Misclassification of ACCA Predicates Does Not Trigger the Actual-Innocence Gateway: Seventh Circuit Tightens § 2255 Time-Bar Rules and Requires Hearings on Equitable Tolling

Introduction

Michael Dewayne Lairy’s collateral attack on his Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) sentence gave the Seventh Circuit an opportunity to clarify three recurring procedural flash-points in federal post-conviction litigation:

• Forfeiture of the statute-of-limitations defense when the government delays raising it because a pro se petition is vague;
• The scope of the “actual-innocence gateway”—specifically, whether a prisoner is “actually innocent” of ACCA when later caselaw shows that one or more state drug convictions were erroneously treated as predicates; and
• The district court’s duty to hold an evidentiary hearing before rejecting equitable-tolling arguments.

The appellate panel (Chief Judge Sykes, and Judges Rovner and St. Eve — opinion by Judge St. Eve) affirmed the district court on the first two points but vacated and remanded on the third, establishing a significant new precedent that misclassification of prior convictions is “legal,” not “factual,” innocence and therefore cannot open the Schlup/McQuiggin gateway, while also insisting that district courts must conduct evidentiary hearings where a prisoner’s factual allegations, if true, could satisfy equitable-tolling criteria.

Summary of the Judgment

1. No Forfeiture by the Government. Because Lairy’s pro se § 2255 petition buried a single undeveloped sentence about ACCA inside a five-page Rehaif discussion, the government reasonably could not know a limitations defense was available until counsel later clarified the claim. Raising the defense at that point was “prompt,” so no forfeiture occurred.
2. Actual-Innocence Gateway Unavailable. The court joined the 1st, 4th, 5th, and 11th Circuits in holding that a legal argument that prior convictions were misclassified under ACCA is “legal, not factual, innocence,” insufficient to circumvent the § 2255 one-year bar.
3. Equitable Tolling Requires a Hearing. The district court abused its discretion by rejecting equitable tolling without an evidentiary hearing; Lairy’s allegations of repeated prison lockdowns, lack of library access, and delayed receipt of his file, if proven, could satisfy Holland’s two-prong test.
4. Disposition. Denial of the § 2255 motion is vacated in part; the case is remanded solely for an evidentiary hearing on equitable tolling. All other rulings are affirmed.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Bourgeois v. Watson, 977 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 2020) & Burton v. Ghosh, 961 F.3d 960 (7th Cir. 2020)
  Provided the framework for determining whether the government’s late-raised affirmative defense is “untimely.” The court analogized Lairy’s vague filing to Bourgeois—“just as much to blame” for the delay.
• McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383 (2013) & Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995)
  Identify the narrow “actual-innocence gateway.” The panel faithfully followed the Supreme Court’s emphasis that gateway cases must be “extremely rare” and require new, reliable evidence.
• Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998)
  Distinguished “legal insufficiency” from “factual innocence,” a distinction the Seventh Circuit deploys to classify Lairy’s predicate-misclassification theory as legal-innocence only.
• United States v. Ruth, 966 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2020); Shular v. United States, 589 U.S. 154 (2020)
  Ruth held that Indiana’s cocaine definition is over-inclusive because it covers additional isomers, and Shular clarified ACCA’s categorical approach. These cases underlie Lairy’s merits argument but do not affect limitations.
• Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010) & Seventh Circuit progeny (Socha, Carpenter, Ademiju)
  Supply the two-prong equitable-tolling test and stress fact-intensiveness, which led the panel to find an evidentiary hearing mandatory here.
• Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024)
  Although Erlinger requires juries to decide ACCA’s “different occasions” question, the panel carefully limits Erlinger, holding that it does not transform ACCA from a sentencing enhancement into a substantive offense.

2. Core Legal Reasoning

a. Forfeiture of the Limitations Defense

The panel used a two-part analytic sequence:

1. Was the defense raised “later than it should have been”? No, because the petition’s ambiguity gave the government no fair notice.
2. If late, would allowing it prejudice the petitioner? The court never had to reach this step because it answered “No” to step 1.

