People v Rickett: Preservation of Legal Sufficiency Challenges, Limits on Appeal Waivers, and Strategic Nonuse of Alibi Evidence in New York Homicide Cases

1. Introduction

The Appellate Division, Third Department’s decision in People v Rickett, 2025 NY Slip Op 06756 (Dec. 4, 2025), is a multifaceted opinion that touches on several recurring criminal law and procedure issues in New York:

The validity and scope of appeal waivers, especially after a jury verdict.
The interaction between legal sufficiency challenges, preservation rules, and a defendant’s request for a lesser included offense charge.
The standards for reviewing weight of the evidence in a circumstantial homicide case.
The handling of Brady material disclosed late but before trial.
The proper use of hearsay and non-testifying declarants to “complete the narrative” without violating the Confrontation Clause.
The framework for evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims under CPL 440.10, especially regarding uncalled alibi witnesses and trial strategy.

Although the decision does not dramatically alter existing doctrine, it crystallizes and applies several important rules, especially:

Reaffirming that a defendant who affirmatively requests a lesser included offense instruction and is convicted of that lesser offense forfeits a legal sufficiency challenge to that conviction on appeal.
Clarifying that late-disclosed Brady material may be adequately cured when the defense receives the information and a meaningful adjournment before trial.
Reiterating that strategic decisions not to call alibi witnesses—especially where a defendant’s alibis are inconsistent—will not readily support an ineffective assistance claim.

This commentary provides a detailed, structured analysis of the opinion, its reasoning, the precedents it invokes, and the implications for future criminal practice in New York.

2. Background and Procedural History

2.1 Factual Background

The case arises out of a fatal stabbing in Troy, Rensselaer County. The core factual narrative established at trial included:

A friend of the victim testified that, days before the killing, she saw the victim steal crack cocaine from the defendant at gunpoint.
Later that same night, the friend encountered the defendant—known to her as “Mike”—who appeared “very angry,” stated he was looking for the victim, and said he was going to kill him.
On the date of the homicide, several individuals were present in an apartment where the victim was located in a bedroom.
Two witnesses testified they saw the defendant enter the apartment with a knife, yelling for the victim and saying, “I’m going to kill you,” then enter the bedroom and emerge, after which the victim came out bleeding from chest wounds.
A third witness, who could see into the bedroom, testified to seeing a person stabbing the victim in the chest multiple times; she did not directly identify the defendant as that person but later learned this individual was known as “Mike.”
The victim died from hemorrhage caused by a stab wound to the heart.
The defendant testified in his own defense, denying any involvement, denying knowing the witnesses, but admitting that he goes by “Mike” among other names.

2.2 Indictment, Trial, and Sentencing

In July 2017, the defendant was indicted on one count of murder in the second degree.
At trial, the jury acquitted him of second-degree murder, but convicted him of the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree (Penal Law § 125.20[1]).
Before sentencing, the prosecution initially sought to have the defendant sentenced as a persistent violent felony offender, which would dramatically increase sentencing exposure.
The parties then reached an agreement: the defendant would be sentenced as a second violent felony offender to 15 years’ imprisonment plus five years of postrelease supervision, in exchange for admitting a prior conviction and waiving his right to appeal.
The defendant executed a written appeal waiver and engaged in an oral colloquy with the court.

County Court (Debra Young, J.) imposed the agreed sentence. The waiver of appeal later became significant on appeal.

2.3 Post-Conviction Motion (CPL 440.10)

The defendant subsequently moved under CPL 440.10 to vacate the judgment, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel based largely on:

Trial counsel’s alleged failure to properly investigate two purported alibi witnesses (the defendant’s girlfriend and his daughter), and
Counsel’s failure to call these witnesses at trial.

After conducting an evidentiary hearing, County Court denied the motion. The defendant appealed both from the judgment of conviction and, by permission, from the denial of the CPL 440.10 motion.

3. Summary of the Court’s Decision

3.1 Appeal Waiver: Invalid

The Third Department held that the defendant’s waiver of the right to appeal was invalid. Although a defendant may waive the right to appeal even after a jury verdict, the written waiver here was overbroad, and the court’s oral colloquy did not cure that defect. Accordingly, the defendant’s appellate claims were not barred by the purported waiver.

