‑variance cases.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Underlying Offense

The conduct at issue was far more aggravated than a simple possessory § 922(g) case. According to the unobjected‑to Presentence Investigation Report (PSI):

In July 2023, Ware became involved in a dispute inside a convenience store with another male customer who “bumped into him and started to argue with him.”
Ware was the aggressor. During the argument, he pulled out a gun and pointed it at the other male.
Video footage showed Ware getting in the other male’s face with the gun and pointing it at the man’s head.
Ware walked back and forth toward the man, waving the handgun, while making repeated violent threats, including:
- “I wanna kill you right now”
- “There goes my flag boy, I'm finna burn your ass boy”
- “I'm gonna blow your ass boy”
- “I don't even wanna let you leave the store”
Other people were in the store—customers and employees—who could have been shot had Ware fired.
Eventually, Ware re‑holstered the gun in his waistband and left the store.

Ware did not object to the PSI’s factual description. Those facts, therefore, were binding for sentencing and on appeal.

B. Criminal History

Ware’s record included both felony and misdemeanor convictions in Georgia:

Felonies:
- Possession with intent to distribute marijuana (more than one ounce).
- Receiving stolen property.
Misdemeanors:
- Multiple convictions for possession of marijuana (less than one ounce).
- Obstruction of law enforcement officers.
- Several driving‑related offenses.
- Three separate convictions for criminal trespass.
- Battery (family violence).

The underlying narratives for the trespass and battery convictions reveal a sustained pattern of aggressive and violent conduct:

The three criminal trespass offenses involved Ware repeatedly and unlawfully entering a woman’s home—between November 2011 and October 2012—by kicking in her door and breaking in through a window when she refused him entry.
The battery (family violence) conviction involved Ware causing visible bodily harm to T.M., a person he lived with or had formerly lived with.

Notably, the opinion emphasizes that most of these misdemeanors did not generate criminal history points under the Guidelines, but the district court nonetheless considered them in assessing his history and characteristics under § 3553(a)(1).

C. Guidelines Calculation and Statutory Range

The PSI calculated:

Total offense level: 12.
Criminal history category: II.
Resulting advisory Guidelines range: 12 to 18 months’ imprisonment.
Statutory maximum: 15 years’ imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(8).

The probation office expressly noted that the “nature and circumstances of the offense” might justify an upward variance from the Guidelines range, foreshadowing the government’s sentencing position.

D. The Sentencing Hearing

At sentencing, the district court adopted the PSI as its factual findings. The parties then presented argument.

1. Government’s Position

The government played the store’s video footage and stressed that:

Ware’s behavior was “wild,” including pointing his gun at the victim’s head multiple times.
The incident was triggered by something trivial: the other man being “too close” to Ware at the cash register.
There were other customers and employees present who were put at risk.
Ware’s criminal trespass and domestic violence history showed a “propensity for violence,” particularly in the context of interpersonal conflict and relationships with women.

The government advocated for a 36‑month sentence—an upward variance—as warranted under the § 3553(a) factors.

2. Defense Position and Mitigation

Ware’s counsel advanced several mitigating points:

Ware’s brother had been shot and killed about a year earlier, leading to a “heightened sense of fear” and a perceived need to carry a gun for protection.
According to Ware, the other male in the store “started stuff,” and Ware felt threatened, prompting him to pull the gun.
Ware accepted responsibility, pled guilty without delay, and cooperated with the police.
He acknowledged he was prohibited from possessing a firearm and recognized the need to address his fear and emotional issues stemming from his brother’s death.
He expressed a desire to obtain mechanic‑related certifications while incarcerated to pursue a stable career upon release.

In allocution, Ware personally told the court he would never carry a gun again.

3. The District Court’s Rationale

The district court varied upward, imposing a sentence of:

30 months’ imprisonment; and
3 years of supervised release.