This approach reinforces that pro se litigants bear at least a minimal burden of intelligibility; otherwise, they cannot later fault the government for waiting until the claim is intelligible to press a time bar.

b. Actual-Innocence Gateway

Key syllogism: (1) Gateway requires “factual” innocence. (2) Mislabeling state convictions under ACCA is purely “legal.” (3) Ergo, gateway closed. The opinion marshals circuit splits, explicitly siding with the 1st, 4th, 5th, and 11th Circuits and distancing itself from the 8th and 9th Circuits’ more expansive views. Importantly, the court underscores that neither Ruth nor any new statute made Lairy’s underlying conduct non-criminal; he merely contests categorization.

c. Equitable Tolling

The court stresses § 2255(b)’s command that an evidentiary hearing must be held when factual allegations, if true, could warrant relief. By failing even to mention a hearing, the district court committed an error of law—hence an abuse of discretion. The panel highlights how a hearing could illuminate:

• Exact duration and impact of facility lockdowns (pre-COVID and COVID-related);
• Specific limitations on law-library or computer access;
• Efforts Lairy undertook to obtain his file and pursue claims.

3. Likely Impact of the Judgment

• Narrower Gateway. In the Seventh Circuit, only factual exoneration or a post-conviction legal development that decriminalizes the conduct (if the court ever recognizes that extension) can open the gateway. Sentence-enhancement errors cannot.
• Government Strategy. Prosecutors may safely delay asserting limitations defenses until a prisoner’s theory is clear, so long as they then raise it “promptly.”
• Defense Counsel Duties. Attorneys must flag possible non-categorical state drug definitions before sentencing or on direct appeal; waiting for collateral review is perilous.
• District-Court Practice. Judges must articulate a § 2255(b) analysis and, where facts are disputed and potentially material, hold hearings; summary denial creates reversible error.
• Substantive ACCA Litigation. On the merits, the panel left untouched but implicitly validated the view that Indiana’s cocaine statute is over-broad, a point useful for defendants whose petitions are still timely.

Complex Concepts Simplified

ACCA (Armed Career Criminal Act)

Adds a mandatory minimum 15-year sentence for § 922(g) felons with three prior “violent felony” or “serious drug offense” convictions committed on different occasions.

Categorical Approach

Courts compare the legal elements of a state statute to a generic federal definition; if the state statute covers more conduct (“over-inclusive”), the conviction does not qualify as a predicate.

Actual-Innocence Gateway

A narrow doctrine allowing untimely or procedurally defaulted claims to be heard when new reliable evidence shows the prisoner is factually innocent. It is not a freestanding claim; it is a procedural “door-opener.”

Legal vs. Factual Innocence

Factual innocence = did not commit the acts; legal innocence = acts were misclassified or later found not criminal. Only the former triggers the gateway in the Seventh Circuit.

Equitable Tolling

Doctrine that pauses the statute of limitations when the prisoner (i) diligently pursues rights yet (ii) extraordinary circumstances (e.g., lockdowns, lack of materials) prevent timely filing.

Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Michael Lairy v. United States crystallizes three teachings:

1. Vague pro se pleadings do not immunize prisoners from a statute-of-limitations defense; the government may assert it once the claim becomes clear.
2. Claims that a court legally misapplied ACCA do not amount to “actual innocence.” Prisoners must find some other procedural path—principally equitable tolling—to reach the merits.
3. Before denying equitable tolling, district courts must probe the facts in an evidentiary hearing whenever the petitioner’s allegations, if true, could satisfy Holland.

Collectively, these holdings narrow the escape hatches from § 2255’s one-year limitations period while safeguarding the equitable-tolling safety-valve through mandatory fact-finding. Attorneys and pro se litigants alike should read Lairy as both a cautionary tale on timeliness and a roadmap for properly documenting extraordinary circumstances.