3.2 Legal Sufficiency vs. Weight of the Evidence

The defendant’s challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence was deemed unpreserved because he failed to renew his motion to dismiss at the close of all proof.
Further, the court held that the defendant forfeited a legal sufficiency challenge to his manslaughter conviction by affirmatively requesting that the jury be charged on the lesser included offense on which he was found guilty.
Nonetheless, the court conducted a full weight of the evidence review on the manslaughter conviction and upheld the verdict, finding that each element—including identity and intent—was proven beyond a reasonable doubt and that the circumstantial evidence satisfied the demanding standard articulated in People v Baque, 43 NY3d 26 (2024).

3.3 Brady Claim

The defendant claimed a Brady violation because the prosecution initially refused to disclose the identities of two witnesses who could not identify the defendant in photo arrays. The Appellate Division found no Brady violation because:

County Court ultimately ordered disclosure of the witnesses’ names,
Defense counsel received a six-week adjournment to investigate, and
The defense thus had a meaningful opportunity to use the information at trial.

3.4 Eyewitness Identification & Confrontation Clause Issues

The defendant raised several challenges to an officer’s testimony that three individuals had identified the defendant in photo arrays:

Noncompliance with CPL 60.25(1) and 60.30 (blind procedures),
Improper bolstering of eyewitness identification, and
Violation of the Confrontation Clause.

The court held that all these claims were unpreserved because no appropriate objection was made at trial.

Separately, the defendant challenged admission of testimony that an unnamed, non-testifying individual called the police and identified the defendant as the stabber. Even assuming preservation, the court held that this did not violate the Confrontation Clause because the evidence was admitted to complete the narrative and explain the sequence of events leading to the defendant’s arrest—citing People v Grace, 179 AD3d 1092 (2d Dept 2020), and others.

3.5 Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (CPL 440.10)

The defendant’s primary post-conviction claim—that counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present two alibi witnesses—was rejected:

The record showed that counsel or his investigator did speak with the proposed witnesses and understood the alibi nature of their testimony; thus there was no failure to investigate.
As to the failure to call them, the defendant failed to meet his burden of showing an absence of any legitimate strategic explanation. Counsel testified that the defendant had given multiple, inconsistent alibis and that counsel could not confirm which, if any, were true.
The girlfriend’s testimony conflicted with the defendant’s as to the precise timeline on the day of the stabbing, and the daughter’s sworn statement placed her contact with the defendant on a different date than the homicide.
In totality, counsel provided meaningful representation: filing appropriate motions, obtaining favorable pretrial rulings, effectively cross-examining witnesses, and securing an acquittal on the top count of murder.

Both the judgment of conviction and the order denying the CPL 440.10 motion were affirmed.

4. Detailed Analysis of the Court’s Reasoning

4.1 Appeal Waiver: Overbreadth and Insufficient Colloquy

The court began by addressing the scope and validity of the appeal waiver. It reaffirmed that:

“while a defendant may waive his or her right to appeal following a jury verdict (see People v Leflore, 154 AD3d 1164 [3d Dept 2017])… the waiver in this case is invalid.”

Two reasons were central:

The written waiver was overbroad, as in People v Rodriguez, 185 AD3d 1296 (3d Dept 2020). Overbroad appeal waivers often purport to bar all possible future review, including issues that are categorically nonwaivable (e.g., jurisdictional defects, legality of sentence), or misdescribe the scope of what can be waived.
The oral colloquy did not cure the defect, in line with People v Rivera, 212 AD3d 942 (3d Dept 2023). A proper colloquy must ensure the defendant understands that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from trial rights and cannot be indiscriminately surrendered.

Thus, even though the waiver was part of a sentencing concession (avoiding persistent violent felony offender status), the Appellate Division refused to enforce it. This preserves a defendant’s ability to raise trial and sentencing issues where the waiver is not narrowly and clearly explained.

Impact on future cases

Prosecutors and trial courts must ensure appeal waivers are narrowly phrased and accurately described.
Post-verdict sentencing bargains tied to broad appeal waivers will face heightened scrutiny.
Defense counsel have a clear path to challenge broad or formulaic waivers on appeal.

4.2 Legal Sufficiency: Preservation and Forfeiture via Lesser Included Offense

4.2.1 Preservation Requirements

Under New York practice, a legal sufficiency challenge is typically preserved by:

Moving for a trial order of dismissal at the close of the prosecution’s case, and
Renewing that motion at the close of all proof (after the defense rests).

The court held that although the defendant moved at the close of the People’s case, he did not renew the motion after presenting his own evidence. Citing People v Colvin, 218 AD3d 1016 (3d Dept 2023), the court ruled that this failure to renew rendered the legal sufficiency challenge unpreserved.