The judge articulated several reasons, explicitly tying them to § 3553(a):

The court “took gun crimes very seriously.”
Ware’s offense was “very concerning” because:
- He was a felon who was not supposed to possess a gun at all, and
- He “had a gun when [he was] emotionally unstable.”
The video of the incident was “frightening” and Ware’s conduct was “out of bounds.”
There were at least three other people in the store who could have been seriously injured or killed if Ware had fired.
Although Ware lacked a prior history of gun violence, he had a decade‑long history of physical violence, especially when angry.
The combination of that history with firearm possession rendered him “extremely dangerous.”
His violent history predated his brother’s death, and he had opportunities to seek help for anger management but “elected not to do that.”

The court expressly noted that it had considered the advisory Guidelines range and the § 3553(a) factors and concluded that a higher sentence was necessary to protect the community and account for the nature of the offense and Ware’s characteristics.

Defense counsel lodged objections to the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence, preserving the issue for appeal.

III. Summary of the Eleventh Circuit’s Opinion

On appeal, Ware argued that:

The 30‑month sentence represented an “extreme” upward variance of almost “150%” from the 12‑month low end of the Guidelines range and was greater than necessary to achieve the purposes of sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
The offense was “isolated,” as evidenced by:
- His lack of prior firearm offenses; and
- His quick acceptance of responsibility and guilty plea.
The upward variance allegedly created unwarranted sentencing disparities.

The Eleventh Circuit, applying the deferential abuse‑of‑discretion standard for substantive reasonableness, affirmed. It held that:

The district court properly considered the nature and circumstances of the offense, Ware’s history and characteristics (including his violent tendencies), the need to protect the public, and the advisory Guidelines range.
The court did not give weight to any improper factor and did not fail to consider any factor entitled to significant weight.
It was within the district court’s discretion to give substantial weight to Ware’s propensity for violence, as evidenced by his prior criminal history, even though those prior offenses were already part of the Guidelines calculation.
There is no “proportionality principle” in federal sentencing, and courts do not apply a mathematical percentage test (such as the claimed 150% increase) to assess the reasonableness of a variance.
Ware’s sentence, which was well below the 15‑year statutory maximum, was another indicator of reasonableness.
Ware’s bare assertion of unwarranted disparities failed because he did not identify any similarly situated defendants who received lower sentences for comparable conduct.

Consequently, the panel concluded it was not left with the “definite and firm conviction” that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors and thus affirmed the sentence.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. The Legal Framework: Substantive Reasonableness and § 3553(a)

The opinion is grounded in the well‑established federal sentencing framework after United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005):

The Sentencing Guidelines are advisory, not mandatory.
The district court must consider the Guidelines along with the statutory factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
On appeal, sentences—whether within, above, or below the Guidelines range—are reviewed for substantive reasonableness under an abuse‑of‑discretion standard.

Section 3553(a) requires a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to comply with the purposes of sentencing, which include:

Reflecting the seriousness of the offense;
Promoting respect for the law;
Providing just punishment;
Affording adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
Protecting the public from further crimes of the defendant.

In addition, the court must consider:

The nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant (§ 3553(a)(1));
The kinds of sentences available (§ 3553(a)(3));
The advisory Guideline range (§ 3553(a)(4));
The need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among similarly situated defendants (§ 3553(a)(6)); and
The need to provide restitution (§ 3553(a)(7)), though that was not at issue here.

The Eleventh Circuit repeatedly emphasizes that the weight given to each § 3553(a) factor is entrusted to the “sound discretion of the district court,” and appellate courts “will not second guess” that judgment so long as the ultimate sentence lies within the broad range of reasonable outcomes.

B. Ware’s “150% Variance” Argument and the Rejection of Mathematical Formulas

Ware argued that his 30‑month sentence, compared to the 12‑month low end of the Guidelines, represented a roughly “150%” upward variance and was therefore substantively unreasonable. The panel addressed this argument in a footnote, making two key points:

The “150%” figure is itself somewhat misleading. Measuring from the top of the Guidelines range (18 months), the variance is much smaller.
More fundamentally, the Supreme Court has rejected any rigid mathematical or percentage‑based approach to assessing the justification required for a variance.

