Fourth-Circuit Clarifies “Joint-Venture Constructive Possession” and Plain-Error Limits on Competency Challenges
A Comprehensive Commentary on United States v. Cristian Cabrera-Rivas, 93 F.4th ___ (4th Cir. 2025)

1. Introduction

In its published decision in United States v. Cabrera-Rivas, the Fourth Circuit addressed a potpourri of issues arising from a failed two-kilogram methamphetamine transaction: competency to stand trial, evidentiary destruction, sufficiency of the evidence, and four separate affirmative-defense requests. Although the panel ultimately affirmed the convictions, Chief Judge Diaz’s majority opinion (joined fully by Judge Thacker and in part by Judge Wynn) articulates two doctrinal clarifications that will resonate well beyond this particular case:

1. Constructive Possession in “One-Load” or joint-venture drug deals. The court held that a broker who can “cause the drugs to be produced for a customer” may be deemed to have constructive possession even when the contraband never enters his physical control—extending earlier precedents (Laughman, 4th Cir. 1980) into modern Controlled-Substances-Act prosecutions.
2. Plain-error constraints on belated challenges to a magistrate judge’s competency ruling. Despite vigorous dissent, the court ruled that when a defendant fails to object to a magistrate judge’s competency determination, any later attack on the magistrate’s statutory authority is tested under Olano plain-error, and relief will be denied absent a showing that Article III review would likely have altered the outcome.

These two holdings mark an incremental but important refinement of federal criminal practice in the Fourth Circuit.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The panel affirmed both counts—conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute over 50 g of methamphetamine—after rejecting:

• A procedural and substantive due-process attack on competency findings;
• A Brady/Youngblood claim stemming from the inadvertent destruction of a recorded post-arrest interview;
• Insufficiency claims on conspiracy and possession charges; and
• Requests for jury instructions on public authority, innocent intent, outrageous-government-conduct, and entrapment-by-estoppel.

Judge Wynn concurred in part but dissented forcefully on the competency question, arguing that competency determinations are dispositive matters that cannot be finally resolved by a magistrate judge and that the majority erred in applying forfeiture.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The opinion is unusually rich in precedent; key citations included:

• Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988) – Bad-faith standard for lost evidence.
• Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993) – Competency standard (“rational and factual understanding”).
• United States v. Laughman, 618 F.2d 1067 (4th Cir. 1980) – Constructive possession within a joint smuggling venture.
• United States v. Herder, 594 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2010) – “Ownership, dominion, or control” test for constructive possession.
• United States v. Fulcher, 250 F.3d 244 (4th Cir. 2001) – Elements of the public-authority defense.
• Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993) & Greer, 593 U.S. 503 (2021) – Plain-error framework.
• Nguyen v. United States, 539 U.S. 69 (2003) – Structural error when non-Article III judges exceed authority (considered by the dissent).

3.2 Legal Reasoning

a. Competency & Magistrate Authority

• Rule 59 and 28 U.S.C. § 636 distinguish non-dispositive orders (reviewable for clear error) from dispositive matters (reviewable de novo). The majority assumed—without deciding—that competency could be dispositive, yet held the issue forfeited. Plain-error relief failed at the “substantial rights” prong because the defendant “would not have objected anyway,” making a different outcome unlikely.
• The dissent deemed this approach incompatible with Pate v. Robinson (1966) because an incompetent defendant cannot intelligently forfeit Article III adjudication.

b. Constructive Possession

Building on Laughman, the court articulated a practical test: if a broker has a “working relationship enabling him to assure delivery,” a jury may infer dominion over drugs still in the supplier’s hands. Critical facts included Cabrera-Rivas’s price-setting, arrangement of delivery, promises of future supplies, and his statement that “we sent that other dude to Texas.” The decision synthesizes Second-Circuit language from United States v. Hernandez, 290 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1961), into Fourth-Circuit doctrine.

c. Destroyed Evidence

Applying Youngblood, the majority found at most negligence in the failure to archive the Vargas recording. Because the defense learned of the destruction mid-trial and cross-examined accordingly, no due-process violation occurred.

d. Affirmative Defenses

• Public Authority / Innocent Intent: Rejected for lack of actual authorization and because “innocent intent” is merely a negation of mens rea, not an affirmative defense.
• Outrageous Conduct: No “shocking” misconduct shown.
• Entrapment by Estoppel: Explicitly waived during the charge conference—thus unreviewable.

3.3 Likely Impact of the Decision

• Drug-trafficking prosecutions: Prosecutors can now cite Cabrera-Rivas to argue that brokers who telephone-coordinate deliveries “constructively possess” the bulk narcotics, simplifying proof in multi-defendant cases.
• Competency litigation: Defense counsel in the Fourth Circuit must object immediately to a magistrate judge’s competency ruling or risk plain-error review. District courts, meanwhile, may feel emboldened to route competency hearings to magistrates, though Judge Wynn’s dissent provides ammunition for future challenges.
• Local rules & § 636 practice: The Western District of North Carolina’s local rule classifying competency as “nondispositive” may be revisited; practitioners should monitor amendments or seek clarification before consenting to magistrate involvement.
• Evidentiary-destruction arguments: The decision confirms that mid-trial disclosure can cure Brady timing concerns where the defense exploits the information before the jury.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Competency vs. Capacity: Being competent means the accused can rationally consult with counsel and understand proceedings now. It is distinct from insanity (mental state at the time of the offense).
• Constructive Possession: Think of “reach” rather than “touch.” If you can make a phone call and have the contraband appear for delivery, the law may deem you to “possess” it.
• Public-Authority Defense: A lawful “green light” from an agent with actual power. Apparent authority or informal assurances will not suffice.
• Entrapment (Classic) vs. Entrapment by Estoppel:
   • Classic: Government induces crime + defendant was not predisposed.
   • Estoppel: Government falsely tells defendant the conduct is legal; reliance must be reasonable.
• Plain-Error Review: Four-step safety valve for unpreserved mistakes. The hardest hurdle is often step 3 (did the error likely change the outcome?).

5. Conclusion

United States v. Cabrera-Rivas is not a headline-grabbing watershed, yet it meaningfully sharpens two corners of federal criminal law. First, it cements a practical, fact-intensive route for prosecutors to prove constructive possession against brokers who orchestrate deliveries without ever laying hands on the drugs. Second, it signals that in the Fourth Circuit, silence after a magistrate judge’s competency ruling will ordinarily doom later structural objections—unless the appellant can demonstrate a probable effect on the verdict.

Judge Wynn’s dissent ensures the conversation is not over; future petitions (or Supreme Court interest) may revisit whether competency is categorically “dispositive.” For now, defense counsel must vigilantly object to magistrate findings, and prosecutors can wield Cabrera-Rivas as a potent precedent in complex narcotics cases.