4.2.2 Forfeiture by Requesting a Lesser Included Offense

The opinion then adds a second, independent bar:

“defendant forfeited the right to challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence against him by affirmatively requesting that the jury be charged with the lesser included offense of which he was convicted (see People v Shaffer, 66 NY2d 663, 664–665 [1985]; People v Branton, 238 AD3d 1429, 1430 [3d Dept 2025]; People v Green, 60 AD3d 1320 [4th Dept 2009]; People v Kearney, 25 AD3d 622 [2d Dept 2006]).”

The rationale, rooted in Shaffer, is that a defendant who invites a lesser included charge cannot then complain that the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction on that very lesser offense. This is a form of “invited error” or strategic forfeiture.

Practical consequence: If defense counsel believes the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law for all charged degrees, requesting a lesser included charge is dangerous. It creates a safer “compromise” verdict option for the jury but forfeits the ability to attack that lesser verdict as legally insufficient.

4.3 Weight of the Evidence: Full Review Despite Forfeiture of Sufficiency

Although legal sufficiency was not reviewable, the court proceeded with a full weight-of-the-evidence analysis, which is broader and more searching than the bare constitutional sufficiency test:

“defendant’s weight of the evidence challenge obliges this Court to assess whether each element of the crime … was proven beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v Diaz, 213 AD3d 979 [3d Dept 2023]).”

4.3.1 Elements and Identity

For manslaughter in the first degree under Penal Law § 125.20(1), the People had to prove:

The defendant intended to cause serious physical injury to the victim, and
The defendant thereby caused the victim’s death.

The court also reaffirmed, citing People v Grady, 233 AD3d 1369 (3d Dept 2024), that identity is an “implicit but necessary element” of every offense; the People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the perpetrator.

4.3.2 Use of Circumstantial Evidence and Baque

The case against Rickett was largely circumstantial regarding the act of stabbing. No witness testified to recognizing him and directly identifying him as the person inflicting the knife wounds. However:

Two witnesses saw him enter with a knife, threaten to kill the victim, and go into the bedroom; the victim immediately emerged with fatal chest wounds.
Another witness observed someone stabbing the victim in the chest multiple times and subsequently learned that person was known as “Mike,” a nickname the defendant admitted using.

The court explicitly applied the modern circumstantial evidence standard from People v Baque, 43 NY3d 26 (2024):

“we are satisfied that the ‘inference of guilt is the only one that can fairly and reasonably be drawn from the facts, and that the evidence excludes beyond a reasonable doubt every reasonable hypothesis of innocence’ (People v Baque, 43 NY3d 26, 30 [2024]).”

Under this demanding formulation, the court concluded that once the jury resolved credibility in favor of the prosecution witnesses, the circumstantial chain—motive, threats, weapon, temporal proximity, and nickname—left no reasonable alternative explanation.

4.3.3 Intent to Cause Serious Physical Injury

The defendant also argued that the People had not proven the required intent to cause serious physical injury (as opposed to, for example, reckless conduct). The court inferred intent from:

Prior threats (“I’m going to kill him”),
His decision to bring a knife to confront the victim, and
The severity and location of the wounds (stab to the heart).

Citing People v Mercer, 221 AD3d 1259 (3d Dept 2023), People v Serrano, 200 AD3d 1340 (3d Dept 2021), and People v Karuzas, 124 AD3d 927 (3d Dept 2015), the court reaffirmed the long-standing principle that intent can be inferred from circumstances such as threats, use of a deadly weapon, and the nature of the injuries.

4.3.4 Credibility of Witnesses with Criminal or Drug Histories

The defendant attacked the credibility of prosecution witnesses based on their criminal pasts and drug use. The court, citing People v Franklin, 216 AD3d 1304 (3d Dept 2023), held that these matters were thoroughly aired at trial and are classic jury questions. Unless the testimony is “incredible as a matter of law” (i.e., physically impossible or utterly contradicted by objective evidence), appellate courts defer to the jury’s assessment of such witnesses.

4.4 Brady Material: Late Disclosure, But No Violation

The alleged Brady material consisted of the identities of two witnesses who, when shown photo arrays, could not identify the defendant. Such information is potentially exculpatory or useful for impeachment and thus falls within the Brady doctrine.

