Implied-Consent Quantum Meruit Awards Survive the “Express-Contract Bar” –
JB Accounting Services, LLC; JB Accounting Tax Service Check Cashing, LLC; JB Accounting Tax Services, LLC; and Jennifer Beverly v. Winters, Dale-Winters & Hughes

Introduction

On 9 May 2025 the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed—without an opinion—a Mobile Circuit Court judgment awarding three tax preparers quantum-meruit damages even though their relationship with JB Accounting was governed by express written contracts. The contracts explicitly denied payment if the preparers quit or were fired before season’s end. At trial the court rejected the breach-of-contract claim but, in reliance on Rule 54(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., nonetheless granted restitutionary relief.

A divided high court upheld that award under Rule 53(a)(1) & (a)(2)(F), issuing no precedential opinion. Justice Mitchell, joined by Justice Shaw, dissented vigorously, arguing that long-standing Alabama authority bars quantum meruit when a valid express contract exists.

Summary of the Judgment

• Court: Supreme Court of Alabama
• Disposition: Judgment of the Mobile Circuit Court affirmed, no opinion (Rule 53 disposition).
• Result below: Breach-of-contract claim denied; quantum-meruit damages awarded to plaintiffs.
• Vote: 7-2 (Chief Justice Stewart and Justices Wise, Bryan, Sellers, Mendheim, Cook & McCool concurring in the result; Justice Mitchell dissenting, joined by Justice Shaw).

Because the majority gave no rationale, the only articulated reasoning appears in Justice Mitchell’s dissent. The practical effect, however, is that the quantum-meruit award stands, suggesting that a trial court’s discretionary use of Rule 54(c) to grant restitutionary relief—despite the “express-contract bar”—can survive appellate review where no opinion is issued.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

The dissent collects the core Alabama cases that traditionally prohibit quantum-meruit recovery when an express contract covers the same subject:

1. Mantiply v. Mantiply, 951 So. 2d 638 (Ala. 2006)
   – “When an express contract exists, an argument based on quantum meruit recovery…fails.”
2. Brannan & Guy, P.C. v. City of Montgomery, 828 So. 2d 914 (Ala. 2002)
3. Vardaman v. Florence City Bd. of Educ., 544 So. 2d 962 (Ala. 1989)
4. Lemoine Co. of Alabama v. HLH Constructors, Inc., 62 So. 3d 1020 (Ala. 2010)
5. Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment §2 (2011)

These authorities form the backbone of the “express-contract bar,” i.e., the doctrinal rule that an implied-in-law obligation cannot displace a valid contractual allocation of risk and payment.

B. Legal Reasoning

Although the majority issued no opinion, several strands of reasoning can be inferred from the posture and Alabama procedural rules:

1. Rule 54(c) Discretion – The trial court explicitly invoked Rule 54(c), which authorizes a court to grant any relief “to which the party is entitled,” even if not pleaded, so long as the claim was “tried by express or implied consent.” The bench trial focused largely on the value of services rendered, placing quantum-meruit issues squarely before the court by implied consent.
2. No Challenge to Contract Validity – Plaintiffs never attacked the contracts as voidable. The trial court nonetheless treated the unjust enrichment theory as a permissible alternative, effectively finding that strict enforcement of the forfeiture clause (no pay if fired) would create an inequitable windfall to JB Accounting.
3. Standard of Review – Affirmance without opinion hints that the appellate court deferred to the trial court’s fact-finding and equitable discretion, concluding that any error was either harmless or within permissible bounds.
4. Non-precedential Nature – Under Rule 53(a)(1) Alabama’s “no-opinion” decisions generally have no precedential value. Yet practical, if unofficial, guidance emerges: trial courts may continue to use quantum meruit as an equitable safety valve when rigid contractual clauses produce harsh forfeitures, particularly where the defendant presents no evidence.

C. Potential Impact

• Trial-level Strategy – Plaintiffs’ counsel might cite this disposition (if only for persuasive value) to encourage courts to employ Rule 54(c) creatively when an express contract’s forfeiture clause clashes with equity.
• Employer–Contractor Agreements – Companies using broad “no pay if fired” provisions risk restitutionary exposure if they accept and retain valuable services.
• Restitution Jurisprudence – The case illustrates tension between freedom of contract and unjust-enrichment principles, a topic likely to recur in gig-economy and short-term hiring contexts.
• Appellate Practice – Litigants should note that a Rule 53 affirmance, though non-precedential, effectively resolves the dispute; obtaining review may require petitioning for rehearing or certiorari pointing to broader public importance.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Quantum Meruit

A Latin phrase meaning “as much as he has deserved.” It allows a person who supplied goods or services to recover the reasonable value of those services when the recipient has been unjustly enriched.

Express Contract vs. Implied Contract

An express contract is written or spoken with definite terms. An implied-in-law contract (quasi-contract) is a legal fiction imposed to prevent unjust enrichment.

Rule 54(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.

Empowers a court to award any relief a party is entitled to, even if not specifically demanded, provided the issue was tried by consent.

Rule 53, Ala. R. App. P.

Authorizes the appellate courts to dispose of cases without a written opinion. Such decisions generally cannot be cited as binding precedent (§(a)(1)) except to anchor res judicata, law-of-the-case, or double-jeopardy arguments (§(a)(2)(F)).

Conclusion

Although officially “non-precedential,” JB Accounting v. Winters sends a signal: Alabama trial courts retain latitude under Rule 54(c) to award quantum-meruit restitution—even where an express contract exists—when the facts are tried by consent and equity militates against contractual forfeiture. The dissent underscores the doctrinal conflict with the traditional “express-contract bar,” foreshadowing further litigation. Practitioners should carefully draft termination and payment clauses and be prepared, at trial, either to defend those clauses or to frame alternative unjust-enrichment theories. Until the Supreme Court speaks in a full, precedential opinion, the tension between contract enforcement and equitable restitution in Alabama remains an open—and strategically fertile— question.