Relying on Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 47–48 (2007), the court notes that:

“[D]eviations from the [g]uidelines range will always appear more extreme—in percentage terms—when[, as here,] the range itself is low.”

And echoing its own en banc decision in United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1196 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc), the panel reiterates that:

“There is no proportionality principle in sentencing.”

Instead, the correct question is qualitative: whether the district court provided “sufficiently compelling justifications to support the variance” in light of the § 3553(a) factors and the entire record. The Ware panel concludes that such justifications were present.

C. The Central Role of Violent Propensity and Criminal History

The heart of the district court’s sentencing decision—and of the Eleventh Circuit’s affirmance—is the finding that Ware has a longstanding propensity for violence, especially when angry, and that this propensity, combined with firearm possession, made him particularly dangerous.

Ware argued that the district court overemphasized his criminal history and failed to credit his lack of prior firearms offenses. The Eleventh Circuit rejected this characterization, noting that:

The district court explicitly acknowledged that Ware had no prior history of gun violence.
However, the court reasonably concluded that this fact did not outweigh the seriousness of his current offense and his long history of physical violence.

The panel underscored the law’s allowance for heavy reliance on criminal history:

“Courts have broad leeway in deciding how much weight to give to prior crimes the defendant has committed.”
“Placing substantial weight on a defendant’s criminal record is entirely consistent with § 3553(a) because five of the factors it requires a court to consider are related to criminal history.” (United States v. Riley, 995 F.3d 1272, 1279 (11th Cir. 2021).)

The opinion also cites United States v. Williams, 526 F.3d 1312, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008), for the proposition that a district court may properly consider prior offenses even where they already influenced the Guidelines calculation. This is critical in Ware’s case, because some of his prior misconduct did not generate criminal history points but still painted a picture of persistent aggression and disregard for the safety and autonomy of others.

The Eleventh Circuit further cites United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349, 1355 (11th Cir. 2022), to support the proposition that a district court may impose an upward variance if it concludes that the Guidelines range is insufficient in light of a defendant’s criminal history. In practical terms, what the district court did here was determine that criminal history category II underrepresented the real‑world danger posed by Ware, when viewed alongside the aggravated circumstances of the offense.

D. Nature and Circumstances of the Offense: More than Mere Possession

The court did not treat this as a routine felon‑in‑possession case. Several aggravating aspects of the conduct, firmly grounded in the video evidence and the PSI, justified an enhanced sentence:

Ware escalated a minor verbal confrontation into a potentially lethal interaction.
He brandished and repeatedly pointed the gun at the victim’s head at close range.
He made repeated, explicit threats to kill or seriously injure the victim.
He did this in a small, public convenience store with multiple innocent bystanders present.

From a § 3553(a) standpoint, this conduct substantially increased:

The seriousness of the offense (§ 3553(a)(2)(A));
The need for deterrence (§ 3553(a)(2)(B)), both specific (to deter Ware) and general (to deter similar conduct in public settings); and
The need to protect the public (§ 3553(a)(2)(C)), especially given his pattern of violence when angry.

The panel adopted the district court’s characterization of the video as “frightening” and the behavior as “out of bounds”—language that signals, in practice, that the offense sits at the aggravated end of typical § 922(g) conduct, even absent actual discharge or injury.

E. Deference to the District Court’s Weighing of § 3553(a) Factors

Ware’s principal appellate complaint was not that the district court ignored a required factor, but that it gave too much weight to his criminal history and propensity for violence and insufficient weight to mitigation (lack of prior gun cases, remorse, cooperation, fear after his brother’s death).