The essential Brady question is not merely late disclosure but prejudice: was the defense deprived of a meaningful opportunity to use the evidence?

Here:

Defense motion practice prompted a court order compelling disclosure of the witnesses’ names.
The court granted a six-week adjournment to allow defense investigation.
Thus, by the time of trial, the defense had access to the information and time to act on it.

Relying on People v Sherwood, 204 AD3d 1162 (3d Dept 2022), and People v Serrano, 99 AD3d 1105 (3d Dept 2012), the court held that under these circumstances the defendant was not deprived of a fair trial and no Brady violation occurred.

Practical takeaway

Defense counsel should seek court intervention promptly when Brady material appears withheld.
If disclosure is made with adequate time to investigate (especially with an adjournment), appellate courts are likely to find no constitutional violation, even if prosecutors initially resisted disclosure.

4.5 Identification Procedures, Bolstering, and Confrontation

4.5.1 Unpreserved Claims Regarding Photo Arrays

The defendant challenged testimony that three individuals had identified him in photo arrays, arguing:

Noncompliance with “blind” identification procedures envisioned by CPL 60.25(1) and 60.30;
Improper bolstering (using police testimony to vouch for out-of-court identifications); and
Violation of the Confrontation Clause because the identifying individuals did not testify and thus could not be cross-examined.

The Appellate Division held that these objections were not preserved because there was no timely and specific objection at trial. Citing People v Vega, 239 AD3d 896 (2d Dept 2025), People v Davis, 200 AD3d 1200 (3d Dept 2021), and People v Richardson, 162 AD3d 1328 (3d Dept 2018), the court reaffirmed New York’s strict preservation rule: even constitutional claims are generally forfeited if not raised at the proper time in the trial court.

4.5.2 The “Narrative” Exception and the Confrontation Clause

The defendant separately argued that his confrontation rights were violated when a witness recounted that a non-testifying individual called police and named the defendant as the stabber.

The court responded that, even assuming preservation, the evidence was admissible to complete the narrative and explain “the sequence of events leading to defendant’s arrest,” citing:

People v Grace, 179 AD3d 1092 (2d Dept 2020),
People v Richardson, 162 AD3d 1328 (3d Dept 2018), and
People v Irvin, 111 AD3d 1294 (4th Dept 2013).

Under New York law—and consistent with federal Confrontation Clause doctrine—courts sometimes allow out-of-court statements not for their truth, but to explain why the police took certain investigative steps (e.g., why they focused on a particular suspect). When so limited (and ideally so instructed), such statements are considered non-hearsay background, not testimonial evidence introduced to prove guilt.

The court accepted this rationale here, thereby rejecting the confrontation claim.

4.6 Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and CPL 440.10

4.6.1 New York Standard: “Meaningful Representation”

New York assesses ineffective assistance primarily under a “meaningful representation” standard, as articulated in People v Satterfield, 66 NY2d 796 (1985), and reaffirmed in People v Dunham, 231 AD3d 1437 (3d Dept 2024). The court examines:

Whether counsel’s performance, viewed in its totality, provided the defendant effective assistance, not whether each decision was perfect.
Whether there was an absence of legitimate strategic or other explanations for counsel’s actions, referencing People v Hymes, 34 NY3d 1178 (2020), and People v Goberdhan, 241 AD3d 992 (3d Dept 2025).

4.6.2 Investigation of Alibi Witnesses

The defendant claimed counsel failed to properly investigate two alibi witnesses—his girlfriend and daughter—who allegedly could place him elsewhere at the time of the homicide.

After a CPL 440.10 hearing, the court found that:

Counsel or his investigator did interview these witnesses,
Counsel was aware of the alibi nature of their proposed testimony, and
Thus, the factual premise of “failure to investigate” was refuted by the record.

Any discrepancies between counsel’s notes and his recollection were for County Court to assess as a matter of credibility. The notes were admitted into evidence, ensuring full consideration.

4.6.3 Strategic Decision Not to Call Alibi Witnesses

The more difficult question was whether counsel’s decision not to call the alibi witnesses at trial constituted ineffective assistance.

The court emphasized that the defendant bore the burden of showing no legitimate strategic explanation for this choice. It then credited counsel’s testimony that:

The defendant had provided multiple, inherently inconsistent alibis.
Counsel could not determine which version, if any, was true.
The girlfriend’s hearing testimony conflicted with the defendant’s testimony about the exact timeline of events on the day of the stabbing.
The daughter’s sworn statement referenced seeing the defendant on a different date from the homicide.

Under these circumstances, presenting alibi testimony risked undermining the defense’s overall credibility. New York courts have long recognized that a reasonable trial strategy may include not calling particular witnesses—especially alibi witnesses whose statements are inconsistent, uncorroborated, or vulnerable to impeachment.

The court cited People v VanDeusen, 129 AD3d 1325 (3d Dept 2015), and People v Cruz, 61 AD3d 1111 (3d Dept 2009), where similar strategic decisions were upheld, and contrasted People v Lanier, 191 AD3d 1094 (3d Dept 2021), where counsel’s failure crossed into ineffective assistance.

4.6.4 Overall Performance: Meaningful Representation

Finally, the court assessed counsel’s performance “in its totality,” referencing People v Lewis, 224 AD3d 1143 (3d Dept 2024), and People v Shabazz, 211 AD3d 1093 (3d Dept 2022):

Counsel made appropriate pretrial motions.
He obtained favorable rulings.
He effectively cross-examined the prosecution’s witnesses.
Importantly, he secured an acquittal on the top count of murder, leaving the defendant convicted only of the lesser manslaughter offense.

On this record, the court concluded that the defendant received meaningful representation, and thus the CPL 440.10 motion was properly denied.

5. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

5.1 Legal Sufficiency vs. Weight of the Evidence

Legal sufficiency asks: “Could any rational jury have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution?” It is a narrow, constitutional minimum standard.
Weight of the evidence asks: “After reviewing the entire record in a neutral light and considering credibility, did the jury clearly err in finding guilt?” Appellate courts can effectively “sit as a thirteenth juror” and reassess the weight of the evidence, though they still give deference to the jury on live credibility calls.

5.2 Preservation

In New York, to challenge an issue on appeal you generally must have:

Raised it in the trial court at a time when the trial judge could have corrected the problem (timely and specific objection).
For sufficiency, this includes renewing a dismissal motion after presenting your own evidence.

If you do not, the claim is “unpreserved,” and appellate courts will typically decline to review it.

5.3 Lesser Included Offense and Forfeiture

A lesser included offense is a lower-level crime contained within a higher-level one (e.g., manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder). When the defense affirmatively asks the court to charge the jury on such a lesser offense and the jury convicts on that lesser offense, the defendant is viewed as having invited that option. He or she cannot then argue on appeal that no rational jury could convict on the very theory the defense asked be put before the jury.

5.4 Brady Material

Under Brady v Maryland, prosecutors must disclose:

Evidence favorable to the accused (exculpatory or impeaching),
That is material to guilt or punishment.

Late disclosure is not automatically a violation; the key is whether the defense had a meaningful opportunity to use the material. If disclosure occurs with adequate time and any needed adjournment, appellate courts often find no Brady violation.

5.5 Confrontation Clause and “Completing the Narrative”

The Sixth Amendment generally bars the admission of testimonial out-of-court statements offered to prove guilt unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.

However, when out-of-court statements are not offered for their truth, but solely to:

Explain why police took certain steps, or
Show how an investigation unfolded,

courts sometimes admit them as “background” or “narrative” evidence. The risk is that juries may still treat such statements as proof of guilt, so careful limiting instructions are important.

5.6 Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in New York

New York’s standard focuses on whether counsel’s performance, viewed as a whole, provided meaningful representation:

The question is not whether counsel made any mistakes, but whether the representation was reasonably competent and whether errors, if any, likely affected the outcome.
Counsel’s strategic decisions (e.g., not calling certain witnesses) are given substantial deference if there is any plausible tactical basis for them.
The defendant must show that there was no legitimate strategic or other rationale for the challenged conduct.

6. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The opinion is deeply embedded in New York’s existing jurisprudence. Key precedents include:

People v Shaffer, 66 NY2d 663 (1985): established that requesting a lesser included offense charge forfeits a sufficiency challenge to that lesser offense.
People v Baque, 43 NY3d 26 (2024): refined the standard for circumstantial evidence, requiring that the inference of guilt be the only reasonable one and that all reasonable hypotheses of innocence be excluded.
People v Satterfield, 66 NY2d 796 (1985), and progeny: articulated the “meaningful representation” standard for ineffective assistance claims.
People v Hymes, 34 NY3d 1178 (2020): emphasized the defendant’s burden to show lack of legitimate strategic explanation.
People v Grace, 179 AD3d 1092 (2d Dept 2020); People v Richardson, 162 AD3d 1328 (3d Dept 2018); People v Irvin, 111 AD3d 1294 (4th Dept 2013): collectively support the admission of non-testifying declarant statements for the limited purpose of explaining the course of the investigation.
People v Sherwood, 204 AD3d 1162 (3d Dept 2022), and People v Serrano, 99 AD3d 1105 (3d Dept 2012): confirmed that timely disclosure plus an adjournment can cure earlier Brady violations.