The Eleventh Circuit’s response is straightforward and doctrinally consistent:

The district court considered the mitigation; it simply concluded that it did not outweigh the aggravating factors.
Under circuit precedent, “the weight given to a particular § 3553(a) factor is committed to the sound discretion of the district court,” and the court “need not give equal weight” to all factors. (Rosales‑Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1254.)
The appellate court “will not second guess” how the district court balanced those factors so long as the resulting sentence remains within the range of reasonableness. (Butler, 39 F.4th at 1355.)

The opinion thus reinforces the high bar defendants face in seeking to overturn sentences as substantively unreasonable. Unless there is some clear distortion—such as exclusive reliance on an improper factor or a failure to address a plainly significant factor—disagreement with the district court’s balancing is insufficient.

F. “Below the Statutory Maximum” as an Indicator of Reasonableness

The panel also notes that a sentence substantially below the statutory maximum “is another indicator of reasonableness,” citing United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008). Here:

Statutory maximum: 15 years (180 months).
Actual sentence: 30 months—only one‑sixth of the statutory maximum.

While this is not dispositive, the Eleventh Circuit routinely uses this comparison as a sanity check: if the sentence falls well below the ceiling chosen by Congress, it is less likely, as a practical matter, to be condemned as unreasonably harsh.

G. Sentencing Disparities and the Need for Comparators

Ware briefly claimed that the upward variance “creates unwarranted sentencing disparities” in violation of § 3553(a)(6). The panel quickly disposed of this argument, emphasizing the evidentiary burden on defendants:

To prove an unwarranted disparity, a defendant must “point to a similarly situated defendant who received a lesser sentence for a similar offense.” (United States v. Azmat, 805 F.3d 1018, 1048 (11th Cir. 2015).)
Ware did not identify any such comparator; he simply asserted that disparities existed.

This reinforces a recurring theme: generalized disparity arguments—unsupported by specific, factually analogous examples—will almost always fail. The Eleventh Circuit demands concrete comparators, and without them, a disparity claim cannot carry the defendant’s burden.

V. Precedents Cited and Their Influence on the Decision

A. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007)

The panel relies on Gall for three propositions:

Standard of Review: Sentences are reviewed under a deferential abuse‑of‑discretion standard, considering the “totality of the circumstances.”
No mathematical rules: Courts must not apply “a mathematical formula that uses the percentage of a departure as the standard for determining the strength of the justifications” required for a variance.
Deference to district courts: Appellate courts “may consider the extent of the deviation, but must give due deference” to the district court’s conclusion that the § 3553(a) factors justify the variance.

These principles undercut Ware’s attempt to frame his variance as “extreme” based solely on percentage figures and fortify the district court’s latitude in imposing an above‑Guidelines sentence.

B. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc)

Irey plays two roles in the Ware opinion:

It articulates the celebrated “definite and firm conviction” standard: the appellate court will vacate a sentence “if, but only if” it is left with such a conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors.
It is the source of the statement that there is “no proportionality principle in sentencing” and that what matters is whether the reasons offered are “sufficiently compelling” to justify the degree of variance.

This framework makes clear that defendants face an intentionally demanding standard when challenging sentences, particularly where the record shows that the district judge engaged with the § 3553(a) factors in a reasoned way.

C. United States v. Rosales‑Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2015)

Rosales‑Bruno is cited for the basic tests of substantive unreasonableness:

A sentence is substantively unreasonable only when the district court:
1. Fails to consider a relevant factor that should have been given significant weight;
2. Gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or
3. Commits a clear error of judgment in balancing the proper factors.
It emphasizes that the burden rests on the defendant to show unreasonableness in light of the record, the § 3553(a) factors, and the deference owed to the district court.
It confirms that the district court is not required to give equal weight to every factor.

In Ware, there is no suggestion that any improper factor influenced the court; all of the court’s considerations—nature of the offense, criminal history, public safety—are plainly within the § 3553(a) framework.