People v Rickett does not overturn or significantly modify these cases. Rather, it integrates them into a fact-intensive application, reinforcing their continuing vitality in homicide prosecutions.

7. Broader Impact and Practical Implications

7.1 Defense Strategy and Lesser Included Offenses

The opinion sends a clear signal: requesting a lesser included offense charge can be a double-edged sword. It:

Gives the jury a path to avoid the top count, which may save a client from a more severe conviction (as here, where the defendant was acquitted of murder), but
Forfeits the ability to later argue that the lesser offense conviction is legally unsupported.

Defense counsel must therefore carefully weigh:

The strength of the People’s case.
The likelihood of an outright acquittal versus a compromise verdict.
The appellate consequences if the lesser offense is charged and results in conviction.

7.2 Appeal Waivers in Post-Verdict Sentencing Agreements

The invalidation of the appeal waiver, despite a sentencing concession, warns trial courts and prosecutors that:

Appeal waivers must be correctly limited; “global” waivers that purport to foreclose nearly all review are vulnerable.
The oral colloquy must be robust, clarifying that the right to appeal is distinct and that some issues (e.g., voluntariness of plea, legality of sentence) cannot be waived.
Post-verdict bargaining that trades off extreme sentencing exposure (e.g., persistent violent felony status) for broad waivers will be closely scrutinized on appeal.

7.3 Handling of Brady Material

For prosecutors, the case underscores the importance of:

Disclosing exculpatory and impeachment material proactively,
Seeking protective orders if necessary, rather than withholding identities entirely, and
Recognizing that even partial resistance can be cured if the defense ultimately receives meaningful time to investigate.

For defense counsel, it highlights the need to:

File appropriate motions for disclosure,
Insist on adjournments if necessary to make meaningful use of late-disclosed material, and
Create a clear record of how late disclosure affected, or did not affect, trial strategy.

7.4 Confrontation and “Narrative” Evidence

The court’s acceptance of the “complete the narrative” rationale maintains a pathway for law enforcement to explain investigative steps without necessarily calling every declarant as a witness. However:

Defense counsel should remain vigilant that such statements not become a backdoor way to introduce powerful accusatory hearsay for its truth.
Specific, timely objections and requests for limiting instructions are essential to preserve such issues for appeal.

7.5 Ineffective Assistance and Alibi Witnesses

The decision confirms that trial courts and appellate courts will give substantial deference to counsel’s choice not to call alibi witnesses when:

The proposed alibi testimony is inconsistent with other defense accounts,
The witnesses may be impeached or proven mistaken on dates or times, or
Presenting the alibi risks undermining the defense’s credibility.

Nonetheless, it also underscores the importance of:

Documenting investigative steps with potential alibi witnesses,
Carefully vetting timelines and internal consistency before committing to an alibi defense, and
Avoiding multiple, shifting alibis that can fatally damage the defense case.

8. Conclusion

People v Rickett is a comprehensive application of several key doctrines in New York criminal law. Its most salient contributions are:

Reaffirming that a defendant who requests a lesser included offense instruction and is convicted on that lesser offense forfeits a legal sufficiency challenge to that conviction.
Clarifying that appeal waivers must not be overbroad and must be supported by a careful colloquy to be enforced, even when tied to significant sentencing concessions.
Reapplying the demanding Baque standard for circumstantial cases and confirming that strong circumstantial chains can fully sustain a homicide conviction.
Confirming that late Brady disclosures coupled with a substantial adjournment can cure initial nondisclosures.
Endorsing the continued use of “complete the narrative” evidence against certain Confrontation Clause challenges.
Reinforcing the deference given to counsel’s strategic decision not to present questionable alibi evidence in assessing ineffective assistance claims under CPL 440.10.

Taken together, the decision will guide trial judges and practitioners on the boundaries of appellate waivers, the risks inherent in lesser included offense strategies, the handling of circumstantial homicide cases, the scope of Brady remedies, and the contours of effective representation in complex, fact-driven trials.