D. United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349 (11th Cir. 2022)

Butler is cited for two connected ideas:

Substantive reasonableness turns on whether the district court weighed the § 3553(a) factors unreasonably, and the appellate court will not “second guess” that weight unless it was clearly irrational.
A district court may impose an upward variance where it concludes that the Guidelines range is insufficient in light of the defendant’s criminal history.

In Ware, Butler undergirds the conclusion that it was reasonable for the district court to conclude that category II understated the risk posed by Ware, given his pattern of violent conduct.

E. United States v. Williams, 526 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2008)

Williams stands for the proposition that prior offenses can be considered twice—once in the Guidelines calculation and again in considering the § 3553(a) factors.

In Ware, this is particularly significant because:

Some prior offenses did contribute to his criminal history category; and
Others (like some misdemeanors) did not generate criminal history points but were powerfully relevant to his “history and characteristics.”

The district court was therefore well within its rights to treat Ware’s criminal record, taken holistically, as a major aggravating factor.

F. United States v. Riley, 995 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2021)

Riley is invoked for its explicit recognition that:

Courts have “broad leeway” in deciding how much weight to give to prior crimes.
Giving substantial weight to a defendant’s criminal record is “entirely consistent” with § 3553(a), because multiple statutory factors directly relate to criminal history (e.g., deterrence, public protection).

This directly answers Ware’s complaint that the district court placed “too much” emphasis on his criminal history and violent propensity.

G. United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2008)

Gonzalez provides the principle that a sentence below the statutory maximum is a “good indicator” of reasonableness. It does not immunize a sentence from review, but it tilts the analysis toward affirmance in close calls. In Ware, where the statutory ceiling is 180 months and the sentence is only 30 months, this factor supports the panel’s conclusion that the sentence lies within a broad band of reasonableness.

H. United States v. Azmat, 805 F.3d 1018 (11th Cir. 2015)

Azmat clarifies what is needed to make out a sentencing disparity claim under § 3553(a)(6). A defendant must:

Identify “similarly situated” defendants; and
Show that they received lower sentences for “similar conduct.”

Mere speculation or general allegations of disparity are insufficient. Ware’s failure to provide any such comparators doomed his disparity claim.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. “Upward Variance” vs. “Departure”

Both “variance” and “departure” describe sentences outside the advisory Guideline range, but they are conceptually different:

Departure: A change from the Guidelines range based on provisions—within the Guidelines themselves—that authorize moving up or down (e.g., for substantial assistance or certain aggravating factors).
Variance: A change from the Guidelines range based on the broader statutory considerations in § 3553(a), after correctly calculating the Guideline range.

In Ware, the district court imposed an upward variance—that is, it used the § 3553(a) factors to justify a sentence above the calculated 12–18 month range, not a technical Guidelines departure provision.

B. Procedural vs. Substantive Reasonableness

Federal appellate review of sentences looks at two distinct questions:

Procedural reasonableness: Did the district court correctly calculate the Guidelines, treat them as advisory, consider § 3553(a), and adequately explain the sentence?
Substantive reasonableness: Is the sentence, in light of the totality of the circumstances and § 3553(a), within the broad range of reasonable outcomes?

Ware’s appeal focuses solely on substantive reasonableness. No specific procedural error is developed on appeal, and the panel treats the Guidelines calculation and the court’s explanation as adequate.

C. Abuse of Discretion and the “Definite and Firm Conviction” Standard

“Abuse of discretion” in the sentencing context is intentionally deferential. The Eleventh Circuit will vacate a sentence as substantively unreasonable only if:

It is left with a “definite and firm conviction” that the district court made a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors; and
The resulting sentence lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts.

This means that even if the appellate judges might have chosen a different sentence in the first instance, they must affirm so long as the sentence chosen is one reasonable option among others.

D. Use of Unscored or Minor Prior Offenses

The Guidelines’ criminal history scoring rules may not assign points to all prior convictions—especially older misdemeanors or low‑level offenses. However, under § 3553(a)(1), the sentencing court may still consider those offenses as part of the defendant’s “history and characteristics.”

In Ware’s case, this is precisely what happened: some of his prior misdemeanors (trespass, domestic violence) did not meaningfully move his criminal history category, but the district court properly regarded them as strong evidence of violent tendencies and disregard for others’ safety and autonomy.

E. “Unwarranted Sentencing Disparities”

Section 3553(a)(6) instructs courts to avoid “unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.” The key elements are:

Similarly situated defendants: Comparable criminal history, similar conduct, and similar circumstances.
Unwarranted: Differences in sentences that cannot be justified by legitimate distinctions (such as more serious conduct, worse history, cooperation, etc.).

The Eleventh Circuit’s case law makes clear that a defendant must point to concrete examples of similarly situated individuals with lower sentences. General references to national averages or anecdotal impressions are not enough.

VII. Impact and Significance

A. For Felon-in-Possession Sentencing

The Ware decision reinforces that § 922(g) cases can vary widely in seriousness and that district courts may treat certain fact patterns as especially aggravated. In particular:

Brandishing a firearm, pointing it at a victim’s head, and issuing explicit threats to kill or seriously injure in a public place will strongly support an upward variance.
The presence of multiple bystanders increases the weight of public safety concerns and just punishment.

Defense counsel in § 922(g) cases should expect that where a firearm is used as an instrument of intimidation or near‑violence, even without discharge or physical injury, courts may view the Guidelines range as insufficient.

B. For the Role of Criminal History and Violent Propensity

Ware underscores that propensity for violence—particularly a pattern of domestic violence, harassment, or trespass against intimate partners—can be a powerful aggravating factor, even in the absence of prior gun crimes.

Practically, this means:

Prosecutors can persuasively argue that non‑firearms violent history, when combined with current gun possession, justifies an upward variance.
Defense attorneys must be prepared either to contest the characterization of prior conduct as demonstrating violent propensity or to present robust mitigation (rehabilitation, treatment, changed circumstances) to blunt its impact.

C. For Upward Variances and Appellate Review

The decision further cements the Eleventh Circuit’s general approach to variances:

There is no rigid limit on how far above the Guidelines a sentence may go, numerically, as long as the district court provides “sufficiently compelling” reasons grounded in § 3553(a).
Appellate courts will defer heavily to district courts’ on‑the‑ground assessments of offense seriousness, credibility of mitigation, and risk to the community.

For appellate practice, Ware is another reminder that success on a substantive reasonableness challenge is rare unless there is a striking disconnect between the justifications given and the magnitude of the sentence.

D. For Disparity Arguments

Ware also illustrates the limited traction of generic disparity claims. The requirement—codified in Azmat—to present comparators with similar records and conduct is a substantial evidentiary hurdle. Defense counsel who intend to raise a disparity argument should plan, at the sentencing stage and on appeal, to develop a detailed comparative record rather than relying on abstract claims of “unwarranted disparities.”

VIII. Conclusion

United States v. Ware does not announce a new doctrinal rule but rather reinforces and illustrates existing Eleventh Circuit and Supreme Court sentencing principles in a concrete setting:

District courts have wide discretion to impose upward variances when the § 3553(a) factors—especially offense seriousness, violent propensity, and public safety—justify them.
There is no mathematical or proportionality cap on the degree of variance; what matters is the quality and strength of the reasons given.
Criminal history, including unscored misdemeanors and a pattern of violent conduct, can legitimately carry heavy weight.
General assertions of unwarranted disparity are inadequate; specific, similarly situated comparators are required.

In the broader federal sentencing landscape, Ware exemplifies how an aggravated felon‑in‑possession case—with a volatile public confrontation, explicit death threats, and a background of domestic violence and harassment—can support a substantial upward variance that will withstand appellate scrutiny. It is a cautionary tale both for defendants, who may view § 922(g) as a mere possessory statute, and for counsel, who must be prepared to address the full tapestry of a client’s history and conduct when advocating for a Guideline or below‑Guideline sentence.